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4 Chap. 1. Of Philofophy in General.
| j ¢; He words Sophia and Philofophia, are of kin one to another-s the former \s| th ee z3 eos being of more Ancient ufe then the lacter, For tliofe Men who were by’
OO and , Becaufe chis Ticle, feemed inicfelf, coo much favoring of Artogances and many’ The terme. | imenvoid of all tcue Witdome, did for gaine or honors fake,make profeffion thereof, terming Pylafephy _ |} themfelves Sopbous and Sopbigas, thatis tofay, Wife Men or Sages: Pythagoras, borhte
| i |
chofe all by common confent co be called Phylofophers, Lovers of Wifedom, rather then’ Sophoi or Sopbiftaiy Wifemen or Sages. Sochat, if we confider the Original of che word, -
Magy
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(Ka Gice =e the French termed Druides; by che Egyptians, Priefir, by che Per-
LAG T a fians, Magi ; by the Indians, Gymnofopbifts, Bracbmans and Samanet 5 BSc Se being pecions wholly emploied in che Inquifition of Truth, and reputed /POZCRAA
S2,O89 by che Ancient Greeks were cermed Sophos and Sopbiftaz, that is to fay
Wife-men or Sages. /
avoid che Arrogance of thac Title (for God alone is truly wife)-and co diftinguifh himfel “\from fuch men as were wile only in Name, alfocodeclare chat Wifdom is. no common thi * nor within the reach of every Man; was che ficft chat changed this Name, refufing to be ca
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co excell all ochers in the Knowledg of great and excellent things: cheyy ,”
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"|Sopbos, that isto fay a Wifemar or Sage, and choofing in ftead thereofthe Title of Pb,’ fe _\fopbos, aPhbylotopher, or Lover of Wifedom; aswe find it recorded by Cicero inche frft
| | ‘Book of his Tafcalans Queftions, and by Pistarch in his Third Book of the Opinions of
| Phylofophers, Chap, 3.
The Novelty of this modeft Tirle was fo pleafing to learned Men of all Sects, that they.
a Sapientia and Phylofopbia, Wifedom and Phylofophy, are of one and che fame
import. 2 Howbeic, The Word Sapientia, is commonly takenin a more ftricke fence, fo asto fig-
- nifieche Mecaphyficks, as being reputed che moft fublime and excellent of all Theoreticle
“Sciences and confequently termed ‘Prote Sophia, the principal parc of Wifedom, and Prote
Phylofopbia, the moft excellent Phylofophy. Whereas on the contrary :fide, ‘the fame + word Sapientia,or Wifedom is ufed ina larger fence by .Ariffotle in che fixch Book of his | Etbicks writen to Nichomachws, Chapter, 7. whére icis attributed unco Attificers and
| Phydias a carver in {tone and Polycletus a maker of Stacues, are termed Sapienter or
| wile Men.
t
Buc as che word Phylofophy is fufficiently known co all men ; fo are there very few thac underftand che crue definition of che thing icfelf “For chofe main Definitions thereof, which goup and down among learned Men,are rather defcriptionsand Encomiums,chen right
_ ome
| Plato bre) Definition | of Phylo« |
Definitions. ‘Plato defcribing the fame in his Dialogue cecmed Ppedo, calls ic The contem- {ophy.
| plationof Death. For, there beingatwofoldkind of Weach, the one natural, which is a ~ Separation of the Sauland Body ; andthe other {uch a Death as whereby ch e Soul continue ing in che Body, is weaned from Earehly things: abandons vitious defires, and pivesic felf
| wholly upcoche Contemplation of the moft Excellenc Objects: and feeing” Phylofophy . ceacheth, this fame Abftraction and Sepacation of the Soul fromthe Body,which isas ic were .
: _ the Prifon thereof, and che Garment of Ignorance, whereby itis clouded 3: chesefore Plato | “ , D
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! things, and chat) J aedeh Action whereby he Rulesand Difpofes all : Phylofophy makes a man capable of both there ey bavé : ble. For fhe both teaches us co contemplate all chings, and cu ra
as far as human Nature is capable. — 6° yep ari guide our Actions by the Rules of Honorand Honefty. ety DY Cicero his That alfo isa common Defintion of Philofophy which was ufed by che Stoicks and by, nly a | Definition. Tully in the Second Book ofhis¢ “ces, Viz, That Philofophy is the knowledg of all th TASH HD \ologht divineand biiinan. By human chirigs under ftanding all chiogs corporeal and Lubject COOULL doth fences ; andby things divine,imeaning all fuch chings as being incorporeal are nor fubject t« Chy9
a fenfes, bite perceptible only by the underftanding. Or by
5 ! ins : Real | ovale may be underftood, as tend tothe Prefervacion and Progagation of this morcal hfe and civif |
a8 tranicend vulpar Ca paciy),
ties. : 34 ’ ie | on, thet
Ariftorles There are alfo certain definitions of Phylofophy extant in the writings of Ariffotle,as where amet
Definition, in the ficft Book of his Metaphyficks, Chap. 1. he faies, it ische Science of Truth > and in Tet
another place (though this feems ro be intended by him, as a definition of ‘Metaphyficks On Fania
ly) he faiesthat, Phylofophy is the knowledge of all things that are, not particularly, but
generally confidered. xe DH \at Soca Phylofophy _ Neverthelefs, as we faid before, thefe are not tight definitions, but exher Encomiums da
cannot be Laudatory ‘Elogies,or Tolerable defcriptions, not containing che crue kind nor the ditt exalily de- ence of the thing defined. ‘Yea an
d che very cruch is Phylofophy cannot be exactly defird) ins fate”, becanfe it is not Genus Univocum,.and hasa nature diftinct from its parts. ‘Neither {1 ofPylol \ Homouymal! (for the parts chereof agree more then barely inname) but fuch aizoneas they) Fa di
term Ab ungoadunum. For we mutt noc chink that Phylofophy is fome one fcience con= yy, verfant abou: fome peculiar fore of being : but that ic is che‘totall kind, comprehending all the teydn Sciences in the world. For all things cannot be known by one habic of the mind, but by rtaa {divers : which when chey are all conjoyned, they make that perfection of knowledg, which re ae | called Phylofophy.’ And therefore all the definitions of Phylofophy which are ufually | Fyoe | tought, do'fwerve from the perfeé Law of a Definition, a Sas \ haa 11s Defi) Howbeit: from what has been already faid, we may colleg this following defcriptions | |.
tion. Phylofopby # an ‘Habit of ibe Underftanding , confifiing in Wifdom ana Prudence, as that whicb contemplates ali tbings, and fo guides ibe atti- fe,
ons of aMan, as that be may attain the Summum bonum, 0
r cheif Felicity of wbich he is Pho in this Life capable. For feeing a Man is perfected by Phylofophy, and thereby | y,., qualified, icmuft needs bea certain quality ar accidental form, by which a man is made fit to :
‘ : ; za ta ’ betel perform all the ations and Duties belonging to: che human Nature. And tt is {uch a kind of nae quality as is not born with us(for no man is borne aPhylofopher)but attained, being no other Ave chen an habicual abilicy, not of the body (for it is nor the body of a man but his mind which
wants gisettion ) but of the underftanding. And therefore Phylofophy is defined to bed a
twofdlg@Mabi of che underfanding, viz. Wifdom and Prudence, under which terms latel4 ie :
lection and fcience are comprehended, AD ices The divi. ~ We are now to confider how Phylofophy ougheco be divided into Its parts ; which isa ne Gon of tbing wherein Authors are nor agteed. The Stoicks haye divided Phylofophy, into nacura! ‘bylofophy Moral ahd rational;under natural Phylofophy, takidg the phrafe in a large fence, they com i accol ug Soe not only Phyfica or the Doétrine of Nature, properly fo called, but alfo Metaphy \ 32 the Sto- ficks and Mathematicks : by mora] Phylofophy
| icks ' they underftand that Do@rine which repuls. pokes ates the manners and aGtions of men; and by r
: ational Phylofophy or Logick that which - teaches us how to reafon, argue, and find out thetruch, And the eruth of this divifion, they rs thus endeavor ‘to prove. _Seeing the happinefs of a man, which Phylofophy aimsarc, does fuch confift/parcly in the actions ofvittue, andparcly in che contemplation of truth, hencetwo 7 puts of Phylofophy arife; the one of which inftrudts our Manners and ations according to he. the Rules of virtue, and is termed Moral Phy lofophy > the othe is bufied in che Inquilition of truth and huneing out the fecrer myfteries of Nature, and is termed Phyficay or natural ae Phylofophy. And becaufe in the fearchof Truth, |
: : ; y Whac f
We arévery apt tomuiftake, a chird pare il
is neceffary, ‘to teach us the way and mechad of reafoning; which from Logos, reafon, is od
called Logic#, Logiak, or the Art of Reafoning. ‘eS
de Cos i 4 But } ’ A
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V ehapa Of Pinlnly im General. saa 2:
|
er 7 ee eee | he 3a this Divifion of Phylofophy is by very many and chofe very learned interpreters of Chetry. peme | «i \d But this &ed. both becanfe the word Phyfica is thereta improperly, aled, efyp th ee
iat |” and becaule it makes Logick a pact of Phylofophy. Fortheincent of Phylofophers was, to EG include in this divifion fuch difciplines, as (seat about fome real kind of being, the ki owledg whether th whereof denominatesa man to be wite ora Phylofopher, and Logick ts no {uch Difcipline. Logick is
thi. | For the Reatons of chings are not. che ee pees iene fy coe Pee ead 2 ani yay |. they have fome tort of beeing 3 for in thts relpect Chey elang to Ma@tapny ens 5 ee (| orinas much as tiey are framea by che mind of man, for fo they belong co natural Phylofo- ll 4 phy 5 but only as inftcumengs, profitable co denote our firft conceptions, and iuch things as a hyloforhy, but che inftrument of a Phy-
\ihig' || eruly.ace. And therefore Logick is not a pate of P baad. Ce ; | Jofopher, toguide his underftanding, being invented not for 1ts own fake, buc for the.betrer 2
|| qanderftanding of all other {ciences. Which Ariftotle confirmesin che ficft Book of his Topicks Chap. 9. Where he calls ic the Handmaid of Phylofophy, vet. my intent 18 n0e conrenacuily ‘vy co wrangle with any man that fhal be of che opinion of Pererius in the fecond Book of his : Natural Poylofophy,Chap, 18. vig. That when it is difputed whether Logick be a Science or AY, f the Controverfie is rather couching words and the manner of Expreffi- i
a part of Phylofophy, tl ae i | vhf ON, then che ching it felf, fome taking the words Phylofophy and Science 5 10 a larger, others iy" ail in a more prefs and proper fignificatton. 5 eae ie icky on Toletus divided Phylofophy sto three parts, Speculative, Active and Factive : taking the ; he see \ oy, by ground of his divifton from that Ignorance which Phylofophy cures 10 us, which is threefold, 4h x Lh
{ eicher of the Truth, and chat parc which heales chis, teaching us co fina out che truth, tscal- ; i , may ded Speculative or contemplative Phylofophy ; or icis Ignorance how, to act and play our dif parts upon the flage of chis world,and chat which cures this, teaching us Co conform our AGi- Ni ‘iif | ons co che Rule of right Reafon, 1s called Adtive Phylofophy 3 ot finally iris the Ignorance \ ther of rhings neceffary co nfaincain and preferve our Lives, and that is healed by che Fadive pare
of Phylotophy, under which is comprehended all cutious mechanical Artifices. But, though The faid | |
an chis divifion be crue in refpect of che principal difciplins: yet is ino good divifion of Phy lo~ divifion a fophy. For, the Pattive Difciplines are not to be reckoned as. part of Phylofophy 5 For, refuted.
ia chey do neither contemplate things divine; nor do they regulate thefe actions which are pro- Man; norishonefty the thing they aime at, but Profit, nor does the chief good and
wht it per Co a 3 : ; : He | Belicity ofa mancontift in them. And whois there that dares reckon Smiths, Carpenters, a | — Joyners, Weavers and fach like Accificers, amongft Phylofophers? For they are only the
Servants of civil Policy. And therefore Lucian juftly derides thofe, which reckon Arts me-
he, chanical as a parc of Phylofophy, when {peaking of one chat was abouc co dig upia Feild, he ini. | ~—faies, chac with bis Spade he would play the Pbylofopher.
i a Ic is therefore to be obferved, that thename of difcipline is of larger Extent then that of The name Maye Phylofophy, and chat all Difciplines are not comprehended under the Notion of Phylofophy. of difci-
tly Yer has Phylofophy obtained this peculiar dignity, thar all difciplines are either a part plin larger
si tee or fruits growing and refulting there from; or an inftrument provided and ficced for pyyjpryppy | mi its Service. |
voce I, for my part, takethat to be che crueft divifion of Phylofophy, which 1s delivered by SAriftorle whi Ariftotlein the Second Book of his Metapbyficks, Chap. 1. and rerained by all forcs:Ofunter= his divifi-
dio te preters, VIZ. 10CO Speculacive and Practical. The Speculative parc, is chat which’ concem= 9
ms ate places all beings or chings, with cheir Principles and Affections or Qualifications, only, fox
oe knowledg and truths fake: But che practical part of Phylofophy ts chat whofe fuby ect is che
tit | ~ AGtions of Men, which ic regulates according to the Rule of right reafon and Honefty 5 aad
puta, does cherefore teach us not ouly coknow buctodoalfo, For feeing the mind which Phylo- The fame
y call fophy isto inform and frame, has cwo patts, the Incellective or underftanding part, and che confirmed ett Appetitive or defiring part, they make a double end, and it makes two parts of Phylofophy 5 fret ak hrequ § the Speculative, which perfects the knowing or Jocelletive pact of che Soul or mind, and the nhs fue
c will praétical,which moderates the Appeticive pare of the mind,and regulates our affections. So
i thac the Duties of a wife man are two, ¢o contemplate all things thae are, and to performe
ty 084 {uch actions as arebeft, and moft fuitable to che Life of a man. Orimore briefly, to contem- } att place chings divine and regulate human affairs. For, after that (co ufe the words of Marfilius . ing ‘Ficinus in che fourth Book of his Epiftles)che Mind of a Phylofopher,has concemplaced what ! wi is the firft good or goodnels it felf,judging in human affaires,what things are paod & what ba@
cul whac filchy and unleemly ,and what honett & comely ; what proficable,and what unproficables
ol | according to the pattern thereof he difpofes AS affairs of men 3 draws chem fvom chat which
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slices tink poh dia
Bere Skedn, — i aaias -
“Of Piylfphy in General. Shape,
Secondly : Saere: ; the from But moftimmediatly from.its end: howbeit diftinée Objeéts do p
Obed.
Of things. neceffatily made, which though they are nor alwaies bur are made ;
Third! : v4 af vine dle a matter, onlythat we may know it, or that befides the k
end,
Object, 1,
Anfwer.
a a Obpett, 2
Anfwer what Pra- xis i.
Threeforts 0, actions fubje é 10 ibe will,
ha tween
“Ys evil, and by this prudence of governing, he rules his own private Family, and the
common-wealth, and teaches. che lawes and waies of che Adminiftration thereof. Nor was this divifion unknown to che Platonicks, For thefe are the two wings wherewith the mind of man fliesupto Heaven, from whence being weighed down with Earthly Cogitations, it had before fallen : concerning which fee Plato in his Dialogues cald Phado and Phadrus, and Marfilins Ficinws in the firtt Book of his Epiitles Page, 612. . gh as .
