Part V.l

define Paflion. PalTian is an irrational motion of t. j Soul, arifing out of fome good or ill j _ it is called an irrational motion, becaufe neither Judgments nor Opinions are Paffions -, but mo¬ tions of the irrational parts of the Soul. For in the irrational part of the Soul, there are mo¬ tions, which though they are done by us, are yet nothing the more in our power. They are often done therefore contrary to our inclination and will ; for fometimes it falleth out, that though we know things to be neither plealing nor unpleafing, expetible nor avoidable, yet we are drawn % them, which could never be if fuch paffions were.the fame with Judgment. For we rejeH: Judgment when we difapprove it whether it ought to be fo or otherwife. In the definition is added, arifing from fome good or feme ill, becaufe of that which is mean or indifferent betwixt thefe, no Palfion is ever exci¬ ted in us. All Paffions arile from that which feemeth good or ill. If we fee good prefent, we rejoyce, if future, we defire. On the con¬ trary, if ill be prelent, we grieve, if imrai. nent, we fear.
The fimple AffeGions, and, as it were. Ele¬ ments of the reft are two ; Tleafure and G7-ief-y the reft confilt of thefe. Neither are Fear and Defire to be numbred among the principal Paffions, for he who feareth, is not wholly deprived of Pleafure, nor can a Man live the leaft Moment, who defpaireth to be freed or eafed of feme ill. But it is more converfant in Grief and Sorrow, and therefore he, who Feareth, Sorroweth. But lie who Defireth, like all thofe who defire or expeH fomething, is delighted ; inlbmuch as he is not abfolute' ly confident ; and having not a firm hope he is^ grieved. And if defire and fear are not prin-’ cipal Paffions, it will doubtlefs follow, that none of the other Affedions are fimple -, as Anger, Love, Emulation and the like ; for in thefe, Pleafure and Grief are manifeft,.as con¬ fiding of them.
Moreover of Paffions, fome are rough others mild; the mild are thofe, which are naturally in Men, and if kept within their bounds, are neceflary and proper to Man, if they exceed vitious. Such are Pleafure, Gridf^ Anger, Pity, Modefty ; for it is proper to Man to in thofe things which are accordirig to Nature, and to be griet^ed at their contraries. Anger is neceffary to repel and punifh an Injury. Alercy agreeth with Humanity. Alo~ defy teacheth us to decline fordid things. O- ther Paffions are rough, and preternatural, ari¬ fing from fome depraved or perverfe Cuftom. Such are exceffive Laughter, Joy in the Mis¬ fortunes of others. Hatred of Mankind. Thefe, whether intenfe or remifs, after what manner foever they are, are always Erroneous, and ad¬ mit not any laudable mediocrity.
As concerning Pleafure and Grief^ Plato writeth thus. Thefe Paffions are excited in us by Nature. Grief and Sorrow happen to thofe who are moved contrary to Nature ; Pleafure to thofe who are reftored to the proper conftitution of their Nature. For he conceiveth the natural ftate of Man to con-
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