VI. Finally, as concerning the Parts which are in the whol, thus we are to hold.

If they are heterogeneal, they have determinate Limits of their greatnefs and fmalnefs, inafmuch as they are parts and Inftruments of living things, which have aceftain magnitude, Butif they be homogeneal, phere cannot be afligned a {mal- left, nor are they contained in any fet limirof fmalnefs. For feeing the Form of Fire, has the fame ref{pect in allics parts, andthatit 1s extended accordingto the extenfion of the matter : after che fame manner as there Cannot be affigned the {ma}- left inexiftenc Quantity 5 feeing every continued, thing is infinitly divifible: fo there cannot be afligned any portion of fire, than which there is not a{maller inthe fame fire.
And fo much may fuffice to have been faid of Quantity 3 we are now to treat de ft- For thefe
thing inf 26 proper adjuncts of Quantity : and they are likewife adjunéts of motion and
mitetn na —.
ture ?
time; feeing any and eveny of thefe is either finite or infinice. And in the firft place, let us confider whether there be any thing infinitein nature. And although there be fundry fignifications of this term Infinite: yet the chief {peech in this place, is concerning that which is Infinite in Quantity, and indeed of that which is attually infinice; andthe Queftion is, whether there be actually in nature ay thing, which is infinite, either in magnitude or in number: or whether there be a- ny natural ching, whereof when you have taken never fo much in Quantity, you may iftiltcake more, which is the definition of thae which infinite. Now itis by the Phy lofopher rightly afirmed, that thereis no fuch thing in nature, for thefe Rea- fons, _Forthat, in general there can be norhing infinite, is from hence aparenc; inafmiuch as al) things produced by and depending upon another, are defined and circum{cribed by ther own bounds and limits, nor canthey by any means poflible be infinice,But of the forts of things, ic may alfo eafily be proved,that rhere is no in- finite multitude. For feeing one fort does alwaies exceed another in perfection, if the forts of things were infinite, the world would beinfinitely perfect, and would have in it infinire degrees of perfection: which isa thing Impoffible. For every thing produced by another, and depending upon another, has a participated and therfore a finite perfeétion. But the world is produced by God and depends upon him. Thar- fore it has a participated and finite perfection, andis fepatated fromi God in perfe- ction,from whom it has receivedics perfection; and therefore, it is neither infinice, nor does it contain infinite forts of things. Nor is there any thing infinite in Magnitude. For, inthe firft place, ifthere were a Body infinice in magnitude,there could be no other in the world but chat ; for fee- ing ic would require an infinite place and would fil the Univerfe, ic would leave no room for any otherbody. Moreover, every thing that hath quantity, hath necef- farily figure. But that which is infinite can have no figure. Moreover it muft con- fift of all its parts either finite, or infinite, or of one infinite andthe reft finite, Buc tioné of thefeis poffible.. For that which is infinice cannot arife out of finite parts. Nor can the fecond or third hold, for one infinite would fil all place and dimenfion, and would leaveno place for the reft of the parc$: andif it fhould havea Quality contrary to the reft, ic would turn all the reft into its own na- ture. 435 , And as we deny that thereis any thing actually infinice, fo we grant there is fomwhat potentially infinite. And firft in che continued Quantity, which is in a poflibilicy of infinite divifion, as was faid before: and fecondly in number, which may be infinitely augmented. For there cannot be imagined fo greac a number, bue that more may be added thereunro. Finally in time and motion, which are “fucceflively infmice... But concerning that which is Infinite, I fhal fay no more, on-
ty conclude with that faying of Piccollimineus in his 1 Book of common Affettions of
natyrat
¢
= en
‘ Chap. 7. Touching Place. a9
ed, natural Bodies, Cha p.3- Tbat which is Infinite, as Infinite w@ unknown, and whilefk we
ihn }
it. know that which ws infinite, weknow that which cannot be hnoven.
Chap. 6. Ofthe Qualities in Leneral,
A Quantity Quahity ought of tight to follow, and we maft fay fomwhat of 4 che Phyfical Qualities in General, Forasall natural B> The ua by reafon of theic matter: fo in regard of their Forms chey have Qualities. Now ny Quality thus confidered in general, andas it belongs toall natural Bod:es,is anad- nL junct of a natural Body, flowing from the form thereof, by which the formis effica- ay cious, and a natural Body aptcodoorfuffer. Forthe forms of natural Bodies yy donot act nor work immediately, like God, but by the Mediation of Accidents and bs Qualities. And though the form be che primary Principle ef Operations, and the { | Qualities are che immediate and next principle of the Operations, yct are they lefs principal, and only Inftrumenctal. And che forms in their actings doufe the Quali- mit ties as Inftruments: buc the Operation of the Qualities {prings from the virtue of tn the Forms. And {fo becaufe nothing is idle in nature, but every natural Body ads therefore every narural Body mutt alfo be furnifhed wich its Qualities, ;
Now thefe Qualities are divided in ref{pec of our knowledg into ‘Manifeft and Oc- Suslisios cult. The manifeft ace thofe, which eafily eydencly and immediately, ‘are known divided. ll to, and judged by the Senfes. So light inthe Stars, and Heavinels and Lightnefs, ; i) being firft Qualities, are manifeftly obvious to che Sences, Buc occule or hidden i Qualities are thofe, which are nor immediately known to the Sences, but their force is perceived mediately by the Effect, but their power of acting is unknown. §o \y ‘4, we fee the Load-ftone draw the Iron, but chat power of drawing is to ushidden and ’
f
‘ Quality dics have Quantity what?
fs —= Pe’
cL o DoD Fr «8
pe
—— ee
not perceived by the Sences.
i
a } +. Sochere are many Influences of the Heavens which we know by their Effects up- i : qe | onthefe lower Bodies, but cannot by our Sences Perceive them. : I i Now from the Qualities of natural things arife cheir confenc and diffenr, and rr things like have a mutual appeute one to another, contraries have an averfne ivone 4 UY fromanorher. Hence fire is ealily unicedto fire, fac things to fac things; but fire hat i thuns water, and fat things fhun fire. And this is the manifelt confent and diffent i Le of Natural things. ia a But from the Eien qualities there arife Sympathy and Antipathy. fo called = Hi ot when natural things are carried one to another by an hidden Love 3 or havé a nate i hig ral abhorrency one from another,as fome cannot endure a Cat to be prefent, no not | fore | fo muchas to lookupontheCac, and others have the like abhorrency from other ( ha } things. And becaufechis fame hidden action is moft con{picuousin a Load-ftone Mt other fuch like A@ions are therefore termed magnetical, Mik at ute, Buc of the feveral forts of Qualities, we thall hereafcer treat in their proper pla- i }
_ 2p ces. ii were | | ‘ie | : . 6 he | td Chap. 7. Touching Place. A cel i pit ; onl ve at which is commonly faid of Time; We liy2intime and yet we know nox what van But time is, may be as truly faid of Place:
;
} adh e ae “Weare in Place, yet are ignorant what ae mite ; Place is. For the Queftion about the nature of Placeis fo intricate, thar the mofk i ace H acute Phy lofophers are herein at a ftand, while the Queftion is,, Whether Place be
ould ii rata or ourmoft bounds of the Body containing: ora fpace equal ta the Bo. ait y placed, .
Both Opinions have patrons and defeuders of ho mean tank: For the firftis the
ae 18 opinion of Ariftotle hinifelf, and che moft o
/ fhis Interprecers: the | a "
ni § mousin Ariffotles time and was maintained bathe Srenebeas hic Deaton eeu fi
ihi® Galen andby Phyloponus amongft the ancient Periperaticks; and amonpft lage | i Writers, by Fulins Cefar Scaliger and other renowned Men. WOE Biche:
,ae . AndthoughI donot take upon meto compofe fo greac a controverfie betwixt berber
she § fuchfamousmen, nor think tilag itis fitting to defers the Prince of Phylofophers, Place bea
gl)
ayy?
a
» f SNS
» S247 vs gz unlefs Surf ay ea ¥ 4 Y
AE SV ARM EES DOE OTEK!
The Pro- perties of Ariftotle, t fhal WP os che chief proprieties of Flace, and examine which ¢
Place.
How plate *\ * ; i and Scitv- Poetica efpeciallyin the 120. Chap. ation dif- diftinguifh betwixta place pre fo called,& as it is an affection of aBody natural
f ev?
