PART XIII

608
Cic, de f.tt»
\
This is further proved, for that Felicity is, as we hinted formerly, no otherwife, than becaufe it is that ftate, in which we may live moft fweet- ly and moft pleafantly, that is, with the greatcft pleafiire that may be. For , take from life this fweetnefs, )ucundity, pleafure ; and where,
I pray, will be your Notion of Felicity^ not of that Felicity on\:f which 1 termedDivine,but even of the other, efteemed Human ; which is no otherwife capable to receive degrees of more and lefs, or intenfion and remifllon,than becaufe addition or detraftion of pleafure may befal it.
To underftand this better, by comparing Plea¬ fure with Pain, ‘ let us fuppofe a man enjoying
* many great inceflant pleafures, both in mind ‘ and body, no Pain hindring them, nor likely ‘ to difturb them ^ What ftare, can we fay, is
more excellent, or more deiirable than this ?
I For in him who is thus affeefed, there muft ne- « ceflarily be a conftancy of mind, fearing nei- ‘ ther death nor pain, becaufe death is void of ‘fenfe-, pain, if long, ufeth to be lights if I great, fiiort, fo as the fhortnefs makes amends c tor its greatnefs , the lightnefs for its length.
* When he arrives at fuch a condition, as he
* trembles not with horror of the Deity, nor fuf- ‘fereth the prefent pleafures to pals away,
\ whil’ft his mind is bulled wir h the remembrance , of paft, or expeftation of future, good things, «but is daily joyed with the reflecting upon c them ; What can be added to better the'eon-
* dition of this perfon ?
‘ Suppofe, on the other fide, a man afflicted
* with as great pains of body, and griefs of mind,
* as man’s nature is capable of, no hope that they , (hall ever be eafed, no pleafure paft, prefent, i or expefted •, What can be faid or imagined ‘ more miferable than he ?
‘If therefore a life full of pains be of all » things moft to be avoided, doubtlefs the great- ‘ eft ill is to live in pain ^ whence it followetb,
‘ that the greateft good is to live in pleafure.
* Neither indeed hath our mind any thing elfe,# ‘ whcrein,as its Centre, it may reft •, all ficknefles
t and troubles are reduced to pain, nor is there
* any thing elfe which can remove Nature out
* of her place, or diffolve her.
CHAP. IV.
That the Pleafure., voherein conjljis Felicity^ is Inio~ lence of Body., and TranquiHity of Mind,
THere being ( as before is intimated, ) two kinds of Pleafures one in ftation or reft, which is a placabikity, calmnefs, and vacuity, or immunity from trouble and grief ^ the other in motion, which confifts in a fweec movement, as in gladnefs, mirth, and wh^tfoever moveth the Senfe delightfully, with a kind of fweetnefs and titillatibn, as to eat and drink out of hunger and third -: It may be demanded. Whether in both , or in either, and in which, confift Fe¬ licity ?
. We fjy, that Pleafure, wherein Felicity con¬ fifts, is of the firft kind, the ftable, or that which is in ftation • and fo can be no other than Indo¬ lence of Body, and Tranquillity of Mind.
When therefore we fay in general terms, Plea¬ fure is the end of liappy Life, we are far from meaning the pleafures of luxurious perfons, or of others, as confidercd in the motion or aft of fruition, by which the Senfe is plealantly and fweetly aftefted *, as fome, either through igno¬ rance, dilfent, or ill will, interpret. We mean no more but this, ( to lepeat it once more, ) Not pained in Body., nor troubled in Mind.
For it is not perpetual Feafting, and Drink¬ ing ^ not the Converfation of beautiful Women ; not Rarities of Fiffl, nor any other Dainties of a profufe Table, that make a happy Life • but Reafon, with Sobriety, and a ferene Mind,fearch- ing the caufes,why,this Objeft is to be preferr’d, that to be rejefted •, and expelling Opinions^ vvliich occafion much trouble to the mind.
