Part V.

PLATO.
iSi
twixt them, he hath mQt Socrates again, and af¬ terwards joyn the fenfe of Flato^ which he took, as it were, from Socrates., with the memory V(/hich he prefaved of Socrates., there will arile a falfe Opinion.
That wherein fenfe and memory are formed, FJatocoix\\)3LiQi\\io a'Tablet of JVajc, but when the Soul by cogitation reforming thefe things, which arc conceived in Opinion by Memory and Senfe, lopketh upon thefe as things from which the other are derived .* P/ato fbmetimes c^lleth this 2.PiUure and. Phantafie. Cogitation he calleth the Souls difeourfe within her felf : Speech., that which floweth from the Cogitation through the Mouth by Voice. IntelleUion is an opera¬ tion of the IntelleSf; contemplating lirft Intelli- gibles. It is two-fold, one of the Soul, be¬ holding Intelligibles before fhe cometh into the Body ♦, the other of the farhe, after fhe is im¬ mers’d in the Body The firft is properly called IntelleSion the other, whilft fhe is in the Bo¬ dy, is termed Natural Knowledge, which is no¬ thing but an Intelleffion of the Soul confined to the Body. When weTay, intelle£f ion is the prin¬ ciple of Science, we mean not this latter, but the other, which is competible to the Soul in her feparate State, ^nd as we faid, is then cal¬ led IntelleQion, now Natural Knowledge. The fame Plato termeth fimple Knowledge the wing of the Soul ^ fometimes Reminifcencc.
Of thefe fimple Sciences confifleth Reafon ■, which is born with us, the efficient of natural Science ^ and as Reafon is twofold, Scientifick, and opinionative, fo IntelleQion and Senfe. It is likewife neceffary that they have their obje£ls, which are Intelligibles and Senfibles ; And tbraf much as of Intelligibles, fome are Primary, as Ideas, others Secundary, as the Species, that are in matter, aiKl cannot be feparated from it. IntelleSlion likwife muff be two fold, one oj Primaries, the other of Secondaries. Again forafmuch as in Senfibles, fome are Primary, as qualities, colour, whitenefs, odaQXshy accident, as white coloured, and that which is concrete, as fire : in the fame manner is Senfe, firft, of Primaries, fecond, of Secondaries. Intelleblion judgeth primary Intelligibles, not without Scientifick knowledge, by a certain compre- henfion without Difeourfe. Secondaries the the fame Scientifick reafon judgeth,but not with out Intelleffion. Senfibles, as well Primary as Secondary Senfe, judgeth, but not without opinionative reafon. That which is concrete, the fame reafon judgeth, but not without fenfe. And fince the intelligible World is the pri mary Intelligible, the fenfible fomething con¬ crete, the firlt Intellebf ion judgeth with Reafon, that is, not without Reafon ^ The other Opini- onauive reafbn not without fenfe, whereas there is both Contemplation and Abfion ; right Rea¬ fon difeerneth not in the fame manner thofe w'hich are fubjebl to Contemplation, and thofe which are fubje6b to Ablion : In contemplation, it confidereth what is true, what falfe ; in things that belong to Abfion, what is proper, what improper, what that is which is done. For having an innate knowledge of that wdfich is good and honeft, by ufing reafon, and applying it to thofe natural notions, as to certain Rules, we judge whether everything be good or bad.
CHAP. V.
■11' c
The Elements and Office of PiaJeEiick,
OF DialeQick, the firft and cliiefeft Element according to Plato, is, firft^ ta confider the Effence of every thing ^ next xKi. ' Accidents thereof. What a thing is, it ’ confidevs, eithbr from its Superiours, by divifion and definition, or contrariwife by Analyfis. Accidents wffiVih ad¬ here to Subftances, are confidered, eithbr ftom thofe things which are contained by indifiiion,ox from thofe which do contain by Syllogfm.
