VI. Continuity, or Unity of Motion, inrefpect of time; andthetermtowhich; =~

(é)
Concerning Motion, At
ae
Times
For the Continuity and Succeffion of the Motion depends: chiefly, upon the Term continuing
to which the motion is made 3 andthe mocionis faid to be performed fucceflively, becaufe che Term to which the motion tends, is fucceflively gained. But that a motion may be one Innumber, #oree things are requilite : one movable, one rerm to which; and one continuedctime. Towhich a fourth may be added, the Term from which. For one motion cannot proceed from divers Terms.
W hat is che Nature of Motion has been explained hitherto, it remains that we now fhew you what arethe Sorts of Motions, Wherein the firft place you ate to 4777 take notice, that there is a difference betwixt mutation and motion. Metabole or on Mucationis of larger extent, and {ignifies every variation of a thing, ‘whether the terms inrefpect of which che ching is varied, be pofitive and contraty, Of contra= dictary : but ‘Kinejis or Motion properly fo called, is not of fo large anextenr, bur is converfanc becwixtterms (upon which, efpecially the term from which its na- ture chiefly depends ) which are contrary, o# if mediate, yer having che traruré “of contraries. Ati
“Moriontherefore properly {o called ts converfant betwixt contraries. Now wé tertt ayrion # fuch things inthis place contraries, not only which do moft of all differ under the made be- fame kind: but whatfoever pofitive rerms, by che coming of one of Which another txt con- is changed, whether it be in refpect'of contrary qualities, or according to intention, "4" or accordingtoextenfion. Whatfoever therefore ought to be reckoned fora teri of motion, muft havethefe cwoconditions. Firftthac ic havea contrary in fucha manner as has been faid; fo that che motion muft pafs from one contrary as the Term ¢ quo from which, unto the othercontrary as the cerm ad quem, to which. Moreover, that muff of neceflity be attained, which terminates the motion of ic felf, and not without the change of che Subject, which is performed by teal action and paffion,
From which may eafily be gathered, that crue motion is only in three Predica- Eee ments, Viz. Ruantity, Ruality, and Ubi or Place ; or chat in re{pect of that thing to are only in which the motion tends, it may be reduced to thefe three Predicaments. For both Qusntily, the forms of thefe Predicaments have contrariety, and pofitive oppofite terms 3 nor 2##iy can their change happen without che change of the Subject. _ & Place.
Buc Generation and Corruption which are changes in the ftrbftance of a thitig arenot properly Motions. Forthat Contrariety neceffaty to motion, isnot found: aS in fubftances. Moteover, fince every thing which is moved i§ an actual Being’; aranik but that which is generated is no actual Being (for if ic were already, there Were are not noneed that it fhould be generared ) therefore Generation cannot be a Morion. pore Laftly, Every motion is continued and performed in time: but generation is not nae” tr formed in time, but ina moment, and therefore alfoic cannot be a Motion, For fubftantial forms being indivifible and noc capable of ntoze di lefs, cannot be fee ceffively acquired and by piecemeal. : RB Ges
Howbeit we mult here obferve, that Generation ‘and corruption are taketh typo 4 we waies, either only forthe acquificion or lofs of a fubftantial form, without piece- fold Ac- dent alteration: or for the incroduétion ofa fornt, with alteration WHich went ban ception of
forethe fame. Generation and Corruption caken in che former Senfej are rio matin ee: ons,’ but are performed in an Inftant : but in the latter fenfethéy may be allowed Hi ty ‘ for Motions. i. fit eed Moreover, this minft not be omitted neither. That Succeffion in motion ts confideredt two wates: Primarily and chiefly as was faid before, 1 refpett of the form; which’ fecing it may be iticended andremitted, and has certain devrees, intel pect of WHICK it is capable of more and lefs, it therefore fucceftively acquires thofe degtees, aie. one before, another after. But fince the fubftantia! form has no fuéh deprees, He éannot
Motion &
Genera=
al
A BRASS
a
‘ Rees sae Se CS a Y ea as PF? te, oe
= aie
.——
os Enea
GRE IRE gece es eects: Sere
