Part V. t

life to thofe things which are divine and fair, in all likelihood will contemn what before they moft efteemed, and love more vehemently this contemplation. Thus it appearerh, that only what is good is honeft, and that Vertue fuffi- cethto felicity.
Moreover , that good and fair confift in knowledge of the firlt good, he declareth in whole Volumes. As concerning thofe which are good by participation, he Ipeaketh thus in his firfl: Book of Laws. Good is two-fold. Humane and Divine, If any thing be dil- joj^ned from the fiiit good, and void of the eflence thereof,^ that is called good by the fbolifh, which in Enthyde^jto.^ he affirmeth to be a greater ill to the Poflelfor.
That he conceiveth the Vertues to be eli¬ gible in themfelvcs, is miuaifeft, in as much as he affirmeth that only to be good which is Honelt, which he demonlirateth in many Dia¬ logues, particularly in thofe of the Common¬ wealth.
Hence he conceiveth that Man to bd mold happy and bleffed, who hath attained the Sci¬ ence we mentioned ^ yet not in refpeH: of the Honours which attend fuch a Perfon, nor of a- ny other reward ^ for though he be unknown to all Men, and fuch things, as are commonly ac¬ counted Ills, as diffionour, banifhment, and death happen unto him ^ he is notwithftand- ing happy. On the contrary, a man who wants this knowledge, though he poflefs all things commonly elteemed good , Riches, Power, Health, Strength and Beauty, he is nothing the more happy.
He afierteth an ultimate end, conformable to all thele which is to be made like unto God, as far as Humanity is capable of being fuch. This he expounds varioully, fometimes as in Theateto., he affirms our refemblance to God to confilf in being Prudent, Juft, and Holy ^ where¬ fore we muft endeavour to lly with allpoffible Celerity from hence to thofe. This flight is the relemblance to God , as much as is polfible; Thefimilitude confiftbth in Prudence, Juftice, and Sanftity ^ Ibmetimes in Juftice only, as in . his laftBook of theCommonwealth.For a Man is. never deferred by God, whilft he endea- vcureth to be juft, and by the very aO: of Ver¬ tue, as much as a Man is capable of, he is ren- dred like unto God. In Pktdone he allerteth,that this refemblance to God is acquired by Tem¬ perance and Juftice, thus. Are not they BleJJed and happy., and from hence Jhall go into the be fl placeyxiho have praltifed the popular civil Vertue iiohich they call Temperance and fujiice ? Again,
’ Iqmeiimes he affirmed, that the end of Life is to be like unto God, Ibmetimes to follow God, as when he laith , God indeed according to the old Saying, containing the beginning., middle and- end of all things., 8cc. Sometimes' he join- etii both together, as when he laith, The Soul Jolloiang God, and being rendred like unto him, &c. The Principle of Utility is good it fell, but this is faid of God, therUore the end con¬ formable to the Principle, is to become like un¬ to God, to the Celeftial, or rather fupercele- ftial God, who hath not Vertue, but is more excellent than all Vertue. Wherefore it is rightly laid, that Ka.KoS'ai^xgyiA, Milery, is a per-
verlity of the the Genius , ivTctiixovia.^ Beatitude is a good habit of the Genius.
This fimilitude to God we fhall obtain , if- we enjoy convenient Nature, in our Manner, Education and Senle, according to Law, and chiefly by Reafon, and Dilcipline, and infti- tution of Wifdom , . withdrawing our lelves as much as poffible from Humane Affairs, and being converlant in thole things only which are underftood by Contemplation .* The way to prepare, and, as it were, to cleanfe the De¬ mon that is in us, is to initiate our felves into higher Dilciplines, which is done by Mufick, Arithmetick, Aftronomy and Geometry, not without fome relpeU of the Body, by Gym- naftick, whereby it is made more ready for the aUions both of War and Peace.
CHAP. XXVIII.
The Definition and kinds of Vertue.
TTErtue being divine, is the perfeU and beft V affeUion of the Soul, which adornetha Man, and rendreth Kim more excellent and ready, as well for Speech as AUion, whether he do it alone or with others.
Of the Vertues, Ibme are placed in the ra¬ tional part, Ibme in the irrational. For where¬ as the Nature of the rational part is one, that of the irafcible another, that of the concu- pilcible another, the perfeUion of thele muft likewife be different. That of the rational is Prudence, of the irafcible, Fortitude, of the concupifcible. Temperance.
Prudence is the Science of things, good, bad, and betwixt both.
Temperance is an apt moderation of Defires and Appetites; when we call Temperance a moderation and obedience, we mean only this, that it is a faculty caufing all Appetites to be fubjeUed unto it, in decent order and liibrnils obedience to be commanded by Nature. This is the rational part.
Fortitude is a Lawful Obfervation of com¬ mand difficult, or not difficult, that is, it is a faculty which*‘keepeth a Lawful Precept.
Jufiice is an agreement amongft all thele , which cauleth that the three parts of the Soul agree with one another, and that each be wor¬ thily converfant in thole things which are pro¬ per, and belong unto it.
Thus it is a common intire Perfeflion of thefe three Vertues, Prudence, Fortitude and Temperance, in fuch manner that Reafon com- mandeth, a nd the reft of the parts each accor¬ ding to its leveral Property, are reftrained by Reafon, and obey it.
Hence it followeth that the Vertues are mutually confequent to one another; For¬ titude being the confervation of a lawful pre¬ cept, is likewile.confervative of right Realbn. Right Reafon proceedeth from Prudence ; Prudence cohereth with Fortitude , for it is ■the Knowledge of good things ; but no Man can difcern that which is good , if he be di- ftra£led by Fear, or involved in the like trou¬ bles . In like manner, neither can any Man be Wife, and iijtemperate, for then he is
over-