€
unlefs upon a very weighty oceafion:yet very great difficulti againft his opinion muft cake the adverfe fide : cexs of Ariftotle have confelle been by any fufficiently confured, thecontrary; andthact ry: andicis very wel kn than Reafon co defend the (Majius does plainly confels, Book of Phyficks, he thus Writes: Authority of Arsftotle' and Thomas Aquinas, foozld moft willing'y unbrace i
fieto be underftood, and has fewer objettions again{t 1f.
a
Chap. 7
Touching Place. feeing the opinion of Aviftotle is laden with es, inthe mean while,til fone body thal anfwer what is broughe
( for I beleeve no man ha’ yet given a folid anfwerther¢to ) efpecially fince it is wel knownthatthevery jncerpre- d, that the other opinionis not improbable, nor has andthat there is no demonttrative Argument to he opinion of Arijfotle, is only probable, but not necefia- own, that moft men havé been moved by Authority rather opinion of Ariffotle: which one man, viz. “Didacus | when in his Commentaries upon the 5- Chap. of the 4. Butt (faieshe) unlefi l mere hindered by the
Fr by ast that 0 piniol
concerning Space which we may ea fily perceive, if diligently we fhal wei eh the foregoing Arguments and what bas been {aid touching the Nature thereof, that it i both more ea~
But becaufe we muft fubmit andings to Ariftocle and St. Thomas, we are forced to confels, that Place
our under{t } becaufethele moft grave Phy lofopliers, have fo deces-
isa Surface andnot a Space, mined ; But that lmay not feem to have done any thing without reafon,wherein Limitare
J ww
elong thereto; that from thence it may appear, which of chete
opinions is moft probable. Arifforle in the 4. Book of bir Phyficks Chap. 4. “Text 30-
telsus, Thatthefe arethe properties of Place. 1. To contain the thing placed, or whofe place itis. 2. Tobeno part of the ching contained, which- property fome joynwiththe foregoing, thus: a place does fo conrain the thing placed, as to be no part thereof. 3. That the place be neither gréaceriior lefier, chan the thing placed: 4. That the placeisfeparable fromtherhing placed; or as fome read 1, that che place cannot be without fome body, bar may be without this body ‘or that. 5. That al) place is upwards or downwards. - 6. That every body is natutally car- ried to its;own place, and is difpofed to reft therein. Howbeit, fome joyn this with the fife: From * other places, Atrhors gather more properties: for they ad, 7. That itisa property of Place to draw to i felf che ching placed: which they would draw out of the 4: of bis Phyficks, Chap. 1. Text 4. 8: Thacrhe place has a faculty of generating, psec and perfecting the thing placed: which they draw fromthe 4. of bis Phyficks ch. 1. Text 4. Chap. 5. Text 48. 49. from the'4. de Calo Chap. 3- Text 235 24. (from his 8. de ‘Hiftoria Animalinm Chap. 28, 29- 9. That the place gives diftindtion and unity to local motion. 10. That Place is immovable, 4:Phyf. Chap. 4. Texcg1. rr Cue of Pfellus they draw this property : that a Place is neither abolifhed,;nor does perifh, though the things which are there-
in, may be abolifhed.
truly and properly
And thefe are the chief Properties of Place which we meet, with in Authors: be- twixt which we mutt neverchelefs diftinguifh. For, astothe firtt, fecond, third, fourth, nifth, tenth, eleventh, chey. are fimply neceflary to a place, nor is there much doubt concerniugthem. As forthe reft, we muft fee in what fence they may be admitted, and-we muft enquire, what agrees with a place in it felf and as it isa place, and what by accident: in-which point there is nefmal confyfionin Authors. In the firft place, thatis to be noted, which Scaliger does hint, inhis 3. Fook dere nor has it beer omitted by otherss chat we mutt
in general; and beeween Ubi and Situs which is not any place, but one affected with certain conditions;which they areneverthele(s frequently accuftomed to cal Place. Hence ’tis 4 common faydngs that rhe place of light things is above, and of heavy rhings beneach:becaufe'in che middle of the world there are qualities by which hea- vy things are amicably cherifhed; and about Heaven there are qualities that-cherifh . light chings: which Qualities neverthelcfs do not neceffarily belong unto the ef- fence of place. For even the fire inthe Bowels of the’ Earch isin 2 Vlace, though noc f-vorable thereunto. Hence alfo Ariffotle in his 8. B. de Hifforia Animalium, Chap. 19: 23,29. Probleme 15. Settion 14 and Pliny every where f platns and Animals arediveis according tot ¢
‘aies thac the natures of he variety of places wherein they are. and
. : ea : \ aes e ml
a \ tt lt ]
1
natulal e) \ eS |
1. § an will eq] ite ia’ Wit q
\ Hiaces
fey
“h heg- 3 ich BF
te
aud that {ome places are convenient and others inconvenient.
Since therefore thefe are reckoned amongft the proprieties.of place: that every thing is carried to its place; chat the place does allure and draw coic felf the thing placed; chat the place has a power ro generate, conferve and perfect the thing pla- ced therein : we muft know, that all thefe properties do not agrestoa place, asic is aplace. For feeing a place as Toletus faies, is formally Quantity :~ic isnot of the Effence thereoftobe a Caufe. For Magnitude as they fay, is not the efficient of an accident 3 which Scaliger alfo intimates in his $. Exercitation, It is not trize ( faies he ) that bodies are preferved by their place, but by their form. And if a Place as a Place, andtherefore not a proper one, fhouldconferve: the Elements would noc feek co get out of that place into their proper place. The Elements therefore are not preferved by their place; but by their Ubi. . Scaligerin the fame Exercitation, Settionu 5. Butfo far the Placeis faidto preferve the thing placed, inafmuch as the body there placed, does conveniently receive the Qualities of the Heavensand E- lements which are moft agreeable thereunto: and inafmuch as Qualities friendly coche thing placed, are in the Subje& which is about the place.
And therefore, feeing in the fearching out of the nature of things, that ‘which is by icfelf, muft be carefully diftinguifhed from that which is by accident: we do heteunderftand theterm Place, not in the latrer, but inthe former Senfe : Nor do we allow of that faying, that only rhe Elements are ina Place. For we donot here feck after the Adjunct of fomefort of natural Bodies; but our Enquiry is, what Place is in icfelf confidered, and asic agrees to al natural bodies in general, and to al ches forts as a proper adjuud.
Weare now in the nexc place to confider, wherher the genuine Properties of place do beft agree ro the Surface of a body containing, orto the Space commenfu- rate with the thing placed. Andthat we may begin with immobility ; that is a moft true propriety of Place, and by Pererius his confeflion, though it make againft
eee
Whether the Pro- prrites of place do
himfelf, itis an eflential Propriety thereof, even as rifibility or a difpofition, ro def agree
Laughter is an effential propriety of Mankind; and as HEgidiuns Romanus fae oe faies Lib. 4 Phyf. 1. 41; Se. 7. the very formal being ofa place. To the affercin (pace ? :
whereof, though there were no other Reafon, this might fuffice, chat all Men what. foever their opinion is concerning Place, do herein agree, chat a Place mutt be im- mediable, and every one endeavors to accommodate this propriety to his Place. And verily he that takes away the immobility of Place, he takes away local moti- on and the diftinction thereof. For that which is moved, of neceflity leaves one place and goes into another : which could norbe, if the place were moved with the thing.
hires Propriety therefore weconclude: feeing place is neceffarily immo- vable, and thefurface of a body containing is not immovable: that ic is no Place. For fuppofe a Tower ora Pillar erected, or a Tree growing up in the Air, or fuppofe an Flillina River, orin the Air, at every moment asthe Wind blows andthe River runs, their place wil be changed, which is againftthe Nature of Place. Yea and this great Abfurdity wil hence follow: that one and the fame body, fixedin one and the fame{pace, quiet aud withouc motion, fhall have every moment a new place, and fo be in an innumerabe company of places.
In rhis Argument the maintainers of a Surface to be Place, are varioufly perple- xed, as we may fee in Pererius Book 11. Phyf. Chap. 2, 3.and Toles. Book 4 Phyf. Gueft. 5. And Pererivs himfelf demonftrates that the an{wers carefully foughr out by Scotus and Aquinas are not facisfactory. And it wil be worth our while to con- fider whether he brings any thing more cothe pnipofe, feeing many affirm chat he has an{wered all Objections. Now this isthe judgment of Pererius: Firft, he faies the word Place is ufed in common and vulgar-acceptation for {cituation and pofition; and tis commonly faida thing has chis or that place, meaning that icis fo or fo fcituated ; and, therefore a thing may change its place two waies, either actively or paflively: Actively, when it paffes out of one place into another, Jeaving the place wherein it was before : ,Paflively, when che thing re- mains immovable, butthe place about it is changed. He fuppofes therefore, that a Tower, a Pillar, or Mounrain, about which ever andanonthe furface of the Air or Water is changed, are not properly in the fame place: yet they remainin the fame place, by place intending {cituation: orchey remain in the fame place acively 3
becaufe
——
Si APR gee as
“a
rm
A fiurface what hat!
