PART XIII.

ET I C U RU S.
5
The jE^irft Part
O F
PHILOSOP
e
C jiNONICK of the CRJTERJES.
(tf) luerr. TT'Orafmuch as (a) every queftion in Philofo- ^ phy is either of the Thing or of the word, to Solution whereof many Canons may be given •, hence the Firft part of Philofophy which com- prifeth them, may be termed Camnkk.
^h') Hunt But becaufe, of the Word, nothing more is fought then the life ot Signification ^ but of the Thing,the Trutb,which is of an abftrufeNature •, therefore we will, in the Second place, compre- . hend in a few Canons all that belongs to the ufc of the Words : Bat> in the firft place lay down thofe of Truth, and its Criteries( which in num- trer exceed the other,)premillng fome few Notes concerning them. .
F'
CHAP. I.
- * ' ^ • f
Of Truth and its Critcriesy
Irft then Truth is Twofold, one of Exifp- ence^ the other of Enunciation or Judgment. Truth of Exiftence is that, whereby every thing which exifts in the nature of things, is that very thing which it is, and no other. Whence it comes to pafs, that there is no Falfity oppo¬ site to this Truth ( for Orichalcum^ for. exam- . pie, is not falfe Gold, but true Orichalcum^ ) and therefore -it is all orte^ whether we' fay a thing is Fxiftent^or True,
^ Truth of EnuntiatioH^or Judgment, is nothing elfe but a conformity of an Enunciation pro¬ nounced by the Mouth, or a Judgment made in the Mind, with the thing Enunciated or Judg¬ ed. :
This is that Truth to which Fallhood is op- fb) Emf. loc, polite •, for as ( ) it is true that .the thing is fo eit. as it is faid to be^ fo is it falfe that it is not fo as it
is/aid to be,
, As for that which they call a future Contin* (x) Cic, defm. g€Dt,( c ) thofe Disjun&ions which are made of Con- ■traries ( or rather thofe Complexions which are made by dis)undtive Particles. ) are true as if we (^i)C}c,Aead./^. ihowld fay, (d) Either Hermachus will live to Morrow or Will not live ; but ( e ) milh^ ofthe Iw tiu disjunctive Propofttion^ taken fingly^ ts
true for neither is there any neceflity in Nature, that fiermachus lhall live to Morrow ; nor, on the contrary, that he lhall not live. ,
Moreover, becaufe as the thing, whofe Truth is fought, belongs either to Speculation ouly, or to Adion. ( the firft of which appertains to Phy lick , thC' later toEthickj ) we muftffor
this reafori have a Cricerie, or inllrumenc of Judging, whereby .it may be examined, judged, and difierned, in order to both thefe.
but forafmuch as natural things affea the Sertfe or IjatcUedt^ and moral things the ylDpe- ute or Will • For this reafon, Criceries arc to be taken from both thefe. ..
From the Senfe^ nothing can be taken more then its Fundtion, Senfation, which iikewife is called Senfe, i
From the InteJk^^ forafranch as befides the Fundlion which it hath, whil’ft like the Senfe it contemplaieth the thing, as if it were prefent and apparent, ( whence. the perception of a things appearing, which appeareth to be as v.'ell to the Intellect, as to the Senfe, is called a Pbantafie, or Appearance; ) forafmuch, I fay, as befides this Fundtion, it is proper to the Intelledt to ra¬ tiocinate or dilcourfe ; there is therefore reqiii-? red a Prxnotion or Anticipation, by looking upon which, fomthing may be .inferred.
Laftly, From the Will or Jppetite, whofe Pro¬ perty it is to perfue or Ihun fomtiring, nothing elfe can be taken, bnt the Affeftion or Paflion itfelf 5 and that either yRledive^ as Pleafiire ; or Aver five ^ as Pain or Grief. ’
: (/) There are therefore in alfthree Crite- ries; Senfe, or Seiifation ; Prxnotion, or An¬ ticipation, anti Affeefion , or .Paffion. Con-, cerning ..each of thefe, forne Canchs are to be preferibed.