The better to underftand why this Pleafure only is the End, we may obferve, that Nature tends to no other Pleafure primarily, as to her end, but to the ftable, which followeth upon removal of pain and trouble. The Moveable file propofes not as the end, but provides only as a means conducing to the ftable, to fweeten ( as it were) that operation of hers which is requifite to the extirpation of pain and trouble. For Example, Hunger and Third being things t! qubleToni and incommodious to an Animal, the primary end of Nature is to conftitute the Ani¬ mal in fuch a ftate, as that it may be free from that trouble and inconvenience ^ and becaufe this cannot be done but by eating and drinking, fhe therefore feafons with a fweet relifh the aftion of eating and drinking, that the Animal may apply himfelf more readily thereto.
Moft Men,itlileed,Uve prepofteroufly • tranf- ported inconfiderately and intemperately, they propofe for their end the pleafure which confifts in motion ; But Wifdom fummon’d to our relief reduceth all pleafures into decent order, and teacheth that pleafure is to be propofed as the end i but that which is the end according to Na¬ ture, is no other than that which we have fpoken of. For while Nature is our Guide, whatfoever we do tends to this, that we neither be pained in Body, nor troubled in Mind ; And as foon as we have attained this, all difturbanccs of the Mind are quieted, and there is nothing beyond itjthat we can aim at to compleat the good both of our Soul and Body. For we then want plea¬ fure when its abfence excites pain in us : But as long as we are not pained, we want not plea¬ fure.
Hence comes it,that a motion of pain, or the ftate which follows upon that one word is the furtheft bound or height of pleafures; for, where- ever pleafure is, as long as it is there, there is nothing painful or grievous, or both together. Hence alfo it comes, that the higheft pleafure terminated in privation of p.iin may be varied and diftinguifhed, but not increafed and ampli¬ fied : For Nature,until fhe hath quite taken away the pain,increafeth the pleafure ‘ but when the pain is quite removed,fhe permits not the plea¬ fure to increafe in greatnefs, but only admits fome Varieties which are not neceflary, as not conducing to our not being pained.
Moreover, hence it apears,'that they infult without caufe, who accufe us, that we mean not by wantofpainjfdme middle thing betwixt pain
and
Pari XIIL
E T ICU^ U S,
and pleafure, buc fo confound it with cr»c other part ( in the dlvilion, ) as to make ir not only a plealure, but the very higheft of pleafures. I'Or, becaule when we are delivered out of Pain, vve lejoicc at that very freedom and exemption from all trouble, bur every thing whereat we re¬ joice is pleafure, as every thing whereat we are offended, pain ; the privation of all pain is right¬ ly named pleafure. For, when hunger and thirft are expelled by, eating and drinking, the very de¬ traction of the trouble brings pleaiure ; foin c- very thing elfe, the removal of pain caufeth fuc- ceflion of pleafure.
lienee alio may be fhewn the difference, when they objet^:, that there is no reafon why this Middle ftatelhould rather be efteemed a pleafure than a pain. For difeontent enfues not immedi¬ ately upon detradion of pleafure, unlefs fome pairi chance to fucceed in the room of the plea¬ fure : But on the contrary, we rejoice at the, lofs of pain , though none of thofe pleafures, which move the fenfe fucceed. By this we may underftand, how great a pleafure it is, not to! be pained ,* which if any doubt., let them ask? thofe who are oppreffed with fharp fickneffes. }
Some laugh hereat,* they objeCt, that this pleafure is like the condition of one that fleeps,' and accuie us of floth, never confidering that* this conftitution of ours is not mere ftupidity,? buc rather a Hate wherein all adtions of life are performed pleafantly and fweetly. For, as we^ Ihould not have the life of a wife man to be like a torrent or rapid ftream, fo we would not it ihould be like a Handing dead- pool : But rather like a river gliding on filentl;^ and quietly. We therefore hold his pleafure i^ot unatHive, but that which reafon makes firm to him.