EON so gaa Pt OE ONCDING: © Lace,
eT = —
becaute thefe bodies thenifelves do not pais from place to place’: yet they remain not inthe fame place paflively 5 becaufe rhe Surface of rhe Air and water compafling the {aid bodies, does nor remain the fame in number, but is ever and anor changed. This is Pererivs his defence, which whether it be noc contrary toal Reafon and fenfe, let himfelf judg. Burl would firft have Pererzus reconcile this propotition whichisin his 11.B. ch.3. p.615- The Surface of the Body containing, which ts of the Effence of place, is not alwaies the fame in number about the fame thing placed but js ever and anon varied; with chat, if his 1.ch.p 607. immobility is effential to place, becaute it is an effential property thereof, as rifibilicy is ofa Man, and Lohantet Ac mobilicy is ufed in the definition of Place, inftead of an effencial difference. Can Surface be of the effence of place, and yet not be immoveable which is an effential propriety of place ? Again i grant, that the rerm place is frequently ufed for che Scituarion and Pofition of a Natural Body, and allow fuch a {peech be proper enough: Yea, and iff{o bea thing ret
aa
nains in the fame Scituacion, Laver againft Pererins, that icremaines in the fame places for Scituation alwaies preluppofes place, andit fignifies the relation of the thing placed tothe place. And therefore Natural bodies when they change their place, do alfo change their Scituation. And itis, dowbtles, a great Abfurdity to fay, thata thing not moved with any local nto- tion fhould change its place. For anew place is pa ined only by local motion: and thac which changes place, is locally moved, and by local motion, we are bronght tothe knowledg of place, as may be fecn in Ariftotle 4. Phyfic. Chap. 4. Text 32+ And therefore Tolet rightly faies : IfI ftir not, and the Surface about me be changed, it may not be granted that lam not ftilin the fame place. That is therefore a weak defence, which is made by diftinguifhing betwixt active mutation of placeand paf- five. For feeing to change place actively, is for a body co be transferred out of one place into another 3 to ch and be moved tothe thing placed: then which, what is more abfurd? Noris Ant. Ruvius more happy in his folution, Book, 4. Pbyf. Queft. 3. who confelling, that chis Argument is fodifficulc, chat in regard ofthe dificulcy thereof, Authors have been divided, asco the manner of attributing Immobility to place; and examining and rejecting the opinions of others, he is at laft forcedto confels ingenuoully ; that it is immpoflible chat the whol Nature of Place, fhould confift in-aSurface, and that Place fhould be immoveable; fince *tis evident, that the ambient Surface is ffequent= ly varied, and that therefore place requires fomwhat, in refpect of which it may Andac length he is fainco fly to this, that Particular places, are cherefore immoveable, ‘becaufe they are parts of total place, or parts of that whol {pace, real of imaginary, which is comprehended under the compafs of the Skies. Whereby co fay thetruth, he fo leaves Ariftotle, as to joyn with them that fay place is that fpace, which every Body fils. Another propriety of place, is to be equal to-che thing placed. But the Surface is not equal the to thing placed; and there fore itis not the place. Fora Surface hath only two dimenfions, but a Body three. Not does Pererius his anfwer remove the difficulry : vig. That the place is equalto the thing placed, becaufe the convex Sutface of the thing placed, and the hollow! Surface of the thing containing are equal. For the Queftion is not about the Quality of the Surfaces of athing contai= ning and athing contained: but touching place and che it placed. Now Bodies ate placed, and not Surfaces. And therefore it is neceflary, that a place, be not only equal co che Surface of the thing placed, but toal che dimentfions thereof: for otherwife che place fhould not be equal tothething placed. For a Lineis not faidto be equal toaSurface, nora furfacetoa Body 3 butaLine toaLine, a Sur- face to aSutface, anda Body toa Body. I fhall not compare any more proprieties of aplace witha Surface. For rbeen already faid, is more then chofe can anfwer, who wil have place Placeisa common Adjuné& of al Na-
be immoveable.
does mot tobeaSurface. Yet oneching Iwiladd. 2 al tural Bodies, and ought co agree to all. But the Surface of a Body conraining, vditss does notagreetoall Bodies. Therefore it isno place. For the Higheft Heaven,
hath no‘Surfaee of any Body to compafs the fame about: whereas itis neverthelefs
The bigh- ‘ 3 &” a Body, and is locally moved; and thereforerequiresa place. For whereas fome
“sy €i Heaven
“in place.
thac the higheft Heaven is in no place, nor that For that every Body: 1s
4 cChinkirisno abfurdicy tofay, © - every Natural Body hatha place: this feems unreafonable.
ange place paflively muft be, for the Place to come unto :
oo +
Fiche Clee
a meaner AE en A A ee a) mt lene tem msn
mene
AN 32
: T.1.Every thing that is, 7 fomvebere. and that wbich ws not, ¥ 10 where, and that vebich is no vobere, wnot. Natural Bodies, are real beings, and thereforethey are fom-
where. Wow there arethree manner of waies, whereby aching may be fomwhere, fie f Replecively,Defin itively ,Circum{criptively or Locally. Bur Natural Bodies cannot Naturally be faidto be any wherein the two firit manners. For itbelongs only to Ged ig ae | Godto be Repletively any where: who as Damajcrintruly wrices in Book 1 Ch. 16. prefent re- ef is totally every bere, totally in-all tbings,and totally above alltbings. Or as Scaliger in pletively. TY his 1. de Plantis 5 vwebo 1s by allthings, above allthings, inalltbines, before all things, t after all th ngs, High, Glorious, Immenfe, Incomparable, fncomprebenfible. Andto ts $ be any where definitively, is faid of Angels. And therefore Naturally bodies as defaatives e fuch, where everrhey are faid co be, they are faidro be there Locally: and by ly Bodies my Reafon of chew Circumf{cript and Determinate dimentfions, they are in a Circum-Naturat - {cribed and Determinatefpace. Hence Du-Rand faies wel in4 Set. Diftintt.44. ("oem hd Queft. 6.. In this refpett only a place ss poffeft by the toing placed becaufe the thijzg pla-/eri? ited tt |. ced bath within the place, the diftention of its parts. Since therefore this is efféntialto. wed the thing placed, asit bas Quantity, it ws 1mpoffeble the thing plced fhould be im the place, d, {| and nottarethe fimeup. Anda \icle after : If a Body be locally in a place, it cannot ak be, but it muft take the placeup: becaufeto takea place up, isto bave inthe place parts als diftantin pofstion one from another andfrom allotber Quantity : and that ss nothing elfe, ole but to have Kuantity. Alto there is a moft elegant place to be feen in Scaligers Ito 56. Exerc tation, Sed. 6. wherein he fhews, how the place is neceflary tothe thing ith placed. Andinvery deed, motion does fulficiently teach, ttatche Heaven isina hat place. For feeing every thing that is moved, is moved in its place, by local moti- ave on: and the Heaven is moved with local motion 3 we muft by no means deny chat ing itisina place. Nor can local motion be imagined withouta place, Yea verily, chat though the Heaven were without motion; yet the Heaven of its own Nature is in that aplace. For feeing place belongs to bodies not only becaufe of their motion, buc an that Natura] Bodies are in place when they ftir not 5 what ever you will affigge to nay be che caufe why Natural Bodies are in place, it wilbe found alfo in the Heaven: are feeing ic is a Natural Body. An hol And whereas the Authority of Ariftetle is objected, whointhe 5. of his Phyficks cies, Chap. 5, Texc 43. delivers this rule of knowing what Bodies are ina place and what fay not; viz. That Body is ina place. without which there is another Body chat con-
tainesit: but thatis not, without which there is none: this Authority does not rface hinderus atal, For Ariftotle did build this rule upon his prefuppofed definition of hath places) which definition falling, this rule fals: and wichal the argunienc drawn ethe therefrom. vq. That the Heaven isnot ina place; becaufe place isthe Surface of river a Body containing : buc without the Heavens there is no Body, For here the quetti- gate onis beg’d : anditis more doubted whether place be a Surface, chen whéther che tals Heaven be in a plice. by odies Seeing therefore, for thele and many other Reafons, that Opinion which makes prgrs is ¢ , be plice to be the Surface of a Body containing, cannot poflibly ftand : and by confel- fpace not a eof tion of all Peripateticks, fucha thing as place there is, and ir is diftin& from the/wface. snot thing placed; Idoaver, thata placeis all chat place long, broad, and deep, which “Sur the Body placed does Occupy and this fpace isathing differeat from the Bodies
| themfelves. For though you fhouldimagine al rhe Bodies inthe univerfe to bere. ro fF moved, there would remaineafpace, long, broad, and deep; which neverchelefs,
act. 3s Not at any time actually without Bodies : buc che whol Univertfe fils this whol
ie i Space, and every para of che Univerfe challenges a part of the whol fpace, equalto
ing fe oat felt. :
ae Now that there is fuch a {pace is apparent out ofthe 4. of Phylicks, Text 3. and — ipperhey aa ® the change of things out of one place into another fhewsas much. For there where there is _ 33 » © Water now is, wg. Inthe Veflel, when that is powred out there willbe Air, or fuch « i © {ome other Body of equal dimentfions wil poffefs the fame place. Nor does chis {bate oe #
goly | e happen only intefpect of Surface. For unlefs a Veflel be emptied accordingtoal » lh 4 H dimentions
BEY TONE iene att Seow .
