PART XIII.

the faeces of roundnefs, which fpecies' is truly fuch, hath a neceffary caufe tor wfrich it is fuch, at fuch a diftancc ; and withal it Is not de- c8iived, for it does not affirm that the Tower is filch, but only behaves itfelf paffively, receiving thQ Jpecies^ and barely reporting that which ap- pearethipit. But Opinion, or the Mind, whofe Office It is to conceive or judge, inafmuch as it adds, as it were from itfelf, that what appea- reth to tire Senfe is a TPwer, or that the Tow¬ er really and in itfelf, is round ^ Opinion, I fay is that which may be true or faife.
(o') sext. Emp. Whence may be inferred, that ( o ) ‘ all Phar- adv.Log. j. ‘ tafies ( or Senfations, ) whereby Phenomena's ‘ ( things apparent,) are perceived , are true ,
‘ but Opinions admit a difference • for fomc are ‘ true, others faife, inafmuch as they are our ‘ own Judgements fuperadded to the Appear- ‘ anccs ^ and we judge fome things aright, others ‘ amif^^ by reafon that formhing is added, and j ‘ imputed to the Appeatances, dr forathing de- i ‘ traded from them : And generlly Senfe which ‘ is incapable pf Ratiocination charged with ‘ falfhood. ' •
‘ But fome are deceived by the diverllty of ‘ thofc Apearances , which are derived, from ‘ the fame fenfible Objed, as in a thing vifible,
‘ ( for example ) according as the Objed feem- ‘ eth to be either of another Colour, or of ano- ‘ ther Figure, or fome other way changed ; for ‘ they conceive, that of contrary Appearances ,
‘ one mufl: neceffarily be true, and the other ‘ which is oppofite thereto faife. Which cer- ‘ tainly is very foolifh, and proper to fuch men ‘ as confider not the nature of things. For ( to ‘ continue our inftance of things vifible, ) it is ‘ not the whole Solid, or the whole Solidity of ‘ the Body which we fee, but the colour of the ‘ foild Body. Now of the colour, that which is ‘ in a foild Body, and appeareth in thofe things ‘ which are feen nigh at hand , is one ^ that ‘ which is without the folid Body , as a Specks^
‘ or Image flowing from it , and is received ‘ into places feituate one beyond another, fuch ‘ as appeareth in thofe things which are beheld ‘ at a great diftance , is another. This later ‘ being changed in the intermedite fpa'ce , and ‘ afluming a peculiar Figure , exhibits fuch an ‘ appearance as itfelf indeed is.
‘ Whence, neither the Sound which is in the ‘ Brafs that is ftruck, nor the Voice which is in ‘•the Mouth of him who cryeth aloud, is heard,
‘ but that found of Voice which lights upon our ‘ Senfe ; for the fame thing cannot be in two ‘ diftant Subjefts. And as no Man faith, that ‘ he hears falfly, who perceiveth the found to be ‘ but fmall at diftance, becaufe coming nigher, ‘ he perceiveth it as if it were greater, fo nei- ‘ther can we fay, that the Sight is deceived,
‘ for that afar off it feeth a Tower, little and ‘ round ^ near, great and fquare ; but rather that ‘ it is true. • For when the fenfible Ob/eft ap- ‘ peareth to it little, and of fuch a Figure, it is ‘ in that place little indeed, and of fticj^ a Fi- ‘gure, the extremities of thofe Images , being ‘ broke off, whilft they arc conveighed through ‘the Air and thereupon coming into the Eye ‘ in a Iclfer Angle. And again, when itappear- ‘ eth great and of another Figure ^ there it is ‘ great and of another Figure, it not being the
‘ fame in both places ; for here the extremities ‘ of the Images are more entire, nnd come into ‘ the Eye in a greater Angle : but it is a great ‘ miftakc to think, tliat it is the fame thing which ‘ appeareth to Sight, and affcdetli the Eye near ‘ and afar off.. * .
( p ), Neither can we fiy, that the Sight is de- . ^ ccived, when we fee a Shadow in the Sunffiinc to move , to follow our Footfteps, and imitate our Geftures. For Shadow being but Air depri¬ ved of Light, and the Earth, as we go, being now here, now there, fucceffively deprived of the Sun’s Light, and fucceffivly recovering that wh'^i eof it was deprived, it comes to pafs that the Shadow feems to change place, and to fol¬ low us 5 but the Eyes are not therefore deceived, it being only their office to fee the Light,} and to lee the Shadow in whatfover place it is. But to affirm, that the very Light or Shadow which is here, is the fame, ordiftindl from that which even now was there, this belongs not to them, . but to the Mind, whofe office it is to determine and judge. So that whatfoever of falfity hap¬ pens to be here, it is to be attributed to Opi¬ nion, not to Senfe.
