PART XII. S C ET T I C I S. M.

. \
to thofe which prove that there is a Body, tve Sufpend. .•
. Now, from the incompt'ehenrvbility of Body, will be inferred alfo, that Incorporeal is Incom- prehenfible - for privations are underftood, to be the privations of Habits, as, of Sight, Blind- nefs j of Hearing,D?afnefs ^ and the like. Where¬ fore to comprehend the Privation, we mu ft firft comprehend the Habit, whereof it is a Pri¬ vation ^ for, he who underftands not what Sight is, cannot fay. This Man hath not Sight, that is, he is blind, : If therefore the Privation of a Body be Incorporeal, and the Habits being in- comprehcnfible, it be impoffible to comprehend their Privations But Body,, as we have Ihewn, is incomprehenfible ^ Incotpbreals alfo 'will be incomprehenfible. For,either it is fenfible, or intelligible ^ if Senfible, it is incomprehenfible, by reafon of the difference of living Creatures, and of Men, and of Senfes,’ and of Circumftan- ces, and by reafon of Commixion, and the like, mentioned in the ten Common- places of -Suf- penfion ^ if Intelligible, there not being granted a comprehenfion of Senfible things, by which we may be carried to Intelligibles ^ neither will there be granted a Comprehenfion of things In¬ telligible, and confequently not of an Incorpo¬ real. Befides, he who faith, that he compre¬ hends an Incorporeal, muff: fay, that he Com¬ prehends it either by Senfe or by Reafoa ; not by Senfe, for the Senfe feemeth to perceive fenfible things, by intromiffion and infinuation ^ as the Sight, ( whether it be made by a conick imprelfion, or by emilfion, or immilTion of Spe¬ cies, or by effbfion of Raies and Colours ) and the Hearing ( whether it be that the Air is ftruck, or that the parts of the Voice are car^ ried to the Ear, and ftrike the Senfe, fo as to caufe a preception of the Voice ,) likewife Odours to the Noftrils, and Sapours to the Tongue, and tangible things are derived to the touch in the fame manner. But Incorporeals are not ca¬ pable of receiving Inch imprelTions, therefore they cannot be comprehended by Senfe. But nei¬ ther by Difcourfe ( or Reafon \ ) for if Dif- courfe be a Dicible and Incorporeal, ( as the Stoicks hold) He, who faith Incorporeals are underftood by Difcourfe, begs the Queftion • For v;hen we demand, Whether an Incorporeal can be comprehended. He, taking Incorporeal fimply, would ‘thereby Ihew the Comprehen¬ fion of Incorporeals • whereas Difcourfe itfelf, if it be Incorporeal, is a part of the thing con¬ troverted. How then can any ffiew that this Incorporeal ( Difcourfe ) is comprehended firft ? If by any Incorporeal, we ffiall require a demon- ftration of its Comprehenfion, and fo to Infinite. If by a Body, the comprehenfion of Bodies is the thing in queftion. By What then fliall we de- monftrate, that a Body is comprehended, which \s affumed to demonftrate the comprehenfion of Difcourfe and Incorporeal? If by a Body, we run into Infinite • if by an Incorporeal, we run into the Alternate common-place. Thus E)iicourfe being. If Incorporeal, Comprehenfible; none can ♦ fay, that an Incorporeal may be comprehend¬ ed by it. But if Difcourfe be a Body, foraf- much as there is Controverfie concerning. Bo¬ dies, whether they are comprehended or not, becaufe of the continual effluxion ( as they call
it ) of them • in refped whereof, they neither can admit Demonftration, nor are conceived to be • infomtich as Plato tei meth Bodies,
j)' kA'otIs, Generated.^ Not being. Hereupon I doubt which way the Controverfie concern-’ ing Body deter'mineth, fince neither by a Body nor by an Incorporeal, for the inconveniences alledged. Therefore neither is it pofflble to comprehend. Incorporeals by Dilcburle , but if they neither incur to Senfe, nor are comor<> hended by Difcourfe, they cannot be compre¬ hended at all. Now if we can neither alTefc the exiftence of a Body, not of an IncorporeaF we muff: fufpehd as to the 'Elements ; and per¬ haps we' muff; fufpend alfo concerning tlvTc things, which, are after the Elements \ if, pf them, Tome are Corporeal ; others. Incorpore¬ al, and both therfe are controverted. -Mni eovcr feeing w,e ought to fufpend concerning Efficient and Material Principles, for the precedent Rea- fons, the whole Difcourfe concerning Principles will be inextricable.
