PART XII. SCEPTIC TVm.

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much as they are made common. If to Good only^ we cannot by thele underftand. Good 5 for as he who underftands not what a Horfe is, knowech not what Neighing is, nor can by that coihe to the Notion of a Horfe, if he firft ligh,t not upon a Horfe Neighing ; So, he who enqui- reth what is Good, forafmuch as he knoweth not what Good is, he cannot know what properly and folely belongs to it, that thereby he might come to nnderftand Good itfclf. For firft he mult learn the Nature of Good itfelf, and then underftand, that it profiteth, and that it is cx- petible for itfelf, and that it is efteftive of Felicity. But that the forefaid Accidents are not fufficicnt to declare the Notion and Nature of Good, the Dogmatifis manifeft in Effed. For, that Good profiteth, and that it is expe* tible, ( whence called dyn^ov qu. dyayh ) and effedive of Felicity, all perhaps grant : But being demanded. What tliat ’is, to which thefe are Accident ? they run into an incredible con- teft, fome faying that it is Virtue, others Plea- fure, others Indolence, others fomething elfe ; whereas, if by the forefaid Definitions it were determined what Good is, they would not fall out among themfclves, as ignorant of its Na¬ ture. Thus the moft Eminent among the Dog- tnatifis differ concerning the Notion of Good. They likewife differ about III, faying, that 111 is Hurt, or not different from Hurt •, others, that which is avoidable for itfelf- others, that which is effedive of Infelicity ; whereby per¬ haps declaring not the Effence of Ill, but fome of the things accident to it, they fall into the forefaid Incxtricability.
CHAP. XXII.
Of Indifferent.
INdijferent is taken Three rvays : Firfi^ for that which fnei/eth neither yippetite nor Averfion ; 45, that the Stars or the Hairs of our liead are of even Number . Secondly., for that which moves the Appetite or Averfion not one more than the other as in two Tetradrachmes nothing different., when one of them is to he chofen. There is an Appetite to ehoofe one of them, but not this more than that. The Third kind of Indifferent is, that which con- duceth neither to Felicity nor Infelicity, as Health, Wealth 5 for that which fometimes may be ufed Well, fometimes Hi, tbis^ they fay, is Indifferent. Con¬ cerning this lafl chiefly they difeourfe in Ethicks.
What to conceive of this Notion, is mani¬ feft from what we faid before from Goods and Ills. They bring us not to the Notion of each of thefe things ^ but it is not ftrange, that they fail in things inexiftent. That nothing by Na¬ ture is Good, 111, or Indifferent, fome argue thus!
CHAP. XXIII.
Whether there is any thing naturally Good, IQ, or Indifferent.
Fire being Hot by Nature, appcaretli to all to be heating ; Snow being Cold by Na¬ ture, appeareth to all to be cooling ; all things
which affed by their Nature, affed all that are according to Nature or well, after the fame nian- ner,; but none ot thofe which are called Good, affect all Men as Good ( as we fliali fliew ) there¬ fore there is nocliing Good by Nature. That none of thofe which are called Goods, affed all Men alike, is manifeft • for ( to pafs by the or¬ dinary People, whereof fome think a good ha¬ bit of Body to be Good •, others, venereal Pleafures ; others. Eating ; others, Drinking; others. Dicing ; others, Riches ; others, fom- things worfe than thefe. ) Some Philofopers , as the Peripateticks fay. There are Three kinds of Goods, fome in the Soul, as the Firtues\ fome in the Body, as Health and the like ; others, exter¬ nal, as Friends, Wealth, and the like. The Stoicis alfo affed Three kinds of Goods, fome in thc^ Soul, as the virtues , fome external, as a virtuous Man, and a Friend ; jome, 'neither in, nor without the Soul, as a virtuous Alan as to himfilf But thofe which are in the Body or external, which the Peripateticks account Goods, they deny to be Goods. Some there are who hold Plcafure to be a Good ; others on the contrary fay, it is an 111 ; Whence one of the Philofophers cried out, I had rather be Mad, than he Pleafed, Now if all things, which move (or affed) by Na¬ ture, move all Men alike, but by thofe w'hich are called Goods, all Men are nor affeded alike, nothing is good by Nature. For neither can we believe all the forefaid Opinions, by Pveafon of their Repugnance, nor fome one of them ; for he who faith we muft believe this Sed, and not that, feeing he is oppofed by the Reafons of the other fide, becomes a Party in the Con- troverfy, and will himfelf need a Judge, but fhall not judge others. Now there neither be¬ ing an acknowledged Criterie, nor a Demon- ftration, by Reafon of the indijudicable Contro- verfy concerning thefe, he muft come to Sufpen- fion, and hereupon will not be able to afl'ert what is good by Nature.