The Verity of che faid divifion is further demonftrated, from thee
nd and Object.
roduce difting
ends. For fecing every difcipline is converfant about fome one ching. or other : and”
there are two kinds of things, ‘as is apparent in Ariflosle his fixth Book of Ethicksto © Twokinds Nicomacbus, Chap. 3. Some chings being neceflary, others contingent
, and of thofe uncorrupted; others
yet arethey ° not produced by us; but by nature, working by cegtaine éaufes - Now the contin-
gent are {uch things as may or may not be, and whofe principle is in the doer and not inthe thing done, which depend upon our will, inthe power whereof it is, to effect them or not.. Hence we gather, there are two patts of Phylofophy, one which is bulied about the chings neceffary, and the other about. things contingent, And this diftinction of things, does alfo produce divers Ends. For either we han-
nowledg we may effect the fame: a third cannot be afligned. For the things which alwades are or which aremade, buc by Nature and not by our felves, we theréfore handle, that we may know theirnature. For whatiwas ever fo made, as to endeavor to effect fuch things as ate only poflible for Nature, buc impoflible for all the Men in the world to effect? But thofe things which are not alwaies, and may be effected by us, wedo not handle only to know them, but chat their Nature being difcovered we may learn to effectthem, Andthereforethofe former difciplines, which are converfant abouc things, notfor any operation, but for knowledg fake alone, are rightly termed {peculative fciences, or {ciences abfolutely and properly fo called. Buc the other difciplines, which are verft in contingent things, or fuch things as are fibjectro our will, are called difciplines or {ciences (the word {cience improperly taken) praéti- cal and operative.
Nor let any Man here object, that al Sciences and allarts do contemplate and fpe- culate one thing orancther, and dire&us tothe effecting fomwhat or Other, as Na- tural Phyloicphy leadsus to natural magick, the Art of healing Difeafes &c. And in Geometry there aremany Theorems which teach us to do fomwhac, asto Raifea perpendicular upona right line given, Foral Sciences, abfolutely, and in refpect totheir end are concemplative, and refpett no action: but the other difciplines, though they.are bufied alfo in the knowledg of things : yet they donot {ubfiftchere- in, but fuch as are active do thereby govern their a¢tions, andthe Fadtive have on ly their workmade, for their end. “Nor does Geometry confider thofe Theoremeés that it may effect any thing; buc only thacitmay contemplare the affections of its fubject, and find out-the Truth: But the difciplines fubject thereunto, do after- wards make ufe of the {aid Theoremes, to effect fomew hat, Which when they do, they pafs the bounds of the higher fciences, as may be feen in Agriculture or Husban- dry, and others.
Nor lec chat trouble-us which {ome fay, viz. That Contemplation and Aédtion are {o nearly combined, that one cannot be feparated from che other, And that there- fore no true difference can be affigned inthis refpedc, feeing Contemplation ic felf is anaction, and that therefore the fciences while they teach us tofpeculate, teach us to Ad, Forevety energy or Operation of a Man is not termed Praxis in this Cafe, but fuch as is fubjeG tothe command of the will, and{eeing many Errors may hap- pen thereabouts, icneeds a cettainhabic, which being inherent in the practical un- derftanding, fhould be its rule as it were in acting. Now thofe Actions which are fubjeét to the willare threefold: Qne proceeds from the willic felf, as Election or choice ; aiecoud proceeds indeed from another power, yet isunder che command ofthe will agthe Operations of che wrathfal and luftful faculties of the Soul: and and touchity: this we cheifly {peak in this place. - The third of it felf, isnor fubject tothe wikis but in fome relpect, as the operations of che Speculative underftanding, (ee :
: \X )) are 4 iat
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which are neceflary, fonie are fimply eternal, ungenerated and
a ——_ESESE
}
foe
which Theotl thele a bekno bit 11 thema abe Math his foi whic nah Wich Quant * CP oN es AUN jet Mather
Latter
"ls Chap. 1. Of Phylofophy in General. 5 Wthe are {0 far fubject to the will, as they areperformed at chiscime, and fo long or fo. (1 ret long, OF according to other Circumftances. Thefe therefore, asthe-former, feéing \ Moy they are not fimply fubject co our will, do alfo not pertaine cothis place. Wemay “OW therefore well grant, that contemplation is an action, that is an act accerding tothe inward energy or operation of the Mind: but no exiernal act, fuchas that is, In re- Ofbis {pect whereto, one patc-of Phylofophy is.faid toipeculace,another to act. For this | internal action isno way different from the knewledg of che truth, asin practical ed Difciplines whole action differs fromthe knowleédg of Truth, and whofe end does
nd not reft inthe crurh known, but befides chat, mroceeds to work fomewhat.
id
sto And feeing as has been faid before that Phy lofophy has more then one fingle fagni- | i fications itistobe marked, that thisnameis accribuced principally and primarily Hf hes co the Speculative part, and confequently and inthe fecond place to the Pradtical.
they For they are commonly termed Phylofophers, who apply chemfelves to the Scien- i ath. ces; and who profefs thenfelves skilful to govern che life of mar. ay | | ad And this is the general divifton of Phylofophy : afterwards each parcis fubdivi- The (ub- }}
\0 1 ded. -Ariftotleim the fixch Book of his Metaphyficks Chap. 1. Divides the {pecula- divifion of I Mit |" “rive part of Phylofophy into Phyfica, Mathematica, and Metaphyfica. Which di- Peculative
gent, vifion truly, was both received by the Ancients, and is this day in ule, and has its Phylofophy | lan reafonstofupport ic. For fince the diverfity of Objects breeds a DiftinGion of {ci- Thefime'. ity | ences,it is manifeft that there are no more nor fewer faiences,thenthe chree aforefaid. drrgonfya- \\ to | = For a being is confideredtwo waies, Univerfally and Parucularly. That Science jed, | te | which confiders the whole and Univerfal ftate of Beings as beings, 1s Metaphyfica. uch | Phe other Sciences confider a being in Particular, and fome forc of being. And tl dro] thefe aretwo, as there isatwofold fort ofbeings. The one isin matter and cannot Edo be known without matter, and this Phyfica confiders: The other is indeed in matter, ce Si} * but ic may be feparated therefrom by our thought, and may be known diftin@ frem \ bout the matter, whichis handled by Mathematica. Andtherefore Meiaphyfica confiders
ined a being, only asitisa being: Wbyjica, confiders itas it is moveable or natural :
Mathematica as it is abftracted from Matter. But, as “Pererins inthe firft Book of
his Phyfica, Chap. 7. Rightly faies ic would not be abjurd, if aMan fhould adda
fourth Science, which fhouldtreat of {pirits and{ubftances fepacated from matter, |
which fome at this day term Pueumatica. Yeait wereno Abfurdity to add a fifc, Paexmati- which fhould treat of fuch things as might be naturally known concerning God. Ca.
Again there are feveral forts of Mathematical difciplines. For cheir fubjeét is Mikene
Quantity 5 which being double continual and difcrece, there wil aifo be two Scien- teat Ba ces purely Mathematical, Arithmetick and Geometry. Mutick 1s dubordinare CO plines ‘di- Atithmetick, from whence it borrows itsprinciples, and confiders Number as itis vided iato (4 joyned withfound. This according to Ariftotle inhis firft Polteriorais twofold, pwe amd \\i
efe- Mathematical and aconftick; but the former istruly and properly a Science, che™*""
ly Latter is ratherto becermedan Art. Stereometria which contiders'the DoGrine of folid bodies is apart of Geometry. Nor isit f{ubordinat co Geometry, becaufe ic
does not confider Quantity with any Contraction, and addition of matter and fenfi-
c = a = f
fer | ble quality 5 nor is it ofa middle Nature becween Phy fica and Geometria: bur purely do, | Matheriaticals fecing ic quite feparates its fubject fromfenfible matter. To Geo-
_— = 7
| merry, Perfpective is fubalrernate or fubordinate, which confiders a line as it is vi- | fible: Now Geometry and Stereometry do bring forth Sundry difciplines, which
ate are in fome fort of a middle Nature betwixt Mathematical and Phyfical : yet are they
re? called Mathematical, becaufethey ufe Mathematical principles, and confiders all
fis } theirfubje@tsin relationto quantity. Suchare: The Doctrine of the Raine-bowe,
1 | Aftronomy, Cofmography, Geography, Chorography; Topography. Thencealfo
ale afterward fundry Mechanical Arts do arife. ie Map| The other part of Phylofophy was the Pradtical. Bur.Praxis takenina large Typ, fub- |" tf fenfe. comprehends under it Poiefss and ‘Praxis, roperly fo called. Now Praxis division of | | ue J or Action differs from Poiefis or working, seceding to Ariftotle in the fixth of by Prattical | nor | Etbicks to Nicomachus Chap. 4. andthe firft Book of bis Magna™Moralia Chap. 35. In¥ hylofopby
und that Action does leaveno Work behind it : but Working or Poiefis is {uch an Opera- ‘ and tion as leaves awork behind ir.’ From this cwofold fignification’of the word rf ett Pradtite, two kinds of difciplines arife, Active difciplines, and Fadire difciplines,. » 02, The factive are the Atts, as was faid before, and donot belong to Phyl¢ fophys But | are Y pat ; \the oe
) ( 4 . X \ x { )
{ )
oe ee,
FE ie VE
Chap. 2.
the active part of Phylofophy is divided into Etbica, Politica and Oeconomica. Asctothe Utilwy of Phylofophy, though that be cheifly to be regarded in che Pra-
The thtility _
and necefi-Ctical parc: yer has rhe fpeculative alfo its eee et which weread much every. 1
ty of vby- wherein Authors. Two Teftimonies fhalifutitce in this place. The firft is that of tofophy, Former Trifmegifius in his Book Entitled, Of Piety and Phylojopby. ‘He that zs pious and Godly # an exat Phylofopber. For peitbout Phylofapby it 1s impo ffeble to be per- fettly religious. But bewbich knowes the things that ares and hove they are ordered, and by whom, and for whom: be will give tbanksto the cbetfemorkmafter, as to agood Father, a loving Nurla and a faithful Steward: And be that gives thanks is Godlys and be that is Godly and Pious, fhallknow, botb w Jere she trutp is, and what it, and the more belearnes, the more godly will he grow. 1 he Second is that of Scaliger, in his 307. Exercitation Set. 3. The Searching into thefefubtilies, although it be not profit able to make Windmils or watermils to grind Corn; Yet it {coureth off tbe ruft of Ignorance from our Minds and wbets and prepares 1 to the knowledg of other things 5° in a.voord, fills it voith fo much (plendor, that it can light it felf to gain the fimilitude of the fir{t work- mafter : vobo as be is fully and perfettly all things, and befides and above all things : fobe will bave thofe to be bis, that are fiudious of theSciences , and has made their underftan- ding, Lord of all things. The plea- Finally, How great the pleafure is which arifes from the knowledg of Phylofo- fure of _ phy and-cheifly che Speculative part thereof, Ariffotle teaches 1n his firft Boak de Pbylofophy Partib. Animal. Gap. s5. ifkall here fet down what Cebivs Rbodiginus, in the fe- ventb Bookand Chap. 30. of bis Antique Lettiones, Cites out of “Maximus Tyrius. Youknow, faith he, whatitis that ltbin, the Speculation of a Phylofopber does moft xefemble? Viz. A manifeft, clearand flying dream. For bis Body remaining {afe and found, ba mind runs althe world over; itis carryedfrom Earth to Heaven 3 2t paffes over the wbole Ocean Sea 3 it flyes through therebole Aire; with the Sun it coinpaffes the Earth, with the Moon it walkes the round 5 it joynes 1t felf to the dance of the other flars, dnd comes little fhort of bearing a {hare with Fovebimfelf, im the Mannagement of all things. O Happy Pilgrimage | O Beautyful fhewes ! O mofetrue and real Dreams !
Chap. 2. Ofthe Nature of Phyfica, or Natural Phylofophy.
Eing we areto treat of Natural things, it is altogether requifite, that we declare
in the firft place what Difcipline that is whieh treates of Natural things, which we cannot do more convenienrdy then by enquiring inco the kind and fubje& (from whence the difference in definition of Sciences is taken }) of Phyfica, or Natural Phylofophy.
The Genus Astoits kind, though fomedo tlin confounding Arc and Science; yetall true or kind of Phy lofophers and Peripatecicks.are agreed, chat Phy fica or Phylofophy natural, is Piplofopky a Science : fince the definition of af{cience does properly agree therete. For it de-
monftrates in aneceflary fubject the proper affections by the proper Caufes : as very many demonftrations touching things natural, do wirnefs. And foalfoic is called by Ariftogle, in the Third of bis Phyfichs, Chap. 4 Text,24. and the Second of bis “Metaphbyficks, Chap. 3. Textthe Third, and che fame is by him plainly proved, in the Fourth of his Metapbyficks, Chap. 5. Text tbe 23.: And although it be reported, lapahd that of old, ‘Heraslitus, Cratilus, and Pythggoras, heldthere was no knowledg of ipnomledgop hatuEAL things, buc only opinion; and Socrates being di{couraged by the Mutabiliry Natural Ofnaturalchings, and becaufe he choughr he had no certain knowledg of them, leav- things, ingthefame, gave himfelf wholly to moral Phylofophy; Alfo Democritus come plained of the deep pit of ruth which had no bottom, and Empedocles of the nar- row paffages of the fenfgs; yet it feemes moft probable that thefePhylofophers did not deny all knowledg,: but rather modeftly diflembledtheic own knowledg, chen confefled their Ignorance; feeing what we know in comparifonto what we know not, islicclemore then nothing; and taxed their Arrogance who did. vainly boaft of their own Wifdome. Andas for the new Sect of Academicks who did not only deny that there was any knowledg of things natural, butthac there was any know-
’ ledg of any thig, they areelfe where refuted. Nor let that trouble us, becaufe in natural Phy’ ofophy many times probable Reafonsare invented. Forthefetake nor \ ) away
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fubjet Adio ed al band! andal fant t mwh ficati Prine WI jel lect deinc ching takel cond ( ples, Scien evely IS Noe’ tothe deliy Conti Conti ing, for ton, Wei Yu Any of th En) able Being Other
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- Of the Nature of Natural Phylofopby. | | 7 ,
Chap. 2. away from the neceflity of the Sciences cruth, but do often prepare and fencerhe way to following demonftrations, or are ufed to declare che principles.
We mutt therefore hold that Pbyfica or Natural Phylofophy is a fcience and that properly fo called, viz. Afpeculative {cience, as appears out of the fixth of Ariftotles Metapbyfichs Chap. 4. And out of the firft of Metapbyficke Chap. 6. Although it be ina mannet fuperfluous to ad the term {peculative, feeing. if we take the word Science properly, all Sciences arefpeculative: now words are not co beimproperly ufed in Definitions.
Now as concerning the neceflary truch of Phyfica or Natural Phylofophy, we mult Natural obferve,thac chere are in chis Science two forts of Propofitions 3 fome are alwaies and Phylofophy fimply neceffary, as che fireburnes: the knowledg whereof is moft properly called bas two Science: others are neceffary for the moft parc, concerning fuch things, asare in fats of their fubject, only in acertaine ftate, or for the moft parr, and when all impedi- P/opaftt ments are removed 3 as a Man is born in the ninth Month, wich two hands, two Eyes,”"* twoKidneys. For thefe difpolitions are of a middle Nature becwixt co xingent and necefflary, and therefore fome do call them neceflary, by aPhytical or natural Neceflicy.