CHAP. VI.
Of Temperament.
BU T, fetting this afide, how can they fiiy,' that Temperaments ate made of the fii ft Elements, whenas there is not any Touch , nor Contaft, nor Temperament, nor Mixture at alF? That T ouch is nothing, we (hewed late¬ ly, in difcourfing concerning the Exiftence of Bodies. And that Temperament fflfo, from what they fay, is hot pofflble, we fhall briefly declare. They fpeak much cqrlcerning it, and almoft inrihmerable are the controverfies of the Dogmatifts about it. To as from the Indijiidi- cablenefs ,,of the Controverfie may be argued the Incompvehenfibility of the Subject. To confute them all In particular, would be. beyond our Defign ^ this which v^e ffiall fay, we con¬ ceive, may fuffice.
All contemperated things confiff:,as they fay, of Subftance and Qlialities. They muff: there¬ fore either hold, that either the Subftances are /mingled/and not the Qiialjties; or the Quali¬ ties but not the Subftances \ or neither with the other 5 Qr both with one another. , But if neither Subftance nor Qiialities aye mingled one with the Other, Temperament will be unintcl^ ligible- for how can one Senfe be made of the things tempered, if the things tempered, be noc mingled together, by any of the forefaid ways ? If they fay, that the Qiialities are fimply adja¬ cent one to another, but the .Subftance is ming-^ led ; this aifo isabfurd, for we comprehend not^ Qiialities in Temperaments, as feparate, but we feel them as made one by the things tempered. If they fay, that the Qiialities are mingled, but not the Subftances*, it is impoffible, for the fuh»- fiftence of the Qiialities is in. the Subftance. Wherefore it is ridiculous to fay, that the Qiia-r lities are feparated from their Subftances, and fo mingled with one another, afid the Subftan¬ ces left deprived of their Qiialities^ It remains to fay, that the Qiialities and Subftances of things tempered pafs through one another and being mingled, make tl.e Temperament, which is
U u u 2 more
5i6 scepticism. part Xlfi
more abfurd than the former ^ for fuch a. Tern perament is impollible. For example, If with Ten pints of Water there be mixed one pint ot , Hemlock, the Hemlock will be laid to be com- ^ mixed with all the Water ^ for if a Man take never fo little of this mixture, he will find it full of the power ot the Hemlock. Now if the Hemlock be mixed with every part of the Wa ter, and co-extended with it, the whole with the whole, by mutual Permeation of the Sub- fiances and Qiialities one through another, that fo the Temperament may be made ^ and things, co-extendcd with one another in every part, take up equal place, and confequently, are equal to one another, the pint of Hemlock fliall be equal to the Ten pints of Water *, fo that the mixtion mu ft either be Twenty pints or Two pints, according to this Hypothells of the man¬ ner of Temperament. And again, One pint of Water being put to Twenty pints of Wa ter, according to this Hypothefis, muft make the meafure either of Forty pints, or of T wo only j becaufe we may cither conceive the pint to be Twenty pints, as being co-extended with fo many ^ or the Tw’enty pints to be that One, with which they are co-equaliz’d. In like man¬ ner, a Man adding but one pint, may argue, that the Twenty pints, which we fee, ought to be Twenty thoufand, or more, according to this Hypothefis of Temperament, and that the fame are but two only *, than which, nothing is more abfurd ; Therefore this Hypothefis of Tempe¬ rament is abfurd. Now if Temperament nei¬ ther be by mixing the Subftances only, nor Qualities only, nor both, nor either ^ and befides thefe, nothing can be imagined ; the manupr of Temperament, and of all mixtures, is not to be underftood. Wherefore if thofe things which are call’d Elements, arc not capable of making Contemperations, neither by touching one ano¬ ther, nor by being blended or mingled, the Phyfiology of the Dogmatifts, as to this thing, is unintelligible.