Hence the parts of Kialedick are thefe, fion. Definition, Analyfis, InduUion, SyllogijMl Of Divifions, one is a diftribution of the Ge¬ nus into Species, and of the whole into parts j as when we divide the Soul into the rational part, and the irrational ^ and the latter, into the con- cupifcible mxd thQimicMQ. Another is of a word into divers lignifications, when the fame may be taken feveral ways. A third of accidents, according to their fubjefts ^ as when we fay of Good, fome belong to the Soul, fome to the Body, fome are external. The fourth of fuf- jeHs, according to their Accidents as of Men, fome. are good, fome ill, fome indiffe¬ rent. Divifion of the Genus into its Species, is firft to be ufed, when we examine the effence of a thing, this cannot be done but by defini¬ tions. , , ; . ^
Definition is made by Divifion in this manner, we muft take the Genus of the thing to be de¬ fined, as that of Man, living Creature *,■ that we muft divide by the next differences, defeen- ding to its fpecies, as rational, and irrational, mortal, and immortal. Thus by adding the firft; difference to the Genus, is made the defini¬ tion of Man.
Of Analyfis there are three kinds, one by which we afeend from Senfibles to primary In¬ telligibles, another, whereby we afeend by de- monttrate? and fubdemonftrates, to indemon- ftrable immediate propofitions. The lafi, which from fuppofition proceedeth to thofe principles which are taken without fuppofi¬ tion.
The firft kind is thus, as if from that Beau¬ ty which is in the Body, we fhould proceed to that of the Mind, from that to another eonver- fant in the Offices of Life, thence to that of Laws, and fo at laft to the vaft Ocean of Beauty, that by thefe fteps, as it were, we may arrive at the fight of the liipream Beauty.
The fecond kind of Analyfis is thusj We muft fuppofe that which we feek, and confi¬ der thofe which are precedent, demonftrating them by progreflion, from interiours tofupe- riours, untill we arrive at that which is firft and generally granted : From which, beginning anew, we return fynthetically to that which was fought. As for example, I enquire whe¬ ther the Soul be Immortal, andfuppofing it to befb, I enquire vAiether it be always moved. This being demonftrated, I again enquire, whe¬ ther that which is always moved, is moved by it felf which being again demonftrated, we examine, whether that which is moved by its
felf
felf, be the principle of Motion. Laftly, whe¬ ther a Principle is ingenerate •, this, as moft cer¬ tain, is admitted by all. That which is inge¬ nerate, is alfo incorruptible ^ whence, as from a thing moft certain, we collefl this demonftra- tion. If a Principle be ingenerate and incor¬ ruptible,, that which is moved by it felf, is the principle of Motion but the Soul is moved by it felf, therefore the Soul is Incorruptible, Ingenerate, and Immortal.
The third kind of Analyfis upon fuppofition, is this * *, He who enquireth after a thing, iirtt, fuppofeth that thing, then obferyes what will fellow upon that fuppofition. If a reafon for the fuppofition be required, alTuming another fuppofition, he enquireth, whether that which was firft fuppofed, follow again upon another fuppofition: This he always obferveth, untill he come at laft to that Principle, which is not taken upon fuppofition.
Induhion is every method by reafon, which proceedeth either from like to like, or from Singulars to Univerfals : It is of great efficacy to excite natural notions.
CHAP. VI.
Of Tropofitions and Argumentations.
OF that Speech which we call Tropofition^ there are two kinds ^ Affirmation and 'Ne¬ gation j Affirmation^ as Socrates walketh j Ne¬ gation^ as Socrates walketh not.
Of Affirmative and Negative Propofitions, fomQ2it&Univer/aI, otheis Fart icular : k parti¬ cular Affirmative is thus, Some Pleafure is good ^ a particular Negative is. Some Pleafure is not good. An Univerjal Affirmative.^ all dilhoneft things are ill \ an Univerjal Negatiite.^ no di- flioneft thing is good.
Of Propofitions, fome are Categorical.^ fome Hypothetical : the Categorical are fimple, as every juft thing is good; Hypothetical import confequence or repugnance.
