Part V.

PLATO.
301
overcome by Affeftions. If a Man do fome- thing contrary to Realbn, T'lato affirmeth he doth through Ignorance and Imprudence, fo that none can be Prudent that is Intemperate or Fearful. Whence it followeth, that the perfefl Vertues cohere to one another, and are infepara- rable.
CHAP. XXIX.
Oj Vertues, Vices, andtheir differences.
TH E gifts of Nature and progrels in them are called Vertues alfo, by reafon of their Similitude with the perfeQ: Vertues, af- fuming the fame name. In this Senle we call all Soldiers ftout, and fometimes call Impru¬ dent and Ralh perfons ftout, when we fpeak not of theperfed Vertues, for the perfed nei¬ ther increale nor decreale •, but Vices are inten¬ ded and remitted. One Man is more imprudent and more unjuft than another, neither do all the Vices follow one another, for they are certain contraries which are not competible to the fame. Such is Fury to Cowardice, and Prodigality to Covetoufnefs, nor can there be any Man at once poflelTed of all Vices, no more than a Body Tormented by all Difeafes.
Moreover, there is a mean aflFedion which inclineth not plainly either to Vice or Vertue, for it is not neceflary that all men muft be good or bad ; they are fuch, who have arrived at the height of thele *, for it is not eafie to pafs fud- denly from Vertue to Vice, becaule betwixt extreams there is a great interval and diftanc.
Of Vertues Ibme^are principal, others con¬ comitant j principal are thole which are in the rational part of the Soul, and by which the other Vertues are perfeded. Concomitant are thofe which are in the other part which are fubjed to AfFedions. Thele ad honeft things according to Reafon, not that which is in them, for they have none, but that which they receive from Prudence, which is confirmed in them by Cuftom and Exercile.
Now for as much as neither Science nor Arr conliftcth in any part of the Soul, but in the Rational, thofe Virtues which are in the ether part, that is fubjed to Affedions, cannot be taught, becaufe they are neither Arts nor Sciences, neither have they a peculiar Dodrine. Prudence is a Science, which preferibeth untd every one what is • proper to him, as a Pilot', or lifter of a Ship, to iriferiour ignorant Sail¬ ors. The like in a common Souldier and a Ge¬ neral.
For as much as Ills are intended and remit¬ ted, Offences cannot be equal, but fome muft be greater, others lefler, for which Realon, they, who make Laws, Punifli fome more gently, others more feverely. And though Vertues are certain Heights, as being perfed, and like unto that which is right, yet in ano¬ ther relped they are called Mediocrities, be cauleallor the moft of them are placed be¬ twixt two Vices, whereof one linneth in ex- excels, the other in defed ^ as on the one fide of Liberality is Covetoufnefs, on the other
Prodigality. For in Affedions we recede fronx the Mean, when we relinquilh that wLich is placed in Virtue, either by excefs or defed-^ But neither he, who beholding his Parents wronged is nothing moved thereat, nor he who , is incenfed at the Imalleft matters void of Paf lion or Moderate, but the quite contrary. He who at the death of his Parents grieveth not, is void of Palhon •, He who deftroyeth himlelf with grieving, is over-pafiionate and immode¬ rate j he who grieveth mioderately, is moderate-, ly paffionate. In like manner, he, who feateth upon all occafions, and more, than needs, is Timerous *, he who feareth nothing is rafli ^ He only is Stout that can keep a mean betwixt Fear and Ralhnefs-, the like in .all the reft. And fqrafmuch as that which is mean in Affe¬ dions is likewife belt, and Mediocrity is nothing but a mean betwixt Excefs and Defed, there are thefe Vertues termed Mediocrities, becaule in Humane perturbations and palhons they aD fed us a middle kind of way.
CHAP. XXX. . I
That Vertue is Voluntary, Vice involuntary.
VErtue being chiefly of thofe things which are in our power, not compullive (for it could not delerve praife, if it came either by Nature or Divine Decree) it followeth, that Vertue is voluntay, begotten by a fervent, gene¬ rous, and firm impullion.
