PART m

cipate ot One, each participates of Part there¬ of or of the Whole •, whereupon follow the former Abrurdities .• But if each hath a peculiar to itfelf, we mull conlider over each of thcfe another’ Monad, and over each of thofe ano¬ ther, and fo to Infinite. If therefore to com¬ prehend, that there are fome Monads in them- felves , by participation whereof every thing that is is One, it be requifite to comprehend in¬ finitely infinite intelligible Monads^ but it is impollible to comprehend infinitely infinite in¬ telligible Monads; by confequence it is impofli- ble to allert, that there are certain intelligible Monads , and that every Being is One, being made One by participation of its proper Monad. Therefore it is abfurd alfo to fay, there are as many Monads as there are things partici¬ pant of them. Now if that which is faid to be Monad in itfelf , neither is One, nor fo many as are the things which participate of it, there is no fuch thing as a Monad in itfelf. In like man¬ ner, neither will there be any of the other Num¬ bers in itfelf; for the fame Argument which we have brought againft the Monad, will hold a- gainfl them all. But if Number be neither in itfelf, as we have fhewn ; nor Number be the things numbred, as the Pythagoreans approved ; and befides thefe there is nothing ; we muft fay, that Nnmber is not.
Moreover, How do they, who conceive Num¬ ber to be Somthing extrinfecal, diftinft from the Things numbred, affirm. That the Duad is ge¬ nerated of the Monad ? For when we add a Mo¬ nad to another Monad, either Somthing extrin¬ fecal is added to the Monads, or is fuMradfed from them, or is neither added nor fubftradfed ; but if nothing be added or fubftradfed , there will be no Duad. For neither will the Monads, being feparatefrom one another, have a Monad confidered as above them , according to their peculiar refpedfs ; neither is any thing added to them from without, ( nor taken away, according to the Hypothefis. ) So that the addition of a .Monad to a .Monad, there being no Addition nor Subflradion from without, will not make a Duad; but if there be Subftradf ion , there will not only be no Duad, but the Monads them- feives w'ilf be diminifhed ; and if from without a Duad be added to them , that of the two Mo- •nads there may be made a Duad, feeming to be Two they will be Four; for there is firft laid down one Monad, and another Monad, to which a Duad from without being added, the number Four is made. It is the fame as to all other Numbers, wbich are faid to be made by Compofition. Iftherefore thofe Numbers which are faid to be compounded of tranfeendent Numbers, are made neither by Subflraftion nor Addition , nor without Subflradion and Addi¬ tion, the generation of that Number, which is faid to be by itfelf, and about numerate things, wifi be infubfiflent. But that the Numbers which arc by Compofition , are not ingenerate, they themfelves declare , affirming , That they are compounded , and made of thofe which are 'tranfeendent, as of the Monad, and indefinite Duad;: therefore Number hath not a fubfiflence of itfelf! And if Number hath not a Subfi- {Lenc&,3;ieither confidered in itfelf nor in things niffflLeVed; Number is not any thing, according
to the fuperfluous curiofity of the Dogmatijls. Thus much may ferve for a brief Account, as to that which is called the Ihyfical Part of Phy- lofophy.
CHAP. XIX.
Of the Ethical part of Philofophy.
There remains the Ethical part, which feem- eth converfant about Goods , and lUs^ and Indifferents. That therefore we may treat of this alfo, by way of Summary, we will inquire into the exiflence of Goods, Ills, and Indifre- rents having firft explained their Notions;
C H A P. XX.
Of Goods ^ lUs^ and Indifferents.
THe Stoich fay, that Good is Profit^ or , that which differeth not from Profit calling Pro¬ fit , Virtue ; and virtuous Adion, that which is not different from Profit.^ a virtuous Man, and a Friend ; for Virtue being the Hegemonick part of the Soul, confiftent after fuch a manner ; and virtuous Adion, being an Operation according to Virtue, is plainly Profit; and a virtuous Man and a Friend, is not different from Profit. For Profit is a part of virtuous, as being the Hegemonick thereof ; now the Wholes, they fay, are neither the fame with their Parts, ( for a Man is not a hand ; ) nor different from their Parts, for they fubfift not without their Parts: Wherefore they fay, the Whole is not different from it’s Parts, coafequently, a virtuous Man being the Whole in refped of it*s Hegemonick ( which they lay is Profit ) is not different from Profit.
CHAP. XXI.
That Good is taken Three ways.
HEnce, Good^ they fay is taken Three ways .♦ One way^ Good is faid to be that from which Profit cometh ; this is the ntojl principal^ and the Firtues : The Second, is that by which Profit cometh, as Firtue and virtuous jiHions: The Third , is that which is able to Profit, as Virtue, and virtuous AClions, and a virtuous Man, and a Friend, and the Gods, and good Deemons .: Thus the Second Sig^ nification includes the firft y and the Third,
Firfi and Second.
Some fay. Good is that which is expetible for itfelf-. Others , that which affijleth to Felicity , or compleateth it. Felicity, according to the Stoicks, is ’Et/fo/ce pla , a good current of Life.
Thefe things arc faid to explain the Notion of Good ; but whether a Man faith , Good is that which profiteth, or that which is expetible in itfelf, or that which co-operates towards Fe¬ licity, he declareth not what Good isj but fom- thing accident to it, which is frivolous. For the forelaid are either Accident to Good only, or to other things alfo.. If to other things alf they are not Charaderifticks of Good , foraf-
moefa
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