Syllogifms are ufed by Flato., either to con¬ fute or demonjfrate to confute, what is falle by interrogation, to demonftrate, what is true
• by declaration. Syllogij'ni is a Speech, where¬ in fome things being laid down, another thing befides thofe which are laid down, is necelTarily inferred from them.
Of Syllogifms fome are Categorical., fome Hypothetical., fome Mixt : Categorical are thofe whole fumptions and conclufio.-.s are fimple propofitions. Hypothetical are rhoie which con- fift of Hypothetical Propofitions : Alixt, which conclude both.
Plato ufeth demonjfrative Arguments in thofe Dialogues, wherein he explaineth his own Do- flrine ^ Probable againft Sophifls and young Men 5 Litigious againft thofe who are properly called Eriftick, as Euthydemus and Hippia-r.
Of Categorical Syllogijms there are three figures •, the firft is, that wherein the common extreme is firft the pratdicate, then the fubjefl. The fecond, when the common extream is prac- dicate in both : the third wherein the common extream is fubjefl in both. Extreams are the parts of a Propofition, as in this, a Alan •/> a
living Creature., Alan and living Creatures are the extreams. Plato often argueth in the firft, lecond, and third Figures j in the firft, asinA/- cibiades 5 /
Juf things are honeffi Hdneji things are goof 'Therefore fuji' things are good.
In the fecond, as in Parmenides a§,
Thdt which hath no parts is neither jiraight nor crooked.
But vohatfoever hath Figure is either fraight or crooked.
Therefore, whatfoever hath not parts, hath not fgure.
In the third thus, in the fame Book,
Whatfoever hath figure is qualitative, Whatfoever hath Jigure is Jiniie,
Therefore whatjoever^is qualnaiivcis finite,
Likewife by Hypothetical Syllogifm Plato oT ten difputeth, chiefly in Parmenide thus.
If one hath not parts, it hath neither begin¬ ning, end nor middle.
But if it have neither beginning, end, nor mid¬ dle, it hath no bound, and if no bound, no figure.
Therefore if one hath no parts, it hath no figure.
In the Hypothetical figure, ordinarily called the third, wherein the common extream is fubjefl in both, he argueth thus.
If one hath not parts, it is neither^ f might nor crooked.
If it hath a figure^ it is either jlraigbt or crook¬ ed.
Therefore if it hath no parts, it hath no figure,
■ In the Third figure by lome called the lecond, wherein the common extream twice precedes the other two, he thus argues, in Phadone,
If haioing the knowledge of Equality we forget it not, we know, but if we forget it, we have re- courfe to Reminifcence, bic.
A/lixt Syllogifms which conclude by confe¬ quence, he ul'eth thus j
If one is whole and finite, that is, having be¬ ginning, middle, and end ^ it hat h figure alfoi, But the Antecedent is true.
Therefore the Confequent.
Of thofe alfo which overthrow by Confe¬ quence, the difterences may be gathered out of Plato.
Thus when a Man hath diligently underftood the faculties of the Mind, the various differences of Men, the leveral kinds of Reafoning which may be accommodated to this or that, and to vvhat perfons fuch and fuch reafons are to be uled, he, meeting with an opportunity fuiting with his purpole, will become a perfeQ: Orator.
The
t^AR-T V.
P L A T O.
i8
The reafons of Sophifnn and captious Argu- inents are, if we obferve narrowly, expreffed by Tlato in Euthyclemo, for there is declared which are in words, which in things, and how they are to be folved.
The ten Eradicaments are touched by Ylato in Eannenide^ and in his other Dialogues - the place of Etymologies is fully fet down in Cra- tylo. To conclude, he was lingiilarly admira¬ ble for divifion and definition, wherein the greateft force of Dialeftick confifteth.