The pro- priesies: of place agree
dimentions 3; anothe cording to the three dimentions. Capacity, inrefpect of their conca
=
Chap. vn
Touching Place.
t body cannot goinro it; andthe thing placed fils its place ac- Let there berwo Veflels of equa! Magnitude and vefurface; and fil the one which fhal have no- and afterward pour the fame water mto ti € o- ther, in themiddeft whereof a {tone fhal hang by a@thred 5 che water will noc al! be contained, by a veffel of che fame capacity and furface. What is the caufe hereof? fa firface be place, whatis the reafon, that, feeing there are in thefe two Vettels equal furfaces, and confequently equa! places, they do not receive a Body placed of thefame fize? Namely, becaufea place isto bé defined and eftimated not.accor- ding to the furface, but che whol fpace and profundity, according to which the thing is placed. And that two bodies cannot be together, is noc ther efore, becaufe of the furface of the Body containing, but becaufe cach body reqnites a peculiar {pace for it felf co exift in, And that this fpaceis place, does hereby alfo appear, im chat all the genuine propricties of place do agree thereunto ; and by this opinion, thofe great difficul- ties are avoided, which vex other opinions. For the {pace tontaines che thing pla-
thing inicbue Air, with Water:
wish fpace ced therein, and is equal thereunto : and isnever without one body of other; buc
The Hea-
it may be without this Body or that: it is immoveable, nor when any Body is re- moved, does the {pace wherein it was move wich it : but che Body affes out of one part of this {pace into another. Alfo by this opinion, that moft dificult Quettion, in the anf{wering whereof, one fide is much puzzled as may be feenin Pererzus BD. it. Ch. 8. Lolet B. a Phyl. Queft. 7. Colleg. Conimbr. Book, 4. Phyf. Ch. 5. Qucfe. 2.
Ari.12.v1%. How the uppermoft Heaven isin place,may ealily beanfwered. bor it
wen is in rues atsuy : ; : 2s tikeeay Sess dgrten nits {pace which it occupies,as Scaliger rightly faies in his 5.Evercitation, Sett. 2.
bts fpace.
is Now what for athing this fpace is, is not very eafierodetermine. Yet we nuit
what this : $ bed ; not therefore deny that there 1s fuchathing. For thefe are diftin@, Queftions,
{pace is?
whether athing b¢ and what itis, And if we fhould deny there were any thing bue chat the Nature whereof is perfectly knownto us: we muft deny againit manifeft reaion the beings of many things, becaufe their Effence is hid from us. Howbeir, when they who deny the uppermoft Heaven to be in a place, fhal explain what that fame Ubiis, in which the upmoft Heaven exifts and is moyed: ic will beeafieto explain what this {pace iS, ter, and we fhall with che fame eafe unfoldthe Nature off{pace. For if from ‘a Na= tural Body I remove in my thoughts all the form, and all the adjuncts proceeding therefrom, as 4riftotle himfelf in the 7. of his Metapbyficks, Cb.3. Text'7. Defcribes it by che negation ofall things: what I pray you will there remain? And fhalt we therefore, becaufe we cannot fufficiently underftand the Effence’'thereof, and can only comprehend it by a baftard kind of reafoning, cal it only an imaginary ‘kind ofthing? By nomeans. Even {o, though our mind cannot conceive fpace, fave py,the denial of al Bodies : ic does noc therefore follow chat it is nothing, or no- thing different fromthe Body, . For ifthis andthis andthat and that Body, may he removed from this fpace; doubriefs all thefe Bodies, wil be differenc from chis f{pace, andthe Space from the Bodies. ¥ et I fhal produce what Authors think therof.Proclus held this {pace to bea body gnimate,indivifible,immovable,immaterial.Orhers wil have this {paeeto be nothing real,but of it felfan emptynefs, or privation of a Body,which yet ic can receive. Q- thers fay this {pace is an accident,17q.A GQuantity,long broad and deep: not as Epi- curus,exifting by icfelf without any ody, bur alwaies conjoyned with fome Body. For danus Brunys ‘Nolanus, takes irto bea fife Kind of Caufe. Which feems to have
been an oldopinion. For they relate from Albertus Magnus, that the Peripaceticks .
did reckon place amongit the Principles of Nature : from whofe opinion, Francifcus Parvicivs, feems hot to differ, in his ‘Book de Spatio Phyfico.
_., Among thefe opinions, becaufe the three laft have renowned Men for their Au- chors, Lam minded to propound them according to their Authors intents. Not buc that I know the Objections which thofe opinions alfo are liable unto; feeing icis much,eafier to, overthrow Ariftotles opinion of place, then to tel what {pace is > -buc ro the intent chat the diligent fearchers of Nature, may have hereby an occalionto
think of the matcer. For.as Arzffotle wifely writes int the 2. of bis Meraphyficke Ch.1.
‘Fer ve are not only bound to shark, them that bave fo writ as to fatiifie’ us with their opinions, busthem alfo rbo have {poken but fuperficially, for even ibefe men alfo advan-
tage
€
Or let chem tel us, what is the Effence of the frft mar- —
ee ee ERO EAS RO SERRE EIS MER ES Ea
is fuch, that when one Body gives placeco another, there isa Vacuum or Empty {pace made, thac the other body may come in as Privation 1s a Vacuicty of che Form to beintroduced: and neverthelefsis by Ariftotle placed amongft the Princi- ples of Nature.. For as Epicurus;-in bis Epitle to Herodotus zn Diogenes Laertius, sprites 5. LE that were not, which we call emptynef or fpace, Naiural Bodies would no
bawe rebereto be, nor weuld any thing be moved, as now we fee things are moved. t
Now che laft opinion fave one Poyloponus did long ago ftifly maintain, and fome even inthis Age do account ic noabturdicy. Nor do they conceive, that whichis objected againft chis opinion, much co hinder che fame ? viz. if {pace ic felf be long, broadand deep, and another body fhould be placed therein, there would be penerration of dimenfions. For two Bodies are not hindred to bein one place, in refpect of Quantity alone; for fo a Body of the Predicament of fubftance could nor be wich a Body of the Predicamenct of Quantity 5 whereas neverthelefs thefe two are one andthe fame in number and fubject; but beceaufe of the corporeal matter, And we mult difference a Body extended and meafured out, from the extenfion and meafurement it felf: whereof the former is a corporeal fubftance, the lacter an accident: both which are neverthelefs termed a body, by reafon of that penury of wordsinthis Cafe. Hence Fobannes Grammaticus himfelf faies, chat a‘Body not.atbreefold dimenfion, but that {ubjtance to which the (aid dimenfion is inberent aa in a fubjett. Nor does any remarkable abfurdiry follow from this opinion, vig. thac an accident fhould pafs out of one fubjectinto another. For that paffage only ofa Form or adjunct out of one fubje& into another is impoflible, whereby an ac- cident or Form being Oneinnumber, does leave its whole fubject, and pats into another: but ifa{ubftantial or accidental Form, does not go out of its whol fub- ject, buc remain therein, icis not abfurd chat it fhould go out of one part into ano- ther. Therefore every dimenfion may receive any Body, as one part of the dimenfion of the whol Univerfe, may concain alfo fome part of the Univerfe in ic.