But to omit thefe, and return to our Subjedt, there are two good things of which our chiefeH Felicity confiHs • That the mind be fret from trouble, the. body from pain j and ib as thatthefe goods be fo full, and all trouble taken away .that they admit not increafe. For how can that in- creafe, which is full? If the Body be free from all pain, what can be added to this indolence ? If the mind from perturbation, what can be .added to this tranquility?As the ferenity of Heaven be¬ ing refin’d to the fincereft fplendor , admits no greater fplendor ,- fo the Hate of a man who takes care of his Body and Soul, and conne^s his good out of both, is perfedl, and he hath attained the end of his defires, if his Body be neither fubjed to pain, nor his mind to diflur- bance. If any external blandifhments happen, they increafe not the chief good, but, as I may fay-, feafon and fweeten it ; for that aWolute good of human nature is contained in thi? peace of the Soul and the Body.
C H A P. V.
Of the means to provare this Felicity j and of Firtuei, the chief
NOw feeing this peace of Body and mind, tranquility in one,indoIency inche ocher, is the compleat felicity of man ; nothing more concerns us than to confider what things will procure and preferve it ; for when we have it,
we want nothing, white wq want it, all we do is to obtain ir, and yet ( as we laid, ) for die moH part We fail of it.
FirH, therefore, we muH confider of Felicity no otherwife than as of Health ,* it being mani- feH, that the Hate, in which the mind is free from perturbation, the Body from paip, is no other than the perfetHhealthofthe whole man. Whence it comes, that as in the Body, fo in the Mind al- fo , thofe things which produce and conferve health are thefame with thofe which either pre¬ vent difeafes, or cure and expel them.
Now feeing that t6 provide againH the drf- eafes of the Body belongs to the arc of Medicine, as well for the prevention as cure of them, we fhall not need to fay much hereupon, but only give two cautions which may befufficient.
One, that for the driving away all difeafes, or at leaH making them lighter and eafiei to be cured, we ufe Temperance and a feber contit nent life.
The other, that when there is a neceffitv of our fuffering thera,we betake our felves to fortitude, and undergo them with a conflanc mind, not exafperating them by impatience, buc comfort¬ ing our felves with confidering, that, if great, they muH be fhort; if long, light.
AgainH the difeafes of the Kdind, Philofophy provides, when we juftiy cHeem it the rhedicine of the mind ; Buc it is not with equal facility confulted,nor applyed, by thofe who arefick ia Mind. For we judge of the difeafes of the Bo¬ dy by the Mind; but the difeafes of the Mind, we neither feel in the Body, nor know or judge as we ought by the Mind, becaufe that where¬ by we ftiould judge is deHempered. Whence wc may underHand,that the difeafes of the Mind are more pernicious than thole of the Body ; as'amongH thofe of the Body, the worH and moH dangerous are fuch as make the patient infenfible of them; as the Apoplexey, or a violent Feaver.
Moreover, that the difeafes of the Mind are worfe than thofe of the Body, is evident from thefame reafon which demonHrates that theplea- fures of the Mind are better than thofe of the Body ; viz,, becaufe in the Body we feel nothing but what is prefent, but in the Mind we are fen- ‘fible alfo of the paH and future. For, as the anxiety of the Mind which arifeth from pain of the Body, may be highly aggravated, if we con¬ ceit, ( for inflance, ) that fome eternal and infi¬ nite Evil is ready to fall on us; fo(to transfer the inflance, pleafure is the greater,if we fear no fuch thing ;it being manifefl, that the greatefl plea¬ fure or trouble of mindf doth more conduce to a miferable or happy life, than either of the other two,though they fhould be equally laHing in the Body. * *
Now forafmuch as there are two principal difeafes of the mind, Dcfire, and Fear^ vyith their feveral off-fprings , and accompany’d with dif¬ eontent and trouble, in the fame manner as pain is joyned to the difeafes of the Body ; it is there¬ fore the office of I'-hilofophy to apply fuch re¬ medies as may prevent them from invading the Mind,or, if they have invaded it, expel them. Such briefly, are the vain defires of health, of honours, fear of the gods, of death, and the like, which having buc once taken pofTelhon of the .Mind they leave no part thereof found.^
6^ E^ICU%US. . Part
I
The remedies which Philofophy applyeth, are the V'lrtua^ which, being deriv’d from reafon, or the more general prudence, eafily drive away and expel the affedlions. I fay, from Rcafon, or the more general prudence ^ becaufe,as there is a more particular prudence, ierving for thedi- redlions of all the particular adions of our life ,• fo is there a n*ore generafprudence, which is no other than reafon itfelf, or the didate of lea fon, and is by moft efteemed the fame with wifdom i whereas, Virtue is only a perfedf dif pofition of the mind, which reafon or prudence doth create and oppofe to the difeafes of the Mind, the VIcqs.