Moreover fome argue thus. Good is either the defire itfelf, or that which we defire : The defire itfelf is not Good, in itfclf ; for then we would not endeavour to obtain that which we defire, left having obtained it vve lofe the de- fire. For example ; if to defire Drink were Good, we would not endeavour to get Drink ; for, alToon as ever we have obtained it, we leave to defire it. ’Tis the fame in Hunger, Love, and the like ; therefore the defire is not a thing expetible in itfelf; rather on the con¬ trary, perhaps troublefome. For he who is Hun¬ gry, endeavours to obtain Meat, that he may be freed from the trouble of Hunger ; the like doth he who Loves, and he who Thirfts. Nei¬ ther is that which is defired, the Good itfelf; for either it is without us, or above us, If without us, either it caufeth in us fome pleafing Morion, and fuch a Conftitution as we willingly embrace, and confequently is a delightful Affe- ftion, or it affeds us not at all ; but if it be not delightful, it is not Good, nor can incite us to it’s Appetition, nor can be any way ex¬ petible. If there be ingenerate about us ex- trinfecally fome delightful Conftitution and Affedion, which we willingly embrace, that which is without os.^all not be expetible in it¬ felf, but for the Affedion which is raifed in us
through
525 S C E P T I C I S M. ?AKy XII. : j
through it j but neither about us, for then it muft cither be about the Body , or about the Soul, or abont both. If about the Body only, wc cannot know it, for all knowledge they attribute to the Soul, the Body they fay in it- fclf is In-ational. Now if it be faid to proceed as far as the Soul, it will feem to he expttible to the Comprehenfion of the Soul, and to it’s delightful Affeftion : for that which is judged to be expetible, is judged ( according to them ) by the latellccf, not by the irrational Body. It remains therefore to fay, that Good is about the Soul only , but even this, according to the Grounds of the is impoHible • for
perhaps the Soul itfelf is not cxifbent, or if it exill, it is not ( from what they themfelves fay) comprehended, as we have proved in the dif- conrfe concerning the Critevie. But how will any venture to fay, that fomthing is produced in n thing, which comprehends it not ?
Rclid.es all this, How do they fay that Good is in the Soul ? If Epicurus lay. That Pleafure is titc t nd,and that the Soul ( for fo do all things, ) con lifts of Atnms, how Pleafure, and an alfent or judgment, that this is expetible and Good , that avoidable and ill, can be in a heap of A- toras, is not polfiblc to be refolved ?
C H H P. XXIV.
What that w, vchich vs called Art about Life.
A Gain, the Stoich fay, That the Goods in the Soul are certain Arts^ the rirtues. Art^ they fay^ is a Syflem of coexcrcifed Comprehenflons ^ Comprehenjions are made in the Hegemonick. Now, how in the Hegemonick, which, according to them, is a Spirit, there is a ftoring up of Com¬ prehenfion s, and a Coacervation of them, fo as to make an Art, is not poffible to be under- flood ; forafmuch as the later imprelTion ftill defaceth the forgoing, fince they fay it is a Spirit, and moved totally, according to every Impreftion. For to fay that Plato's ttve{ vrdiwii can demonllrate Good, I mean that tem¬ perament of divifible and indivifible fubllance, and of the nature of Alterity and Identity, or Numbers, is mcerly to trifle ; whence .neither can Good be in the Soul, Now if neither the defire be the Good, nor the extrinfecal Subjec'l which is expetible for itfelf, nor in the Body, nor in the Soul, as I have proved,there is nothing naturally Good ^ and for the fame Reafons, nei¬ ther is there any thing naturally Ill. For thofe things which to forae feem 111, are perfued by others for Good, as Lafeivioufnefs, Injuftice, Covetoufneis , Intemperance , and the like. Whence if thofe which are naturally Good , affecl a11 Men alike ^ and thofe which are faid to be 111, afteft not all alike, there is nothing Ill nrturally.