acer Re Tet ME LS hag 46 Boox Il. Chay. 1: cannot be intended, nor remitted, nor is ic fucceflively introduced, but inan infauc andallatonce. Afcerwardthereisfaidco bea fucceflion i172 refpett of the Subject whichis movable: which fucceflion others feem to call extenfion. © For he a thing movable is divifible, and has fome parts formore others hinder: andche mo- ver acts firft upon the formore parts and whichare neereft it felf, and afterwards upon the hinder and more remote: alfo in this manner we may grant thac Gene- ration is made fucceflivly. Buc both thefe fucceflions are conlidered, in morion properly focalled: but the former holds more of che nature thereof: which being abfenc from Generation it cannoc be called motion. ‘ Moreover, it isevident, thatchere is no motion in Relation, Attion, Paffion, When, and Habit, the Predicaments fo called. For thofe mucations which are made inthem, do either not happen wich the change of the fubjed@t, or not cf thendfelyes primarily, but confequencly and by accident. : The forts Motien therefore properly t only made out of one fubyett into another : and there are of Motion. three Lorcs thereof. In Quantity there is Augmentation and Diminution, For thefecwo mutations havenocommonname. In Quality, thereis Alteration. In Place, there is local motion from place to place. Ret what LoMotion Reft is oppofed, which is che Privation of Motion in that thing, rwbich at is. wa naturally apt to be moved and inasmuch as motion is made ro attain reft, ic may alfo be faido be the end and perfection of motion. Soabody, whenithas attai- ned its natural magnitude, ceafes growing. Rettwo- Ref is either natural, whofe principle 1s internal, and co which the mowable is ua- fold. curally enclined: So the Earth is naturally movedtothe Centre, and refts chere. Or Violent, whofe Principle is external, when a bodyis kevt by force in a place not natural chereunto; as whena ftone or clod of Earth, is hung up in the Air.
Of the World.
BEOSLOEE PUSVOSLEOEL EEE ESCAPES ES EL YEEVEGE DURES AE ~ OL AO BAC) FAO 2AGDSASC OA : BAOA*XDOX. GAS GE BB ZEGAO SEEDS SCEES CESESEPSSLSEESHSS FOS SFHESSEGES SE STIs VETS
THE
SECOND BOOK
Chap. 1. Ofthe World:
eae general, without any confideration of the forts: weare now to
Sica
_ BY GA & SEDSSES444
The fun- Elegancy and Ornamenc the Latins call Mamndus for the fame caufe:. which word dry fignif- becaufe it fignifies a thing which is abfolure, perfect and comprehending in it many the warp things orderly ranked, many thingsare fo termed. Marfilivs Ficinus on the 3.
me “Aygels rank’d in their Hierarchies; the third ische Elementary, whichis made up €¢ of
form leeds
(ah | el Me Wg
Chap. 1. : Of the VV orld. Boox II. 47 of Heaven and the Elements : the fourth is the great world, which contains alcteas red things, both corporeal andincorporeal: the fitr, isthe hecle world or Micro. 0. cofme, which is Man. .
‘Weare inthis place chiefly to treat of chac world which confitls of Heayenand Earch andthe Bodies therein contained, and by another name is called to pan, the Univerfe becaufe it comprehends al natural bodies, & to which the term Mundus ur W orld does chiefly belong and which in regard of its order was given it by Pytbha-
° a goras as Plutarch faies in the 2. of his de placit. Pbylofop. cb7.though we may doube . hereof, becaufe che word Cofmos is read up and down in the writings of Hermes wo Trifmegifius. Forthis univerfe is truly Cofmos or Mundus, that is to fay adorned,
Sarre
orderly marfhalled, and beautiful. — And therefore Ocellus infcribed his Book of naturalthings per:tou pantos, de univerf{o, of the Univerfe, and touching thefe ; names he thus writes. J cal this whol world by the name of univerfe: For becaufe it is 4 h diftinguifbed and adorned witb all things that are, therefore ith.1s gained this name | fi Cofmos and Pan, the world and ‘Univer{e. | iy Andas there are fundry fignifications of theterm world, fo there are fundry defi- i " nitions or defcriptions thereof, which Franc. Piccollo nines has collected in his mA a Book de Mundo ch.2. But cthofe are of all other moft ‘pertinent and moft fic for bi | this place,which the Author of the Book de Mundo has in his 2. Chap.(for whether it tne | be Ariffotle’s or Theopbraftus’s, or of Lome other Author isa queftion, of which fee ata