Now before we fpeak of the fubjec&t of Phyfick or Natural Phylofophy, fome The (ubj.é things are co be premifed concerning the word fubject.. For chis word has fundry ¢bereof. figuifications. 1. A fubject isthat wherein there are accidents. 2. A fubjed is that part of a propolicion of which fomwhat is afirmed. ge Uhe matter is cermed a jy. yyy fubject in refpect of itsforme. 4. A thingis faidtobe a fubje& in’ refpect of fomeyany wai s Action and Operation; and itisthatabout which che Arcift or workman is employ. wed ? ed and whereupon he exercifes his Labor. 5. That iscermeda fubject, which is handled inany Science. Now icis fo called, becaufe ic is fubjected to fuch accidents and affections as are demonftrated therein, as alfo becaufe our knowledg is conver- fant thereabour. And inthis laft acceptation, we do here take the word Lab jeCE sities yor in which fence neverthelefs, it istaken divers waies. For firft ina more large figni-derQood in fication, all chat is cermed fubjedt, whereof wecreac in any Science, whether ic be 4 the place ? principle, anaffection and accident, or any other thing. Buc properly that thing or macter which is therein coofidered is called the {ubject of a Science, whichfub- 7), pro- ject has thefe Properties. Fir, That we know chatit isin Nature alwaies and perties of necéffarily, and what the name thereof fignifies. And cthereforethe fubject is never we fubjett demonftrated in its proper Science. For feeing it is the Bafis and Foundacion of al] of 4 “iene things delivered in the Science, if that fhal be called inro Queftion, denied, and takenaway, all things thar are {aid thereof, are denied And taken away. TheSe- cond condition is, chat ic haveproper affections or difpofitions, and proper princi- ples, ofall which ic isthe Bafis and Foundation. And therefore a fubje&, inthac Science wherein ic isa fubje@t,,is not confidered as inherent in aly other things and every thing that ts conlidered in any Science, as being inherent infome other thin 2 is not the fubjedt of chat Science. The third is, chat ic be adaquate or commenfurate tuthe whole Science,and noc wider or narrower then ity,and that all things which are delivered in the Science, do pertain to the Explication ‘thereof, Of a fubjeck thus conlidered there are two parts: one isas at were the matter, and is termed the thing '¥9 parts contidered 5 the other isin ftead of the form, and is termed che manner ofconfider. ea ing. Theching confidered, may be commonto many difciplines ; bue the manner of conlidering, which contraéts the ching toa certain and peculiar way of confidera- tion, is proper to every Science, and thereupon properly depends the diftingtion ofSciences. ‘
Touching this Adazquate fubject of Natural Phylofophy, there is fome differer amongft authors, moft ofthe Greek Incerpreters of .Ariftotle, do make the fib jeck opinions of of this Science to be Corpus Naturale, a Natural Body 5 »Thomas Aquinas Laies it is Phylofo- €ns Mobile, a Moveable being 5 Albertus and HHigidius fay iris Corpus Mobile, a move-Pbersabout able Body 3 Scotus wil have it to be, a Natural fubftance ; Toler makes ic,a Natural ‘” [“e& Being;others fay it is Nature,by nature underftanding God and Angels and al Bodies, p, : psi others again wil have it co be nature, meaning thereby al things pertaining to natural. yeofopry Bodies {uch asare not only the compound bodies themfelves,but alfo their principles and affections or difpofitions : others fay icis Ens Mobileja moveable weitig,noc only, as Thomas Aquinas, underftanding thereby, a moveable Body, byt alo the matter
wand \
Tbe terme
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il
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Chap. 2. and forme: others will have it tobe soi i Naturale Miftum, a mixc natural Body . others, a Body fubject ro generation and corruption. Itis not worth the while ro produce in this place, all che Arguments that are ae brought co juttifie thefe feveral opinions. Lapprove only of the firft opinion,which
r" faies che fubject of chis Science, 18a natural Body. Tothis opinion (as fhall be faid hereafter) I conceive the four following may be reduced; and moft learned men cons ceive that che ftrifeis more about words then the thing 1¢ felf,and that herein lies che controverfie, how the fubjedt of this Science, the thing ic felf being agreed upon, fhould be called: whecher a Natural Body, a moveable being, a Natural iubftance, a Natural being: and therefore thefe other opinions are tobe reduced to the firft, or are fimply to be rejected, as the latter five. ;
Theade- The adzquate fubjectt therefore of Natural Phy lofophy is a natural Body, in quate fub-as much asithas init Nature, chac is co fay a principle of motion and reft. For we of ~Naruralistakenthree waies. ' Firft, Forchac which is effentialtoany thing, and eee: belongs to the very effence or being thereof: Secondly, For every thing which con bow many cernes che knowledg of Nature; in which fenfe, both the firft matcer and form and waies 1» accidents ofa Natural Body, arecermed Natural: Thirdly, And properly it is taken derftood ? for chat which has Natureinit, chacisco fay, a certain incernal principle of motrion
and ceit; and foneither motion, nor matter is cermed Natural, but only Bodies compounded of matter and forme. And {eeing the Adaquate fubject of a Science, as was aid before, confifts in the ching confidered, -and the manner of confidering the fame: thething confidered in this Science, isa body, andthe manner of confidering is, in as muchas it has Nature init, thatistofay. A principle of motion and Reit. For alchough every Body has in ica principle of motion, and that which has inita principle of motion is a body 5 yet inas muchas a body. may be confidered, not caly as it has in ita principle of motion, butin divers other refpedts: by this confideras tion, Narural Phylofophy is diftinguifhed from other difciplines, which doalfo treat of a Body.
Confrma- And that what has been faid touching the fubject of this Science, is true, may tion of the hence appeat : inthacall the porprieties of the fubject of a Science do agree here- See unto. For it is fore known what itis, and what che name thereof fignifies, it has xs ad. proper principles matter and form its proper affections as motion, place, time &c,
nor is it in this Science, inhzrent in any otherthing, and itis Adgzquate or commen- {urate to the wholeScience. For alithings deliveted in Natural Phylofophy, are either the principles of anatural Body, or its affections, or its kinds and forts. The {ame alfo is apparent from Ariffotle. For asto the thing confidered in this Science. chat itis truly faidco bea Body, appears from the Begining of bis Second Boor of
g OF the Nature of Natural 'Phylofophy.
Phyficks, and his 3. de Calo Chap. 1. and bis firft de Calo: Where he tels us that the °
Science of Nature is converfant about Bodies, and chatic confiders their principles and affections.
And that che manner of confidering is, inasmuch as the fame Body has nature in it, is apparent from the begining of his Second Book of Phyficks. For fecing alk things are diftinguifhed fram other, by theirform and things natural differ from artificial and non-natural things, becaufe they have the principle of their motion in, themfelves,: but the other only by accident: doubrlefs, co havein it felf a principle of motion, is in ftead of the form, andthe formalreafon of the fubjeét, whereby a Body, the thing confidered in Natural Phylofophy, is differenced from all other things. Thefameis confirmed by -Ariftotle, in the Second Book of his Phyficks, Chap.7. Text 70. or 71. Where hefaies: What ever things move being themfelves moved, do belong to the confideration of Natural Phylofophy doc. - For he teaches, thag thofe things only are confidered by a Natural Phylofopher, as his fubject, which have in themfelves a principle of motion, _Howbeit, other things may alio be con- fidered in natural Phylofophy, which have nor in thema principle of motion, but it is as they are principles or Accidents to bodies Natural, but notas the proper fub- ject of the Science of Nature,» Whichis manifeft from the 73. of the fame Book, where he faies, that there are fome principles Phyfically moving, bucnot Phyficals
rhe Dif that is to fay not confidered as the fubject of Phyfica or natural Phy lofophy, becaufe fering op they have aeapduieen aptincipleofmotion, And this is the true Opinion con- nions Re. cerning-the fibject of this Science, cto which, as was faid, the following four 5’ Opinions
cyuciled, a, / ? Z
wn Geienc nto, ftanc
pride Wit, Nat ie
TM ae Ee Oe rR Pens Chap. 2. Of the Nature of Natural Phylofophy. Opinions mult be reduced, or rejected. For feeifig thefe Opinions Contain two synapner of confidering the fubject, the one, as it is moveable; the other, as iris Na-
tural: both of them do fignifie, indeed, nothing elfe, but Nature having in ita prin-
ciple of motion. For fince moveable, may be takentwo waies, as for that w hich hath anaptitudete motion, which isacertain affection of a natural ching 5 or fot that which hath Naturei it, thac is matter and forme, or the Principle from whence fuch apticude ariies: moveable cannot be taken here in the former icute, but only in the latter. Becaufe che paflion of a fubject cannot be irs Hutio f'ormalis, or formal Conititutive confideration ; and with ics fubject ic makes aching which is acciden= tally one; and is later chen ics fubje&, of which it may alfo be deimonitrace d. Hence therefore would follow this Abfurdity, that the fubjedt, vig, Athing moveable, fhould in its proper Science, be demoniftrated by its proper Caute, VIX. Nature. “And rherefore, “Moveable cannot be taken for a paflion, but for the reafon and eilential degice of a Body, from which of itfelf motion arifes. Infente ic deriotes nothing elfe, but natural, or thac which hath Naturein ic. How beic, if we thal accurately weigh the matter, ‘the manner of confidering is better and righter delcribed by the term Natural, or that which hath Natute, then bythe word Moveable. For teeing Natural includes both motionandreft, and Moveable only motions the former is commenturate, che lacternoc. And therefore either we mult take Moveable for Na- tural, and chat whichhath Nature, or we muft rejectic as lefs Proper and nor com- menfurate. Since from all which hath been faidit appears, chat ‘Nutwral, or im a much as it bath Natuve im ity is the true manner of confidering the fubjeé of this Science, therefore by all means we muft make the thing confidered to be equal there- unto. But if we fhal confider allchings which are placed inthe Predicament of {ub- ftance, we fhall find nothing but Body equal thereunto. For what ever hath inica principle of motion isa Body, And therefore it muft needs be, that both Ends or Being, and {ubffance, are taken for a Body, But a Body inas much as it hath Nature init, ismore properly faid co’be che fubje& of natural Philofophy, becaufe ro have Nature is accidental to Subf/ance, and to Being, unlefs they be taken in a prickt fenfe for a Body. Nox isthere fucha proportion betwixt Subffance, Being, and ‘Natural, as ought of neceffiry to be, betwixt the thing confidered andthemannev of confides ration. For. Being is not faid to be Moveable, as it isa Being; for fo every Being fhould be Moveable.
And if there be any that will not allow their opinion co be thus correéted, and wil endeavor to obtrudeupon us, fomwhat more common, or more narrow, for the fub- ject of natural Phylofophy, they are juftly to be reproved. For thofe chat wi} haveGod himfelf, che Intelligences, and Angels, to be handled in Nacural Phy lofo- phy,. asthe fubjettthereof: truly chey do abfurdly and unskilfully confound things abitract and fimple with bodily things and fuchas are overwhelmed in matter. For feeing thefe things are exceedingly different, how. can any man aflign to them one manner Of cotilideration, which is the thing which makes a Science to be one?
Nor do thofe men think aright, who make Naturethe fubjett of natural Phy lofo- phy 5 underftanding, thereby, both che principles, andaffe&tions, and Compounds. For they do not rightly ufe, neicher the word Swbjef nor the word ‘Nature. Fora fubject properly fo called, whereof we difcourfe in this place, is mot taken fo every thing that ishandled ina Science, but for that whofe conditions are fuch, as have been fer down before, and which is diftinguithed from the Principles and Affections: Again, they do illin confounding Natmre and a thing Natural; which they might cally learn,out of Ariftotles fecond Book of PhyficksChap.1.where the Phy lofopher fhews us, how Nature, Natural aud according to Nature, differ one from another,
Alfo we approve not their opinion, who conceive that Exs Mobile a Moveable Bes gis to be counted the fubjed& of this Science; and by Mobile they underftand al- fothe matter andtheform. For nothing is called moygable, buc chat which is the fubject of motion : and nothing hath in ita principle of motion but a Body. For matter ishot moved of it felf, but by accident, wig. Inas muchas, itisa parc of that 30dy which ismoved. But if fo be whatever hath any relation to mation, fhould be called movable al things explained in this Science, will be feveral fois of its fub- ject, and therefore there willbe no Principles, no Affections or adjuncisi\ different therefrom. | | a
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10..—«‘it‘«‘«C Of tie: ‘Natt nzre of Natural Phylofophy.
we have rejeéted their opmmion, who makeiomwhat more commonchen a Natural Body, cobethe fubject of this Science,fo can we not agree ro them, who wil have che fubject chereof, tobe fomwhart more narrow. for dome make the thing confidered tobe, a Natural Body tranficory, or fubject to mutation: others, a Na- tural Body mixt, Yet they agree inthe manner of coniiaera‘ton, which both make to be in as mugh as itis Movable. But they both arein an Error. As to the thing Confidered; becaufethe former rejeét the Heavens 5 the laccer both the fleavenand Elements, from being forts of che fubject, and will allow chem to be only Prin- ciples thereof, For things muft be‘o handled and confidered, as they are conftitu- tedby Nature, Seeing therefore the Heaven and Elements are fo produced by Na- ture, asnot only that they fhould be the Principles of other things, but alfo, chat as peculiar forts of Bodies, they might compleat the Univerfe : chey are to be known and handled both waies. As we fee Ariftotle hath alfodone ; who explained them afcer the former manner in his Book of Generation and corruption ; after the latrer in his Books touching the H in Which Books, what ever is faid of the Heaven and Elements, is faid without any refpect to mixc Bodies. ‘ As to rhe manner of con- fidering, they are both our, inthat they make 1t more large then the thing coniidered, For notonly, things mixtand{ubje&tomutation, but the Elements alfo are Mo- vable, or have inthemfelves a Principle of motion. The defini- Fromallthe Premifes, lecusat laft infer; that, ‘Phyfica or. Natural ‘Phylofopby, tion of Na- 5. the Srience of Natural Bodies, or of fuch asbaveNuature inthem. W hereof being ural EY” now to treat, £ fha{l chiefly follow thac fame Eagle-Ey’d Phylofopher Arijbotle, He For he didfo excel inthis part of Phylofophy, that, though fome do make him infe- rior to Plato in matters divine, (which Scaliger neverthelefs denies again and again inthe 365. of his Exercitations, See. 3. Yet inthis Science he will eafily bear away theBell. Iwillfay nothing of the Platonifts, I fhal only relate what is ceporced of fPlato. Fer he coming upona time into his School, ‘and Ariftotle being not there, he cried out, The Phylofopber of Truth is abfent. And another time when he was ab= fent, hefaid, TheMindss not come And amongft the Peripateticks innumerable company of moft Famous Men and every way moft learned, Greeks, Ara- biaus, and Latines have handed this Phylofophy to Pofterity, and {pent all their lives in explaining thefame, and acknowledged it aloae forrhe true Phylofo- phy, and have Judged ic worthy of fo much honor, as never any other Phylofophers Phy ficks were thought worthy of, Inthe mean time, I1weuldnot derra@ from the diligence and Induitry of others, nor wouldI cal any man from making a more dili- gent fearch into the fecrets of Nature. Thofe who have gone before us (faith Seneca) have done much, but they have nordoneall.. Thereis much work yet remaines, and much there will resiain, and he that fhall be born athoufand Ages hence wilnot want occafiontoaddfomwhat or other.. Bucthat Man will doit more ealily, who, hath known thefe chings aforehand: and iris eafieto addto things invented. And thar [may propound a Summiarie of al Natural Phy lofophy, as in a table be- Phylofovhy Lore your-Eyes; you muft know, chat Ariftotles Interpreters have fitly divided all divided this Scienceimtotwo-parcs; the former they call common, the latter Proper. In into a-ccm- the firft we are to'treat of the kind it felf, viz. A Body Natural commonly taken. monana And of allthings appertaiaingtoa Narural Body fo generally confidered; which BPE Ariftotle handles in his § Books of Natural Phylofophy cal’d Peri Phy fices.Acroafews. {n the ocher, we areto treat ofall the forts of Natural Bodies ; which Ariffotle does
ANatwal i all hisother Books of Natural Phylofophy. Wor is chis divifion without Reafon.
oe. Besa Natural Body is taken three manner of waies. r.Only for the common kind,in
waderflord? felf confidered, withoutany confideration ofthe forts. 2. Fora Collection only of the forts. 3. For-both rogether, vig. Boch for the common kind, andthe Col- lection of al the fpecies or forts Nor are Natural Bodies only to lke confidered accor. ding to the Proper affeéfions, but alfo according to che common. Not mutt the common affections, of che kiad-be atcributed co the forts, nor muft fuch things as are proper tothe forts, be denronitrated of the kiud. A Body Natural therefore taken inche firft fente, is the fubje& othe common part; taken inthe fecond fenfe; of the propers” gndin the third, of the whol Science.