The Summ of that wdiich he faith in Cratylo., is this ^ he enquireth whether Names are by the power and reafon of Nature.^ or by Impq/i- iion. He concludeth that the reQitude of names is by a certain impofition, not temera¬ rious or cafual, but feeraingly to follow the na¬ ture of the things themfelves ^ for reflitude of •names is nothing but an impofition confonant to the nature of the thing : Hence every im¬ pofition of names is not fufficient for re£iitude, neither the nature nor firlf found of the voice,
' but that which is compofed of both fo as every name is conveniently and properly ap plyed to the thing. For any name apply ed to any thing will not fignifie rightly, as if we fhould impofe the name of Horfe upon Man To fpeak is a kind of Affion : Not he that fpeaketh any way fpeakelh rightly, but he who fpeaketh fo as the nature of the thing requifeth. And for as much as expreifion of Names is a part of fpeaking, as Noun is a part of Speech, to name rightly, or not rightly, cannot be done by any impofition of names, but by a natural affinity of the name with the thing it felf. So that he is a right innpofer of names who can exprefs the Nature of the things in their names ^ for a Name is an Inftrument of the thing, not every inconfiderate. name, but that which agreeth, with its Nature. By this benefit we communicate things to one another whence it followeth, that it is nothing elfe but
there be a Divine Providence over all things, to which there are other Gods lubordinate-, how Men are in refpeO: of them. The endoi Mathe- 7naticks is, to know the nature of a Superficies and a folid, and to confider the Motion and Revolutioji of Coeleftial Bodies, the contempla¬ tion whereof mull firft be propofed in brief ThusP/^ra ufed to confirm the acutenefs of the Mind, for it (harpneth the underlfanding, and rendretli it more ready towards the contem¬ plation of Divine things.That which confidereth Numbej’s^Qmg likewile a part of Nlathematies, conferreth not a little to the underlfanding of ^ things that are ^ it frees us from .the error and ignorance which attend fenfible things, and con- duceth to the right knowledge of the eflence of things ; It likewife renders a Man expert in Military Affairs, efpecially towards the order¬ ing of an Army by the fcience of IdaUicks. Geo?neiry alfo conferreth much towards the un¬ derlfanding of good it felf, if a Man purfue it not only for Mechanical dimenfion, but that he may by the help thereof afcend to things which are not, bufying himfelf about thole which are in continual Generation and Motion. Stereo7netry likewife is exceeding ufeful, for af¬ ter the fecond accretion followeth this contem¬ plation, which holdeth the third room. A^ro~
\ no7vy ^alfo is uleful as a fourth Difcipline, whereby we confider the Motions of the Hea¬ vens and the Stars, and the Author of Night and Day, Months and Years. Thus by a familiar kind of way, finding out him who made all thefe, and by thefe Difciplines, as from certain rudi¬ ments or Elements proceeding to things more Sublime. Likewile Mufick is to be learnt, which relateth to hearing^ for, as the eyes are ^reared for Alfronomy, fo are the ears for Harmony and aswhen we apply our felves to Alfronomy, we are led from vifible things, to the Divine invifi- ble Effence •, fo when we receive the Harmony of Voice in at our ears, from audible things, we af-
an inftrument accommodated to the teaching cend by degrees to thofe which are perceived by and dTcerning of a thing, as a VVeavers lliuttle Intelleff, unlefs we purfue Mathematical Difci-
to his Webb. It belongeth therefore to a Dia leffick to ule Names aright •, for as a Weaver ufetha Shuttle rightly, knowing the proper ufe thereof after it hath been made % the Car¬ penter-, lb the DialeQick rightly ufeth that name which another hath made. And as to make a Helm, is the Office of a Ship-wright, but to ule it rightly of a Pilot -, fo he who frameth names, lhall impole them rightly, if he do it as if a Dialefifick were prelent, who underftand- eth the nature of thole things which are figni- fiedby the names. Thus much for Dialeflick.
CHAP. VII.