Neither is there any thing naturally Indiffe¬ rent, by reafon of the Controvcrfie about Indif- ferents, as for example .■ The Stoich^ of In- differents, fay, That fame are preferred^ others veje{ied • others neither preferred^ nor rejefUcd, Pre¬ ferred are thofe^ rvhieh have a fujfcient dignity^ as health^ riches rejelhd^ thofe whith have not a fuf- ficicht dignity j as poverty^ (teknefs. Neither pre->
ferred nor rejedled ; as to firetch^ or bend the fin¬ ger. But fome hold^ that^ of Indijfcrents none vs abfolutely preferred or rejected ; for ei^ery Indiffe¬ rent^ feemeth femetimes preferred, fometimes rejelT ed, according to various circumfiances. For i f (fay they ) a Tyrant plots againfl the Rich, whil’ft the P6or are fuffered to live quietly, there is none but had rather be poor than rich ; fo as Riches in this cafe will be in the number of the rejected. Thus each of thefc which are called Indifferents, is by forae held to be good, by others to be ill • but if it were Indifferent by na¬ ture, all men would alike conceive it to be In¬ different. Therefore there is nothing Indifferent by Nature. Again, if fome lhall argue, that Courage is expetible by nature, becaufe Lyons, and^ Bulls, Cocks, and fome Men are naturally inclined to it, we reply, that for the lame rea¬ fon timidity ought to be reckoned amongfl: things expetible in their own nature ; for Harts, and Hares, and many other Creatures are addid- ed to it by nature. Even a great part of Man¬ kind are fach. For it feldom happens, that a man gives up himfeif to dye for his Country , or, puragioufly attempts fome bold Adion, as be¬ ing with-held by effeminate timidity the great¬ er part of men decline all thefe. Whence the Epi'-^ cureans conceive it to be proved, that pleafure is expetible in its own nature •, for living Crea¬ tures, fay they, as foon as they are born, being yet unperverted, delire pleafure, and decline pain. To thefe may be objected. That what- foever caufeth ill, cannot be good by nature, but pleafure caufeth ill, for to all pleafure is annexed pain, which, according to them, is ill in its own nature; For example: A Drunkard hath plea¬ fure in drinking, a Glutton in eating, a Luxu¬ rious perfon in wantoning ; but thefe caufe Po¬ verty and Sicknefs, which are painful and ill, as they conceive ; therefore pleafure is not good in its own nature. Belides, that which caufeth good, cannot be naturally ill, but pains caufe pleafures ; by Labour wc attain Science and Riches by Labour a Man obtains the Enjoy¬ ment of his Love, by Pain is acquired Health ; therefore Labour is not ill naturally. For if Plea¬ fure were good in its own nature, and Labourer Pain ill in its own nature, all Men would be a- like affefted with them : But we fee many Phi- lofophers embrace Labour and Pain, and -con¬ temn Pleafure,
In the fame manner may they be overthrown, who fay, that a Life conjoined with Virtue is good by nature, becaufe fome Philofophers have made choice of a voluptuous Life ; fo as by the difagreement amongfl them, is fubverted, that a thing isfuch or fuch in its own nature.
It will not perhaps be from our purpofc, to propofe briefly fome more particular opinions of things honelt and diihoneft, of the lawful and unlawful,Laws,ahd Cufloms,and devotion to the Gods, and piety to the dead, and the like ; for by this means we fhall find a great difference amongfl things to be done, and not to be done. With us is held dilhonefland unlaw¬
ful ; with the Germans, not difhoneft, but an allowed cuflom. Neither did the Thebans of old efleem it difhonefl ; and Mmone the Cre¬ tan, they fay, was fo called, by Emphafis of the Cretan Nation. S.ome alfo refer to this Achil-