W e mult Yiercfore in Natural Phylofophy, treat inthe firft place of a Body Na- cura in gev eral, and confider its principles and common affections, which agree ta ai Mature’, Bodies, confidered as {uch, And feemng a Natural Body is oh
oie aud
eCavens >
Natural
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iW
Np 340
Of the Principles of Natural things.
and compound - we mutt firft difcourfe of a fimplenatural Body, and its forts, the Eeaven and Elements, or ofthe world as it isa mals of al limples, After, the ex- plication of fimple bodies, mutt follow the Doctrine ofa mixt body ; and firft in genera), where its principles, viz. The four Elementsiand its general affections or adjund@s arecto be explained. Here therefore we muft treat of the Elements, and of their qualities, of A@ion, Mixture, Generation and corruption. Mixt bodies, fee- ing they are twofold,perfectly and imperfectly mixed : in the firit place we contider chings imperfectly mixed 5 and then fuch as are perfectly mixed. And feeing things perfectly mixedatre either fimilaror diffimilar : firtt we mutt treat of abody Homo- geneal, perfettly mixed 3 whichis handled by Ariftotle inthe fourth of his Mereors; Afcerwards the feveral forcs hereof are to be explained, as things dug out of the Ground, Mettals, andalthe fimilary parts which conftitute Animals and plants. Here therefore we muft treat of things dug out of the Earth and of Mettals. Foro. ther fimilar mixt things, becaufethey exift not by themfelves in‘nature, but are therefore only, thatchey may eonftituce Animals and Plants, we muft noc treat of them in any other place, fave where we difcourfe of Plants and Living Creatures. And thus far may that pare of Nacural phylofophy be extended, which treats of chofe things which are common to things living, *and things livelefs. And the laft place we muft treat of fuch things as concern only things living: and fo the whole doctrine of natural Phylolophy, fhal end in the Explication of plants and Animals,
Chap. Be
4
Chap. 3. Of the Principles of Natural things.
Echough thefe two words Principle and Caufe, are oftentimes confounded, yet A they arefound fomwhat co differ amongft Phylofophers. For a principle is commonly ofa larger extent thenacaufe. For althat is termed a Principle out of of ftom, which at firft any thing is, or is made or known; but that a thing may bea caufe itisneceffary that it receive its Effence therefrom, and depend thereupon. And thus every caufe indeed, isa principle, but every Principleis not acaufe. For the cerm from whence any man fets uponthe way, & the point whence a line flowes, are the Beginnings of a way and a Line, but not the caufe. But patiing over the fundry fignifications of a principle, letusnow treat thereof, as it concurs co the conftiruci- en-and generation of things Natural. In which fenfe, Principles are by Ariffotle thus defined : Principles arefuch things, asareneiber made of otber things, nor one of an- atber, but all things are made of them. Amd{othere are three conditions of Phyfical Principles. firff, chat they be not niadeof other things. For if they weremade of others, they fhould receive their Effence, from the principles of another Nature, and fothemfelves fhouid not be principles. The Second, That they benot one made ofanother. Forifone of chem did:confticute another and were.a part of the fame Effence, they fhould neither be Pirfi nor Simple. The Third, that all Natural things be made of themand receive their Effence from them.
Now as concerning the number of Principles there were fundry not only Opinions but Dreams.alfo ofthe Ancients, which becaufe they are largly confuted by Ari-
feotle inthe firft of bis Phyfichs, and the moft of them are now vanilhed ; ¥eaandfome
Whether & Principle and. © aufe do diffi ev and bow §
The names ber of preaciples
of chem are net fufficiently underftood: 1 fhal here pafs over all thofe Opinions, and * Mt
only undertake to explain chat of Ariftotle, as moft agreeable cotruth, whoaflerced only three principles of Naturalthings, viz. Matter, Forme, and Privation.
Yet this one tbing Imuft premife, That while leftablifhthefe three principles, I do not exclude that only firft Principle of all things, God, eternal, immortal, only one and indivifible, ftom whom andin whomareall things, buc my enquiry is only after the firft Natural principles ofall chings. For neither does Ariftotle deny that all chings have their dependance upon the moft,good.and great God; as appeats in the firft Book of his Metapbyficke, Chap. 2. Where thus he writes: For God feems to be the Canfe and principle as vtwere of all sbings. And in the fifth Probleme of the thiecieth Section. God hath given us iwo Organs mithin us, reberemith we ie a6 of the Organs that arewithout : vig. To our Body the Hand’ to our Sont, hee ’Mind. “A “
Now beitigtofearch out the number of Natural principles; we wills
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ag Of the ‘Principles of Natural things. Chap. 3.
a ene $e ea ree er ne ——
- beginni ng from hence,that be principies of things are contrary one unto another : which both all the ancients do feem to grant, and the ching it felf argues as much. For rhofe are called principles, which are neither made one of another, nor of any other thing, butali chings are made of them. Now fuch things are prime contraries. For
{eeing they are firit, they are not made ofany other: and becaule they are conttarics
they are not made one of another, for one contrary cannot changeinto the fubftance
of 4nother thing which is contrary tom. “Moreover experience it felf does wicnefss chat ofallchings thatare, every thing does fiot ak upon every thing, nor fuffer from every thing, nor is every thing made of every thing, unlefs accidentally 5 but every thing acts upon its contrary, and fuffers from its contrary, is made of its contrary, and diffolved into its contrary 5 or as Galen {peaks in his firft ‘Book of Temperaments, Chap. 2. Every mutation 1s made by acontrary; andofa contrary, and into acon-
trary.
en a therefore the Principles of things are contrary, they muft needs be more than one: for contraries are not one, nor can one ching be contrary co ic felf, a Phyl. Chap. 6. Text, §0- Wor yet canthey be ln finite. For fo fhould there be no knowledg of Netural things, which depends upon the knowledg of their Principles, and Nature it felfabhors infinity. Moreover, fince in every kind, there is one firft ariety, twoextreams: confequently in a fubftance
5 V
Cot contrariety 5 andotone contrar / u : ; 8 there are not infinite contrarieties, but chofec wo firft and extream are to be held for principles. st ees : ‘
Wherefore rwo firft contrary Principles are fufficient :. one from whichthe depar- cure is made, and which is the term from which the other, to-which the Progre(s is made, orthecermtowhich. Howbeit thefe contrariesare not alone fufficient for the conftitution of aching. Forasa contrary doth not make its contrary ;. fo they alone of themfelves canner confticute afubftance, For that contrary whichis indi ced, cannot be received into that whichis expelled; feeing contraries do mutually relifé one anocher ;
ceafes to be.
naturalthing, another while wich che other may conftitute another, and which ig be the fubjeét of chofe contraries, by curnes.
is moft of allapparent, wherein we {ee there is a common fubje& of the accidental form abolifhed, and of that which is bred anew: and ic ismanifeft that there is no
progrefs from contrary to contrary, without fome fubject matter: the fame isto be
concluded touching that: fubftanctial mutation, which happens in a natural body.
And thefethree principles do fuffice.. For both one fubject 1s enough to fuffer ; and two contraies coact. Foronecontrary can corrupt its contrary. The princi- ples therefore are Parily contrary, which are called Ferm.and Privation : and parc- ly notcontrary. Forthetubject which we call ‘Matter, is apt, toreceive al forms- And they are all three neceflary to Generation, which is nothing but a progrefs from the privation of one form inthe matter, totheacquilition of anew form: yet every one after a peculiar manner, vz. Theform asthe terminus ad quem, the terme to which the motionis made; Privation, asthe cerme from which: the Matrer, as the dubject ofthe Mutation. -Howbeic tothe Conftitution of athing, two principles are only neceflary viz. MatterandForm. For privation, befides that it is ne fubftanec feeing it is contrary tothe form, it cannot confift herewith. Hence Simplicius xup- on tbe firft of Ariftotles Phyficks faies, Fo enquire afcer the Principles of natural things, is one thing, to enquite inco the principles of mutation, is another; for of things na- tural Privation is an accidental Caufe ; but of Mutation it isa direct caufe, er a caule by ic felf, ae Thefe things being thus generally fpoken touching the principles of natural things, tet us proceed to handle themin particular. And as to che firft Matter, although that "aah aligy thing in Nature, was before proved - yet let us prove it again, after thismajuner. Whatfoever is made, is either made {imply of nothing, or of fopyhing.J Nor of nothing, for that is creation andnot Generation; andtherefore of Fomtpaig, now that of which athing is generated, is either only form,or the whol
compound,
{

- Pbyficks Chap. 6.. Text. +2
ie oe Te DU On OTe. es eager cr re Smee ame eR Chap. 2. Of the Principles of Natural things, i
compound, or fomwhat befidesthefe. Nottherwoformer. For inthe Generatia on of anew thing the former form perifhes. Thereis therefore fomwhat elfe remai-
i
ning befides the form in that thing,out of whicha new fubitance is renéraced, vix the matter, which.hath a privation of che thingto be generated, aud which is api co re-
ceive as well that formwhich it now actually poffeties, as that which, the former being abolifhed is introduced inco its place. Now that this # the firft (ubjett aud de- pendsupon no other, is thus proved. Whatever things are changed, havea com- mon fubject. Alchefefublunary things ace changed one into another; ifnot alims mediatly, yet mediately. For things muiually fight one againft another, with contrary qualities, alcer one another, and throw one another from their natural ftare and condition. Fherefore they haveal a commonfubject. For ifie were of fome other thing, it would not be fubje&t co all mutations : and ific were not common, al
as
Oo
mutation; ێven{o by analogy,anda certaine baftard kind of know lede and in{pecti- ms
Lo ey Goes V3 on ( as Plato faies } we cometothe knowledg of matter. For fromthe knowlede of fenfiple matter, weare ledcothe knowledg ofinfenfible: and fo is matte ate co form Natural, as Brafs or Wood to the Form or Figure of Mercury. Forevena¢. Brats or wood, does init ielfactually poffefs no arcificial form; yet is it fhe witha power to receivealforms: eyen fo the firft matter,hath in it felf, no determi nate {pecifick natural forme; yerisit apt coreceive all formes, howbeir herein ch differ, inthatche arcificial matter i Natural matter doth not exift li ! Now matter is. conlidered Tro maner of waies, ‘ one abfolutely, asic is a beéing ora certain fubftance: the other, repedtively, as itis a e .
: ( aprinciple of natural things, In the firft manner of confideration, we lay it is void of all formes and Qualities
Dimenfions and Quantities, and weallow ira power of rece€iving indifferently ‘all pey of formes 3 inwhichrefpect Ariftotle in the Sixth of bis Metapbyficks Chap. 3. Text. 8.-waies, Deicribes 1 by the negation of all things. Inthe fecond notion we attributeunto ica power of receiving particular forms, and privation; in which fignification Arifiotle
in the frilt of his Phyficks Chap. 9. Text. 82. Define : bie
every thing, of whic everything is made, being no
a rT. \
rOn(eae 9 1We mane
es it, that it is The firfb fabjoth of The difais of ri not acciaently inberent, and inke pbich ti” oF 2i returnes weber it 1s corrupted. pied And although in its firft nation, it can very hardly be known, becaufe ofits weak and obfcure Entictie, by which it comes near toa Non-beeing, and is the lowett of matter is al beeings : yet mutt we not think chat ic isa meer fiction of our Brains. For it is no notion undoubtedly a real being, and indeeda {ubftance, as appears in the], Of Avifiotlas of the r~ G he 52. Chap. 9. Text, 79.° In the Second de Anim. Chane Text. 7. In the Seventh of ‘Metaphyficks, Chap. 2. Text 7- For of.ic, and formal naty- ral {ubftances are compounded; and it is the fubject of Generation, and receives the formes; andic felf is in no other thing or fubject. Now by fubftance, we do not here underftand a compound fubitance, which is properly called fubftance bith a being asitis diftingufhe from anaccidenr, and oppoted chereunto - which. is (oO : fold: Oneinatt, asthe forme: the Orber in power, asis the matter, Nor ie it rs incorporcal but.a.corporeal fubftance. Eor feeing ofit and Form al compound bo- cies do confatt if both were incecpdreal, there wouldthen arife from incor poreals a corporeal compound which is abfurd. Moreover feeing a body of the predicament of quantity doth alwaies prefuppofe a body of the predicament of fubftance 3 nor can a body of che predicament Of quantity exift without a body of the predicament of fubltance, nor this without that: and that a body ofthe Predicament of fubftance as fhal be faid, doth imaiediacely inhere in the firft matter, ant altogether depend thereupon : ‘ic muft therefore needs be a body percatning coche predicament of fit ftance. And the fit matter hathchis its effence of it felf; and as Seal: bis 5.Exercitation,the matter is; andin his 17. Py
9
rer fies in
Se: Bical aa ot gle
rer by that effence which is properto it felf,is that whichic
he te te Pa eer etation. The;matcer hath its quiddity ox Wwomebatnely, whereby i is fomwhat, and difters from other things. iN es _ And ives the matter hath an effence andentity proper toic felf, vk is fomwhat different from the for
ABs: jp matter f,
ute Oe 8 he eS wr Bath 10 rm: yet hath ic of and by ic felf no exiftens
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The firfe matter is unlimited.
"T heere is
is propet only toa compound, which hath it from the forme : which feeing che mat- rer hath not ( which its indetermination that 1 may fo {peak witneies) it cannot be faid of it felfto have actual exiftence, which is an eficct of che forme, but only by the forme, which determines it, perfects it, and makes it tobe this or thar. The matter therefore is alrogether a meer poflibility, thatisto fay, a certain imperfect indeterminate fubftance, and arudiment of allforts of natural things, and which receives al its perfeétion and all its qualities from che form.
Yet this isthus to beunderftood, not thatthe matter is only a poflibility to irs own being, which ic hath of ic felf by its own Effence; bur ‘to this or thac fore of Being, as Scaliger faies in his 17. Exercitation, Nor Pe usaid to beioApoios becaufe ic hath no quality, but becaule every forme and qualicy which is therein, is without and belides it's Efferce. For, as Scaliger faies, in his 61 Exercitation. The ficft matter, is one Individuam r particular being, like a lump of wax, one partwwheréot bears the form ofa Candle, another the forme ofan Image; another of a Ball, another of a Die: and the faid mafs may, have as wel this form as that, and challenges none as properly belonging to itfelf, yet muft ir of neceflicy have alwaies {ome forme or other. Nor wasthe matter created by Godas a certain diftiné fort of a natural thing,but it israther concreate or creared together with natural chings,and as was faid it 1s as it were a rudiment, Beginning and part of al natural things, nor did it ever exift without any form but only with and under che fame.