' 0/ Theoretick Phi/ofopy-
WE come next to Theo7-etick Philofophy, whereof one part is Theologick., ano¬ ther Phyjick., a third, Metaphyfick. The end of Theology is the knowledge of primary Caules : Of Phyfiek^ tounderftand the nature of thellni- verfe, what kind of Creature Man is, tvhat place he holdeth in the Worlds whether there
plinestothis end, the dontemplation thereof will be imperfefif, unprofitable, and of no value. We muff therefore prefently proceed from thole things which are perceived by the eyes and ears to thofe which reafon only difcerneth-, for, Ma- thematick is only a preface to divine things. They whoaddiQ; themfelves to Arithmetick and Geometry, defire to arrive at the knowledge of that which is, which knowledge they obtain no otherwife than as by a Dream, but really they cannot attain it becaufe they know not the Prin¬ ciples themfelves, nor thofe things which are compounded of the Principles: neverthelels, they conduce to thofe things which wc mention¬ ed ^ wherefore Plato will not have fuch Dilci- plines to be called Sciences. Dialeffick method proceeds in fuch manner, that by Geometrical Hypothefes.^ it afcendeth to firft Principles, which are not taken upon Hypothefes. for this reafon he calleth Dialeff a Science -, but, neither Mathe- matick,nor Opinion,becaufe it is more perfpicu- ous th^n fenfible things ^ nor a Science, becaufe ’tis more oblcure than firft Intelligibles: But,the Opinion of Bodies, the Science of Primaries, the Contemplation of Mathematicksv
They define Idea an Eternal Exemplar of things which are according to Nature ^ for, the greater part of Platonifts will not allow an Ided to be of things that ate made by Art, as of a Shield, or Lute, nor of things that are pre¬ ternatural, as of a Fever, or unnatural Cho- lei i nor of lingulars, as of Socrates or F/ato nor of vile ab]e£l things, as of Filth or Straws^ nor of relatives, as of greater and longer : For Ideds are the Eternal Notions of God, perfeQ: in themfelves.
That there are Idea's^ they prove thus ; whe* therGod be Intellect or fomething Intelligent, he mult have his IntelligibleS, and thofe Eter¬ nal and Immoveable ^ if fo, there are Idea's. For, if matter it felf be in it felf void of mea- fure, it is neceflafy that it receive meafure from fome Superiour, that is wholly remote from matter But the Antecedent is true^ therefore the Confequent ^ and if fo, there ate Idea\ cer¬ tain meafures void of matter. Again, if the World were not made by Chance, it muft not only be made of fomething, but by fomething, and not only fo, but after the likenefs of; fome¬ thing j but, that after whofe likenefs it was made made, what is it but an Idea? Whence itfolloweth, that there are Idea's. Again, if Intelleff differ from true Opinion, that which is Intelligible differeth from that which isOpini- onable -, and if fo, there are Intelligibles diftina from Opinionables, wherefore there are fifft In¬ telligibles, as well as firft Senfibles, whence we conclude there are Ideas.
He likewife aflerteth Faith and Imaginttion ; Faith., of things fubjeH: to Senfe ^ hnagindtion of Images and Species.
Becaufe Dialeftick is more efficacious than Mathematick, as being converfant about Divine Eternal things, therefore it is put before all Ma- fhematicks, as a Wall and Fortification of the reft.
CHAP. VIIL Of fir ji Matter.
WE rriuft next give a brief account of Frincipks., and thofe things which be¬ long to Theology., beginning at the firft, and from thence defeending to the Creation of the World, and Contemplation thereof, whereby, at laft we come to the Creation and Nature of Man.
To begin with Matter • this he calleth the Receptacle. Ndife., Mother.,F/ace., and fubjeHoj all images., affirming that it ts touched without Senfe ^ and comprehended by an Adulterate kind of Reafon. The property thereof is to undergo the Generation of all things,and to cherifli them like aNurfe, and to admit all Forms, being of her own Nature expert of all Form, Quality and Species ; Thele things are imprinted and form’d in her as in a Table, and fhe admitreth their Figures, not having of her felf any Figure or equality. For, Ihe could not be fit to receive the impreffions of feveral Forms, unlefs fhe were wholly void of all Quality and of thofe Forms which flie is about to receive. They who make* *fweet Unguents of Oyl, make choice of that Oyl which hath the leart feent •, they who would imprint any Figures in Wax, firft fmooth and pollilh the Matter, defacing all former Fi¬ gures. It is requifite that matter capable of all things, if it muft receive all Forms, muft not have the nature of any one of them, but muft be fubjefled to all forms; without any quality or figure ; and being fuch, it is neither a Body nor Incorporeal, but a Body potentially, as Brafs is potentially a Statue, becaufe then it becomes a Statue, when it puts on the Form thereof.