C H A P. VI.
Of "Right -reajon, and Free from which the . yinues have all their paife,
BEing therefore to proceed in our difeourfe to Virtue and its feveral kinds, we muft premift fomething concerning Reafon itfelf, and likewife concerning the Free-will which is in it- for thence is derived all the praife belonging to Virtue i as alio its oppofite, the reproach 'due to Vice.
Forafmuch as Reafon generally is nothing but the faculty of ratHocinating, or judging and iir- ferring one thing from another, we here take it particularly for that which judgeth, inferreth, and ratiocinates in things of adlion, fubjedf to eledfion or avoidance.
But whereas, judgment or reafoning may be eitherrightor wrong, that reafon, whofe judg¬ ment is falfe, is not properly reafon, and there¬ fore we term it opinion ; yet in refped it is the common phrafe, you may call it alfo reafon jf you pleafe, meaning wro7}g reafon j as right rea¬ fon may be termed Opinion^ meaning feund O- p inion.
Right reafon arifeth either from ingenuity, or experience, and fedulous obfervation. Being grounded upon firm and correct pi inoiples, our ratiocination becomes lolid ; and juftly do we appeal to the judgment of him, who is expert and knowing in things. But of this already in the Canonick part, concerning the Griteries, which need not repetition. ^
When, I fay, things fubjedt to eledtion and avoidance; I take for granted that there is in us a free or arbitrary power or reafon, that is, a faculty eledlive and profecutive of that which reafon hath judged good, aud of avoiding and lliun- ning what it hath judged ill.
That it really is in us, is proved even by ex- perience,agd by common fenfe, which raanifefts, that nothing is worthy of praife or difpraife, but what is done freely, voluntarily, deliberately, and by eledliort ; and therefore muft depend on Ibmething within us which is beyond compulfion, and in refpedf whereunto, all rewards and pu- niftiments are rightly ordained by the LawstThan which nothing were more unjuft, if the adfions of men were to be imputed to that rigid Necef- fity, which fome afiert, derived" from Fate, as the foie command refs of all things, declaring, that whatfoever comes to pafs floweth from an eternal truth, and continuation ofcaufes.
"Truly it is much better to be addiPitd to the fa¬ bulous ( that isy the common^ ) opinion of the gods] than to be Jlaves to the belief of Fate, according as feme Naturalifs hold it, impofttg it upon our necks as an everlafiing Lord or Tprant, whom we are to ffand in awe of, night and day. For the other o- pinion hath fome comfort in it, that the gods will bo moved with our prayers ; but this, imports an in^ exorable refity. ^
True indeed it is, that, in things void of rea¬ fon, fome efFedts are necelfary, (yet notfone- ceffary, but that they might have been prevented, as we declared in the Canonick ; and where we treated of caufes, ) but, in Man, endu’d with realon, and as far as he makes ufe ofthatrea* fon, there Cim be no NecelFcy. lienee it was, we endeavoured to alTerc the declination of mo¬ tions in Atoms, that v/e might from thence de¬ duce, how Fortune might foractimes intervene, and put in for a lhare arnongft human affairs, yet, that which is in us, our Will not be do- ftroy’d.