Finally, Neither does that:follow from this cpinion, that there can be places adually infinite, orthata place can have a place, or that aplace, can change its place, asic isin the +. of Phyficks Chap. 4. Text 37. For the patcs of watér’arein water, asin their whol, and infpace as in their place: which if they are finite, they have finite Spaces anfwerable, if infinite, “they have infinite. Moreover fince allthe water changes place, the parts alfo of the water change place: yet place does not change place, noris there a place of place. But as the whol and parts are transferred: {fo alfothe whol and parts change place : but the {pace which is parc of che Univerfal {pace,remainesimmovable.. For neither a River, or Heaven, ora Veflfel, or any fuch ching isa place, but that {pace whereina River, Heaven ora Veffel or any other thing is contained.
‘Didacus ‘Mafius out of Philoponus and other Defenders of}Space, does thus de- fcribe thenaturethereof. Thenature thereofis a body: for it confi'ts of three di- mentions, Gongitude, Latitude,and Profundity: yet is ic immaterial; becaufe ic has no matter nor form. For it ought to penetrate the thing placed, according to allitsdimenfions : but if ic were material ic could nor penetrate. “And therefore itas alfoindivilible; becaufe from icno parts can be taken away. For divifion can only have place in fuch things as confift of matter: andmoreover ic is fepara- ced fromthe Bodies placed therein, For the fame {pace in number which contains the Wineinithe Flagon, the fame receives Air, and whenchat is gone Water or fome other Liquor. And cherefore it receives notits individual nature from the Bodies, but of the bodies within whofe fides ic is contained, asthe {pacein the FJa- gon from the Flagon; that inthe Air from the Air. Moreover it is affected wich - no qualities 5 becaufe ic is neither whice, nor black, nor hot, nor cold. . And chere- tore it feems rather a Mathematical Body, feparate from all fenfible matcer, thena Phyfical and natural body. Alfo ir penerrates al bodies which ic imbraces inits Lap,
yet without divifion, as {weetnefs penetrates. through the whol Body of the Milk H 2 without
o
| A enh Ay ote EN HO ‘ “ .
onching Places Chaps 7
emcee» EET RSS
a i nt re ee a ne
ee van
“without dividing thefame. For foic penetrates all bodies which it contains, as to Alchemn according co all their parts and dimienfions, buc not fo as to divide them.
Finally, there is one {pace inthe whol univerte and world, equal thereunto, which in divers patcs receives divers Bodies. Noxwhen a Body is moved from placeto Fes
place, does it carry its Space withic, but ic pailes out of one parc of che Space into
Now Francifcus Perriciwa docs thus conceive of Place. Firft, He fates ic is a / t ipace, andthat 1c is fomwhat,. fee- inachey have coynedchefe Terms, Dimenfion, Diftance, hiterval, Soace: and that this confenr aroie from their Sences. For al n do fee thac che Heavén is diftarc from the Earch, the Eaft from the Weft, che Head from the Feet: and local motion and the migration of bodies out of one place into another, doreach the fame thing. For where chere was Water before,the water bene Poxred forth, Air enters into its
water again filscthe place of Air. “tapes aies this Space was before all other things produced by God the great W ork-mafter, inafmuch as all ocher things ftood m need rhereot, and without ic they couldnotbe. And whereasicis hardto know what Space is 3 he faiesitis no wonder :; for ali the Qualities of Bodies whereby they incux into ourfenfes, are la- terthan the Bodies themfelves : but Spaceis different. frem Bodies,yea and 1s before Bodies. For he makes Space the frit of all worldly things, yea before che world infelf. Forifthe world ( faieshe) fhould be defiroied, and reduced to nothing that {pace in which the warld is now, as inits place would remain quite empry. Buc if God will againimike new Heavens and a new Earch, there is {pace before- hand, which can contain new Heavensandanew Earth. For icsbeing now full doesnot belongtorhe Effence of Space (no more than the form belongs to the Effence of materia prima, though 1t benever wijhour fonie form) but a p'enicude accidental chereunto.For it happens by reafon of the Bodies,which are al differrent therefrom. And kefaies chat Spaceisno otherwife a place, thanas it affordsa place for bodies ro abide in, and of its own nature, before it isaplacé, it is a parc of che univerfalfpace. Andtothat common obje¢tion, IfSpace be any thing, 1t is either a Subfiance or Accident, heanfwers: Space ofitfelf, fince ic gogs before the worl, and is wirhout the world, is no worldly thing, excepting chat parc thereof which contains che world, or which the werld poffefles with ics Body bur goes before'al worldly things, wherheér bodily ox not bedily,Subftantial or noc Subftantial, and as allthings are accidents to ir, foisic coallthu.gs: andthart this fame {pace was unknown tothe Authors-of che Predicaments. Andat laft he de- Anes Space co be an hypoftatical extention, fubfifting of it felf, inherent in nothing, Burif icmuft needs be of fome predicament: if (faies he) that be a fubftance, which futtains other things, which fubfifts ofic felf, whichis nor inherent in any other thing, then Space is perfe@tly a Subftance. FeorSpace fubhits of it felf, ic refts upon nothing, it needs nothing,to helpit to be,or to fuftain it,bur ic felf fuftains fubftances, andfoenablesthem tobe, andic fupports allother things in nature. Alfo that ic isthe Griginal of Quantity, and that ic has length, breadth, depth, and all dimenfions: alfo that it is never moved in whol or in part, but whatfcever things are moved, are moved through this fpace,{o that it {elf is wholly unmoved and unmovable, What he further writes ac large fee in his Book de fpacio Pbyfico. This onething onlylad. The Quantity ofaBody, is moved with tht-body it felf whofe Quantity itis : but as Ariftotle himfelf faies, a body tranflared into che place of another, pofieffes the fame placein number and nature, which that body into whofe place it comes did before poffefs. For examplefake, Water fucceeds Air inthe fame numerical place; and fo the Quantity of the Ais and Water, are nume- rically different from the Quantity of the Space; fince each remains in its own body, though ic takes up and poffeffes another place, And feeing the Place is no part ofthe thing placed, nor any part Cas bas been fhewed ) of the ambient body, what other thing IJ pray You can we immagine, when boththe Ambience Body, and che Be pidced be removed, but a Space having three dimentions of Length, Breadth, Depth? And fo much for this point. Let us conclude this hard difcourfe wit han excellent faying of Fulins Cefar Scaliger inthe 297. Exercitation, ?Tis ea- keer for any man to oppofe the Sayings and Opinions of wife men, then fafely to commit bis on Opinion to the judgment of others, ‘Nor do lever forget, but alraies pur my felf in imind. to fee, confider, remember, bow weahthe Lies of our minds are to pry into the. fecret Clafers of Nature. CHAP
Da pe Lit
it
en ED 4
\ 4 4
Chap ty | Za, | % Peculiar adjunct of Effeace, isthat which Phylotophers cal Duration ia eee } : vie c , +24) pales Cas fpuvacion 5 Chat ag #, & 18, asthey fay, a continual tract of being, as Scaliger rightly has it, mm hi ~ of 350: Exerci: ation Set. 7. fot Duracionis che meafure of che being of every things audin every ching, thele three follo w oneanocher Effence Exiftence,and Dura clon: Sis which holdrhis order, that Effence 13 firft,Exiftence nexc, and Duration laft ofa]: {2 1° 9G
e Eficnce as the Exiftence of a thiny. deed from the Effence ofa thing it differs really. For there are divers things whicl
e
a a, 4 BES a {> Blanca A xz met fren EE “pa at Set rae: "pellan ied ' by, have the fame Effence 3 and yet kav Gitfereat Guratio +S Bue {i omtne exiiten ce of
a gas ;
QA cathy
| {hore oT lana @ ur, fe TF er AMR AR Wh Lge CALE CHS a? ad
f ~ 3 7A XZ | hae ae. Vert fe le €xtenlion of Onanticy ’ te 4
iy
) —— Pr ry a eae! — w mr € ¥ — ret ex ai = rs) crt tanto ~ Le ~— bed © LS rt & ty Ka. rs
5
iscoQuantity ( which neverthelefs donor reall them. For the 1
iutency to Bxiftency itfelf, yecrhereis fome. difference 1 } Nature of exifténcy, is only this, chat a chi “aules,and aGtually fo Whar; Bit Curation fignifies the extention of athing, inthis ice being, andthe c i j : a, : eg : cor mt oF) se heh tiguation or abidance ofthe exiftency. Duration cherefore properly belongs to Wi
fa t te 5 BIS (31% tre OU OF iS
¥ Pe ¢ ig oe o {> ’
ome a ead Syed 4
exiftency, notto Quiddity, andit alwaies prefuppotes exiftency, without whi ic canneither be, nor be underftood. Hence therefore Duration is not amifs def ned, tharit isthe Extention of the Exiftence ofa thing: orcheabidance of a thine dead. Ne) in irs Effence. Se NG RT psa L of) a ic o ° aR ° v m i sh ee Now fuch as the Eifence of things is, fuch is alfo its Meafure : and as many mianners as tnere are of a things abiding in its Effence, fo many durations it has i, | eye aN Nie EES ee . mess Ns oe z ; ieee Asthings therefore are threefold, fo is there a threefold diitation, or as fome 4 shree- aot Ey ge Ay seer ah Dee ees $ ofr i a ’ - ty Der. -, athreefold meafure of Duration; Time, Age, Eternity. For the mea- fii € or the guration of things, which are no wa’es infinite, and which have borh a i Beginning and End,is Time : Fhe meafure of the duration of things, which are paitly ) eae ee ~ feat ns 2. Bs . _@ : e 38 c A L an iss V1 at in kedpeet of their beginning, and partly infinite becaufe they have. ng cha,1s Calica /Lvum, Age or Mveternity. But Eternity isthe nieafure of che dura= tion, of that wv hich is abfolutely infinice, having neither Beginning nor End. But we are Now to treat of Time. 1 has V/ £ os z - : 3 ‘ vi y) Al Men do freque Bey talk of Time, and are often mentioning Lo day, ¥ efterday i) to Morrow, and tell of daies, months and years; andin fo doing they acknowleds way that cimeisreally fomwhat: but what that is. ve sant ie lat time is ysOmwhat: Put what that is, very few cancel: and there have | aiWalss been fundry opinions abou the nature oftime, as may be feenin Fraicifc | pars se pd a @ ® ’ 9; “ Per , j a . é iccollimineus his Book de Nat. com. Affett. ch. 13. Ariftotle reckons up chrée ahd re. i futes them in 4. Pbyf-ch. ro. For {ome would have time co be the motion of the Hea- Fens : ‘ Bie ~ 2 roy =e ct BO oe ce a ° tne mS vens 3 others the greateft of the celeftial Spheres, others Motion limply confidered.