Ludovicus Vives upon Auftin de Civitate Det Lib. 4. Chap. 2. Collegium Gonimbri- A cenfz inthe proxme to Ariftotles Phyficks queft. 5. arc. 4.) the firft is this, The i world is a Fabrick framed of the Heaven and Earth and the ‘Natures in them contat- Ht ned. Thefecond1s this, Ibe world x the Order and Difpofure of all things, which 7 an preferved by and through God: which may thus I conceive be fitly joyned both in “ HNN | one. The world is that fame orderly Difpofure of all natural Bodies, proceeding from ay
- |} Godand by him preferved. HN
A The Matter therefore of thezvorld are all natural Bodies, not only fimple but al- py. HH iu
ww |) © fomixts; not only livelefs, bucalfo living: yea anduniverfally, a natural and words / i | fenfibleBody, as Ariftotle faies in his 7. deCelo,ch.9.t. 98 Andthe world is mater. If | || compounded of the Heaven, the four Elements,mixt bodies,inanimate and animate, ui
OT mettals, chings dug out of the ground, Plants, and Animals or living Gréatures. t
| But whatis the Form of the world is not fo evident,and there arefundry opinions Touching ey thereabouts. For fome fay Godis the Form of the world; others afoul common the form of
| tothe whol Univerfes others, che Heaven; others,its Figure 3 others, Order. But Pid Ay | among thefe opinions, two have atthis time the preheminence: che one is chat which pe Q- Wilk
(| attributes a cercain foul cothe world for its Form:the other is chat which makes or- : ii | dercobecheform ofthe world, Thac the world has a foul is an old opinion,appro- wie }| ved bymany moft renowned men. Ic is countenanced by ‘Hermes Trifmegifbus, Zoro Ki | after, and Orpbeus. Soinhis Book called Nous pros Erme, AU things ( faies he ) are |
eth }) - fulof foul. And in his Book de Intellettione & fenju, he attribuces a properSence and 1 fthe | Intelligence unto the world. Pythagoras held the fame, with Plato and his Follo- | yi }) wers, who oft times cal the world a living Creature, and aflignic a common foul, ny Ww 9) which every where through Land and Water, contains in ic felf fpiritual and mil ete quickening feeds; and of it felf ingenders, wherever corporeal feeds are wanting 5 i li cl |} ~=andalfo cherithes the feeds left by Animals, and ofa putrified Grape-kernel en- ay of |) genders a various, orderly and precious Vine; which wherever there wants a gene- v4 aud ) ator, andaccidental qualities feem only che Caufe of Generation, fupplies che ee | = place of agencracing Subftance 5 as Mar filius Ficinus fhews at large, in bis 4. Book al felt i of Platonich Theologue Cb. 7. | il word But the Peripetaticks like not of this Opinion For fecing no evident reafon itil may} perfwades the fame, nor is there any neceflicy that it fhould be fo 3 they neither Hees the» ff ateribuze ro the world any informing Subftantial form, nor one common foul, nor hey & minds dothey think it fic comulciply things without great occalion. Forno Adtion does ret we plainly appear inthe whol world, as proceeding from any, peculiar foul common ial ¢ (WO i rothe whol world: but all operations do proceed from peculiar and diftingé he oll, (|) forms. Andcherefore fince all parts of the world have their peculiar forms, there ! We dee i needs no common form to knic them cogethec; fecing withontir, the feveral forme il es of Hf can perform their own operations. Moreover, if chere were on? form i OP DS , po iclp | the world, theother forms, mult ctiher be pares thereof; or be informed thereby,» ~ t f & bok = * ar
i
ee ae
ra hia
tT aaa
ie {|
Chap. I.
upon the other forms, juft as the form of a living Creature comes uponthe form of amixtBody. For ifthis were fo, it fhould be more excellent and more perf. ¢t then the reft of the forms : which the Placonifts neverthelefs, willnorgrant, Fer the Soul of che world does not include more and more excellent faculties, then the forms and Souls of all Natural Bodies.
Andtherefore the Peripateticks deny that the world is one, by rhe unicy ofa Form informing; and they attribute thereunto only anunity of order of chofe things, which proceeding from one principle, do tend unto the fame as theic end, agreeing one with another and with it; becaufe all things come from one andtend
The Form to one, as f. C. Scaliger faies in his 6. Exvercitation, §. 2. [he Form therefore of the 3 &
of the world.
The F ffici-
ent Caufe of ibe wold,
The Exd
of the wold.