CHAP. VII.
Of Motion.
BEfides, what hath been faid, the Phyfiolo¬ gy of the Dogmatifts may be conceived to be impofiible, by difcourfing upon Motions • for all Commixtions muft be made by fomc Motion of the Elements, and the Efficient Principle. If therefore we prove, that there is no generally acknowledged Species of Motion, it will be ma- nifeft, that, though all which we formerly op- •pofed, (hould, by way of fuppofition, be grant¬ ed \ yet that, which the Dogtiiatifts call Phyfick, ferves to no purdofcw
CHAP. VIII.
Of Lotal- Motion.
THcy who feem to have difeourfed moft ex- adly of Motion, fay, there arc fix kinds thereof. Local- Motion, Alteration, Augmenta¬ tion, Diminution, Generation, and Corruption.
Wc Ihall examine each of ch^fe particularly, be¬ ginning with Locoi' motion. T his, according to the Dogmatifts, is that, by which that which movech, pafleth from place to place, either ac¬ cording to its Whole, or according to Part % according to its Whole, as in them who w^alk according to Part, as in a Spliear that moves about its Center ; for the WMiolc remaineth in the fame place, the Parts only chance place.
Three, as I conceive, are the principal Con- troverfies concerning Motion. A/ds, and fome other Philofophers, hold, that there is Motion ; Parmcnidts^ Meliffiis.^ and others, that there is not Motion , the Scepticks nothing rather that it is, than that it is not. For as to the Phe¬ nomena’s, it appeareth that there is Motion ; but as to Philofophical DiCccurfe, that there is not. If therefore, upon examination of the Arguments on both fides, we (hall find them to be of equal weight, we ftiall not affent to either. Let us begin with thofe who ho]d,-that it is,
Thefe infift moft upon Evidence .• For if, they fay, there is no Motion, How doth the Sun ap¬ pear now in the Eaft,anon in the Weft ? or How doth he make the Seafons of the year, which arc according as he is nearer to, or further front us? Or How do Ships put oflTrom one Port, and reach another far diftant ? Or how does hej who denies Motion, go abroad and come home ? Thefe they conceive cannot be anfwered, and therefore one of the Cynicks, an Argument be¬ ing propounded to him to take away Motion,' made no Anfwer,but rofeup and walk’d, (hew¬ ing by aftion and evidence, that there is Mo¬ tion. Thus they cndea'vour to filencc the con¬ trary Party.
But they who take away the exiftence of Mo¬ tion, argue thus. If a thing be moved, it muft be moved either by itfelf, or by fome other ^ but neither by itfelf, nor by any other. For that which is (aid to be moved not by itfelf, muft be moved either by fome Caufe, or by none, by no Caufe they fay nothing is done; if by fome Caufe, the Caufe by which it is moved, will be its Mover, and fo they will run into In¬ finite, according to our ufual way of Argument. Again, if that which moveth, eftefts and that which effeds, is moved, that will alfo requirti another to move it, and this a Third, and fo' to Infinite; fo that Motion (hall be without any Principle of firft beginning, which is abfutd. Therefore every thing that moveth, is not mo¬ ved ‘by another. But neither by itfelf; for every thing that moveth either impellcth for¬ ward, or draweth backward ; or upward, or downward ; therefore whatfoever moveth itfelf, muft do it after one of thefe ways. If by Im¬ pelling forward, it muft be behind itfelf ; if by drawing back, before itfelf 5 if upwards, be¬ low itfelf ; if downwards, above itfelf. But for a thing to be either above, or before, or below, or behind itfelf, is impoffible ; it is therefore impoffible for any thing to be moved by itfelf. But if neither by itfelf, nor by any other, then nothing at all is moved. If any recur to Appetite and Eleftion, we muft let him know, that the Queftion is concerning that vfhich is in our porotr., and that this Qtieftion is indeterminable, forasmuch as we have not yet found a Critery of Troth*
Again,
j
■PART XII. SCEPTIC I S M.