It behoves us to employ all our wit and en¬ deavours to maintain our own free-will ggainft that fempiternal motion,and not to fuffer wicked- nefs to efcape unculpable.
But what I fay of fortune, implies not that we aferibe any divinity to it, not only as the vul¬ gar, but even as thofe Philofophers,who efteem- ingher an unftable Caufe, though they conceive not, that Ihe beftows on men any thing of good -or ill that may conduce to happy life, yet chink that file gives occafion cfvery confiderable goods and ills. We imply not this,- 1 fay, but only mean, that, as many things are affeded by ne- ceffity and counfe^o alfo byFortunejand there¬ fore, it is the duty of a wife man to arm him- felfagainft Fortune.
Now feeing, whatever good or ill there is in human adions, depends only upon this, that a man doth it knowingly, and willingly, or free¬ ly ; therefore the mind muft be accuftomed to know truly, that is, to ufe right reafon ; and to will truly, that is, to"bend the free will to that which is truly good, from that which is truly ill. Forafmuch, as this accuftoming be¬ gets that difpofition in the mind, which we de- feribed to be Virtue; as the accuftoming of it to the contrary , begets that difpofition which we may juftly define Vice. ’
Not to mention, that what produceth plea* fure, fincere without any pain, trouble or re¬ pentance attending or enfuing thereupon, is tru¬ ly good;that which produceth pain, fincere with¬ out any pleafure, or joy fucceeding upon it, is truly ill ; I only give this hint of both to diftin* gui/h^ach of them from what is only apparent and diflembled; Such as that good which begets prefent pleafure,and afterwards introduceth pain and trouble ; and that ill which procui^spain or trouble, but afterwards pleafure and checrful- nefs.
C H A P.
XIII.
P A k
B T 1 QU %U S.
CHAP. VII.
Of the Virtues in General.
FOrafmuch as all Pirtue is either Prudence, or the Diaate oiKight Reafon, as we accuftom ourfelves to it, or isdireaed by,, and dependent on Prudence, and the Diaate of Right Reafon ^ it is manifeft, that to this later kind belongs, as welljthat whereby a man is alfeaed toward him- felf, asthat, whereby he is afFeaed towards ano¬ ther : For by Prudence, a Man is madecapablc to govern not only himfelf, but others.
Til i Virtue which relates to others, is gene- rally ca '.led Ju^ice^ that which concerns ourfel^ is ordin 'vily diftinguilhed into temperance, and Fortitude. But we ufe to comprize both under the term Honefiy, as when we fay, to aa Virtu- oufly,is no other than to aa Prudently, Hone lyjuitly : they who live Soberly and Conttnent- ly, are faid to live Honeftly or Decently j they who do Valiantly, are thought to behave them- felves Honeftly or Decently.
Hereupon we ( as others, ) diftinguiln v irtue into four kinds. Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Jujiice; but fo, as that we oppofe not Pru to any afFeaion fo much as to Incogitance Ignorance, hlly, ( except by accident, inalmuch as perturbation blinds Reafon, and caulech a Man to aa imprudently •) nor jufiice,to any ar- feaion in fo much as to Malice, 'whGtehy a Man is prone to Deceits, ( unlefs by accident, in as much as anger, hatred, covetoufnefs, or fomeo^er paflion may caufe a Man to do unjuftly ; (Jem- feianccy we oppofe tO Dej^ ; Fortitude, to
Fear. , r -j *
Hence is manifeft, when I formerly laid, A Tober or well-ordered Reafon procures a plealant or happy Life ^ we are to underftand,that it pro¬ cures it by means of the Virtues which it ingene rates and preferves. And whereas I added, that it fearched out the Caufes, why things are to be embraced or avoided, and chafeth away Opinions which occafion great trouble in the mind, we are to underftahd that is all one with general pru¬ dence, the principle of all things expecible and avoidable, and confetjuently the greateft,becaule the Virtues which arile from it appeafe Pci^urba- tioDS, teaching, that we cannot live pleafantly, unlefs prudently, honeftly, and juftly ; not pru dently, honeftly, and juftly, unlefs plea
^3utly. , • . , .
