Part V.

19
That rational Souls are iminorta], may clear- iSo a Boy may be laid to be a Grammarian, a ly be allerted outot Ylato-^ but whether the Mufician, a Carpenter in power. He is in habit
irrational be fuch leemeth doubtful •, yet is it probable that being guided only by Phantalie, not endued with Reafon or Judgment, neither do they contemplate any thing, or dilcern, ,or- colledt from it, nor can they difcern ills, but generally underftand nothing, nor are of the lame nature with thole Souls which have In- telledl and Reafon, but are capable of dying and being corrupted. For as much as they are imriiortal, it followeth that they are put into Bodies, being planted into the formed Nature of Embrio’s, and tranfmigrate intole- veral Bodies, as well humane as others, either according to fome certain numbers which they expe£t, orby the Will of the Gods, or for in¬ temperance of Life, or for love of the Body. For the Body and Soul have a kind of affini¬ ty, as Fire and Briraftohe.
Moreover the Souls of the Gods have a di- judicative Faculty, called Gnoftick, dnd. im- pullive to fome adlion, called Paraftatick, which faculties being likewife in humane Souls, be¬ come changed as foon as they come into the Body, the alTiftent into the coiicupifcible, the impulfive into the irafcible*
of one or more of thele wheQ, he hath acquired that habit. Fie is laid to be in aft, when he operateth according to that acquired habit. That which we call polfible to be done, is none of thefe. Indeterminate is that which is in our Power, and to which part foever it enclin- eth, will be true or falfe.
CHAP. XXVII.
E T H 1 C
Of the chief Goof and of Vcrtues.
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CHAP. XXVI.
Of fate and ¥ree-wilh
Concerning Vate.^ Elato field thus : All things are in Fate, yet all things are not de¬ creed by Fate. For Fate,though it be like a Law, yet it uleth not to fpeak in this manner, that this Man lhall do thus, and to that Man, that lhall befal ( which were to proceed into infi¬ nite, there being an infinite Generation of Men, and infinite accidents happening daily to them -, befides that this would take away our Free¬ will, ourpraifeor difpraile, and whatlbever is of that kind) but rather thus •, Whatfoever Soul choofeth fuch a Life,and doth fuck things, thefe fhall follow, the Soul therefore is free, audit is left within its Power to do or not to do, without any compullion or neceifity. But that which followeth the Aftion is performed by Fate. As from P^nF’s ravifliing of Helene., (which it is within his Power to do or not to do) fhall follow that the Grecians contend with the Trojans about Helene. Thus Apollo fore¬ told Laius -y
If thou beget a Son., that Son Jhall kill thee.
In the Oracle are comprehended both Laius and the begetting of a Son, that which lhall follow upon the begetting of the Son depends on Flato.
That which may be done is of a middle kind betwixt true and falfe, and being fo indefinite by Nature ^ ^hat which is incur Power, is car¬ ried on as it were unto it. That which is done by our eleftion,is prefently either true or falfe ^ that which is in power is different from that which is faid to be in habit and aft. That which is in power, declareth an aptitude in that thing, wherein the habit is not yet perfeft.
E muft next give a. fhort account of Plato's Ethicks. That which is worthy ot ,all Honour, and is the Supream Good, he conceived not eafie to be found, and if found, not lafe to be declared. For this reafon, he communicated the Contemplation of the chief good to very few, and thole of his molt inti¬ mate Acquaintance, ot whom, his Judgment made choice for this pur pole. But our good, if we examine his Books diligently, we fhall find he placed in the knowledge of the firft Good, which may rightly be called God, and. the firlt Mind. For all things which Men call good, he conceiveth to be called good in this refpeft, for as much as they derive fome- thing from that good , as all fweet and hot things are termed fuch from fome Participa¬ tion of the firft fweet and the firft hot. Of thofe things which are in us, only the Mind and reafon have a fimilitude of the firft good. Wherefore he calleth our good, Fair, Vene¬ rable, Amiable,Proportionate, and laftly Beati¬ tude. Of thofe which are commonly called good, as Health, Beauty, Strength, there is none good, unlefs it be employed towards the pra¬ nce of Vertue. For being feparated from Vertue, they are like Matter only, and to thofe who make ill ufe of them, only ill. Yer thefe Plato fometimes calleth Mortal Goods. Bea¬ titude he reckoneth not amongft humane goods, but amongft the Divine and Immortal. Whence he afferteth that the Souls of true Philofophers are replenifhed with vaft admirable goods, and after the diffolution of their Mortal Body, are admitted to the Table of the Gods, and with them walk over and Purvey the Field of Truth, becaule they did fee they ufed the utmott endea¬ vours of their Souls to know it, and efteemed it the moft precious of all things, by the Be- ,nefit whereof they illuftrated, and excited their Mind as a loft or blinded Sight, preferring the confervation thereof before many corporeal Eyes. Foolifti Men are like thofe who lead all their Life in fome Cave under gmund, where they never few the light of the Sun, but only ^ feme empty thin Shadows of fuch Bodies as are with us upon the Earth, which feeing, they think they fee true Bodies. As thefe, if ever they ftiould be brought out of darknefs into the clear light, would queftionlefsdefpife all things which they few berore, and themfelves much more, as having been abfofutely deceived ^ So they who rife up ont of the darknefs of this ^ life
1^2
PLATO.