From this, that Vertue is voluntary, it fol¬ loweth that Vice is involuntary. For, who, in the moft excellent part of himlelf would ever voluntarily choole that which is' the great- eft of all Ills? When a Man is carried on to Vice, he firft enclineth to it, not as if it were ill, but good, and if he fall into ill, doubtlefs he is deceived with thinking, that this way by a lef¬ ler ill, he may arrive at a grearer'good, and go- eth in this manner unwillingly to it. For, it is not poffible, a Man Ihould purfue ill as it is ill, without any hope of good, or fear of a greater ill. All ill things therefore, which an ill man doth, are involuntary, for, injuftice -be¬ ing involuntary, to ad unjullly is fo much more involuntary, as the' adion of Vice is beyond the idle habit thereof Yet, though wicked adi- ons are involuntary, the wicked neyerthelels ought to be punilhed, and that not after one manner-, but, according to the, variety of hurt which they do to thofe they wrong. That which is involuntary conlifteth in ignorance of pertur¬ bations, all which may be diverted, either by Realbiij or civil Cuftom, or Diligence
JCi
^ C H A P'. XXXI. '
Oj Love Friendlhip. ■ i
FRiendJhip, properly fo tern^, is made by a mutual reciprocal benevolence. I'liis is, when cither is as much concerned for; the happinefsof the other, as.of hisown* which B b . equality
4 -
PLATO.
equality is prelerved only by fimilit'ude of Man¬ ners : For, the like is friend to its like, if they be both Moderate-, but, the intemperate cannot agree, either with themfelvs or the Mode¬ rate. . .
There are other things which are thought friendfhips, but are not fuch, in which there appeareth fome fliew of Vertue. Of thefe, is the natural good will of Parents to their Children, and of Flindred one to another, as alfo that which is called Civil and Socia¬ ble : Thefe are not always accompanied with mutual Benevolence. Likewife, the Ama¬ tory Art is a kind of Friendihip. That which is Honeft is proper to a Generous Soul, Difho- neft to a Perverle ^ mean, to one meanly affe- fted. For, as the habit of the Rational Soul is threefold. Right, Dilhoneft, and Mean; fo many different kinds are there of Love, which appeareth moft clearly in the difference of the ends they propofe unto themfelves. The Di- fhoneft aims only at Corporeal Pleafure, and therefore is abfoluetly Bruitifh. The Honeft confidereth the Mind only, as far as Vertue ap¬ peareth in it. The Mean defireth both the Beauty 'of the Soul and of the Body ; of Which Love, he who is worthy, is mean likewife; that is, neither abfolutely Honeft nor Diftio- ncft. Hence that love which aimeth only at the Body, ought f o be termed a Demon (rather than a Deity, which never defcendeth to an Hu¬ mane Body) tranfmitting Divine things to Men, and Humane to God.
Of the three kinds of Love, that which is proper to a good Man, being remote from Vi¬ cious AffeSlions, is Artificial, whence it is pla¬ ced in the rational part of the Soul. The Con¬ templations thereof are thefe, to difcern who is worthy of Love, and to contraH: Friend- fliip with him, and enjoy it : This difcernment is made from his Aims or Defires, whether tliey are Generous, and direfiled to a good end, or Violent and Fervent. The contraHion, or acquifition df Friendfhip, is made, not by wanton exceflive Praife, but rather by repre- henfion, (hewing him, that it is not convenient he (hould live in that manner he doth ; when he enjoyeth the love of him whom he affeQs, he muft always exhort him to thofe things, by exercife whereof, he may arrive at perfect habit. .Their end is that of Lover and Belo¬ ved, ■ they m% at laft become friends.
CHAP. XXXIL Of Vajfons.
INjuftice is fo great an ill, that it is better to fuffer wrong than to do wrong -, for one belongeth to a wicked Man, the other to a weak Man : both are Diihoneft, but to do wrong is vvorfe, by- how much it is more Di- \ ^ (honeft. It is as expedient that a wicked Man
be puniQied, as that a fick man (hould be cured by a Phyfician ; for all Chaftifement is a kind of Medicine for an offending Soul.
Since the greater part of Virtues are con- vorfant about Pailions, it is neceflary that we