Again, if a thing be moved, it is either mo- ' vClI in the place in which it is, or in which it is rot - but not in the place, wherein it is, for if it be in it, it continues in it. Nor in the place in which it is not, for where a. thing is not' there it can neither aft nor fuffer. This was the Argument of Diodorus Cronus. But it is an- fvvered fcveral ways, of which we lhall only al- Jedge thofe which we. conceive to be ofgreatefl; force, together with the Judgment which ap- pearrh for the prefent to us. Some fay, that a thing may be moved in the place where it is, for the Sphears which roll about their Centers aic moved, and yet continue l?i their place. In Anfwer to whonijthc Argument fnould betranf- ferred to the feveral parts of the Sphear, and we niuft fhew by this Argument, it is not moved as to its parts, if we will prove that nothing is moved in the place wherein it is.
The fame Anfwer may be made to thofe, who fay, that a thing moved muft touch two places, that wherein it is, and that to which it goes ; We lhall ask them, feeing, that what is moved is carried from the place wherein it is to ano¬ ther, Whether this be when it js. in the firft place, or when it is in the Tecond ? But whilft it is in the firfl:, it palfeth not to another, for it is yet in the firft ; and when it is not in this, it palTech not out of it : Befides this, the Qiic- Itioa is Begged. For in the place wlierein it is not, it canhot aft*, for no Man will grant fimply, that it is carried to any place who grants not that it is moved.
Some there are, who diftingnilh thus : Place is taken two ways, largely, as my Houfe *, ftrift- iy, as the Air, which enclofeth the Superficies of a Body. Now when a thing that is moved, is faid to be moved in Place, wc mean not Place in the large fenfe but in the ftrift. To thefe may be anfvvered, by fubdividing Place largely taken ^ that in one part thereof, the Body is faid to be moved properly, as being its exact Place ; in the other, not fo, this being the reft of the parts of Place largely taken. Then inferring, that nothing can be moved, neither in the Place wherein it is, nor in the Place wherein it is not, conclude , that neither in Place at large, impro¬ perly taken, can any thing be moved. For it tonfifts of two Parts, of that wherein the thing exaftly is, and of that in which exaftly it is riot *, in neither of .which can any thing be moved, as was proved. .
It may be argued alfo thus.- If any thing be mo¬ ved either it is moved from foraepart of the fpace, and then another ^ or it is moved all at once, over the whole divifible Interval .- But neither can any thing be moved from fome firft part of the fpace, and then another, not all at once, over the whole divifible Interval, therefore nothing is moved. That nothing is moved from fome firft part of the fpace^ is manifeft from hence j for that, if the Bodies, and the Places, and the Times, in which thofe Bodies are faid to be mo¬ ved, be divided into Infinite, there will be no Motion, it being impoflible to find in Infinites a Firft, from which Firft ( Part ) that which is faid to be moved lhall be moved. But if the things aforefaid end in an indivifible, and eve¬ ry thing that is moved pafs the firft divifible Part of its Place, In like manner as the firft indivifi-
ble Part of its Time, all things will be of equal Celerity ^ as the fleetell Hoi'fe, and a Tortoife ; which is abfurder than the former. Therefore Motion is not made from fome firft part of the fpace. But neither all at once over the whole divifible Interval : For if apparent things muft, as they fay , clear things unapparent -, when a Man ftiould go the fpace of a Stadium, it is repuilire that he firft perform the firft part of the Stadiunsf^ and then the fecond, and fo the other parts in order. So every thing that is mo¬ ved according to the Firft, mufl. firft be moved ; for if that which is moved be faid to pafs at once over all the parts of the place, in which it is moved, it will be in all its parts at once } and if one part of the place be cold, another hot ; or one black, another white, fo much as to qualifie the things that are in it-, that which nioveth will be at once hot and cold, and black and white. Befides, let them fay, how much of the Place at once that which is moved pafleth. If they fay it is Indefinite, they grant, that fomthing may be moved over the face of the whole Earth at once ; if they deny that, let them define the quantity of the place ^ for to en¬ deavour exaftly to define fuch a place, than which the thing moved cannot pafs, at once.^ any ( though never fo little ) greater diftance, befides that it is abfurd and ridiculous, will per¬ haps incur the former inconvenience; for all things will be fwift alike, feeing that every thing pafTetb alike through determinate places. Bat if they (hall fay, that what is moved all at once, is moved through a little, but not exaft¬ ly determinate. Place, we (hall confound them by a Sorites, continually adding to thefuppo- fed, Magnitude, another very little Magnitude of Place. For if at any time they make a ftand, then they fall into their former determination of the Place, and ftrange Conceits : but if they admit an increafe, we (hall force them to Grant, that a thing may be moved all at once over the vyhole Earth. Wherefore neither are thofe things which are faid to be moved, moved at once over the whole divifible Interval ; and if neither all at once, nor from fome part, then nothing is moved. This and much more is al- ledged by thofe who take away local Motion.* But we ( not being able to difprove either thefe Arguments, or the PhiEnomenon which they follow, who lay there is no Motion, as to the oppofition betwixt the Phjenomenas and the Arguments ) fufpend. Whether there be Motion or not.