Tae | || Thea An herefore rf PCG si nar ee, depth,’ 4 hat wen ay therefore find out what Time is, we mutt know
pew
! } i eta Darian {
testo y
Le nek
iftains |
Vatwtes |
Wl 4 :
y that time may he
oevet | two waies confidered 5 Firft as the internal duration of a thing which has had be- : i novel ginning, and fhal haveend, and is fucceflively continued, and to fay allina word, a Wh I ofathing which is movable secondly for the meafiire of the faid duration by fee d ‘felt | motion: andin this latter fenfe time is commonly underttood by natural Phy lofo- nah plat it phers, who hold that time is not Without motion, nor can be underftood without ike yi Ht ae E oe Seen : ae wien weunderitand there has been mo- at oe pears in {uch as fleep : For he Suchen say Cpe phat anny timehas paffed : as ap- nue wherein they fel eee rich tt y Pom teeta st? ub ues Joyning the moment ov vache y tel aileep withthemoment of their waking, conceive no time to have
és Ae paffed between; whichchat Tale thews cited by Ariftotlein Lib. 4. Phyf.ch. 77 mba | i 7 Story to which others relate, of three men at Athens who being drunk ail at 4 Fe Nee flept chree daies together. For when one of them did awake the next
a } night aicer that in which he firftlay down,and faw che Stars fil fhining, fuppoling
a | phat felt hight was noc yet over, nor the Sun yet rifen, he compofed himfelf again il to fleep, tilac lait awaking with his companions onthe third day, he returned to
ce | pie bead ’ believing ON the nEXC day following thar night wherein he w&$nc> gt grunkto ped, Anda story of Fable noc unlike a
cis related by Pliny in his 1 Book
&
a ny se
jyto the.
CHAP ee
Oo
Ps
2 PWAEE pene Seariatae:
nearness tn i aS TNT ATS reese
33
Time i of his Natural Hiftory ch. 52. of Epimenides.
femwmbat of Motion
The De- . fatision of in vefpett of former and latter.
Time.
a ra
Chap. 8.
—— annie
(oncer ning Time.
And dayly experience fuggelts the thelike. Timecheretore is not without motion, yea and fomwhat thereot is moti- on. For Lime and Motion are perceived togetber. For though we fic {til in che dark, and perceive no motion by any of our Senies ; if we conceive any in ourminds, pre- fently crime prefents itfelftherewith; and again, as often as we think of time, fome motion does alfo therewith offer it felfto our minds. Lime therefore is fomching of Motion: which whatitis, let us thus further fearch out. ri
, ismoved from {omwhat to fomwhat, that is to fay, from the rerm from which, to the term to which; fochat betweenthofe two rerms rhere liesa Magnitude. Now all Magnitude is continued, Andtherefore that mo- tion which is made continually, through a conunued magnitude, muft 1 felf be con= tinued : and confequently Time alfo muft be continued: for fo great as is the mo- tion, fo great is the Time - and a longer motion is performed in a longer time, a fhorter inafhorter. Moreover ih magnitude, thereis former and latter. or eve- vy magnitude is divifible inco parts, which are fo difpofed, that tome go before, others come after. For which caufe, there\is proportionably fomwhat which comes before, and fomwhat which goes after in motion : and thofe parts of a moti- onarefirft, by whichthe Movable is moved over the firft parts of magnitude, and thofe latter, by which it is moved over the laft. And for the famie caufe, alfo in time there muft be aformer anda latter 5 and fo motion inafmuch as it has former and latter, agrees with time, fo that by the diftinétion of former and latter if motion, we cometo the knowledg of time. For when we confider two Inftances or two extreams, wherewith morionisterminated, and underftand that there isa middle {pace betwixt thefe rwoextreams, prefently we conceivetime, Contrari- wife, when we conceive any thing under the notion of one Inftanc, and do not chink of two Inftances one former, the other lacrer: we perceive no time at
all. Frem what has been
W hatfoevever is moved
faid we therefore gather, that ‘Lime is the number of “Motion Which Definition that 1: may be more rightly
underftood and explained, thefe things are to be obferved. Inthe firft place, thar
A twofold Nymber is two-fold, the one Nmubring as two three &c. the other Numbred as two
number.
A Mea-
Stones, three Trees, four Men. The former, which is alfo called formal number, and wherewith wereckon, is one Ens or being of it felf, viz. difcreet Quantity, by cogitation abftracted from all matter, and perceptible by the mind: and ic is common to all things, nor is multiplied according to the variety of things numbred. Orthe word Number is taken two waies; Firft for Quantity difcreet, or a multi- tude confifting of parts diftinct one from another, or fer any meafure though conti- nued. Now time is nota humber in the firft, but inthe laft fenfe; nor is umea number wherewith we count ( feeing time is a continued Quantity, number a Quan~- tity difcreet ) bura number counted cr reckoned, vig. the parts of motion recko- nedup, For we mult not here pafs over, that fome diftinguifh betwixt a number nu- merable and numbred, and fay thata number nvmerable arethings, which have an aptitude to be numbred and diftinguifhed by the underftanding, although a&- ually they are not numbred : butanumber numbred arethiugs, which are already aétually numbred by fomebody. And they fay that time is a numiber nume- rable, ora motion, which may be diftinguifhed, {0 as to have fome parts going be- fore, others coming after, although there were. no man actually to number the fame. Erom whence it appears, that Time 7 a real thing. . For the aptitude to be numbred, or the numerability, does not depend upon the numberer, buc is in che time and metionitfelf. A numbernumerable is again twofold: the one which Co- heres to things which are really feparate one from another : and fuch a number time is not: the other, confifts of parts diftinguifhed one from another, notreally, but by our thoughts, as ifaiman fhould conceive fome continued magnitude dividedin- to ceftain parts; and {uch anumber is time. For it isa flux and continual {pin- ning outs of the parts of motion, which perpetually follow one another. Moreover this a\fo is to be cbfervedin this place ; -chat a Meafure is twofold:
c ° e . e . fure twor one formal which is called men{urata meafured, or menf{urabilis menfurables the o-
fold.
« ther Meafuring which is called active: which others exprefs by fayingthat time is che number of motionactively orpaflively. Forma! Meafure, is that which when ic
ry
¢
= NS TT a
ws? st > >
Vadine gedit
pi
- partsind continual flux.andfucceflion, fo chat when oneis;jpaft another prefently
' Z er eA et ra ot ty
h Toh a Bie C 3 ry (os wa
Chap. 8. oncerning Time. a 39 is in any fubjeét, it makes it formally meafurable; andthus every quantity, in- herent in any Subject, makes the fame to be formally meafurable,and his meafurce isas it Were an-accident in chat thing whofe.meafure icis. Buc Meafure meafuring, isthat which as arule meafures another ching. For this is alwaies without che thing which ic numbers and meafures.