( f ) The fame Anfwer may be given to a CO LucretJoc. thoufand other Objedions, as of a Ship which feems to ftand ftill, and the Land to move -, of the Stars, which feem to reft ; of Mountains far afunder, which yet feem to be nigh ; of Boys, who, having made themfelves giddy by turn¬ ing, think the Roof itfelf runs round , of the Sun appearing to be near the Mountains, when as fo great fpaces divide them ; of the appearance of a Space under Water, as large, as from above it to the Sky ; of a River, which to thofe who pafs over it, feemeth to. flow back towards the Springy of a Gallery, whidi feems narrow at the further end ; of the Sun, who feems to rife out of the Wafer, and to go down into the Wa¬ ter *, of Oars, which feem crooked or broken ^ of Stars in the Night, which feem to glide over the Clouds • of Things, which, by drawing the Eye on one fide, double.
CANON 3-
( r ) j4ll Opinion aUeJlcd^ or not contradiiied by Cr)Fi'om Sext. the evidence ofSenfe.^ is True.
Evidence of Senfe, I here call that kind of Senlation. or Appearance, which, all things ob- ftrudive to Judgment being removed, as di¬ ftance, motion, indifpofition of the Medium, and the like, cannot be contradifted. Whence to the Queftion, Whether a thing be Inch as it appears? We ought not to give a fudden An- fwer, but to obferve (j) that which I call lj.ivo{/xvov exjie&able, in regard that we muft ftay, until the thing be fully examained and fifced out, according to all the ways that it can pof- fibly happen. - ‘
♦(f) Atteftation I call Comprehenfion, made CO sext. Emp. ‘ by Evidence, that the thing conceivable is fuch ‘ as we before conceived it ^ as Plato coming to- I wards me, from afar off I conjefturc. and , think, as far as I can guefs at fuch a diftance,
« that it is Plato • but when he draws nigher, and , the diftance is taken away, by the evidence of I the thing, then, is there made an Atteftation ' ‘ that it is ‘Not-
EPICURUS.
^ 52
PART Kill.
‘ Not contradidion is faid to be the finding ‘ out of 3 thing not raanifeft, which we fuppofe, and conceive by refleding on fomthing manifeft lor evident; as when I fay, there is Eacuum, t which indeed is unmanifeft, I am induced there- ‘ to by fomthing yaanifeft, that is, by Motion , t for if there were no Vacuum^ there would be
* no Motion, feeing the Body that (hould be mo- ‘ ved, would not have any place to go into, ^11 ‘ things being full , and clofe pack’d together. 1 Whence that which is apparent or manifeH: 1 doth not contradid that which is unmanifefl:> t fince indeed there is Motion.
The Atreftation and Not-contradidion is the Criteiies, whereby a thing is proved to be true.
CANON 4.
(i) Out of ( Ojrinion, contradided or not attefted hy sext. Em^ir. evidence ofSenJe^ vs falfe.
(^b) sexu Ibid. In which words, (i?) Contradidion is fom-
* thing oppofite to Not-atteftation, it being the
. ( joint deftrudion of a manifeft thing together
‘ ftance. Some affirm, there is not Eacuum ^ but 1 together with this fuppofition muftbefubver- 1 ted a thing manifeft, viz.. Motion. For if there
‘ we have already fhewed. '
‘ In like manner, Contradidion is oppofed to
* Atteftation ; for it is a fubverfion, whereby it 1 appeareth that the thing conceivable is not fuch t as it was conceived in the opinion ; as a Man ‘ coming towards us from afar off, we at that ‘ diftance guefs he. is Plato, but the diftance being 1 taken away, it appeareth to us by evidence that . he as not Plato. This is contradidion, for the ‘ thing manifeft contradids the preconceived ‘ Opinion. Thus an Atteftation and Not*con- ‘ tradidion is the Critery, by which a thing is , proved to be true •, fo Contradidfion and Not- « atteftation is the Critery by which a thing is ‘ evinced to be falfe ; Evidence being the Bafis and Foundation upon which all right Opinion of Truth and Falfe is grounded.
