C. THE ACT OF CONTEMPLATION

Some of the principal descriptions of the Act of Contemplation have already been cited, but there are many others throughout the writings of Augustine. His characterizations are of quite unusual interest and value, from the vivid autobiographical, and therefore convincing, character of so many of them; from the intellectual and philosophical acumen of him who experienced them; and from the lofty eloquence with which they are related. Their many-sidedness, too, is a most noteworthy feature: he uses every sort of conception, intellectual and symbolic, as the vehicle for expressing the intimate relations into which his soul came with God. It seems that these efforts of him who was undoubtedly, on the whole, the greatest religious genius in Western Christianity, to express his highest reli- gious experiences, must be worthy of careful study. A detailed analysis of all these passages, so far as I have been able to collect them, will therefore be made, and in the most important cases the actual Latin words will be given in the footnotes. The statements will be grouped according to the idea under which the Object con- templated is conceived.
Sometimes the Object contemplated is expressed in the terms of pure metaphysics. Such are:
Ultimate Reality
Augustine so describes the culmination of his own earliest experi- ence: *In the flash of a trembling glance my mind came to Ultimate Reality, Absolute Being That Which Is,' 1
Elsewhere: 'God has given to His spiritual saints not only to be- lieve, but to understand divine things,* and contemplation, c wis-
1 *Mens mea pervenit ad id quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus' (Conf. vii. 23).
ST AUGUSTINE 35
dom,' 'lies in cognition and love of That Which always is and unchangeably abides, namely God.' 1
Contemplation is 'the striving to understand those things that really and supremely are'; when attained to it is 'the full enjoy- ment of the highest and truest Good 5 ; by it we attain to 'that highest Cause, or highest Author, or highest Principle of all things.* 2
The Unchangeable
The intellectual or philosophical conception by which Augustine predominantly thinks of God is as the Being that is not subject to change: c He truly Is, because He is unchangeable' (de Nat Boni, 19). It was mainly the intellectual necessity he felt for Something Unchangeable as the basis and background of things changeable, that led him, more than anything else, out of Manichaeism into Christianity, and in his search for God he usually represents his mind as passing ever upwards through the grades of things subject to change, till it arrives at that Being in Whom there is no variation.'
And so his mystical experiences are often expressed in terms of this idea: e.g. as a perception of something unchangeable; 3 a be- holding with the mind's eye something unchangeable; 4 a learning something divine and unchangeable. 5 The same fundamental idea runs through the following descriptions of the act of contemplation, as the perception of unchangeable Good; 6 as some vision of un- changeable Truth; 7 as the search for some unchangeable Truth. 8 Or again, the Light unchangeable; as where he says he c saw with the eye of his soul, above his mind, the Light unchangeable'; or 'arrived by some kind of spiritual contact at the Light unchange- able.' 10
-' These partly neo-Platonic, partly Joannine conceptions of Truth and Light are favourite ideas with Augustine when speaking of con- templation and mystic experience.
1 'Gognito et dilectio eius quod semper est et incommutabiliter manet, quod Deus est' (Enar. in Psalm, cxxxv. 8).
* *Appetitio intelligendi ea quae vere summeque sunt ... perfructio summi et veri boni ... perventuri ad summam illam Causam, vel summum Auctorem, vel summum Principium rerum omnium* (de Quant. Animae,^^ 76).
'Aliquid incommutabile persensi 5 (Knar* in Psalm, xli. 10).
*Acie mentis aliquid incommutable, etsi perstrictim et raptim, perspicere po uimus* (ibid.).
'Divinum et incommutabile aliquid discitur' (c. Faust, xxii. 54).
"Cernere incommutabile bonum* (ibid. xxii. 53).
'Aliqua visio incommutabilis veritatis' (de Cons. Evang.^ i. 8).
'Aliquam quaerit incommutabilem veritatem' (Enar. in Psalm, xli. 7). ^
'Vidi oculo animae meae supra mentem meam lucem incommutabilem' (Conf. vii. 1 6). .
10 'Pervenire spiritali quodam contactu ad illam incommutabilem lucem (Serm. Hi. 16).
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But in order to make sure that we understand him aright, it is necessary to institute a brief study of his psychological theory of perception and cognition, or, as it is called, his Ideology, a matter wherein the interpretation of his mind has given rise to keen con- troversy between rival schools of philosophy. We shall confine our- selves to setting forth in order what he says.
Excursus on St Augustine's Ideology
His Ideology is to be studied mainly in the Twelfth, last, Book of the work de Genesi ad litteram. It is primarily concerned with St Paul's vision when rapt to the Third Heaven; but as a basis of the dis- cussion of visions, principles are laid down governing also ordinary perception and cognition. 1
Augustine distinguishes three kinds of perception, following the three kinds of objects perceived: 2
Corporal, whereby are seen physical things.
Spiritual, whereby are seen images of physical things not present, be it in memory or in imagination. Augustine apologizes for this unusual use of the word 'spiritual', based (surely improperly) on i Cor. xiv. 15; it has in fact often led to misunderstandings of his meaning, of which 'imaginary' is the best equivalent.