CHAP. IX.
• Ofldcae.
WHereas Matter is a Principle, Plato like¬ wife introduceth other Principles befide Matter. One as an Exemplar., Ideas ^ another Paternal., God, the Father and Author of all things. Idea, aS to God, is the Notion of God, as to us, the primary Intelligible, as to matter, a manner, as to this fenfible World an Exemplar, as to it felf; fijjence. For whatfbever is made with underftanding, muft necefiarily be referred to fomething, as if fomething be made from an¬ other, as my PiUure from me, the exerriplar thereof muft be prefuppofed, and if there be nothing Eternal, every Artift conceiveth it firft within himfelf, then transferreth the Forms there¬ on into Matter.
CHAP. X.
Of God.
WE come next to fpeak of the third Friri- ciple, which Plato, though he think it almoft ineffable, conceiveth may be expref- fed in this manner. If there are intelligibles, and thofe neither lenfibles, nor coherent with fenfibles *, but adherent to firft IntelligiUes, then are there firft fimple Intelligibles, as there are firft fenfibles ^ the Antecedent is true, therefore the confequent. But Men fubjeO: to perturba¬ tion of Senfe, when they would contemplate fomething intelligible^ prefently fall upon the thought of fomething fenfible, whereby at the fame time they imagine Magnitude, or Figure, or Colour-, and therefore cannot underfterftand this fincerely : But the Gods being void of Cor¬ poreal mixion underftand purely and fincerely. Now becaufe the Intelle£b is better than the Soul, and that Intellefl which is always in aft, and at once underftandeth all things, is better than that Intelleft which is in power, and of tliefe, that is moft excellent which is the caufe of the other , and fuperior to all ^ This can be nothing elfe but God, whom we call the firft, as be¬ ing the Caufe that the Intelleft of the World always afteth. He, being himfelf immoveable, afteth upon the Intelleft of the World, as the Sun upon the Eye, when it turneth towards him* And as that which is defired moveth the Ap¬ petite, it felf remaining immoveable •, fo doth this Intelleft move the Intelleft of all Heaven.
Now
I Pakt V.
PLATO.
185
Now this firfi: Intelle£l being mort fair, muft have the moft fair Intelligible 5 but nothing is fairer than it lelf, therefore it always under- llandeth it felf, and its own notions, which Adi is called Operation.
Moreover, God is eternal.^ ine_ffub!e^ per-
fad in that. is, needing none*,
perfeQ^ that is*, abfolute in alii times, and eve- ry tony perfebl., that is, ahiblute in every part, Diviniiy., Ejfence., Truths Harmony, Good. Nei¬ ther do we fo name thefe, to diftinguilh one from the other, but rather by them all to un- derftand one. He is faid to be Good, becaufe he beftoweth his benefits upon all according to their feveral Capacities, and fo is the caule of all gopd-Khr, becaufe he is in his effence both more and equal. Truth, becaufe he is the princi¬ ple of all truth,as the Son of all light. And Fa¬ ther, as being caule of all things, and adorning the mind of Heaven , and ' Soul of the World tfter his own exemplar and notions. For according to his own Will he filled all things with him felf^ exciting the Soul of the Wsjrld, and converting it to himfelf, for he is caufe of that IntelleH, which being adorned by the Father, adorneth alfo the nature of all this World. He is likewile ineffable, and as we iaid, can only be perceived by the Mind, for he is neither Genus nor Species, nor difference, neither can any accident be applied to him. He is not ill, for that it were Impiety to affirm *, nor good, for fo he Ihould be termed if he were meanly or highly participant of goodnels. Nor difference, for that cannot be made according to the notion of him. Nor qualited, for he is not made that which he is by quality, nor per- fefted thereby. Nor void of quality, for he is not deprived of any quality that appertaineth to him. Ador part of any thing, nor as a whole conftituted of parts 5 nor as the fame or divers, for nothing can happen to him whereby he may be diftinguifhed from others , Neitlier doth he move, or is he moved.
Hence the firft apprehenfion of him is by AiftraSion from thefe things, as we underftand a Point by AblfraHion from Senfibles , con- lidering firft a Superficies, then a Line, then a Point. The fecond is by Analogy in this manner. As the Sun is to fight and vifible things, himfelf not being fight, yet affording the one to lee , the other to be leen , fo is the firft IntelleH: to that Intelleff, which is in our Soul , and to thole things which it underftand- eth. For, it felf is not the Intelleff, yet it perfeffeth in thefe the A£l of InrelleQion , to thole it affordeth that they are underftood, enlightning that truth which is in them. The third way to underftand him is thus .* When a Man beholdeth that Beauty which is in Bo dies, he proceederh to that which is in the Soul, then to that which is in Offices and Laws : Laftly, to the vaft Ocean of Beauty, after which , he confidereth that which is good it lelf amiable it felf, expetible it felf, which Ihineth like a Light, and meeteth the Soul, that which alcends unto it by thele degrees. By this he comprehendeth God himfelf through reafon of that Excellence, which confifteth in adoration of him. He confidereth God void of parts, for nothing was before him a
part, and that of wJiich fomething confifteth IS precedent to that whereof it is part, for a Superficies is before a Body, and a Line before Superficies. Moreover God not havdng ma¬ ny parts, can neither be locally moved, nor altered by qualities, for if fie be altered, it muft be done by himlelf, or Ibme other -, if by Ibme other, that other muft be of greater Power than he j if by himfelf, it muft be either to better or toworle, both which are abfurd.
From all thefe it followeth that God is incor¬ poreal, which may likewile be proved thus. If God were a Body, he Ihould confift of matter and form ^ for every Body confifteth of matter, and its form joins to that matter, which is made like unto the Idea's, and in an ineffable manner participant of them ; But that that Ihould confilt of matter and form is ab¬ furd j for then he could not be either limplc or a Principle*, therefore he is incorporeal. Again, if he be a Body, he confifteth of mat¬ ter, and conlequently is either Fire or Air, or Earth or Water, or fomething made out of thefe 5 but none of thefe is Principle by it lelf j befides he muft then be later than matter, as confining of it, which beihg abfurd, it is neceffary that God be incorporeal. Moreover, if he were a Body, it would follow that he muft be generable, corruptible, mutable, which to affirm of God were intolerable.
CHAP. XL Of ^alkies.
Tflat *^alities are incorporeal, may be pro¬ ved thus .* Every Body is a Subjeff, qua¬ lity is not a SuWefl, but an Accident, theretbre' (quality is not a Body. Again, no Body is in a Subjed i every quality is in a SubjeH, there¬ fore quality is not a Body. Again, quality is contrary to quality, but no Body as no Body is contrary to a Body •, therefore qualities are not Bodies. To omit, that is molt agreeable to Reafon, that as matter is void of quality, fo quality Ihould be void of matter, and if qua¬ lity be void of matter, it muft likewnfe be void of Corporeity, for if qualities w^ere Bo¬ dies, two or three Bodies might be together iu the fame place, which is abliird.
Qualities being incorporeal, the maker of them muft be incorporeal alfo *, moreover there can be no efficients , but in corporeals, for Bodies naturally fuffer and are in mutati¬ on, not continuing always, in manner, nor per- fevering in the fame ftate. For whenfoever they feem to effe£l any thing, we ftiall find that they fuffer it long before. Whence as there is fome¬ thing which' wholly fuffereth , fo muft there be fomething which wholly aSeth ; but fuch only is incorporeal.
Thus much concerning Principles as far as they relate to Theology ; we proceed next to Phyfical Contemplations.
A a
CHAP,
PLATO.