By this you find why I conceive, thatthc Vir¬ tues are connatural to a happy life, and that it is impoffible to feparate happy life from them. All other things, as being frail and mortal,_ are tranfitory, feparable from true and coniiant pleafure ; only Virtue, as being a perpetual and immortal good, is infeparable From it.
By thi* alfo you may underftand, that all the Virtues are conne^ed within one another, and that by one j becaufe to the principal jPrudence, all the reft are conjoined, as theMembers to the Head, or as Rivers to the Spring from which they flow j the other,becaufe as well Prudence,as all the reftcohere with happy Ufe, there cannot be a happy life where the Virtues are not } nei¬ ther can the Virtues be there, where the life is not happy.
Noewithftanding chat the Virtues are all con¬ nected within one another, yet are they not therefore all equal, as fome Conceive, who hold that ail Vices and Faults are alfo equal. For a man may be more inclin’d tojufticc, than to Temperance,- and Temperance may be more perfect in one, than in another. As for in- ftance, ( without Envy be it fpoken, ) myfelf,by length of time, have made fo great a progrels in Sobriety, as lefs than an Ohlus ferves me for a meal j Metrodorus, who hath not yet made fo great progrefs, a whole Oholus. And it is evi- dei^t, that, of men, one is wifer than another ; and of them, who do rightly according to Vir¬ tue, equal Rewards are not allotted to all, as neither equal Puniftiments to all Offenders. Even Sence and Manners confute them, who make all equal, and hold that they offend alike, he who beats his Servant wrongfully, and he who his Pa¬ rent j feeing, fome there are who make no dif¬ ference betwixt eating a Bean, and the head of our Father.
Others condemn, and ejwlaim on us, for af¬ firming, that the Virtues are of fuch a nature, as that they conduce to Pleafure or Felicity, as if*ve meant that Pleafure which is obfeene and infa¬ mous, but let them rail as they pleafe. For as they make Virtue the chief good, fo do we : If the difeourfebe of the means conducing to hap- 3y life, neither is there any of fo great power as Virtue, therefore not more excellent, ("not Wealth, not Honour, not Friends, not Children, &c. ) But if the difeourfe be of living happily, or Felicity, why fhould not this be a good fu- perior to Virtue, to the attainment whereof Virtue itfelf is but fubfervient ?
They exclaim again, that we enervate Virtue, in not allowing her fo much power, as to ren¬ der a wife man free from all paflion or ajfteCtion, but to permit him to be moved therewith, ( as for inftance ) to grieve, weep, and figh at the death of Friends ; But as we let a high value up¬ on Virtue, as being able to deliver us from vain terrors and fuperfluous defires, the chief heads of all greivous Perturbations • fo like wife not a little efteem it, for that it reducerh the reft of the affeClions to fuch a mediocrity,in which there remains fome fenfe as it were of humanity.
Certainly, that total exemption from Grief, which thefe men boaft of, proceeds from fome greater ill, cruelty, and immoderate ambition of vain-glory, and a kind of madnefs. So chat ic feems much better to feel fome paflion, to be affected with Ibme griet, to fhed fome tears, fuch as proceed from perfons touched with love and tCndernefs, than to be wife as -thefe would have us, and grin like brute Beafts.
CHAP. VIII.
Of Prudence in general.
WE muft now fay fomthing of every Vir.
tue in particular, beginning with Pru¬ dence, whofe office being to govern the life, and fo to provide for every occurrent in life,as to di- red it to happinefs, ic feems al«ne to comprize the offices of all Virtues.
. I i i i That.
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