Intellectual, whereby are seen things in no way physical, incapable of being represented by images, being the objects of the pure intellect: this perception he would call 'mental', 'were there such a word' (de Gen. ad. litt. xii. 6-9, 15-20).
He neatly illustrates his theory by the case of one reading the Commandment, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself 5 ; the actual letters are seen by corporal perception, the absent neigh- bour's image by spiritual (imaginary) perception, and the abstract idea e love 9 by intellectual (ibid. 6, 15; 11, 22).
In most places he couples together the first two kinds of percep- tion, corporal and spiritual (imaginary), as both being the per- ception of things changeable, and therefore the objects of science (scientia), as distinguished from wisdom (sapientia), whereby are
1 In the older editions de Genesi ad litteram, like most of Augustine's longer works, has a twofold numbering; the paragraphs are numbered right through with Arabic figures, and there is also a division into greater sections, or chapters, with Roman figures. In the latest edition that of the Vienna Corpus only the latter numbering is given, but in Arabic figures. Consequently, for convenience of reference, both systems of numbering are given here for the passages of de Genesi ad litteram, the greater sections being marked with Arabic numbers in clarendon
type.
2 'Vision' is the word he uses: it is taken most frequently in its objective sense, meaning the thing seen; but sometimes in its subjective or psychological sense, meaning the act of seeing.
ST AUGUSTINE 37
perceived things not subject to change, eternal. Elsewhere he dis- tinguishes wisdom and science: c to wisdom pertains the intellectual cognition of things eternal; to science the rational cognition of things temporal' (de Trin. xii. 25).
In corporal and spiritual (imaginary) perception the soul is liable to error; but in things intellectually seen it is not liable to error if there be any error, it is because the soul does not really intellect- ually see; for what it intellectually sees is true (de Gen. ad. litt. xii. 25, 52). Similarly elsewhere. 'Intellectual perception is not liable to error; for either: he who thinks something else than what is, does not intellectually see; or: if he does intellectually see, it follows it is true 5 (ibid. 14, 29).*
Augustine terms the objects of intellectual vision 'intellectualia' and 'intelligibilia' indiscriminately, saying that the attempt to make a distinction would be over-subtle (10, 21).
As objects of pure intellectual perception he enumerates the mind itself; every good disposition (affectio, iraQog) of the soul, or virtue, as charity, joy, peace, longanimity, and the rest, by which it draws near to God; lastly, God Himself (24, 50).
Also in the treatise de Trinitate, at the end of Book xii., he dis- courses of 'inteiligibilia'. To wisdom pertain those things that neither have been nor are to be, but are; and because of that eternity in which they are, they are said to have been, to be, and to be about to be, without any changeableness of time: they always have had the selfsame being, and they always will have it. They abide, not fixed in local spaces like bodies; but in an incorporeal nature 'intelligibilia' are so present to the gaze of the mind, as visible and tangible things in places are present to the bodily senses. The 'rationes' of sensible things existing in place, abide intelligible and incorporeal not in local spaces: the squareness of a square figure abides as an incorporeal and unchangeable 'ratio' (de Trin. xii. 23).
Here we are in the presence of Plato's doctrine of Ideas, and it will be of interest to give St Augustine's Christianized formulation of that doctrine:
Ideas are certain primary or principal forms (principales formae), or 'ratios' of things, abiding and unchangeable, which themselves have not been formed, and by this fact are eternal and always re- maining the same, which are contained in the divine Intelligence. And whereas themselves neither come into being nor perish, every- thing is said to be formed according to them, that can come into
1 'Intellectual visio non fallitm Aut enim non intelligit, qui aliud opinatur quam est; aut si intelligit, continue verum est s (29). Of. *In intellectualibus visis (anima) non fallitur : aut enim intelligit, et verum est ; aut si verum non est, non intelligit' (52).
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being and perish, and everything that comes into being and perishes.
Each thing is created according to its own proper Yatio'; but these 'ratios', where are they to be supposed to be except in the Mind itself of the Creator?
But if these 'ratios' of things to be created, or that have been created, are contained in the divine Mind, and there is nothing in the divine Mind but what is eternal and unchangeable, it follows that not only are they ideas, but they are true, because they are eternal, and remain the same and unchangeable; and by participa- tion in them it comes about that everything is whatever it is.
And these 'ratios' may be called 'ideas 5 , or 'forms', or Species', or 'ratios' (Lib. de div. Quaest. Ixxxiii. 46).
In each kind of perception the objects perceived are seen in a light that is of a higher order than themselves. In corporal vision physical things are seen in the light of the heavenly bodies (or of some fire, de Pecc. Mer. L 38); in spiritual or imaginary vision the images of physical things are seen in c a certain incorporeal light proper to itself (de Gen. ad. Hit xii. 30, 58). This evidently is a mere makeshift, and I do not know any other place where Augustine attempts to define the light wherein are seen the objects of spiritual or imaginary vision.