To omit, that Evidence is fomtimes had by one Senfe, and about fome proper Senfible ^ fora- times by many, as when the Senfible is common, as Magnitude and Figure, Diftance and Pofiti- on, Reft and Motion, and fuch like, which may be perceived both by the Sight and Touch, and become manifeft, if not to one Senfe, at leaft to the other. Whereupon it fomtimes happens, that by reafon of feveral Qitalities, feveral Sen- ces may be fummoned, that the Evidence which cannot be got by one, may be obtained by the other; asvv'hen we cannot difeern by Sight, whe¬ ther the Bread that is offer’d us be true o r coun¬ terfeit, we may fummon our Tafte, whereby it will evidently appear^ which of the two it is
But this 1 advife, that, after we have exadtly confidered allj we adhere to thofe things which are obvious to us ; ufing our Senfes, either the common about common Senfibles, or the proper about the proper. Since we muft hold general¬ ly to all Evidence which is freely prefented to us by every Critery, but efpecially by this : ‘and Cenacioiifly ftick to it, as to an infallible Princi-
‘ pie , left either the Criteries which are efta- blifhed by Evidence be overthrown, or Error,
‘ being eftablifhed as llrong as Truth, turn all ‘ things upfidc down.
1 need not repeat or give particular Advic^, what is to be done about the Inftance alleclged of a Tower, which at diftance leems Round, but nearer, Square : for, from what is deduced it is manifeft, that before we afTert any thing, we muft expeft or paufe, and approach neither, and ex¬ amine and learn, whether the Tower be fuch when we come at it, as it appeared far off.
I (hall only give this general Rule. That un- lefs ( the truth of the Senfes being preferved after the manner aforefaid, ) you diftinguiffi that which is opinablc or conceivable into that which is expeftible or requireth time, before it be afferted what it is, as being not yet duely per¬ ceived, and into that which is prefent and pro- pofed to us , and throughly examined, it will come to pafs, that you wifi perpetually bedif- quieteJ with deceitful or vain Opinions, But if, when the things opinable are agitated in your Mind, you fiimlyefteem all that is here called cxpedable as fuch indeed, and pafs not, lightly by it, as if that which is falfe, not ha¬ ving the Atteftation of any Evidence, were firm and allowable ; in this Cafe you will behave your felf as one that is cautious of all Ambigu¬ ity, and folicitoufly takes heed to every Judg¬ ment , which is rightly or falfly paffed of an opinable thing.
CHAP. Ill.
Canons \of Prmotion or .Anticipation ; the Second Criterie. .
OF Pracnotion or Anticipation may be gi¬ ven four Canons ;
C A N O N I.
(^a') All Anticipation or Pr motion, which is in (a) Out of the Mind, depends on the Senfes , either by d-aen. Incurfion, or Proportion , or Similitude , or Compofition,
I mean, that the Notion ( or Idea, and Form as it were , which being anticipated is called Pragnotion ) is begotten in the Mind by Incurfion ( or Incidence, ) when the thing incurreth into the Senfe diredly and by itfelf, as a man Juft before our eyes. By Proportion, when the Prjc-' notion is amplified or extenuated, but the Num¬ ber, Scituation and Figure of the Parts, with a convenient bignefs of each, is retain’d ; as when having feen a Man of due magnitude , we from thence form in our mind the Speices of a Giant, by Amplification ; or of a Pigmy, by Extenua¬ tion. By Similitude, when according to a thing firft perceived by the Senfe, we fancy another like it ; as when we imagine a City unfeen, like to fome that we have feen. Laftly, by Compo¬ fition, wjJben we put as it were into one the di- ftind Notions which we have of two or more things; as when we fo unite the Notions of a Horfe and a Man, as that the Notion of a Cen- taure arifeth out them, but { ) not without fome ajjijtence of Ratiocination.
i
CANON
J’ARTZIII.
553
EPICURUS,
CANON a.
Anticipation is the very Notion^ and ( as it were ) ' Definition of the Thing ; without which , we ^connot Enquife^ Doubt ^ Think , nor fo much
as Nam^ any Thing.
V or by the word Anticipation., or Praaotion, / under fi and a Comprehenfion of the Mind, or a fui- table Opinion or Vnderflanding fixed in the Mind, and, as, it were, a certain Memory or Monument of that Thing which hath often appeared from without, ( which the Mind hath reprefented in itfelf after iome one of the forementioned manners : ) Such for example is the Idea, or Form and Spices, re- fieCiing upon whith, v>e fay to our felves that Thing is Man. For ajj'oon as ever we hear this word Man pronounced, intmediatly the Image of a Man is underfiood, according to the Anticipation formed in the Mind by the foregoing Senfations.