; .
world is the order or orderly difpofure of Natural Bodies Wowbeit, we are hereto obferve, as Number istwofold, the one numbering. or wherewith we number, the other numbered, which is nothing but the things themfelvs which reckoned: fo there is atwofold order, anorder ordering, whichis anaccidenr, and the mutual re- {pect of the parrs one to another, or as Auguftin defines ic in his de Civit. Dei B.19. Ch.'13. a Difpofure which among things like and unlike gives every one its place: and an order ordered, which is nothing but che things themfelves aptly difpofed, and fuchisthe world. For natural Bodies, asthey are aptly difpofed, and parti- cipate ofthe condition of one firft principle, and mutually accomplifh and cherifh one anorker, do make one orderly Syftem, whichis called the world.
As tothe efficient Caufe ofthe world, though the Epicureans were fo madasto think and fay thac this beautiful Theatre of the world was made by a blindand fortunate concourfe of Atomes : yet all found Phylofophers agree in this, char this world depends upon the moft good and great God, as the only firft principle of all principles. Foras Auftzn in his de Civit Dei B. 11. ch. 4. faies, The world ic felf, by its moft orderly mutability and mobility, andthe moft beautiful Feature of all vilible things, does after a fort filenrly proclaim both chat it was made, and by none bac God, nor could be made by any but him, who isunutterably and invilibly great, andun{peakably and invifibly fair. And Scaliger in: his 3. Exercitation, thews that Simplicious, Philoponus, Ammonius,Avenroes, and many other renowned Men, neither fewerin number nor of lefs Authority, then thofe of the contrary foo- lith opinion, didhold thatthe world dependedupon God, as its Efficient Caufe: and at laft, thus concludes. For if by his Providence all things are governed «which no man in his wits can deny) it neceflarily follows, that he was the maker of.al... For if he made notthe world: then hereceivedit made by anorher, either as borrowed, or by force, or by fale, oras a pawn, or hired, of by lawful fuc- ceflion, or feazing upen it when empty, or by command, asa Minifter, Servane and. Mercenary from his Lord. All which are meer trifling and Impious Con- celts. 6 bE As for what concernes the end of the World : The End moves the Agent toad. Buc there was nothing before the worldfaving God alone. Nothing therefore mo- ved God to create the world, but he himfelf moved himfelf. and therefore he cré- atedit, that he might communicate his infinite goodnefs. Which Augu;tine has neatly expreffed inthefe words, de Civit. Det Book 11. Cb. 21. Three things ve ought cbeifly to enquire concerning the Creature, who madeit, by wbatbemadeit, and wberefore be made it. and God {aw ibe Light that it was good. If therefore we ask wha made ib? it was God. If whereforebe made tt 2 becaufe itis cood.. There is no more excellent Author then God, no moye efficacious Art, thenthe word of God, no better Caufe, then that what ss good might be made by thegoodGod. Nor does Plato render any other caufe, why Godmadethe world, but becaufe he is good. For it is the property of goodnefs to communicate it felf. And this is the end of creating che world.
But what the ndis ofthe worldalready confticuted andexifting, is eleganrly taughe
God faid Cquoth he) let there be light; and there was liabt, ° ‘
) tug
tN,
whed
aule:
naker | either |
1h Luce ervalt ; LOle
toact, rem0- ne cles we has nes we if, Anh lil
mail I} WA
t| emed I .
OF the VVorld.
Boox II,
But he could not be Prince unlefs he were fuch as he is, vig. In the middle: nor could he be inrhe middle, unlefs becwixtextreams. Thereforetheextreams Were made that he might be in themiddeft: and if any ofthe extreams, or thofe chings feated betwixt the middle and the extreams were wanting, there would be a vacui- ty amongft the forms. Whichis much more abfurd, then that there fhould bea Vucuum without aBody, For feeing the moft good Godis ful of himfelf, and the world as the Platonifts fay, is Gods Statue or Standing Image: it muft alfo be ful, and have no defeét eitherin forts, or Quantity. Andtherefore if even the fmalleft thing were wancing in the world, the Univerfe would be no longer the Univerfe, and the world would ceafe tobe the world, thatistofay, beauciful, orderly rancke, and perfect.
And thus far we have known the world by its Caufes; icremaines that we take a view of che cheif adjuncts therof,and difcufs che controverfies raifed touchingthem, Now inthe firft place comes Eternity 5 andche queftion is, Whether thig world be
God is thé end of all things.