In regard to intellectual vision, sometimes he speaks in the same vague way of the light wherein e intellectualia' or c intelligibilia 5 , the Platonic Ideas, are seen: c lt is to be believed that the nature of the intellectual mind has been so made, that being brought into contact (subjuncta) with 'intelligibilia' in the natural order, by the dis- position of the Creator, it sees them in a certain incorporeal light sui generis, as the eye of the flesh sees the things around in this cor- poreal light* (de Trin. xii. 24),
But in de Genesi ad litteram, xii. it is laid down that in intellectual vision the light wherein the soul sees all truly intellectual objects (omnia veraciter intellecta), is God Himself. 'Different [from the things intellectually seen] is that light itself whereby the soul is so enlightened that it beholds all things truly the object of the intellect. For that light is God Himself (31, 59). 1 It is to be noted that this passage was written in 415, when Augustine had been twenty years a bishop, and it was his constant teaching. Thus in the (authentic) Soliloquies, of 387: 'God is the intellectual (intelligible) Light, in Whom and from Whom and by Whom shine intellectually all things that do intellectually shine' i.e. as objects of pure intellect (i. 3). 2
1 For the Latin see below, pp. 53-54.
8 'Deus intelligibilis lux, in quo et a quo et per quern intelligibiliter lucent quae intelligibiliter lucent omnia.*
ST AUGUSTINE 39
The central portions of de Civitate Dei were written about 415-20. In them we find the following: He praises the Platonists for having said that 'the light of our minds for learning all things is the same God Himself by Whom all things were made' (viii. 7). And: The incorporeal soul is in such wise illumined by the incorporeal light of the simple Wisdom of God, as the body of the air is illumined by corporeal light* (xi. 10). In the elevation described in Confessions, vii. 1 6 y he says he 'found by the eye of his soul, above his mind, the Light unchangeable 5 , which he goes on to recognize as God (the passage is given below, p. 44). And in c. 23, when seeking by what light his mind was bedewed (aspergitur) when it recognized that the unchangeable is greater than the changeable, *he found the unchangeable and true eternity of Truth above his changeable mind'.
It is hardly necessary to say that Truth for Augustine means not subjective or logical truth the conformity of thought to reality but objective or ontological truth, that first and sovereign Truth which, in common with all Christian thinkers, he ultimately identifies with the Divine Being. Thus: 'Where I found Truth, there found I my God, the Truth Itself' (Conf. x. 35); and c Thou art the Truth' (ibid. 66). The passage in the Soliloquies already referred to brings out Augustine's identification of this and the kindred great Abstracts with God: S I invoke Thee, O God, the Truth, in Whom and from Whom and by Whom are true all things that are true' (i. 3). And he continues in parallel sentences of Wisdom, Life, Beatitude, Goodness, Beauty, Light, identifying each of them with God, 'in Whom and from Whom and by Whom' they are partici- pated in by creatures.
Similar to the piece just cited from Confessions, vii. 23, are the following:
The human mind when judging of things visible is able to know that itself is better than all visible things. But when, by reason of its failings and advances in wisdom, it confesses itself to be change- able, it finds that above itself is the Truth unchangeable (Lib. de div. Quaest. Ixxxiii. 45).
The human mind recognizes truth only in the Truth and Light of God: A man hears either man, or even angel, speaking; but, that he may feel and know that what is said is true, his mind is bedewed (aspergitur) inwardly with that light that abides eternal (de Pecc. Her. i. 37).
The Truth unchangeable shines like a sun in the soul, and the soul becomes partaker of the very Truth (de Gen. c. Manich. i. 43).
There is the Truth unchangeable, containing all things that are unchangeably true, which belongs not to any particular man, but
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to all those who perceive things unchangeable and true; as it were in wondrous ways a secret and public light, it is present and offers itself in common (de lib. Arb. ii. 33).
Finally all truths are perceived in the unchangeable Truth itself: If you and I both see that what you say is true, and both see that what I say is true: where do we see this? Not I in you, nor you in me; but both of us in the unchangeable Truth itself, which is above our minds (Conf. xii. 35).
The passages cited, which cannot be explained away as meta- phors, show that, according to Augustine, the human mind per- ceives Ideas', 'intelligibilia', in some way in the Light of God, and grasps all truth in the Truth unchangeable, which is God. Hence his Ideology, or theory as to how the mind comes to the knowledge of 'intelligibilia 3 , is the theory of the divine illumination. This theory, under the influence of St Augustine's authority, held sway in the early Middle Ages, until it was generally supplanted by St Thomas Aquinas's Aristotelian teaching on the subject. But it was perpetuated in the Franciscan school of St Bonaventure; 1 and St Thomas, while rejecting it, allowed it to be tenable and quite probable. 2
Any critique of the theory would be out of place here. It can only be said that it is a piece of St Augustine's Platonism; it is in no way Pantheism; nor is it the theory of Innate Ideas; nor is it Onto- logism all which systems have laid claim to it. It could not be said to mean that God Himself is seen when 'intelligibilia' are seen in His Light or in His Truth, any more than that the sun necessarily is seen when objects are seen in its light.