Cf) Laqt. CiCa Jcitd, A.,
T
Four.
.a H A P. II.
10 u ■ . , ( ■
( ) Canons of Senfe ^ the Firjl Criiery. (a) QgAet _
Epicurus f/ife-
O begin with the Canons which concern Senfe ; of thefe there may be laid down by°^a/-
foidus, ne Ca- tionici cenfea-
C A N O N I. woMies
hand jure
{b') Senfe is never deceived ; and therefore every Senfation^ and every Perception^ of an ^ppi^^trance is true, tarcb adv. Col.
This is proved,Firft, becaufe ( c ) ‘ All Senfe ‘ is void of Ratiocination , and wholly incapable ‘ of Reminifcence. For neither being moved by ‘ itfelf,. nor by any other, is it able to add or ‘ detract' any thing; or to joyn or difsjoyn by ‘enunciating or concluding, fo as thereby it ‘ might think any thing, and be miftaken in that ‘Thought. The Intellect indeed can do this,
fiue
55°
EPICURUS.
PART
(j; ^exT. but the Senfe cannot, (d\whofe property it is ; only., to apprehend that which' is prejent., and mo
veth it ■, as the fight., colour prefented to it : but not to difcern, that what is here prefented is one thing •, what there, another. Now where there is a bare apprehenfion, not pronouncing any thing, there is no error or falftiood. ft-' Laert. , Next, becaufe (c) *■ there is nothing that can ' ‘ rcfel or convince the Senfes of Falfhood, ( for
‘ neither can Senfe of a like kind refel Senfe of ‘ a like kind -, as, the fight of the Right Eye ‘ the fight of the Left, or the fight of Plato the ‘ fight of Socrates ; and this, by reafon of the ‘ equality of their credits ) or that there is ‘ the fame reafon for both. For a pur-blind Man doth not lefs fee that which he fees, than Lynceus feeth that which he feeth. ‘Neither ‘ can that which is of an unlike kind refel that ‘ which is of an unlike kind, as the Sight the Hearing, and the Tafte the Smelling I ‘ be- ‘ caufe they have different objeds , and ferve ‘ not to give judgment of the fame things. Nei- ‘ ther can one fenfation of the fame Senfe refel ‘ another, becaufe there is not Jtny fenfation ‘ wherewith we are not affeded • and to whichj ‘ whil’ft we are affeded wdth it, we do not ad- ‘ Iiere, and afl'ent : as whil’ft we fee a Staff one while ferait, out of the Water; another time, part under Water, crooked, for we cannot by any means fee it crooked in the foriner condi¬ tion, or ftraic in the later, Laftly, ‘ neither ‘ can Reafon or Ratiocination refel the Senfes • ‘ becaufe all Ratiocination depends upon pre- ‘ vious Senfes, and it is neceflary the Senfes firft ‘ be true, before the reafon which is founded on ‘ them can be true.
This is confirmed $ forafmuch as Senfe is the firft of the Criteries, to which we may appeal from the reft, but itfelf is felf-evident, and of (/) licn. manifefl truth. For (/) if we fay every Senfe is deceived, you will want a Criterie to deter¬ mine and make good even that very faying upon Laert. any particular Senfe* or^ (^) if fome one on¬ ly, you will entangle yourfelf in an intricate Difpute, when you (hall be demanded,' Which Senie, how, and when it is deceived, or not de¬ ceived ? So as the Controverfie not being deter¬ minable, you muft ncceflarily be deprived of all Criterie. Whence may be inferred, that, if any appearance to Senfe be falfe, nothing can be perceived, or, ( to exprefs it in other terms ) unlefs all appearances and bare preceptions of a thing be true, there were no credit, conftancy, fh) sext,adv. and judgment of truth. For, (1^) ‘ they who ^* ‘ alledge the contradiftion of appearances one
‘ with another, can never prove even this con- ‘ trad iff ion of them, or, that fome are true, ‘ others falfe •, they cannot prove it by any ‘ thing that is apparent, for the Queftion is of ‘ things apparent ; nor by any thing unappar^nt, ‘ for that which is unapparent is to be demon- ‘ ftrated by (ometbing elfe that is apparent.