Quantity doth properly follow the Nature of Matter, andis as oldas it, norcan be feparatedtherefrom, m deed orinthought. Bure is only unterminated quantity {peak of, For terminated.quanticy doth neither follow rhe forme alone nor the matter alone, but both of them. _ For quancity of icfelf flows from Matter ( for, by means thereof al things are termed fo great ol fo great; andit alfo isthe fubjec& of all mutations. Now every thing which is changed, is divifible. Phyf. 6. Chap. 3. 36.) But not fromthe formes for it ofic felf hath no muchity, is not divifible, only it isextended, and is faidto be fo great or fo great according to the extenfion and quantity of the Matter. But certaine bounds both external asthe Figure, and internal as certaine {orcs of Quantity,do proceed from the Forme. For as it ftreigh- tens the Nature of the matter, and limits it tofome peculiar and determinate fore of naturalthing: fo it limitsthe Quantity thereof, and imprints thereon, this or chat fort and Figure of Quantity. And when we fay che Matter, is unbounded, let nor any one founderftand us, a3 that che matter either is or hach ever been without cer- tain mits. Nor is it faid in refpe& of the forme to be introduced, in which refpect the feed ofan Oxe, if yeuregardthe bounds it fhal receive from the form of an Oxe maybe called a certain unlimited thing; but inrefpect of all limits, which either ic hath or may have from any form whatfoever. For as the matter confidered in it felf, is altogether without form; yet receives all forms, nof is ever without form : even fo Quantity and Dimenfion of matrer which follows the effence thereof, hath of and by its felf no certain and determinate bound and Figure; yet is it fit to receive all, nof is ic ever found withcuc fome Figure and determinate dimenfion. And thus unbounded and potentialdimentions, are ina fubftance corporeal, unlimited and potential, fuchasisthe Matter: buc adtua! and determined, in a determined and perfect Body.
Out of the fame Nature of the Matter, flowes Poffibility, or Potentiality, which is
Of the Principles of Natural things.
a twofold an apitude or fitnefs roreceive all Forms, and it is imo fold, Univefal and Particular.
potenitali- iy of ibe matter.
e ae
tiniver{al
Univerfal is the Aptitude and propenfity of the matter co receive all forms without > om pr 5 a . - ° diftinction, and equally ref{pectsthe two'oppofice principles, form and Privation, that istofay all formsalike. For matter, tofpeak properly, hath no appetitere
_Privation, as Privation, but as another form, ‘and privation is not defired but ano-
cher formannexed thereto. And thisistermed the firft and indeterminate Potentia- lity, andthe Appetite of thqsatter, which is nothing elfe, but the inclination of the faid matter to receive any forme. For it is not rightly faid, that che matter while it is furnifhed with this form, does covet another; nor do the changes which happep; by reafon of ‘the matter, but by reafon of contrary forms, nor is there ipkhe matter any appetite of change, but only of perfection. And every pares perf! cted under every form, and all the matter by alltheforms; As Sealiger hath it ip¢his 61. Exercitation. | :
Now
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Of the Principles of Natural things. ie
Chap. 3.
~ Now this univerfal Poflibilicy, or Porentialicy is notthe very eflence of the firft
matter taken in the firft fenfe; bat on!y a certaine accident and Natural Propriety;
following the Effence thereof. Now no accident is effential toa fubftance. And thcuegh the matrcer be fomtimes termeda Poilibility : yec by this word 1g NOt un- derftooda Quality, bucits fubftange, which is imperfect, and as ic were incom- plear, having only a weak kind of Being : orit may be termed a potentiality, meas ning a fubftance in Poffe, and after this manner of ipeaking, Potentialicry or Pofliz bility isufed in ftead of a difference, to declare its obf{cure Efflence, and which cannot be ealilyunderftood. And although alfo the matter in its firlt Notion is termed Apoios without Quality : yer may we allow fome quality therein.; but it mut be fich as makes no Reftridtion or Determination of the matter, and does ioc reftrain it toa certain and fpecifick Nature, fuch as is an univerfal Potentiality.
For fecing the niatter is therefore faid co be free from all Qualities and forms, thae
it may receive all: and this univerfal Potentia or Aptitude, does not only noth n-
der but further the Reception of all Forms and Qualities; ic is not to be taken fromthe imaccer. And this apcitude is as old asthe matcer and infeparable there-
from. For feeing the matter by reafon of its univerfal potentiality, bach an apti- tude coreceive alforms; and every day by Reafon of contrary Agents, fome forms do petifh: therefore this Appetice thereof can never be fatisfied, and one form going away, it defiresto be perfected by another. Buc chis felf fame univerfal po-
Wer of potentiality, 1s asic were of the Effence of matter, according to the feeond
acceptation. For in as much asthe matter isa paflive principle; this Potentiality,
as as it Were itsformand conftitutes the fame. For therefore matter is termeda .
material principle, becaufeit hath an aptitude to fluffer, But a Particular Potenti= p sdeall ality, is that whereby che matter re{pects one determinate form: andthis does note ee follow the Eflence of the Matter, buc is communicated thereto by the Agent, or the
form and Qualities, which fic and determine the fame, to receive this or chat form.
Sothe firit matter, being furnifhed withthe form of a Dog’s Seed, hath no other g Particular Aptitude fave that of receiving the form of a Dog. This Aptitude is ac- ' cidental tothe matter, whecher taken in the firft or fecond fenfe, and feparable
therefrom.- For when the 4& comes, it perifhes 5 and therefore neither does con-
fricuce ics Eifence, nor yet follow the fame as aneffencial Accident. For the Mat=
tet, bothasitisabeing, andasitisa principle of things, fubfifts wichoucic, For F | before it received. far examples fake, this Particular Form of a Lyon, the Matter was actually in being, and when it fhall have laidic down, it will remain in actual
being. Seeing therefore this Determinate and Particular power or Potenriality, is | not one aloue, but many according to. the vatiety of Forms, and the matter may \ exilt without any one of them: none of chemconttitutes its Effence, or properly | followsthe fame: moreover nothing Definite or Determinate does conftitute its Effence; or can depend thereon. Poffibility indeed or potentiality as fuch does immediately depend upon the Eflence of the Matter, and isan effential accident or : adjunct thereof: but.inas much as ic is definite, and re{pects this peculiar Form, ic isnot fromthe Matter, but fromcherhe Agent and prefent Form, whichis a priva- tion of the Formto be introduced. And therefore it is not as oldas the matter, bit 1s feparate therefrom (as hath been faid) when the Aét comes, it is feparated. This Particular power or poflibiliry, is only oppoted tothe Act, as Privation is to the Habic: cheunivertal is not oppofed thereunto. For thatdoes not refpect any pe- culiar Form: but an infinice multitude of them.
_&nd this is the Doctrine of the Peripateticks concerning the firft matter : yet not different from the Teuets of the Platonifts,as we may fee in Alcinoys in his Book dé ie Deotrina Platonis Chap. 8.in thefe words. He (viz. Plato) cals the Matter, the Re- - ig ceptacle, Nurfe, Mother, Place, and Subjett of all thines 5 and be fates that iv is felt . svitbont fenfe, and comprebended by a baftardkind of reafoning. ‘“Hewil have it to be the property of matter, to receive al Generations, and likea Nur{eto cherifh them alfo to receive all formes, feeing it felf of its oven nature is void cy all Quality, Form, and Fi- gure. Alfo he faies that it is fprinkled and figured with fhapes, like a Pitture, baving of it felf no Figure or Quality. Nor were it a (ubjetk fitly-preparedfor fundry impreffions of forms unlefit were quite void of all thofe Qualities, which it w to veceive.For we fee thofe that would make {weet ointments of O yb da frek for Oylinfeéted with no pared at all: andtbofewho would print forms upon Wax,or C lay, do fir(k work do*fmoorh dg polifh thre masters
ee!
on
RE Os prea T=, pe
era se Of the Principles of Natural things. Chap. 3.
- e nate eG Ithe ol d figures are quite blotted out. Por it ws fit that the univerf{al matter, if it beto receive all forms, flould not bavein it felf the nature of any of them, but that without all Quality and Figure, it mut{t be the fubject of feverabforts of things. And being {uch ad's faid, it #s neither a Body, nor yet incorpoteal,but potentially a Body, even a Bras is potentially a Statue, becaufe receiqing thefigure it may become a Sta- aie ee he other Principle of Generation is Privation, That we may underftand what pal ee that is, we muft fee how it differs from negation. For Negation is of larger extent tion bow than Privation, andisaccribuced cto matter taken in the firft fenfe, and denotes an ibey differ, univerfal Abfence of all forms and Qualities in the matrer. , But duch is not privati- on: ( for one Privation is not oppoied toallforms, but to every one a proper } buc it agreestomatrer taken in the fecond fenfe, and alwaies prefuppotes other Qualities, and is neceffarily conjoyned with fome form, which goes next be- fore the Form to be introduced. For the Privation ofthe form of Wheat, is not anuniverfal negacion of all formes in the firft Matter, nor yet every other abfence thereof,. as for example fake, chat which is 10 Iron ci fGe Wheat is noc generated of Iron: burthat which acompanies fome definite and determinate form, vix. that of the srain of Wheat. Hence Lhemiftivs upon Ariftotles Pofteriora, writes thus 5 Privation isa Negation in a determined fubject, and Alexander de Ales upon the Mes taphificks; Privation effentially requires the Negation ofa form with an aptitude torectivethefame. Andthe very fame Scaliger afhirmis im his 18. Exercitation. Privation (faieshe ) feemsto have the Nature ofa certain Being. For ic is the fame after a fort with chat Habic, whichis contraryto the Habic, whereof it-is a privation. Andtherefore as Zabarelafaies; Privationis in its own nature, the ab-
fence of a form,and itis nothing, and 1s oppofed to a form only Privatively, but in--
afmuch as another formalwaies accompanies the fame, 1n which refpedt the pri- vation of that thing is properly faid to be fome pofttive ching having contra- what Pie Piety thereunto. We gather therefore from the Premites 5 that ‘Privation is the wation is? Abfence of a form inthat Matter which isimmediately difpoted co receive the fame. Now Prvation is not of che Effence of Matrer, butan accident thereof being taken Itis not of in the feond fenfe, being neceffary,not fimply, but in refpect of Generation. For Vibe it concurs with other Principles to the Generation of a thing; and it is in Generati- " onas it were the term from which the motion is made. For thar whichis generated, was tiot before; yet it was pollible, andin generation not being goes before Being = and therefore it is called a third Principle effencially diftinét from matter: and matter concurs one way to Generation: Privation another. . The third Principle of natural things we make to bethe Porm, which becaufe it The Ferm is che moft excellent of all, it requires more diligent confideration. That there i¢ fomwhat in things befides the Matter, called Form, allina manner do grant: but what that is, whether aSubftance or an Accident, all are not agreed. . For there were both Phylofophers of old, and fome there are at this day, who conceive there is no fubftantial form in the matter. ¥ et verily, thac is che truer opinion which faies that thereis in every natural thing, belides the matter, fome fubftantial form, which is naturally before all che accidents or adjundts, both common and proper. For the Patts of aSubftance, arerhemfelves alfo fubftances. And if things did confift only of matter, the Effence and operation of alirhings, would be one and the fame, and there would be notrne diftinétion becwixt them. For from ac- cidents a true diverfity and diftinction of Effence aud Operations cannot be drawn. For che Actand effential perfection of a ching, whence its difference is taken, does belong to thefamie kind, wherein the thing is placed : or as Toletus faies, No imper- fedt thing in any kind is pefeétedin chat kind, fave by fomwhat of that kind. Since therfore Matter isan jmperfect Subftance, andis perfected in the compound ; it muft be perfected by another Subftance, wig. The Form. Moreover, the diverfity of Accidents and Operations, whence proceeds it? Why isthe fire not cold, but hor ? hot by reafon of the matter > for that operates nothing, makes no diftinction, but is void of al Quality. Therefore we muft prefuppofe fomithing more noble than an
oo" accident. * Finally, if the Form were an Accident, there would be no Generation of
¢ elf an ine 27Y. ching, fiut only an alteration,
i © - my ] ar ofa) z “ ° a . e 3 corporeat __& he Fop#m therefore is a Subftance of it felf; andindeed incorporeal; of ic felf
Subftance’ void of all Quantity, Demention and Divilion, Bneit patticipayes of Quantity by
: Accident,
Cs
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COMPU
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Chap. Qe ‘aoe Of the Principles of Natural things. i7
ee tM a A Se iu . :
Accident, viz. inafmuch as it is inherent in che Matter, according tothe extention and divilion whereof, it is extended and becomes divilible. For as the matter is not, fo neither isthe form perfect ef it felf, ner conftitutes any fort of natural things; but it concurs together with che matcer, tomake up the compound. And therefore neitherthe matter nor che form, hath of st felf all chings requifite romake the compound; but each wants the others help,and they mutually ailitt one another: The form wants the marter to fuftain it; and therefore fome callthe Matter Prine cipaum Subjettivum forma, the Principle of the form, or that Principle wherein the form refides 3 upon which che form depends in its making and contlervation, Bue the matter is perfected by the form and fromic receives ics actual being and perfe-
-2)
cion, and therefore fome callthe form, the formal Principle of the matter; not becaufe it gives it its Effence, but becanfe it perfects the fame. i he whol nature there fore of the Form contifts herein, that bya real conjunction with the matter, it may give it Chat pertection which is proper thereuuto, and fo with it conftitute the com- pound, And therefore it is by Ariffotlein the fecond of his Phyticks Chap. 3. Text $. definedto be, That which makes a thin 2 t0 be vebat it is, and in his 6. Book of Me- raphyficks Chap. 8. Il cal the furm that which makesa thing to be what it is, and the tirft Eifence of a thing, and in the 6..0f his Metaphyticks Chap. 11. Por the form i the inward fubfiance of a thing, from vebich al fo ‘be whol maiter i called a Sub= fiance. Forthe form isa fimple fubftancial Ad, with the matter making one entire compound. Forthis isthe end of Generation; by itthe matter is perfected ; it is coveted by the matter; herein the matter finds ic felf contented; from it al acci- dents and actions flow.
Buc, Concerning the original of For nes, there is a very great controverfic amonglt Tie yi: Phylofophers, which hath exercifed the Brains of the moft able amongit them 4 vinal of ~ norieems it as yet fufhciently determined whence che forms have their Original, Fovins. For though Ardiorle and his Expoficors dofay, That neither the matter is genera. ted,northeform, buc the compound yet their Intent is not, chat both the matter and the form are generated at one andthe fametime (forthe matter is not genera- ted, nor canbe ) or that fomethird thing different from thefe is produced; bur this they would fignifie: that the form isnot produced by it. felf apare from che matter and withoutit, and afterward joynedtherero; but that ‘ic is produced in the matter and joyned therewith. For the compound is nothing but the matter and formjoyneds Therefore we muft grant that in fome fort the form is made, inaf- much as it is che Buct and End of Generation.
This being granted we muft fee Whenee the forms bave their original. Wyou thal whence the ask a Peripatetick or follower of Ariftotle (decting afide at this time rhe Opinions "ms pr:
: ; j A? + of Anaxagoras Plato, and Avicenna ) He wil telyouthey are drawn out of the “!**
Aptitude or Potentiallicy ofthe matter. hear indeed ( co ufethe words of Scali-
: are by man
yet few do fufficiently explain what we areto underftand th ereby. But this feenis
to be the opinion of chofe who do think moft rightly : for forms(excepring the hu- Whatit +
ling elfe,buc tor them 1°” Pi exifting before gay
} MEO OhE tH
1em both in cime and nature, asthat both in re{pect oftheir con
peration, they do fo depend thereupon, that out of it they neither can be made, nor wer of the
pre
but itis produced inthe matter. And fo two things are required cro rhe eduction of
roims: Dirff, That the Subject have a natural aptitude to the form’: Secondly,That ! : gand
confervation; that is to fay, chat without the help of rhe fubjeét, and out of it; it
can neither be produced,nor preferved, nor operate ~And confequently al natural rorms, except the humane, do fo depend upon the matter, that out of it, and with-
But if any man, not content with what hath been faid, thal further usee, and fay; wheite
thac he acknowledges what hath been faid cto be trne, viz. thar for alten is to be the For. drawn out of the aptitude of the matter, isnocthing élfe, but fora formro\be made be oe oy 13 £ er ¢ +f a e's yyy ea ey ee 2 ae Mpotbing Pe sn the matter, and not out of the fame’: but flial yet enquire; whether urchematter, ie ah Js
Ah’ I's shy apideat oo a be thasee? cre CMe
——
For 1. Book of Creation Chap. 7. So that che Agent affords nothing of its own Eflence thereunto, bur a¢tion only ; or fo asthat the Agent does not communicate the Forme it felf, but brings the Aptitude of the matter to {uch aForm into Act, cau- fing the Potentialiry of che matcer to break out intoaformal AG. ;Buc whether a new Form comes out of the Effence of the old Form, is an hard queftion co anfwer. :
Theor. Forfeeing naturally, nothing is made of nothing, and a Form is now inthe mate ginal of ter which was not there before, the Geuftion wil be, whence is its Uriginal? How bbe forms the Interpreters of Ariftoile dotorment themfelves, about this point is every where
from sphence uP.
it
to be feén, and among the reft out of Toletus in his Comments upon the 1.0f Phificks Chap. 9.queft.19. and upon the firft de Generat.ana Gorrep.Chap. 3. Queft.2. where he reckons fundcy opinions of the Peripetat:cks in this point. For inthe firft place, fome mentioned by Du-Randin his 2. B. upon the Sentences D. 18. didhold, that there did precede in the matter certain Entities, out of Which afterward the Forms were made, vig. feveral forms out of the feveral Entities, and tnefe Entities or Be- ings, they called Poflibilicies of Forms. Secondly, Others chink, that che parts of the forms precede in the matter, but very remuis, and that afterward they are in Ges neration vigorated and that fo every form is precedent inthe matter,in a,weak man- ner of Being. Thirdly, Albertus Magnus held, that al forms did effentially precede inthe matcer.fo the chat Matter isa kind of habit prepofleffing al forms effentially.
But Toletusacknowledges the Abfurdity. of thete opinions, and therefore he de- termines, that there was nothing of the formin the matrer, -which did precede the introduction thereof; andthis he proves by firm reafons which you may (ee inthe forecited place.
Others that they may avoid thefe abfurdities, do attribute this power tothe Ef- ficient, and fome with Plato make the Ideas co be the efficient Caufes of che Forms : and others fince have brought inthe Soul of the worldto chat intent: Avicenna hath invented acenth Intelligence,whomin his own language he cal’s Cholcbodea,'& gives him this office of making forms. Ferneliws with ome others makes the Heavento be
the eflicienc caufeofforms. But ifthat were fo, Generation would not be univocal, and the form not having been inthematter, mutt beheldtobe created. Howbeir that does not pleafe orher peripetaticks. Wherefore Piccolimineus in his 2. B. of the Principles of Natural things,alchough he grant,that the form is in part made out ofnothing, becaufe nothing of ic was before inthe matter 5; yet he denies that it is created, becaufe it pretuppofes a Subject, out of which ic is educed. But Toler. un his 1. de Gener. & Cor. fees that this anfwer, which wasalfo ‘Marfilius Ficinus his anf{wer, wilnot hold, andtherefore he writes: This Doctrine does not pleafe me. For verily if che production be of the formiv‘felf, feeing no parr thereof was precedencinthe matter, it muft be calledaCreation. And the truth is, whecher the form be produced inthe matter or out of ic. if there were nothing thereof prece- dent, it muff be a Creation; which himfelf acknowledges ought not to be attribu- ted to natural agerits.
He therefore, to free himfelf from this difficulty, determines: that what is firft generated and corrupted is the compound 3 and that the form is not produced by it elf, bat comproduced and made together with the production of che compound, and thatthe Adtion is firft terminated upon the compound ic felf, and confequently and as it were by accident upon the form.
But in very deed, whether the Form be made in the firft or fecond place, or con- equently, whether alone or withthe compound, the Queftion remains: juft as ic was 3 viz. Whence the form, which now is inthe matcer and before was not hath its Effence; whether ir did przexift in the marter,or was made by convertion of matter into form, or ofnothing. For it does not follow that if the finger be made with the hand ic is therfore made cf nothing. Yea the compound fhould rather be {aid to be made confequently and in ch fecond place, thanthe form. Foras whiles W ood, Bricks, Morter and other things are made and compounded, an Houfe is confequen- ly made « even fo a natural compound, which is nothing elfe but matcer and form, is made, when the Mattcr and Formismade. .And feeing the matter is not made, what ellefnal thal we fay is made excepr the Form. ‘Andcherefore when he obfer- “ved, that he neither fatisfied himfelf nor others 3 andfaw that no part of the form
did
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rosiph Lett Omnitt! from! rhea that of deedbe happen they a accord tute, t ale 20 things anas ded, d muy)
Hea bing bid y forth G wholes thiugs CLeatioy theme} in P lane afford { Plant Slept: and {Op plane | therefy 6, Bap Mofa ond, Ito | Wai Alte: Creaty therein. Of the i
' ON; the
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| do of their owa Nature takeup, but do fil. | Auimal or Plant co grow never
a ee
Chap. 3.
~ Of the Principles of Natural things
aes
19
did preexiftin the marcer, nor could a power of creating be attributed ro Natural Agents; at lengch in his 1. de Gener. and Gor. Chap. 3. Queft. 2. He concludes; I confefs this is an admirable power and Virtue, which pattakes fomwhat of a crea- ting power : buc it is no {uch creating power : feeingic hathalwaies fubjects to work upon. Alfothe Virtue of the matter is wonderful, out of the Aptitude whereof things are produced, which actually are not there. But in very truch, that virtiie isnot wonderful, becaufe there is hone iuch, buc their wilfuluefs is wonderful, who will haverhat co be drawn out ofthe matter, which is impoffible, as not being -inthe power either of the matter or of the Agent. For many men had rather relt upon certain principles, which caunor facisfic minds covetous of the truth, then make prefeflion of that which is the manifelt and folid truth. Which they perhaps therefore do that they may bethoughtc good Phylofophers : whereas, doubtlefs; Ariftotle if he had known the firft and crue Original of 5 orms, and the Creation of the world, as we do, he would have left ns, a Natural F hylofophy betrer and more compleat chen he hath done, ty a Let us therefore to whom thefe things are made known our of the holy Scriptures; omitting thofe opinions, which endeavour to bring the Forms out of the matter, or from Heaven, or from elfewhere, determine that the Forms themfelves, as alfo the matter, were at the beginning of the world created with the things themfelves; that of chem all Natural things might confift; And that the &rft matter cannot in- deed be generated but chat by means of the Forms, all changes of generation do happen, and chat the Forais are the fecond principle of Natural things, by which they are chat whichchey are, anddo that which they, are commanded to do; that according tothe Forms al Naturul chings do nor only act, according to their Na- ture, thatistofay, asthe Creator hath commanded them to act, but thereby they are governed, preferved and propagated. For God commanded, that natural things fhould not only exift by their Forms, but propagate themfelves thereby,
andas hecommandedit, fo he gave every ofthema power to do fo as he comman- which command of God (thatno man
ded, and forthwith to encreafe and multiply | of Heaven) appears to have been given out before the
may bring the Forms out E Eleaven was created. Genejis,;1. verfe, 11 and 12, And God faid let the Barth t tree yeilding Fruit after bis
bring fortb Grafs, the Herb yetlding Seed, andthe Frui kind whofe Seed is init felf upon the Earth : and it was fo. For the Barth brought forth Graf, and the Herb yeilding Seed after bis kind and the Treg yeilding Fruie, whofe Seed was in it felf, after bis kind: and God aw that it wag good. All Natural things do therefore obey the command of the Creator, andal Forms, as in the firfe creation by a power put into them, do beget by promotion and propagation of themfelves ; they*remaining neverthelefs in the mean while entire;which alfo we fee an Plants and Animals, which generate by Seed. For they when they afford Seed da afford fomwhat of their matcer and fomwhat of their form. For the Seed of a planc while itis inthe plant, is animated with the Soul of the plant. But when ic is feparated therefrom, that Portion of the Form; which is Inherent in the Seed, and together with che matter, of thé seed is feparate fromthe Planc, grows intoa plant likéro that from whence it came, And the fame holds in Animals, And as Scaligar faies in big
therefore the Form jg Potentially in the seed’; becatife Ogive the Form: it is therefore drawn
6. Exercitation, Sett.5. The Seed is abler
out of aremote poflibility, whichis the firft act, toanear poflibilicy, which is the Second Act. Sothatthe Form is in the fame matter, afcerche fame manner as, to need no helps, but ro enjoy its End and to which the who! compound is ordained = whichis then brought to pafs, when the Form does conftitute its own matter, and Alter, Laborand difpofe it asif it were iés Houfe. | And therefore when a living Creature is made of the Seed, the Form is not then firft induced thereinto,bur exifts therein already being comauinicated by theIngenderet,and it does only by affittance of the wombs Heat ditplay it felf; which is rather a ==:tain arifing or {pringing out, then a drawing out. “Tobe fhore > This is common toall Forms (though co fome inamMore noble, others in amore
( inferior degree) that they can .nuulciply themfelves, are Incorporeal, have of themfelves no dimenfion or Quaptity, nor
And if we fuppofe che Body of any
will filicall:s and though ic be never fo much leffened,
the Ferm is do waies leffe- Fa
ned \
fo big, yet the fame Focm without any Addition>m
ve fee Fee,
QR RP Bate ste
Spe se ee ee emer we ee a SS a eee niet
20 Of Nature and the Caufes. Chap. 4, ~ ned or impaired. But lecus conclude this difcourfe with the words of Scaliger in his 307 Exercitation, Seft. 29. The matter w a pojfibility, apt to be perfetted: the Form is an At, fit to perfett. And thus we fee the jnallowness of mans underftanding, who is fo bold as to fay be knows the Forms of fubjtances. But this exquifite knorwledg is bidfrom our Eyes: viz. How of two things, one is made. How the Form is totally
in the whol andin every part of the compound. So divine athingy the Form, tbat being a fubftance, it fils another jubjtance fo ful of it felf, tbat of both one is made.
Wherefore tofearch further, is tbe part of anovercur ous and. bufie mind. For it is &
part of Mans W:ifdom,to be willingly ignorant of jome things. Yet we mutt not reject
as falf, fuch things as arehardtobe known. For (as Plato faies in his Dialogue
called Theatetus ) they are profane who think, there is nothing, but what they can feel
and bandle.
Chap. 4. Of Nature and the C. aufes.
EA Here are fundry Significations of che word Nature, which you may fee in Ari- fignificatt- feotle, 1m the 5. of bis Metapbyficks, Chap. 4. And in Pererinus, inthe 7. of bis ons of the Diy fick, Chap. 1. InPiccolomineus, inthe 2. of bs Phyfickr, p.249. In Fonfeca, ae Aer es ees, 5. of bis Metapbyficks, Chap. 4. thal cite only fome which are mof fuitable
to our prefent matterinhand. And inthe frft place, fome cal God himfelf by the name of Nature, Again, otherstake Nature for che fecond Caufes ; in which fenfe Scaliger, in bis 188. Exercit. and 359. Seft.11.feems to define it to be the ordinat
powercfGod. Thirdly, Nature fignifies the whol Univerfe of things. Fourthly, Nature is taken for the Effence of every thing; in which fenfe we fay chat things
{eparate from matter, as Godand Angels havea Nature, that is to fay an Effence, -
Fifcly, Naturalis oppofedto voluntary, fo that a thing which aéts without deli- beration is called Natural; and that which acts with Deliberation, Voluncary. And yet more ftridtly, Natural is. oppofedto Animate, and Natureiscaken for a Faculty oppolite to the knowing Faculty. For fleeing the knowing Faculty re{pects both parts of the oppofition, andisapt to doas wel this as chat contrary ; Nature, contrariwife, isfaid cobe chat which refpedts but one contrary, and is only determinedthereunto. Finally, ina cerrain middle way, betwixt thefe laft fignifications, Nature is faidto bethe internal principle of motion; and-every thing is faid to be Natural which is mucableand variable. Andinthis place we treat of it, in this laft fignification : and that we may the better find out what it is, let us fee how Natural things differ fromthings Aruficial. ,
Things All things inthe whol Univerfe are of twokinds : fomeare from Nature, asthe ects Elements, Living-Creactures and their Parrs, Plants, é¢. And fome again are from and Ani- Other Caufes, as Art, Counfcl, Fortune, Chance., And although things Natural ficial bow differ from Artificial many waies, as may be {een in Pererius, Lib. 7. Phyf. Chap. 2 say aiffer’ Yet this difference fhal ferve our tutn: that Natural thingshave aninward Princi-«
ple oftheir motion andreft : Buc Artificial things, as fuch, and of themfelves, have
no fuch principle. For whereas.a Statue or Image rcends downwards, it does it noe
asa Statue: Buc asconfitting of Stone or Wood, Simce therefore Natura) chings
The deg- are hereby differenced from Artificial, Nature isnot unficly: defined to be the Prin-
nition of ciple cf Motion and reft in that thing wberein itis primarily, of it felf,; andnot by acci- Nature, dent.
But before we pafs to other things, that this definition’may be rightly under-
ftood, fome things areto be hinted, Andin the firft place you muft obferve, how
Nature is faid co bethe principle of Motion and Reft. . For it isnot foto be under-
ftood, as if Nature did effec both thefe rogether: but oneafter another. Nor as
if there were the caufe of bethin every Natural thing. For every natureis not the
principle of Motion and Rete But it is thus co be underftood, that all chings which
naturally move and reft, have this motion and reft from nature. For there are
fome things rhat alwaies reft; fome which are alwaies moved; fome which both
reft and argéimoved , and yet nature is che Caufe of al thefe. Moreover, this is noc
_todbe forgot; that every nature isnot the principle of every motion, bur this of
“that, and another of another; nor is. every natural body moved’ with all motions.
And
Agr hued ae Kad 4
and thou own ever) pin call cert the and Fon of th
Mas
a a SR
Chap. 4. Of Nature and the Caufes. 21
And by Rett we do not underftand every Ceffation from motion, and every priva-
tion thereof: but co reft, is to remain in is Natural place. So Barth, whenic
comes to its place, it hatha Principle whereby it Naturally refts therein, and re-
moves not therefromuntefs by violence forced. And whereas in the Definition it 18
faid, that Nature is a principle of motion andreft, inthac Wherein IC 135 thereby ;
Nature is feparared from Art and from an external Agent, Ww hich are the Caules of
a Traniient operation only. Yet,1 deny not bur chat Nature is the caufe of a Tran-
fient Action. For Fire heatesalfo other things. Howbeit; Arijftotle would define
Nature, only by an immanent Action, becaufe thereby it is manifeffly diftin-
guifhed from Ait. And if the definition of Ariffotle be fo explained, that Nature
* che internal principle, from which every thing hatha power of acting and fuffe-
ring, and ceafing fromboth; alfeeming dificulcies wil be cleared up. And becaufe the principle of Motion is twofold, one Active, by which the moti- 4 rve-
onisefeded, another paflive, Wherein? hereuupon arifes a double controvertfte fold prig-
amongit Authors. Firft what we are to underftand by a pailive Principle: Se- tes
condly, whether Nature be beth thete Principles or only one of them, _As to the ative ae
Kirk, a paflive Principle may be underitood CWO Manner of waics, Firft for ChE pafeue,
paflive Aptitude of things oppofice which is free, and not more apt toreceive of it be paf-
felf, one motion morethen another, buc is equally propenfe to both: Secondly, fut whaté
Fora power already reftrained, and limited, to one only of the Oppofices, and
Determined to one Motion, whichis faidco bethe Natural motion of thething. I
amof the latter opinion: for fromthe former, this ablurdiry feems co follow. chat
ail violent and Artificial motions, may be called Natural 5 feeing che firft matter 1s
‘of irfelfalike difpofed to receive all Motions.
Astothe other Controverfie: although fome have faidchat Nature is only an Mauve is
active principle, others thatic isonly a paflive; Yet Il conceive, borh may well be: « principle
afirmed of Nature. Forcothingshaving Nature in chem, ic isnolefs Natural co 4 7 a movethemfelves, thenrobe moved by themfelves. ee
And from what hath been faidit isnow apparent what is Nature in things, wig. The palfeve. ? principle of motion and reft, both active and paflive. It remaines chat we now ig declare, what that is,andto what things the name of Natureisdue. Ariftotle gives | ® y,. the name of Nature both cothe matrer andthe Form; and that nor amifs, provi rye may ded he be rightly underitood, For the Form alone primarily and of it felf deferves be applied, to becalled Nature: andic is a Principle of motion as well active as paflive, But becaufethe matter is indifferent and doubtful, difpofed toreceive contrary moti- The Forns ons, re{pectingno determinate motion, but al indifferently ; it cannoc primarily i eile and properly becallednacure. Forfo, asallnatural things have one matrer, {0 ; fhould there be of all bucone Nature: whereas neverthelefs every thing hathits own peculiar Nature. Yea, if fo bethe matter as well as the Form were Nature, every thing fhould havetwo Natures, Nor isit abfurd to cal the Forma paflive principte. For feeing, as. hath been faid, a paflive principle, is not fo called, inrefpect of every indeterminate motion; but only ofthac determinat and certain motion, which is peculiar andnaturalto every ching: by very goodrighr, the Formvalfois calleda paflive principle; fince from it proceeds al determination and reftrainc of matter co che receprion of certaine determinate Motions. Now the Formis termeda paflive principle, inas much asic is inthe matter (for in refpect ofthe matterevery thing is faid co fuffer and determinates the Naturethereof: and in as much as it isthe Form, itis alfo termed anactive principle. Themacter, not» withftanding as hath been faid is alfo called nature ; nor becaufe it is nature of it felf; buconly potentially: orbecaufe ic hath an aptitude co receive the Form, which of icfelfis Nature. Actually therefore the Fora)is nature; potentially the matter. |
The wholSum therefore of this difcourfeis this: Onething hath one naturé, which properly and primarily is called the Form, . For this of its fejfis the active principleinthings, andinas muchas it isthe Form: and alfo the paffive, in as much as it devermines the doubriul nature of the matcer, And therefore to be a 4 paffive principle, isin divers ref{pects atcribuced both cothe maccer and the Form, - For the nratter is che Paflive principle,not as icis barely the matter but inas much as ic is furnifhed wirhfome Form, whereby icts determingd to receive fome partiealat motion. The Formisa paflive principle, moras it isthe Form, but asic decermunes
rhe
y ER aS
22 Of Nature and the Caujes. Chap. 4+ the doubtful nature ofthe Matter. Andthusneicher of them without the others afliftance, can be called a paffive principle. whether e- From what hath been faid, it may eafily be collected, what may be determined very Form in reference co that controverfie, Whether every Form in forming, is to be counred mfomieE Nature, or not. The Definition, truly, of Nature doth evince: that every form in- ed dul forming, inafmuch as itisinherent in the matter; and informs the fame, may righc- ly be called Nature.
Things It isnow manifeft what and what kind of thing Natureis. One thing muftyet be natural & added: What that thing is which hath Nature, and what that is which is according according tq Nature. Natural things are Subftances which have nature in them, VIZ. A princi- obits ple of motion and of reft. ‘Such are only natural Bodies. ‘For that thing is noe spe called natural, which produces any thing that is natural 5 for fo God himfelf fhould "be reckoned amongft natural things. Nor is that faidto be natural, whichis produ-
ced by naturral motion 5 for fo the firft Man and this whol world fhouldnot be na-
tural, Buechat thing is properly natural; which hath an implanted Principle of its
‘ motionand reft. Andfucha definition of a natural Body, does comprehend all bodies both Celeftial and fublunary. But according tonature, is of larger exrenr, than having Nature, or Natural; for according tonature, are not only the Sub- ftances, but alfo their properties, and their affections or adjunéts which follow their Nature. And fo much of Nature may fuffice to be faid.
But inafmuch as nature is chiefly confideredin this place, as ic isreferredto mo- tion, or, asthey fay, it hath a peculiar Caufality over the motion and reft of that thing wherein it is: the Caufes are now to be explained, vig. inafmuch as they have refpect to motion; and we arerco conlider what kinds of Caufes have place in things
what anatural. They define a Caujeto be that by the virtue or efficacy whereofany thing Caufe it, is made: or by which any thing is of it felfproduced. Nowthey arefour: The and bow Niarter, of which a thing is made and fubfifts : The Form, by whicha thing is that nll ag which icis, andnothing elfe: The Efficient, whence proceeds the Beginning of Mu- Ae ? ‘cation or Reft: The End, for the fake whereofathingis. Nor isthere need to in- vent more Caufes; feeing by thefe we can fufficiently Anfwer any Queftion, whya The Man- thing is, and whereby the caufe thereof is demanded. Yetthere are more Modes ners of | or mannersofCaules.’ For a Caufe is neer or remote: of it felf or by accident; Caaf. in act or in aptitude, fimple or conjundt, of which fee Ariftotle in his 3. of Phyficks 4 Chap: 20 lia ToCaufes by Accident, Fortume and Chance are referred,” For feeing fome bow ihe, things are made alwaies or for the moft patt, othersicldom3 again fome are made differ ? ‘for fome ends fake, others for none: and thofe which are made for an end; are | made either by Election or without Election: Fortuneand Chance ate faidtobe the Caufes of fuch things as happen feldom & without an end propounded. And herein Fortune and Chance agree,that they are both the Caufe of fuch things, which are nor alwaies or for the moft part, but feldom effected, and which are undertaken for fome Ends fake. Yetherein they differ, that Fortune is of things done with Ele- ction, and Chaunce of things done without Election. what Fo ‘Fortune therefore is the Caufe by accident of thefe things, which among things ae Ah done by Election and for fome end, do net alwaies nor frequently but feldom hap- Chance? pen. And infucha fenfe we may grant, that there is both Fortuneand Chauncein things. But in refpect of the moft great and good God, nothing happens by chaunce or by fortune. si 3) 2 whether it But it isthe part of anatural Phy lofopher to confider alkthe four kinds of Cau- bclang toa fes, and by all four anfwer may be made to that queftion why or how a thing comes Re: to be, and that phyfically. For it is the part of a Phyfitian or natural phylofo- ests pher, to contider the Parts and Principles of a body natural. And. to him it be- confider ‘longs, to explainthe mutation and generation of things and their caufess andto the Can- fee for what-things fake, thaEgicient adts,or to enquire into che end : moreover ta
fes? weigh and confider what is made, or what form isintroduced afterwards, to know
‘what that is which fuffers and receives the form, viz. the matter, finally to fearch out the eficienc whichintroduces the form.
Howbeit we are to know, that the three Caufes, Efficient, Form, and End; are in natural things many times united together, and prow into one Gaufe: fothat the formandend, though they differin definition, yet in number and
of Th I
t Ween, ee Wheres ond eh. did th Lda \hemfe Une ¢
(se eA OE ee ere
SS
Chap. 5. Of that which w continued, and infinite a2
. and fubject they areone Caufe : butche formal and etticient cannot be one in nuns ber, yet one in kind. forthe fame form ef an animal, is at the fame time both | d the form and end: the form in refpect of the thing Generated, inafmuchas itis an | { act perfecting the matter, and therewith making upthe compound: but anend ne , ref{pect of the Generation. Foricische Butt co which nature rends, and wherein |
fhe refts conrented after it isattained. Moreover the fame form is. alfo the Effici: ent, inafmuch as the thing generated, is of the fame {pecie
s ot fort withthe, Gene- trator.
| This thing alfo is to be noted, after what manner every caufe, does concur to ih * the ProduGion of the E ffect. The End concurs to the production of the Effecé no ah, ‘ otherwife chan as it moves the Efficient to produce thefame,. andafterctherh Lig 1s ae { effected, all che canfality thereofceafes. he Efficienc concurs fomtimes only to i | the production of che Effect, and fomtimes altotorhe confervation or prelervation ° \
thereof; which latter efficiency does chiefly belong to the univerfal Caufes, which i Scaliger does excellently thew, in his 28. Exercitaizon. It js not Cfarhhe) neéceffary; * i, | tbat the particular efficient Caufes foould be perpetuated togetber mith their Effetts : 1 but then only to flickto them vehen they work. Tor it is enough that they give them their Bat iy jor, whereby not only they are, but are preferved : frice out of their matter the quali- 4 4 ites being driven by their contrary, tb2form al{o is forced away. Only the firft Effici- \) ent, becaufe be is Lord of Eternity and the world, accompanies his effects : there is no . neceffity tbat otber Effictents fhou d do "fo : no not-the Heavans tbemfelvasy otbervore mi, thanby bisfavor and Indulgence. So far Scaliger th Buc che Matcer and Form are neceffary both for the Production, Conftitution and A | e Confervation of the thing, i}
é iy 3s And although there were anciently, fome who thought all things were made at io f random and by hap hazard: yer we avouch that God and Nature do nothing in uM ie ~ Vam. Yet wedonot here introducea {imple Neceflicy, but only a Conditional, i. “| andtherefore we do not deny all Contingency innatural things, i, ee Many things might be added touching the Caufes; butall thac may be {aid of Hy © | them, belongsnot toour prefenc Putpote, alfo I endeavor to be as bricf as may be. : uf «| Only one Queftion we fhall here difcufs, viz. Whether an accident ‘cary Whethel } S |] produce a Subftance. There are about this Point Three Opinions. The ti- " iy |) ofirft is of fome late Writers’ who aver » thae an accident by its own no eh if | proper Virtue can produce a Subitance? fo that when Fire produces fire, chat eillsieed ld
| whol production intrinfecally and effectively proceeds from Hear, nor does the : \ i ie fubftancial form which is in che fire concur to the effect. Lhe fecond, is the Opini- i fF -| onof Scotus, Ocham, and ‘Du-Rand, who teach, that Accidents can neither by theig Wa re own proper Virtue, nor the power of fubftantial forms, produce a fubftance- bus ie that afubftance is immediately produced by a Subftanice. The third is the opinion | n of Thomas Aquinas, who avers: That accidents do not produce a fubftance by their ‘| C own proper force, but by the power & virtue of the fubitantial forms, whofe ee: : : and Inftrumentsthey are. This laft opinion feems to rhe moft probable. For that ! oom fubftances act mediately, any body may hereby learn, inafmuch as the things be- . . | tween which chere is action ahd paflion, are many times, wefee,in feveral places: cd
x | Whereas, neverthelefs a muttial contract betwixt the Agent and Patiencis neceflary., if « andthe Agent and Patient ought to be together. And that Accidents cannot of r, themfelves produce a fubftance, does hence appear; inthat whatfoever is in the ‘i ¢ | effect, does prxexift inthe efficient caufe. For nothing gives chat whichic felf hath iy
not, either formally or eminently, as they fay. a Chap. 5. Of that which is continued » and of that which is infinite. Ps aM NI Othing is more uitimacely wiherent ina natural Body than Quantity; as being ee ee Oy. of equal durance with the firft Matter, and alcogether infeperable therefroii, y | andby help whereof, all the remaining Accidents do adhere to) che. Matter, Yea 0 and by a Body in the predicament of Quantity, we comecothe knowldg ofa fub-*
ftantial Body , which 1s nothing but a fubftance that hath three dimentions | of fl Length, Bi cadth, and Thicknefs. For thefe differ one from another, like Subftanze if and Accident. In Subjeé they aréones For that Body which confitts of Quanti et i C' id ;
x
Wi, aaa SN a ale aie
a
ee LO Nes WILE RUE aphicly ie cen? ees p Lite eee Cale 24. OF tbat Ww F1C 2% COMTLILUEC 5) arc 638 LititCe Tt ae ‘ 5 Fe One em WE een en ay Sach ys Seay fan REG PPLE Mee a E ty, isnioc without a fub{ftantial Body : but they differ effentially, having difference
effences, whenno manthinks of them. what con- Now continued Quantity is that whereof we cheilly treat in this place $ whofe tinued —_ bounds are one; or whofe parts are coupled witha common boundary. And there 2 ilegels are three forts EHERE OF 5 aLine, a Surface, and aBedy, many fold. CUAL Office and Peculiar bounds. £ ora Line isa Longitude w ichout Lacitude,¢ ie A Line, bounds of a Surface. The bounds of a Line isa point : whofe Nature isro continae touch, terminate. Foricbegins, continues.and endsa Line. The Nacure alio of 4 Line istocontinue, Touch, Terminate, and alfo to divide. ‘ol by a Line a Surface is continued, and Terminated, andby the fame, two Surfaces, do mucual- ly touch one another : Finally by means ofa Line, every thing is divilible accor- ding to one dimenfion, 774. Longitude. ASurface isa Quantity long and broad 5
hyp hy be ay , and are
oHIE® by means whereof Bodies are continued, do mutually touch one an divided. For by means of the Surface, athing may be divided a
fold dimenfion, viz. Longitude and Latitude. Fina!
Long, broad and deep. fice is not to continue, ~termina
> 2 | Py - Bie A 4 ~ 1m. 9g \ .T rey iL @: ) isd ch Qua hathi y 9
ee ~f, - 5 fe @ of COUCTY 5 bLIC
A Body ac a kina xen And its Of to filand poffefs, andro be apttobe divided according to its threefold dimeniions, “|e 7 :? t Length, breadth and Depth. Thus therefore, in refpect of all dir
ARnHht > wey As et as Fes ets ienfions things are faid to have Ona yo Fol
J
Cae E ings
pofiRa tobedivifible: bucinrefpect of a body only they | { i fil. For that two piste, Gad bodies cannot be together in one place, is not becaufe they are fubftances: For of their ee divers incorporeal fubftances, may be together in one and the fame place : but be- ing bodily. caute they have matter furnifhed with a threefold dimenfion, the Penetration
whereof is impoflible.
Here I muft cake leave to digrefs a little, and propound fome things not much up and fa) POM. Our pul pofe, fo poffefs or Occupy, and cto fil, As fora body to befo ina dodiffer. place, asthat another cannot be inthe fame place with it: and it ts proper co fuch
To take
+
i
things as have matter ofachreefold dimenfion, For fuchthings dofo rake upthe z Sy 7 —y 2 > - 0 > = 3 whol place, that another Body at the fame time cannot be therein. Burchofe
things are faid to fil, which may either nany of them together, or with other bo-
dies, be ina certain place, fo chat the Prefence of one fhall not hinder the prefence
why £ yo ofanother. And therefore two bodies can nevet be together, nor cantwe holdthe and as the common experflion is, Penetration of Dimentions is impo-
bodies Yame place: C cannot be Mable... For Naturally it cannoc be, that intothat place whichany ofus fils, ano- i one therMan; or any other Body, fhould be admitted, til we leavethelame. But it is
place? otherwife in things free from dimenfion and Matter, and in all Forms, fubftantal and accidental, which ismanifeftly apparent in the light of the stars, for the lights of infinite Stars, are every where fhed and {pred about under the Concave of the Moon, ‘nor do the Elements at allhinder them, by whom this {pace is before pof- feffed, nor does the prefence of che one hinder the pretence of the other, nor though they are allof them in all places, are they confounded or jumbledtogether, Ihe fame wefeein other things which give light. For if you place Locking-Glaflts upon the walls ofa chamber round about, and fet candles in the middeft of the laid Chamber. They willallfendtheir image and light intoall parts of rhe Chamber, already ful of Aire, nor willthe prefence of one hinder the other, nor wiltney be inixed or jumbled together: butchey will all appear diftinétly, in all the Glaffes. Soin Honey, inall parts thereof thereis yellownefs, andfweetnefs, and imel and moifture. And the fame happens in fubftantial Forms. For both our Soul andthe Soul of all living Creatures, does fil allthe Body, which it. informs, nor though a Bedy have before cakenup the place, is it hindred from being in all parts of the Body. {tis cherefore the Property of thiags which have dimenfions and.are cor-
poreal, to poffefs and takeup : but of things free from dimeniions and matter, to fil: andby how mucha thing is more free, from dimenfions,, Mattern, and bodily b 5 > j
bulk, by fo much the moxeuefils. Hence wefeeatfound filsa greater fpace, then afmel, and colors greater thenfounds and che light of fire yet a greater,
_light of the Heavenly bodiés, a greater then that.. Finally the moit good and greac
si God being infinitly free from all dimenfions and from al matter, does infinitely fl
vepletively all things, yea is himfelf aninfinitefulnefs, abfent from mothing, included inno-
thing, nor mixt with any thing; but is cocally althe world over, and totally every
where without this world. For though he is. prefent with all things, yet isnoc
{ome
aud the
- part, After thefe latter manners, things indivifible
Sy ee ee Chap. ie Of that which ws continued , and infinite. 25
{ome part of his plenitude prefenc wich one ching, another with another, but he is wholly prefenc with all things. Finally chis World is made in the Atome, indivi- fible point or Centre of his fulnefs. And therefore, al things void of matrer, and all forms, of themfelves, have neither Quantity, nor canbe divided, unlefs bY sremfetues accident, in as muchas they are inherent ina body by whofe dimenfions they are ave wity- bounded, and may be many of them together. For dimenfions being taken away, i, ee the Form of any of us, may be with the Form: of another, in the fame place, and ni vt filthe faid place, nor fhouldthe prefence of one hinder the prefence of another, ”'#/ible And we fee the fame Form, which at firft firs the Body of an infanc, fil the faid body without encreafing ic felf, when the infant je grown coa tall Perfon.
But let us returnto Quantity : where we are fallen into that moft noble queftion which hath exercifed the wits of fo many renowned Men: viz. Whether a conciny- that which ed Body is made up of indivifible parts, ar of parts divilible? And whether chat is continn- which is continued may be divided infinicely ? There were ancient ly fomethat held, ¢4 pee that a continued Body was compounded of indivifible parts, as Pythagoras, De- % mnarve-
: . : : bh mocritus , Leuctppus, and the yreaceft Patt of thofe who flourifhed in 4rifotler time fible ov of
divifible and the Scoicks themfelves who in rhis point foHowed their Ringleader Zeno. Buc Hie
Ariftotle undertakes their refutation, in the Sixc Book of his Phyficks.. Alfo they are oppofedin that which is called, Of Indivifible Lines, which goes up and down under Ariffotles Name, which fome deny to. be Arifforles Book, though according to his judgment, and collected from his publick difcourfes. Andin this point che moft excellent Phylofophers and Mathematicians do follow Ariffotle. And though weighty Reafons be alledged on both fides yet thal I fide with Ariffotle, and that for theie Reafons following.
Inthe firft place, if that which is continued be compounded of indivifibles, a5 for examples fake, a Line of Points, one indivifible with another, wil cither make a thing continued, or athing contiguous, or a thing whofe parts are ranked one az feranother. But noneofthefe canbe. And therefore chac which is contitiued ie not compounded of indivifibles. Indivifibles are hot continued. ' For continued things are thofe whefe outmoft bounds are one and the fame. But the ‘outmogft bound of Indiviblesis not: for every ¢xtream is diftindt from that thing whofe ex. treamitis. And therefore indivifibles are not continued. And for the fame reafou likewife they cannot be contiguous. . For thofe things are contiguous’ whofe ex. treams aretogether. The fame is alo thus proved. What ever touches another thing, touches ic either as an whol touches an whol, fo that all its patts are toge. ther withthe parts ofthe other, or asa parttouches a whol, or asa part touches a
cannot touch one another : fog
that which is indivifibe hath noc Parts, nor can it be parted. Nor yet after the for- mer manner.. For every thing continued, hath patts without parts, fo that one patt is, feaced here, another there. If therefore in the making of a Line, the points fhould totally couch one another, and in making a furface, che Lines fhould toral- ly touch one another ; Finally in making a Body, che furfaces fhould wholly couch oneanother ; from all the points would {pring one point, and fromvall the lines one line, aadfrom allthe furfaces one furface only. » Aud fo aching indivifible, added co what is indivifible, makes it no greater then ic wass nor does it confticyte a thing continued, which confifts of many parts, each of which is without the reft, Nor doindivitible parts ina thing continued, -foflow one another as 1n rank or row: for fo there fhould come nothing of the fame kind between + burt becween any indi- vilibles, there comes fomwhat elfe of the fame kind: for betwixt two points there isa line, in which chere muft needs. be points,
Secondly, Ifa Line were made of Points, ora Surface of Lines, or a Body of Sur- faces; a Line which did confit of ten points, would be longer then that which con. fifts only of nine, and a Surface compounded of ten Lines fhould be broader chen thac which does confit of only nine; anda Body made up of cen Surfaces fhould be deeper then that which is made only of nine. But chefe fhould not fo happen fave fot a point, a Line, a Surface. Therefore that point muft have Longitude, that line Latitude, thac Surface Craflitude or Depth. Forinrefpe@ of that which is not long, another ching cannot be faidto be longer 3 norin te{pect of that which neither is broad nor hath breadch, can another thing be faid to become broader 3 nor in ref{pect of thar which hath neither depth nor thicknefs, cana thing be faid co be
G ,
thicker
Whether
Forms of
- ep eniytnere aA cating Sn ee
ERE CT
é ‘
bP nie ge
el ner,
Of that which ts continued, and infinite. Chap. 5. thicker thenanother thing. All which things nocwith ftanding are manifeftly falf. Thirdly ic would follow, thatthereare very many magnitudes, which cammot be divided into two equal portions 3 which is falf: feeing,it is by the Mathematicians demonftzated that every continued thing, may be divided into two equal halves, to which it hatha double proportion. Kor chings confitting of unequal indivifi- bles, cannot be divided ico equal parts.
Fourthly, Ic would then follow, thatthe Diameter of a Quadrate were equal to its fide, and a greater circle equal toa lets, which has the fame centre: which is abfurd.. For it you draw lines from every pout of one lide of the Quddrate, as inany ds you can poflibly, to che oppolite lide, they will all pafs through every point of che Diamecer, nor willthere be any point therein, through which they wil not pais. For chofe lines fil all che {pace of the Quadrate. So it from the Centre _
ou draw. kines to allche parts of the greater Circle, they will all likewife pafs chrough the lefler Circle, and therefore the lefs wil have as many points asthe greater, and fo they willbe equal. And irom rhele inftances it appears, thata continued thing does not contift of indivifibles, and therefore thar it may be divi- ded into parts perpetually divifible. For feeing it conlifts of fuch into fuchit muft needs be refolved.
Y et we are here co obferve, that athing may be faid to be indivifible two man- net of waies: fora thing is either {inply fuchas having no parts: of re{pectively, which cannot be actually divided into fuch parcs, though it contain them, duchas are the {malleft things Natural. And touching the for mer, is our Queftion 5 vig. Whether a line, confift of points; a Surface, of Lines; a Body, of Surfaces. Moreover we muft know, that when ic is faida continued magnitude may be infinit- ly divided we are not to underftand, that it hasinfinite parts actually or potential- ly, foas by continual dividing chey may at length become infinite: but thus we nuit hold, that fo many patts cannct be raken from a continued magnitude but more Willremain. For we muft not here admit of a veal divilion. For fince all Quantity adheres in fome Natural Body, and there are Nacural Bodies of the {mal- left fize imaginable, there will be found a quantity actually the fmalleft poffible. But we mut thus underftand its thacchere cannot fo {mal a Quantity be affigned, but thatour underftanding can conceive it divifible into two parts, and again each of thefeincotwo, andfo continually defcending lower and: lower. Again, thisis to be obferved, thatit is rightly faid, thaca continued Quantity may be infinitly divided: but at cannot rightly be faid.chat ic may be divided into infinite parts. For if we fay iaco mfinite parts, we fay not truc: for as the continued Quantity is actually finite: fo alfo its parts are actually finite : and are terminated by the bounds of the whol. But this is true, thata continued magnitude is apt to be divided infinitely, thatisto fay, in dividing you cannot cometo any thing but what may be dividedagain. And henceit doesnot follow, that whatis continued in magnitude has infinite parts. For every whol is eftimated by fuch parts, as have a certain magnitude: and fuch in every continued thing are finite - but thofe parts in refpect of which a continued Quantity is faid to be infinitely divifible are not actually of any determinate magnitude. : é
Hithertohas been fhewed that acomtinued Quantity ina Body Natural, is not compounded of indivifible paris, and therefore is infinitly divifible, alchough it be never actually divided into infinite parts; feeing Natural things have determinate bounds of their greatnefs or fmalnefs... Touching which, feeing there is fome con- troverfie amongit Authors, I fhalad fomwhat to what has been faid, and make in- quificion into the greateft and {malleft Nacural.things. Wherein that I may pro- ceedthe better, I muft premife fome things.
In the Firft place, Although the notions of Greateft and Sma\left, are transferred from Quantity to other things, .as alfo Qualities and motions ares yet chat in this place we {peak properly of Natural fubftances. For touching them the Queftion is, whether,they certain bounds and limits fet totheir Quantity. Secondly, That this Queftion may have a manifold fenfe: as a man. may ask both whether there be in Nature agreateft andf{malleft fubftance, then which now can be greater or {mallet : and.whether Nature have fec bounds of Quantity, fo chat fhe hath not of cher felf power, to make things bigger or lefler ?. Moreover, itniay be furth
gan OF 1 pole 3 y oe rure er que- fton’d, Fixit whether there be abfolutely che greateft and {malleft thing poflible,
in
ee
Chap. 53 7. inthe Univerfe ? Secondly, whether in every fort of Natural Bodies both fimple and compound, and of Homogeneal mixt Bodies as wel as Heterogeneal, anc of anis mate as welas inanimate, there arecertain and fet bounds of Greatnefs ang imal- nets? Thirdly we are to obferve rhat the rerms or bounds of greatneis and imaIlnefs are twofold; fome incrinfecal which things receive from their own Nature : others extrintecal, which are by others externally prefcribed to things. Fourthly, That the greateft and leaft are fo termed Pofitively ‘or Negatively. Pofitively that’ is the sreareft thing, which is greacerthenall others, andco which nothing 1s equal ; and the leaft contrarily Negatively, thatisgreateft, then which nothing is greater, though there be fomwhat equal. Andthat is Negatively the leaft, thamethe which nothing is leffer, chough there may be fomwhacas little,
Thefe things being premifed, thus we conclude. [.\ In the whol Univerfe, There is and in every fort of Natural things, there is adtually fom thing which is greateft and Adually fomthing which is leaft. For unlefs there were fomwhat greateft and fomwhat im the _ leaft, inthe whol world, and inevery fort of things, either policively or Negative- bole pig ly: there might be a greaterthen any that is never fo great, anda lefs then any that i licoy isnever fo {mal, and {othere {hould be actually in Nature an infinite multitude of fart of nas things, . Buc that that cannot be, fhall be hereafter demeonftraced. The famedoes ‘tural alfo hereby appear; Seeing all accidents do follow the fubftancial-Form = ande- things; very Natural Body, hatha Form actually determined :» therefore every Natural eens Body. muft alfo have accidents determined anda limited Quantity. » And, indeed, ewan : of all Bodies Heaven is che greateft. becaufe it containes all things) bue what the lealt. {maleft thing is, we cannot-peradventure derermine,. Howbeit Ariftotle in his 5- Book of the Hiftory of living Creatures Chap. 32. Writes thac.in old Wax, asin wood, awhite living Creature is bred, which of all Liveswights may be, -coun~ ted che leaft, the name whereof is Acari:
I]. Inevery fort of Live-things, there are intrinfecal bounds of greatnefs and
imalnefs, wichoup which Nature cannot produce nor conferve Living things: fo that no Individual or Particular Creature. of. that fort, may be produced and con- derved, whicheither exceeds that term of Magnitude, or fals thore: thereof. ..For examples fake, in cafe the greatefh Height of a Man be four Cubits, the {malleft. one Cubic: there can no man be generated that fhall prove higher then four Cubits, :or lower then one Cubic : ,buc all fhall be either.of four, or of threes or of two, or of one Cubic, or of fome other meafure betwixt four and one. . And thus does Arifioile determine in his 1. of Phyfickys, Chap. 4. Text: 36. aiwthe 2.\de Aninia; Chap. 4. Text 41.) inthe 4.\de Gener. Animal; Chap. 4..in the 7. of Politichs, Chap. And Reafon perfwades the fame. For fince augmentation or growth ds determis hate: and quantityis acquired by augmentation, ic felf mutt therefore be determi- nate... And-chac Augmentation, is definite,:-does hereby appear, -becaufe icis an action of the Augmenting faculty, which is determinace.as all other faculties of the Formare: the inftruments elfo are definite or determined. . For the very:Natural Heat is limited, and becomes every day more remifs; Yea; andvis*at laf extin- guithed.. Yea, and al the‘other., Inftruments are alfo limited. Nor is €xperieace again{t 1.) For.we never heardofa Dog born as bigasanElephane, sor grown ra thar greatnefs, nor of an Elephant born no greater then a Puppy-Dog, «:Howheir; hard itis to fer down and-obferve the terms, in every {pecies.. For they. have fundry variations, andmorein one fort, then,in another. Amongft Men chere ig a great diverfity of Magnitude; .a greater amongit Dogs; but not fo great amonegft Cats, and Birds and other Animals.
IIT. But the Elements have no determinate magnitude of themfelves and inttin- fecally, buc from without. .Forthe Elements of themfelves, if they had mattet enough; and there were no outward obftacle might be augmented indefinitely.
For look how much greater Bulk the fire gains, by {o'much the more efficacy it has, the more at refifts contraries, and turnes-theavinto its own Nature... Bur their mag- nitude is limiced by chethings which containthem, and in re{ped of the Materia Prima,or firltmatrer. For ieeing the bulk of the firft miaccer is finite; the Elements cannot be infinitely auymencted. @isG
iV. And Becaufecthe Elements do likewife changetheiy Quantity} by Ravefacti-»
on andcondenfacion 5 touching that, weare likewifeto: know : that ef ther own 2 Nature, \ .
= os
oe Sy Fo
De a RT fas
Se
ee
> Whether there is a
28 Of that which is continued, and infinite.
Y nito et infinito: couching that which is finite, and chat which is infinite.
ae Chap. 5.
eet nae
nature, they are inchis point limieed. Forthey cannot be condenfed or tarefied,
after every fort and manner, without being corrupted. And experience does wit- nefs, that the earthis never fo rarefied asthe fire, nor the fire fo condenfed as the Earth. Yeaand when the Air is coomuch condenfed ic is turn’dinto water; and che water being too muchrarefied is changed into Air,