Whether
Eeternal or not ? This queftion is much canvafed by the difputces of many Men, and the world the opinions of Phy lofophers concerning the fame have been various; fome affir- %¢ eternal.
ming the world hada beginning and fhall have anend; othersthat it had a begin- ning but fhal never have an end; and others again that ic never had beginning nor fhaleverhaveend. That we may therefore difintangle our felves from fo greata variety of opinions, we mutt firft obferve this: that the chief queftion in chis place isnot; whether God madethe world. For though the madnefs of fome hath been fo great, that they durft fay thatthis world was made by Chance; yer al found
Phylofophers, do agree that God is the author of the world: and therefore che 272 724
Author of the Book deMundo, Chap.6. faies Elegantly and Pioufly : It # an anei-
was not meade by
ent faying {pred among{t al Men from their Anceftors, that alltbings were made both) of chance.
God.and by God 3 nor can any ‘Natural thing be {ufficiently furnifbed to per fifhin fafety, if it be left torts ovenfaveguard. without the tuition of God. And that Ariftotle him- felf knew the moft good and great Godto be che maker of the world, andthat he expreffed as much in words, 1s the judgment of moft worthy Phylofophers, Ve. rily if che world were not made by God, it muft be made by it felf : whichis abfurd. Fora finite ching cannot be che Ceft being; and every finice thing depends upon fome other: nor arechere many prime, infinite, eternal beings.
Here therefore the queftion is 5 Whether the world be from eternal, or were created
«an the beginning of Time 2? The moft renowned Ancient Phylofophers have held, chac
the worldhad abeginning. But Ariffotle held that this world hath been fromall ecernity, as himfelf witneffes, in his 1.de Calo ch. 10. #. 102. But let not us care what
this or that Phylofopher haththoughe, teeing our Religion does teachus, that this The werld world was made inthe beginning by the moft great and god God. For whom iszotetere may we better beleeve when the world was made, then God himfelf the Author #4:
thereof.
But whether or no, fecting afide divine revelation, ic may be firmly proved by
natural Reaflons, chat the worldisnoceternal, many dodoubt. Tul. Caf. Scalige?, K 5
It
t
fl Creatron is I : é poffible ac- ouc of nothing, may be evinced even by the light of Nature.
Pie 0 ing ofathing, fuch is its operation: but the inimortal Ged, fince in refpect of his
i! i phy,
God made : the world ly produced this world, is not contraryto humane teafon. For fince God isa moft
freely.
The world : a 5+ 4 foal have wade us that this World fhal have an End 5 nor is any Phylofophical reafon ftrong

But ape a aS SE jaca er
~~ Of the World.
‘hoor lh. ‘
world had a beginning and fhal at laft be confumed by fire. his 77. Exercitation, S.5. that becaufe God is the efficient caufe of the world, ir muft needs have hada Beginning andnot be eternal, For whattoever is made, is after ics efficient caufe, and nothing that is made is of equal durance with ics maker, for fo it fhouldnot be made. This Argument others alfo ufe, and fay that for a thing to be made andtobe ecernal implies a contradiction. For that which was made, fomtimeswasnot. Andcthey fay that Eternity is the duration of Goda- lone, nor can any creature be Coeternal with its Creator.
Nor are thofe Arguments which Ariftotle and his followers bring to prove the e- ternity of the world, fuch as mans wit cannot anfwer and refure. And I conceive ic is well faid, chat noreafon brought againft our Faith is true, or. canbe: becaufe truth isnot contrarytoctruth. Forthough things of Faith are abovethe order of Nature, yet they are not contrary thereunto, For even here, thele who contend for the erernity of the world, do cheifly build upon two falf foundations: one, that Creation is impoffible, and thac even the firft caufe cannot produce any
thing ouc of nothing: the other, that God acts by the neceflity of his Na-
ture.
‘Chap. ie |
Now that Creation is not impoffible and that the firft Caufe can produce fomwhat For fuchas is the be.
effence he depends uponnone, and needs no eutward thing, neither does he need
any external ching to be prefuppofed in his aéting. _ Moreover God 1s the caufe of
all things, and nothing except Gcd hathits being of it felf, but all things depend on God. And in very deed, they who deny creation, and fay it is inipoflible God fhould make any thing ofnothing, and yet grant that God is the Efficient caufe of the world (for they muft needs grant that) do contraditi themfelves. For if God be the efficient caufe of the world: doubtlefs, he made itofnothing. For befides God andthe world, there is nothing out of which he fhould produce it. Others bring more reafonsto prove the fame. And in truth, they who deny thac God could produce fonithing out of nothing. they deny Godtobe God, that isto fay, that his power and perfection is infinite.
And that God atts freely and not compelled by his Nature,and that he moft free-
perfect being, depending upon none, ftanding in need of none, felf fufficienc, Autexoufios, Autagatbos, and (which word was elegantly invented by Scaliger Erercit. 365. 8.2. Autautos, felf, of himfelf: the wil of God cannot neceffarily defireany Creature, norcan he neceflarily produce any, nor can his powér be com- pelled by any thing: but himfelf moft freely wils, what by his wildcm he knows to be beft - and he could, if he pleafed, have made rhis world much fooner or Jater, or not atall. . Yet he does alwaies, thac which is beft. Nor, becanfe he nade the world in the beginning,was his will therefore changed. For from eternity, ic was his pleafure to produce the world, them when he produced the fame. Nor muft we think, as Azflin {peaks in his De Civitate Dei B. 11. Ch. 5. That any thing hapned accidentally to God, in that he made the world rather then, then in former times ; fincethe former times had paffed equally through infinite fpaces, neither had there been any difference, why onetime fhould be chofen rather then another. And as he faies, in thefaid.11. Book, Cb.12. where he handles this argument ex- cellently ; thar which wenow enquire after five thoufand and od years, pofterity may ask with the fame Curiofity fix hundred thoufand years hence, if chis mortal condition of men born and dying fhal continue fo long, and they retain their chil-. difh infirmity. .Thofe who were before us in the infancy of the world might move the fame Qneftion. Yeaand the firft man himfelf, the day after, or the fame day he was created, might enquire why he was made no fooner. Forindeed, as he faies in the fame place, allthe bounded {paces of Ages, if compared to boundlefs Erer- nity, are nothing.
A& it appears from Scriptures, that the world hada beginnirg: fothey alone per-
\anencs ¢ enough to prove the fame. For though it be true which Scaliger fates in his 61. Ex-
c
ercitation, S.¢. and Exercit. 307. S.20. that allthings becaufe they have nor the caufe
Cheed I |
nto el ait ()j |
| | |
end on C Gof
ft free. I amok § iced | | cage B | Hany
e com B knows i rlacet, nade | ay, ee Nore y thing
formet
Chap 2.
Of Heaven, and the Stars. Boox II. BI caufe of their being fromthemfelves, but depend upon another, are of themfelves mutable, andcorruptible 5 but are not corrupted, becaufe God wil not have it fo:
yet true itis, that the world left to it felf, with that common and ordinary con- courfe of God which now it has, may for ever endure, nor does it of its own accord tendto corruption: butict fhallend by the free command of God, viz. when he fhal wichdtaw from it his ordinary afliftance, and change it into a better condition. And
fo much for that Queftion whether the world be erernal.
Nor is it much lefs controverced : Whether this world be one. For here Phylofo= — ypephey phers are at great variance, as may be feen in “Mirandula his Exam. vanit. do. gent. there is Lib. 7. Ch. 20. Forfome have heldthe world to be but one, others that there are but one many worlds, and they either like orunlike oneanother. Forfome were of the worlds opinion, thac there were other worlds befides this, in fome of which there is nei- ther Sun nor Moon; in others, that there is Sun and Moon greater then chofe in this world; andin fome many Suns ; alfo thac there are fome Worlds void of al Plants, Animals, and Moifture: and “Metrodorus did fay, that ic is-as abfurd that there fhould be but one world, as chat in a vaft field there fhould grow only one Ear of Corn.
In chis variety of opinions, we beleeve there is but one world: but. we hold fete ting afide what may be urged from our religion, that there is no Phy lofophical rea- fon ftrong enough to provethe fame. For fure enough God can and could have made more wotids: But whether or no he will make more: none can tel but him- felf, teeing neither fenfenor reafon can inform us. For as for the reafons every wherealleadged by Ariffotleand others fortheunity of the world; chey arenoc fuchas do certainly provethefame. WhichPlytarch, befides orhers, does thew in bis Book of the Ceafing of Oracles, and Mirandula in Exam. Vanit. Dot. Gent.