Hence therfore a Queftion arifes ; Whether Time be.ameafure or number.with rebich being it felf out of motion, we number moiton : or whether time be tbe meafurable motion it felf 2? Andalchough Authors fay in both fenfes thac timeis a nun.ber or maeaiure ; yet primarily and principally, Limeis aformal meafure, and a number whichis numbred. -Ariffot. 1 Phyf. c.11.t-102 and.12.t-110. Forthe nature of time does not Cepend thereupon,in that therewith we number other things; but herein ic con- fifts,in that itisa motion numbred according to former and latter. Moreover tobe ameafure ( viz. meafuring or active ) is athing refpective: but rime is a thing ab- folure. It isnot therefore effential to time tobe a meafure meafuring. For as the HN effence of an Ell-yard does not depend upon meaturing, vig. that we fhould chere- i | with meafure Cloth or any otherchiag: but herein, in chat 1c is a {tick or other ma- Sal terial of fomany orfo many Foot long,to which ic afterward happens that we mea- Hi furefomwhat therewith: tothe Effence of time cenfifts herein, chat ic isa motion i numbred, and diftinguifhed according to former and latter, which afcer- ie ward is followed by this adjunct, viz. tobecome the meafure of other things, t So by time, which is dedcribed by the converfion ofthe Heavens, we meafure. the ia motions of otherchings ; andby the pares of time, hours, daies, months, years, {i we meafure iome whol motion or other, : 3
Tim @ a Meafere Meafureds
ee ~
Nor becatife time is a number; and a number does not exift without the AGion of Time is ie our mind; does it therefore follow, that cime is only a feigned ching, anda notion sr sy
of onr Brains. For we muft know that here are two things co be confidered intime; 1, Tipe Me Firft its Effence, which is a certain duration of the parts of motion; The other is two things Le i irs AfliGion or Adjuné, which is numerabilicy and menfurabilicy. The former, are. conf- wiz the abfolute effence of time, doesno waies depend upon our underftanding, derable. but it would remain though our underftanding weregone, Butmenfurabilicy does & 1 Ef ny in fome fort depend upon the operation of our mind. Forfeeing the patts of Time OR Flt are either adtually meafureds or havean aptitude’ro be numbred.; according tog, the Ad andas they are actually numbred, they depend upon che operation of. our mind, which beingtaken away, yet the menfurability would:remain ‘nevertheléfs, iN Nor when our Minds compates the parts oftime paft andifucure, joyns. them, and ry reckons 3 does it fe'gn any thing which is not,bur finds out che parts which were be- l forereally inthe morion. Foras an Ell-yard, when we.do notthink chereof, has a the Quantity of fomany or fo many Foot: yet the diftinétion and the marking I them out, is the work of our mindand Arc: foalfoMotion is of it felf.in nature, \ according to fucceffion, without the operation of ournminds 5 -but the, comparing of Hi the parts going’before and coming afcer,andche reckoning up che faidjparts, ,4sche
Agtion of our Mind. ical: 3
- Wemuftalfo in this place cake notice : that alchough time be-a reall thing, yet Time is
it is no permanent thing, which hasits parts together aétually prefenc and -perma- @ perme- li nent : bucit isa Succeffive thing, which hasno parc actually exifting, -buc.all.jirs *¢#? *bing va
2.
follows. Hin And we muft alfo here enquire for better underftanding ofthe definition; what what thar Hy things motion it is vbich is meant in the faid definition 2? Aud we are to know, that thing is chiefly and principally is underftood the:Motion of Heaven, whichis of all others 7hefe mo- moft known, :moft repular, uniform, and'perpetual: but efpecially the mation of ae che frit Movableor Primum mobile, of cheSunand the Moon, “by, whofe Motions eh eees Daies, Nights, Months and Years are defcribed. Bucthe common-Peopleattribute faision of no timetothe motion of che reft of che Scars; becanfe chejrmotions are to. che vul-. Time? gar unknown, . Howbeit Mathematicians, donot quite omitthefame. And.as the motion of'Heaven is univerfally commonto al Nations': even fo.al Nations ufechis Time. Howbeic, we muft nor fay, thactime is notatiall in other|Morions 3 for fee- ing there js former and:lattter.in every motion,and it may be accordingly numbred; inevery motion, alfo there: wilibe cime, §
ORE
REY TSE ye ewes Je’
a = nn
40 Concerning Time. Chap. 8.
whether Out of what hath been faid another Queftion arifes 5 Wheiber there be ona shere be time or many. To whichthatan anfwer may be given, we muft know. f&irft Ae atk That one may here be faid to be one in Number or in Sort. Secondly, ny ? That time as hath been faid 1s more or left principal, more principal is of the heavens,- Jef principal and fecondary, of all other motions. thirdly,
That there are two things in time, as che Schoolmen {peak, the one ‘Mu-
terial whichis motion, the other Formal whichisnumber. Hence we anfwet to
che Queftion, That the firft and principal time, # but one in‘Number. For as there isevery where, andin ail Nations but one motion of the Heaven:. fo is chere bur onetime, depending thereupon. But if crime be taken abfolutely, for the number
of every Motion, it isnot one in number : buic formally indeedicisoneinSorc, bur materially ic is many being Multiplied, according tothe Multiplicacion of motion.
For as feven trees and feven Hories, donot differ as they are feven, burt asthey
dre Horfes and Trees : even fo,what ever motions are together, do nor differ as they
are numbred according to former and latter, but as chey are peculiar motions.
Time therefore is formally one wich all, for the Nature of prefenr, paft, and fucure
jg commontoall, and thofe things which are diftinguifhed according to thefe dif- ferences of time, they are alfo diftinguifhed accord ng to cime: and they which agree in any of thefe differences, they alfo agree in tinie although they differ other-
wales. whetberin _ And now there comes another Queftion; Whether Reft fhould be added in the dafi-
. the defini- nition of time ? Becaufe not only the moti6ns of things, but alfo their reft, 1s num-
td ae bred by time, and as welreit as motion, is in time. 3ut no evident reafon per-
fhould be LWades, that we fhould mention Quiet in the definition of ume. For time is of ic
added? {e\f che nieafure of motion, but ofreft, by acc,dent. For Keft becaufe it hath nor former and latter, cannot of it {elf be meafured and numbred.. For reftis meafu- redby time, either as it is a privacion of motion, for che meafure of privation and habit isone and the fame: anda ching is faidco have refted fo longa time, as irhas not been moved, or as it fhould have been moved; if ic had been moved all thac while; or becaute the reft of one body is alwaies joyned with rhe motion of ano- clier, by means whereof, the reft is meafured.
whether And teeing time and motion do hang fo one upon another, this Queftion mutt al- time do ASbedifcufled: Whetber time do really differ from motion. Now. the fenfe of this veelly dif- Queftion muft be firft obferved. For the Queftion is. noc concerning the cime o£ fer from the Primum Mobile or furft moveable, conipared with che motions of other Bodies. motion? Bor hereof there is no Queftion, and all do grant, that the cime of the motion of
Heaven, differs really from the motion of other Bodies; feeing chéey are in feveral fiibjedts 3 but the Queftion is, Whether any time compared votth that motion whofe number and meafure it #7, do really differ therefrom. And although others do think otherwife : yet theirs feems to be the truer opinion, who conceive that motion does notreally differ from time.- Fortime is noching but mocrion nuabred, accor- ding to priority and pofteriority- , ?
What we Finally, This remaines to be explained in our définition’: what isto be under- ae to ux- {e0d by foré and afcer or Priority and Pofferiority. Touching: which we are to devftandty ¢ake notice, that fore andafter are not taken here abfolutely, fora bare refpec& priority. yrit'as added to the fubjett, and concretly for the parts. of motion, including fich a re-
fpett. For priority and pofteriority do in chis place fignifie noching elfe, then the parts of motion numbred, according: as they daft, and one follows ano- ther. The pa'ts °° The Parts of time are Paft and Future: which partsare both diftinguifhed and of time.”
Now wo . . : ‘ ae : : iso partofa Line.” For {fois nomtotime, asa poincistoa Line: now that. which
parrof eee time. - 18 CONtinued Zs not made up of indiviftble parts.