Again, this is confirmed ^ becaufe, takifig a- vvay the certainty of the Senfes, and by that ftieans the genuine knowledge of things, we take (0 Lucrct.Ub.^'^^y all rwle of Life and Adion. 0 For as in a Building, if the firfl. Rule be amifs, the Square untrucy.thc Plummet faulty, all things muft meceirarily be defeftive, and awry,' and difproportioned j fo muft all things in life be
prepofterous, and full of trouble and confufion, if that which is to be efteemed, as it were, the firft Rule, Square, and Plummet, for the dif- cci ning things good and bad, done or not to be done, be unfipcere or preverfe, that is, if it want the certainty which is, as it were, its re- flicude. Whence it cometh to pafs, that though Reafon ( for example, ) cannot explain the caufe why things near at hand arc fquare, but feem round afar off ^ yet is it better to hefitate and alledge fome wrong caufe, rather than to overthrow the firft faith and foundations where¬ on the conftancy-and fecuriiy of life is fo ground¬ ed, that unlefs you dare credit Senfe, youjaall not have any way to (hun precipitation and de- ftrudlfon. *
Thirdly, (k) ‘ Becaufe the truth of the Sen* (0 Laeru ‘ fes is manifeft even from this, in that their ,
‘ functions exift in nature, or feally and truly ‘ are. For that we fee and hear, is as truly fome- ‘ thing indeed exiftihg, as our very feeling pain ;
‘ and there is no difference ( as even now we ‘ faid, ) between faying, a thing is exiftent, and ‘ true. ,
To (peak more fully, (/) * As the firft Af- (l) Sext- ‘ fe&ions, Bleafure and Pain, depend upon fome iog.
^ Caufes which produce them, and are by rea- ^ fon of thofe Caufes exiftent in Nature, ( that ‘ is, Pleafure depends on pleafant things. Pain on ‘ painful, and it neither cometh to pafs, that)
‘ what produceth Pleafure is not pleafant, nor ‘ that what caufeth Pain is not painful, but that ‘ which produceth Pleafure, muft neceflarily be ‘ pleafant ; that which Pain, painful and offen- ‘ five to Nature, ) in like manner? as to the af*
‘ fedions of the appearance^ produced in tfs,
‘ whatfoever is the efficient Caufe of them) is ‘ undoubtedly fuch as makes this appearance ;
‘ and being fuch, it cannot come to pafs, that ‘ it can be any other than fuch as that is con- ‘ ceived to be, which makes this appearance:
‘ The fame is to be conceived of all the reft in ‘ particular, fOr that which is vifible not only ‘ feems vifible^ but is fuch as it feems*, and that ‘ which is audible, not only feems audible, but •
‘ is indeed fuch, and fo of the reft : Wherefore ‘ all appearances are true, and conformable to ‘ Reafon. ,
(w) ‘Hence it is manifeft, that the Phaft-
‘ tafies even of thofe who doat and dream, are, ^ ^
‘ for this Reafon, conceived to be true^ for that
‘ they truly and really exift, feeing that they
‘ move the Faculty, whereas, that which is not
‘ canndt move any thing. So that there is a ne-
ceffity in Nature, that the fpecies of things which
are received in the Intelled, or Imagination, be-^
ing in this manner moved, mingled, and di*
ftufbed, that fuch Phantafies cannot but be, what* ^ ■
foever Opinion follows them, whereby things
are judged to be fuch in themfelves, of whieW
: we are to fpeak next. .. \.,
*
. CANON 2. ■ : , .
{ii) Opinion foBowt upon Senfe, and is fkpty^^n') From 14* added' to Senfatiefn, and capable of TfUth^r'ertm*
♦ Falfhood. - ir
This is proved, becaufe when a Towdf (for example) appeareth round to the Eye, the Senfe indfeed is true, for -that it is really with
the'
EPICURUS: