Part V.

C AKN E AD E S.
221
not reconcilable
liger^ whofe Method is Ptalomys Oblervations.
'^■'he 4th of the \6yt\i Olympiad was Of the Julian Period Epoche of the CallippicA period
Which fubdu£led, there remains Subdu£l two periods more
4585
4383
202,
152
remains 5 o.
The Year propounded therefore is the 50th of the third period. The Neo^nenian of Heca- to7?ib£on^ Jiine 26. which is 177th day of the Julian Year ^ the 7th oiThargelion ( according 10 Fetavius) at that time was the 302d of the Attick Year.
(
To
177.
add
• 302.
Summ
475^-
Subdubf
3^5.
Remains
1 1 4.
^ Laert. fC/c. Acad, quih 4.
The 1 14th day of the Julian year is the 24th of Aprils on which fell the 7th of Thar- ^gelion *, which the Dominical Letter being B. fell on Sunday, Proleptically taken.
^ He was Difciple to Egejlnus the Academick^ and + learned Logick of Diogenes the Stoick , whence in arguing he would many times fay, If I have concluded right, the caufe is my own •, tf not right, Diogenes mufi return the Mina he had of me j which was the price the Dialeffick Philophers took.
CHAP. II.
How he confiituted the new Academy.
E fiiccceded Egefinus in the School, and is by Cicero reckoned the fourth from Arcefilaus, (who conllituted the middle A±ca- demy, introducing a fufpenfion of AlTent, ground¬ ed upon the uncertainty of things : ) Carneades, confiituted the new Academy, maintaining the lame kind fulpenfion,with no lels eagernefs •, yet upon more moderate grounds : ^ For he held that ''^"^the incomprehenfibility of things, proceeded not from the nature of the things rhemfelves, as Arcefilaus maintained •, for as much as every thing really exifteth in it felf^ and if any thing be affirmed, or denied of another, it is true or falfe, as to the thing it felf ^but the things them- felves remaining firm, we derive from them Phantafieand Similitude, which for the mofl part, like falfe Meflengers lie and deceive To all true things there are fome falfe adjoyn- ed, and thofe fo like, that there is no certain note of Judication and Affent, wherefore we cannot perceive any thing to be true.
But he was^ nothing lefs rigid as to the Acade t Atad. ttiical fufpenfion, for the denied that any thing . could be perceived, not lb much as that very Maxim , Nothing can be perceived, arguing thus.
tOi All Phantafms are of two kinds •, the firft in¬ cluded the perceptible and imperceptible •, the fecond kind, the probable, and the improbable. Thofe which are contrary to Senfe and Evidence, pertain to the former divifion •, againft the lat¬ ter we ought not to fay any thing. Where¬ fore there is no Phantafie followed by percepti¬ on, but by approbation many • for it were coii' trary to Nature that nothing ffiould be pro¬ bable.
More fully ^ Sextus Empericus. Carneades, faitli he, did not only oppole the5/wVy^j, all that went before him, as xo Judgment. His firft and common Argument againft all, is, that by which he fhewetli abfolutely , that there is nothing from which truth can be judged^not Ee^- fon,not Senfe>, nor Fhantafie, nor any thing, for all thefe in a w'ord deceive us. His fecond Ar¬ gument is that whereby he ffiews, that altho there be fbmething that doth judge, yet it can¬ not exift without an Afteftion from Evidence. For an Animal diftereth from inanimate things by the fenfitive faculty , it apprehendeth there¬ by both it felf and external things j but Senfe remaining immovable, impaflible , and immu¬ table , is not Senfe, nor apprehendeth any thing, but being changed, and after fome manner af- fefled by incurlion of Evidences, then it decla- reth things. In that afteflion therefore of the Soul which arifeth from Evidence, we are to leek that which judgeth. This Affe£fion is de¬ clared when that appeareth from which it pro- ceedeth, which Afte£lion is nothing elle but Phantafie. Fhantafie therefore is a certain affeblion in an animal, which fheweth both it elf and fome others, as when we fee any thing, our Sight is affeffed in fome manner, fb, as it was not before that a8: of Seeing. this alteration we apprehend two things : Firfr, the alteration it felf, that is the Phantafie. Se¬ condly, that from which this alteration pro¬ ceeds, the thing vifible. The like in the reft of the Senfes. As therefore Light manifefteth it felf and aft things in it, fo Fancy being the chief guide of Knowledge in an Animal, muft like unto Light, manifeft both it lelf, and that evident obje£l which efteffeth it. Butbecaufe it doth not always Ihew that which is true, but often erreth , and diftereth from the thing w'hence it proceedeth, like ill MelTengers, it necelTarily followeth that all Phantafies'eannot leave a judgment of Truth, but only if it be true. Again, becaufe there is no Phantafie lb , but it may be falle ^ and of all Phantafies that feem true, there are fome falfe , which difter little from them ^ that which judgerh muft confift in common phantafie of true and falfe.But; the common Phantafie of thefe compre- hendeth hot:,and if it comprehendeth not,neitiier is there any thing that judgeth. And if Phan- tafic have not a Judicative Power, neither can Reafon judge , for that is derived from Phanta¬ fie and juftly; For that whereof it judgeth, ouglrt firft to appear unto it, bur nothing can appear but through Senle void^of Reafon ^ therefore neither Senle tmid of Reafon, nor Realbn 'it lelf is that which judgeth.
Thus difputeth Carneades againft all other Philolophers, to ffiew there is not any thir.g that judgeth. But being demanded what
judgeth,
222
CARNEADES.
P A R T. V.
judgeth, as to the leading of Life, and acqui- fition of Beatitude, he hath recourle to proba¬ ble and together with probable,
undijlrabied and circumcurrent^ their differences the^. Phantafie is the phantafie of fomething, viz. of that which it is made, and of that in which it is made : That of which it is made is the external fenfible Objetb ^ that in which the Man. It hath two relations, one to the Objecf phanfied, the other to the phantalm derived from that Obje£l. From the relation to the objeff it is either true or falfe ^ true , when it agreeth with the objeft ^ falfe, when it difagreeth From its relation to the Phantafm, there is one which feemeth true, another falfe. That which feemeth true is by the Academicks called Emphajis and Probability^ 2.nd probable Phantafie ^ that which feemeth not true, is cal¬ led Apemphafs^ Improbability.^ and not-probable phantafie. FGr,neither that which feemeth falfe, and is fuch ^ nor that which is true, and feem¬ eth not fuch, have any thing in their Nature perlwafive. But , of thefe Phantafies , that which is manifeffly falfe, and feemeth not true, limiteth the Judicatory, but is not that which judgeth, as likewife produceth from that which is, but differs from it, fuch as was that of the Fury proceeding from EleUra to Orejles. Of that which feemeth true, one kind is tenuious^ as that which is in a thing fo little, as that it is not vifible, either becaufe it takes not up room enough, or by reafon of the weak- nefs of Sight, which receiveth things confu- fedly, and not diftinflly. The other is that which hath this common property with the true, that it feemeth to be very true. Now of thefe, the tenuious, loofe, remifs Phantafie cannot be that which judgeth ^ for that which cannot clearly manifeft it felf, nor the thing that effefted it, cannot attrafi us, nor invite aflent-, but that which feemeth true and is manifefl: enough, that according to Carneades.^ is the Judge of Truth.
This beii^g that which judgeth , it hath a great Latitude , and being extended into ano¬ ther Species, hath a more jirobable and ve¬ hemently afefled Phantafie. Probable is ta¬ ken three ways -, Firlt, for that which is true, and feemeth true •, Secondly , for that which is falfe and feemeth true j Thirdly, for that which is true, common to both. Whence that which judgeth muft be that phantafie which feemeth true, which the Academiicks call pro¬ bable. Sometimes the falfe incurreth •, fo that it is neceffary to ufe the common phantafie of true and talfe ; yet not becaufe that more fel- dom incurreth, I mean that which imitateth the Truth , we are not to give credit to that which is for the greater part true, whereby it happeneth our Judgment and Aflions are for the moff: part direcled.
That which firft and commonly Judgeth, Carneades held to be this. But forafmuch as phantafie fometimes is not of one kind, but like a Chain, one dependeth on another, there muft therefore be a fecond Judge, which is pro¬ bable and undifra&ed phantafie. As he who receiveth the phantafie of a Man, neceffarily receiveth the phantafie of fuch things as are about him, and without him ; of the things about
him, as colour, magnitude, figure, motion, fpeech, cloathing, Shooes; of things without him, as Air, Light, Day,Heaven, Earth, Com¬ panions, and the like. When tlierefore none of thefe phantafies feems falfe, but all agree in feeming true, we credit it the more. That fuch a one is Socrates we believe, becaufe he hath all thofe things which Socrates ufeth to have, as Colour, Magnitude, Figure, Gefture, Cl oak, in none of thefe difagreeing with it felL And as feme Phyficians argue a Man to be in a Fever, not from one fympcom, as from a high Pulfe, or great heat, but from the concurrence of that heat with the Pulfe, as as alfb from ul¬ cerous touch, rednefs, 'thirft, and the like, all agreeing together. So the Academick maketh a Judgment of Truth, from a concurrence of phantafies, and when none of all his phantafies that join in the concurrence retrafthim as falfe, he faith that which incurreth is true.
That there is a * credible tindiftraSIed con¬ currence, is manifeft from Menelaus : Having left in his Ship an Image of Helene which he had brought from Troy.^ as if it had been Helene her felf^' landing at the Ifland Pharos., he there met with the true Helene, and frorn her attrafled a true phantafie, but would not believe that phantafie, being diftraHed by the other, which told him that he had left Helene in the Ship. Such is undiftraded phantafie therefore, which likewife feemeth erroneous,® forafmuch as there are fome more undiftrafled than others. Of iindif raided phantafies, that is molt credible and perfect which maketh a Judgment.
Moreover there is a Circumeurrent phantafie, the form whereof is next to be declared. In the undiflraUed we only enquire whether none of thole phantafies which join in concurrence, attrafl us as falfe, but that they all feem true, and not improbable. But in that which is made by concourfe, which ufeth Hm/;y5?c///’r^;/f^,ftri£tly examines every phantafie which is in that con¬ currence, as in AfTemblies, when the People take account of every particular perfon that ftands for the Magiftracy, whether they de- ferve that power and right of judging. In the place of Judgment, there is that which judgeth, and that by which the judgment is raade^ the diftance and interval, figure, time, manner, -af- teflion, and operation, each of which we examine ftriftly. That which judgeth , whe¬ ther the Sight be dim, for if it be, it is too weak for judgment^ that which isjudged,whe- ther it be not too little ^ that through which whether the Air be obfeure ^ the diftance, whe¬ ther it be too great ^ ff^mcdium whether confu- fed i the place, whether too wide arid vaft: • the time, whether too fudden -, the Affedion ’ whether not phrenetick -, the operation, whe¬ ther not unfit to be admitted. For if all thefe be in one, that which judgeth is probable phan- taiie, and togetiier, probable, nndif railed, and circumeurrent. Wherefore as when in Life we enquire concerning fome little thing, we exa¬ mine of VVitnefs ; when we enquire into fome¬ thing of greater confequence, we examine more-, but when of a rhing moft neceffary , we examine each of the Witneffes by the joint teftimoriy of all So faith Carneades, in light.
incon-
•V