_ Wether Lattly,' Concerning tige we muft noremit do enquire vobetber it be in the porer of oharpe time to generate or corrupt things. And although ic 1s conimonly faid thac cimedoes corrupt: produce and perfect fome things, and corrupt other fome, and the Poets commuion-
ly fay, Time confumes all chings 5 Time'isa devourer: Times able to changeall
things, and chat nothing is ftonger then time, as may chiefly be feen in Ovid his
_ Calde Triftibus, Eleg.6. Yet we breifly anfwer wich Scaliger in Kis. 352. Exercitati- on: That Time astime bath no Force to effett anything. Kor feeingthacitis Quan- tity,
di
role ‘ink otion ccote
Chap. 9° C oncerning Metion.
tity, ic acts nothing. Andallthote effects are to be afcribedto things, which are sn of with Time. But Time ic felfis therefore faid to corrupt or generate things,. becaufe che Application of Natural Agents for the corruption or Generation of any: thing happensintime. And fo much for Time.
W hereunto for Affinities fake, though they donot properly belongtothis place, [think fictoad a few things rouching Avwm and Eternity. the term Ataym, al- though inthat fignification as it is diftinguifhed from Eternity, and comes fhorg thereoi as having a beginnings it was not ufed by Ariffotle nor the ancient Peripa- reticks and Plaroniits : Yet is ic at this day very much ufed by School divines and other noble Phylofophers, who diftinguifh ic boch from Time and Erernitys taking it for fuch a duration as hath hada beginning, but fhall have no end, which the attriburecoAngels, Now touching this fame Evim or AEveternity although there
ace fundry opintons of Authors: yet this fhalfutiiceus to fay inthis place; thacalh the Nature of /Ev sm or Abveternity, does confift herein, that zt 7 the Meafure of the:
duration of thofetbings, which bave a beginning but no end: or as {ome will have ir, It is the duration of things which bave no end butbavebad a beginning, Now the way ro meaiure this A:aum wherewith we are belt acquainted, is by. lis coexiltency, as they {peak, and its relation to lime. For we fay the Angels have dured 566T. years, whichis the Time fince the worlds Creation. Hence it is manifeft, chat févum differs from time and Eternicy ; from cime in refpect of che end which Time hath, but anm or Atveternity hath not; from Eternity, in re{pect of its begin-
ning, which Evzm hath, but Erernityhathnor. Which Leo Hebreus expreffedin
his third Dialogue of Love: The Aiveternity of Angels (faies he) is placed in the confines of Time and Eterniry.
But Eternity, although there are other fignifications thereof: yet properly ic Eternity fignifies a Duration which bath neither beginning nor End, In which fenfe, we fre what it is
quently meet with this definition thereofin Boetims : Eternity is atotal and perfect peffeflion of a boundlefs Life, allar once. Fer all the Effence of eternity confifts in immutability or unchangeablenefs. Forthac which is Eternal neither begins, nox ends, norisany way changed 5 buts almaies the fame, and hath its wbol Effence all at once. Whencethere refults two proprieties of eternicy , Firft, chat ic hath ne bound, in refpect of beginning or end ; Secondly, that iris allact once. For choygh we attribute daies and years to etermity, yee we do it only for our better under- ftandings fake. All which Plotinus cenfidering, in his 3, Ennead. Book. Che2. he faies, Brernity a life alltogetber, alvaies rebolly prefent, and not now one part aud afier another. bur thefe things belong norco this place. I conclude therefore with Auguftine, in his 12. B. de Civitate Dei, Cb. 12. Nothing lafts long which hath, onceanend andalthe bounded {paces of all Ages, if compared tu bounhdlefs ecers nity, atenotto beaccounted{mal, but notching ac all. Six hundred Millions of years or that fum multiplied by as many, fo that there were no name for the pro« duct ortotalSum, yet all compared to ‘Eternity is nothing; and if the faidfum be {ubfiracted from Eternity, not once ortwice, but as often as any accountants are
able to fwbftract the fame, yet fhould they never reach co the beginning of eternity, which hath no beginning,
Chap. 9. Concerning Motion.
WV E comenow to a.remarkable Adjun& of Natural Bodies, wig. Motioz, by y the knowledg of which we are brought acquainted with che greatelt parc of che moft abftrufechings in Nature ; and by the guidance whereof, ina manner al the knowledg of Natural things hath beenfound out. Now.co Queftion: whether there is any Motion, is the part only ofa contentious and froward perfon : fince it is difcerned by al our fences. And therefore Diogenes did Wel, who having heard the reatons of Zeno, whereby he endeavoured co prove that rhere was nomotion, he judged them not worth the anfwering, but only Rofe up and walked). iitimae ting that inthings fubject ro fence, we fhould believe ourfences, Which Ariftotle alfoapprovesiu his 8. Phyfic.. Chap: 3.T. 32. to fay tbat noting moves, andte-gey about to proveit, omiiting our fences,, is reeaknef of Underftanding;. | I.
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cheia and Gifferent : alchough {ome do confound them, wherein they arero blame.
Sah Chane 9.
Concerning Motion.
ooo
But as ic is moft known that there is motion : fo whac is the Nacure chereof,is fufh- ciently obfcure. Andtherefore, that we may the beccer underftand mbat motion is, we will in the firft place Eyenouns Ariftotle’s definition of motion, and diligently contider the fame ; by which means we hope to attain to a good degree of knowledg touching the Nature of motion. Thus therefore Ariftotle defines Motion in the 3.0f his Phylicks, Ch. 1. T. 16. Motion is the Aé& of tha: thing which sina poffibility, im
bis defini- aa mutch agit isina pofebility, or of that which ~ moveable, in as much aait is “Mover tion of mo- able.
In this definition firft we muft diligently confider the word Entelecbeia Ctranfla- ted Act) which as it is moft ufual in Aaa, and every where co be fonnd in his works; fois the fignification thereof not io wel known, and many have raken pains to find out the true meaning thereof: fo thaticisreperced of Heraolaus Burbarus avery learned Man, that having once attained tof; eak witha f{piric, he defired no- ching elfe of him, but that he would expound what the word Entelecheia in Ar jtotle, aid fignifie.
In the firft place, we aretonote that the words Endelecheia and EEntelecbeta are For as chefe words do herein differ, that Endelecbetais more ancient, being ufed by Me-
cheiadifer ander and Plato in his Timew, Yea, andcon monly by the people of Greece but
Enteletheia isa new word, witnefs Tully in the 1. of bi Tufculans Queftions, and by Ariftotle either invented or frequently ufed; fothey dffer alfoin De:ivatioa and Signification. For ‘Endelecbeia does figuifie a continual and perpetual mocion or agitation, fo called from en cai dein cai Helam to echomenon, becaufe ic is in the fub- ject and draws and moves the fame, @s appears from that Greek proverb Ranis endelechou{a coilainei petran, the ftil falling drop hollows the ftone. From Ari- frotleinhis 2.de generat. G corrup!. Chap. 10. and other Greek Authors.
But Entelechbeia is derived from en and telos er form Enteles and Ecbein,to have its 3
Dea end, to have perfection 5 and Entelecheiaif you would render it word for word, is
the having of perfection, or the poffeflicn of perfection : and Entelecheia is alwaies in Ariftotle oppofed co poflibiliry or aptitude, as may be feen m che 3. of bis Phyfick, Ch. 1. £. 2. inthe 5. of bis Metapbyfickr Ch. 2. and in his 2,de Anima. Ch. 1..7, 2. Out of which may be colleéted, what Entelecheta truly fignifies. For feeing a thing is faid to be ina poflibiliry to be fomwhat, when as yec icis not that thing which poflibly it may be: iitoledeii muft fignifie co be really and a¢tually chat which ie isfaidco be, and really ro have attainedtobe fuchia thing, and no longer tobe in 4 potentiality thereunto : and Entelecheia muft be that which perfetts and fils up the Pofibility or Aptitude of athing; and makes that the thing nsay novo really and perfett- ly be faid to bethat, mbich before it was {aid to be only 1n way of pofjibility or Aptitude : And co {peak all in fhort Entelechera is the filling up of the Pocenciality or Aptitude ofa thing. \
This being the fignification of this werd (which though new co che dul multitude, yet was known to wife men to whom Ariftotle wrote and not to pedancs, as Scali~ ger in his 307. Exercit. Set. 39+ has it) 1t is cheifly atcributed co the fubftanrial Form, For itis the fubftance and perfection ofa thing, and becaufe of it aching istreally that whichit isfaid tobe. Andindeed, as Franc. Piccolbomineus faiesin his 4. Cb. de Motu, Entelecheia is applied, as wellro formes free from matter asco fuch as are joyned thereto: which opinion of his feems to be countenanced inthe 3. B. of Phyficks Ch. 7. Text 3. Howbeit Zabarella herein diffents from him 77 bis