‘ Wherefore that Thing which is primarily ‘ and chiefly meant by and coucht under every
* word, and fo apprehended by the Mind, is fom- ‘ thing perfpicuous and manifeft : For w^en we
* enquire after any thing, or doubt of it, or think ‘ fomthing; welhould not do it, unlefs we al-
* ready had a Prjcnotion of that thing •, as when ‘ wc enquire, whether that which appeareth afar ‘ off, be an Horfe or an Oxe, it is requifite that ‘we ffiould firft have feen and known by Antici- ‘ pation the Figure of an Horfe and Oxe. In- ^ deed we could not fo much as name any thing,
* unlels we firft had fome image thereof known ‘ by Anticipation.
Hence itcomj^sto pafs, that, if it be deman d- ,cd what any thing is, we define or deferibe it in fuch manner as it is, according to the Anticipa*- tion thereof which We have in our Mind . Nei¬ ther do we thus only,being demanded what fome lingular tj^ing is, as what Plato is , but alfo what an Univerfal is, as Man, not this or that, but , confidered in general j this is brought to pafs ac¬ cording as the Mind, having feen many Singu¬ lars , and fet apart their feveral Differences, fornieth and imprinteth in hcrfelf the Anticipa¬ tion of that which is common to them all, as an Univerfal Notion 5 refleSing upon which, we fay, Man ( for example ) is fomthing animate, and endued with fuch a Form.
CANON 3.
Anticipation is the Principle in all Difeourfe, as Icing that to which we have regard^ when we infer that one is the fame or divers^ conjoined with or disjoined from another.
(i) Uert, For, C d ) whiPfi we conceive any thing, either by Enuciation or Ratiocination, it depends upon fomthing firfi evident, unto which thing we having regard, and referring our thought, infer that thing of which the Qiujlion is, to he fuch, or not to -be fuch • that is, the fame, or another ; coherent, or not coherent with it Thus, if we are to prove that this thing which we behold is a Man, we fo look back upon the Praenotion which we have of Man, as that without any ftop we fay,Man is fomthing animate and endued with fuch a Form v this that 1 fte, is animate and endued with fuch a Form,
therefore this that I fee is Man ; Or, it is not animate, nor endued with fuch a Form,therefore it is not Man.
But it is not neceffary to confirm all things with exquifite Reafons or Arguments, and feru- pulous forms of Rcafoning, which are cried up by the Dialedicks ; For there is this difference betwixt an Argument and the Conclufion of the Rcafon, and between a flender Animadverfion and an Admonition^ that in one, fome occult, and ( as it were, ) involved things are unfolded and opened ; in the other, things ready and open are judged. But where there are fuch An¬ ticipations as ought to be, then what will follow or not follow from them, or what agrees or dif- • agrees with them, is perfpicuoufly difcerned,aod ' naturally inferred, without any Artifice, or Dia- ledick Conftiuiftion -, wherefore we need only take care, that the Anticipation which we have of Things be clear and difiinft.
CANON 4*
That which is Vnmanifeji ought to be demonjl ra¬ ted out of the Anticipation of a Thing Mani-
fe.fi.
t
This is the fame we faid even now,That the An¬ ticipations of Things from which we infer Som- thing,and thinking upon which we make Sumpti¬ ons or Propofitions, which areMaxims or Princi- ples,by which that which is inferred or concluded is conceived to be demonftrated, be perfpicuous and manifeft. For, ( e ) Demonfir atim is a Speech, which coUelUng by granted Sumptions ( or Propo¬ fitions, ) brings to light a Truth not manifefi before.
Thus, to demonn:ra*ce that there is Eacuum^vihidi is not manifeft, fuppofmg the Anticipation of Tacuum,and the Anticipation of a manifeft thing ( Motion , ) thefe' Sum;)ti6us are premifed. If there is Motion, there is Tacuum , but there is Motion, and then is inferred, therefore there is alfo Vacuum,
In this place, Motion is taken for the Argu¬ ment, Medium, or Sign, which properly ought to be a fenllble thing : For the fenfe is that, ac¬ cording to which it is necaffary to make a coti- jedure by Ratiocination, ultimately to that which is un manifeft, although fuch a §ign or Medium hath not always a^neceffary Connexion with that which is inferr’dj but is fomtimes only contin- gent,or probable, and might be otherwife.
Of this kind are many, from which we argue chiefly in fuperior thiogs , thofe being fuch as may be brought to pafs, not, one way only, but many, as was hinted formerly.
Hither alfo may be (/)referred that which I ufc (/) CUAe nat, to term viffovofjLittv, Equivalence, by which it is in- *• ferred, that one of the contraries being, the other alfo muft be ; and when I argue thus, if the multitudes of Mortals be fo great , that of Immortals is no lefs; and if thofe things which deftroy be innumerable, thofe which preferve ought alfo fo be innumerable.
, Agaihft thofe who deny there is any Demon- ftration, may bebrought this Argument : (.g^d^sext^ Emp, Either you underftand what Deraonftraion is, or you underftand in not? if you underftand and have the Notion thereof, then there is Demon- B b' b b ftratibii
/~
EPICURUS.
PilR
ftration-, but if you underltand it not, Why do you talk of that, whereof you have not any knowledg ?
. (fc) They who take away the Credit of the lucret. ' and profefs that nothing can be known being in the fame Ranks, do they not,when they confcfs that they know nothing, imply they know not this very thing. Whether any thing can be known ? We Ihould not therefore con¬ tend againfl; them, that they walk backwards npnn their Head; Yet if they affirm they do, and I thereupon grant, that this is known by them, I have a fair occafion to ask them, how, fince before they faw nothing true in the things themrelves,they came to underltand what it was to know, and what to be ignorant ?
to the Pleafurc, or a leffier Pain might be taken inftead of a greater. *
C H A P. V.
i. ’ •
Canons concerning theufe of Words,
1 Shall add fonithing concerning the ufc of Words, ( which I defign’d to fpeak of Jaft ) and efpecially that which concerns Difeourfe ; for which, two Canonsmay feeni fufficient, one for the Speaker, the other for the Hearer : They arethefej
C A N O N I, '
CHAP. IV.
Canons of Affection or Pajfton *, the 'third Criterie.
When thou fpcake(\:^tnay‘ufe of Words Common and Perfpicuous \ leji either thy JWeaning be not known., or thoumnecejfarilj wajle the time in Explication.
LAItly , concerning Affe(ftion ( or Paffion, ) which is, as I faid, Plcafure and Pain, there' Ca) Ovitona- may be Four («) Canons.
irtistt,
C A N O N I.
Pleajure^ which hath no Fain joined with it^ is to be embraced.
CANON 2.
Pain., which hath no Pleafure joined roitb it^ is to be fhmned.
C A N O N 2:
' 1 ■ * ■
Whe^ thou hearejl., endeavour to comprehend the Power and Meaning of ‘the Words f left either their Obfeurity keep theP hi Ignorance., or their yimbiguity lead thee into Errour.,
Above all, (^) ‘ we muft know wh^t Things ( ‘ the Words fignifie ; that we may have fom- ‘ thing, refle'fting upon which, 'we may fafely ‘ difeern whatfoever we either conceive,ot feek,
‘ or doubt ; otherwife, if all things ^puld ef ‘ cape us undetermined , they who wotild de.
‘ monftrate any thing to us, will proceed to in- ‘ finite, and we ourftlves gain nothing by out ‘ Difeourfe, but Words and empty Souhds. For ‘ it is neceffiary, we have regard to the Notion ‘ and primary Signification of every Word!, and ‘ that we need not any Demonftration to under.
‘ fiand that thing, in cafe yve can pitch upon ^ any thing, to which we may refer that point,
‘ about which our Enquiry, Doubt, or Opinion ‘ are bufied.
Hence it is, .that the Method of enquiring af. ter Truth, which is performed by a certain or derly Procedure, ought firft to preferibe cerl tain Rules, by which that Affair may be per. formed, that fo the Difeourfers may agree, whde it is concerning which they difeeurfe. So that if any Man fhall not firft agree to this , but hath a mind rather to cavil and trifle in wor. diffi Equivocation, he is not to be difeourfed with, or ftill to be preft to explain himfelf, what ’tis, he would be at *, for by this means his Juggling will be difeovered, and his Cavils will folve themfelves : Nor will' he be able to intangle his Adverfary,but ratbet difeover him¬ felf a ridiculous Sophifter.
CANON 3-
All Pleafure , which either hindreth a greater Pleafure., or procureth a greater Pain., is to he fhunned.
CANON 4.
All Pain., which either putteth away a greater Pain., or pracureth a greater Pleafure , is to be embraced.
Of thefe we fhall fpeak more largely in the Ethicks. In the mean time, I fhall give this general Advertifement concerning Heafure : Pleafure is defirable of it felf, becaufe it is Plea¬ fure •, Grief or Pain is alwayes abhorred and avoidable, becaufe it is Pain • whence I con¬ ceive, a wife Man will have an Eye to this ex¬ change or .recompence , ^that he fhun Pleafure, If it procure a Pain greater than it felf ; and un^ dergo Pain, if it produce a greater Pleafure. As for my own part, I fhould forfake Pleafure, and covet Pain,either if Remorfe were annexed
THE
• 1 ■