IG H A P.
C ■ 8 SCEPTICISM. PART XII.
C H A P. !X.
GJ Jn^n-xniathn and Dhmr.ution,
1 "I Poa tbe fame Ground we furj^)en'd as to AiigimniaUsn and Diminution: For , Evi- c[',;t!ce feetns ro prove that they are , but Dif- courfeCov Reafon ) to overthrow them ^ As thus That is augmented, being already an Ens and Sobfiffcent, mnft he moved further as to quantity ( for it any (liall fay that by Appo- fidoa of one thing another is' augmented • he fpcakerh falQy • ) Since therefore Subftance never is at a Hand, but alv/ays in fluxion, and fome are hflinuaced into othei's , that which is aug¬ mented hath not its firfl fubflance with the ad- dition of foinc other , but a Subflance wholly new ^ As thercfoie ( for Inftance, ) If there being a piece of Wood three Foot long, fome Man putting to it a piece ten Foot long, fiiould lay he hath augmented the pkee of three Foot, he Ihali fay failly , ( forafmuch as this is wholly another thing from the other: ) So in every thing that is {aid to be augmented, the former matter flowing out, and new matter flowing in, if that be added which is faid to be added, none will fav that this is Augmentation, but Altera¬ tion of the Whole.
The fame may be faid of Diminution *, for bow can that which fubfifts not, be faid to be diminiflied ? Befides, If Diminution be made by Detra6:ion, Augmentation by Addition ^ But neither Detraftion nor Addition be any thing, neithfer is Diminution nor Augmentation any thing. I ■ ;
■ C H A P. X.
Of Detraliion and Addition,
Detraclion is Nothing , they argue 1 thu’s if Sorrtbing be detrarted from another, either an Equal, is detiafted from an Equal, or a Greatet from a LelTer, or a Lefler from a Greater : But none of thefe • therefore Detraction is not poflible. That De¬ traction is not made by any of thefe ways, is manifefl : That which is decrafted from ano¬ ther, before it is detracted, rauft be contained in that from which it is detracted, but an Equal is not contained in a Equal, as Six in Six pfor that which containeth, ought to be greater than that which is contained ; and that from which fomthing is detracted, ougiit to be greater than that which is detracted, that after the Detra¬ ction there may be fomthing remaining, for here¬ in Detraftion feems to dilfer from quite taking away. Neither is the Greater contained in the Lefler, as Six in Five ; that were abfurd. Nei¬ ther is the Lelfer contained in the Greater ; for ■if Five were contained in Six, as the fewer in the more, by the fame Reafon, in Five will be contained Four , and in Four Three, and in Three Two^ and in Two • One *, thus Six fhall contain Five, Four, Three, Two, One, which being put together, make Fifteen, which mull be contained in Six, if it be granted that the Leffer is contained in the Greater. In like
manner, in the Fifteen which is contained in Six, will be contained Thirty five : and fo, by Pro- ■grelTion, infinite Numbers .• But it is abfurd to fay, that infinite Numbers are contained in the Number Six , therefore it is abfurd ro fay, that the Lefler is contained in the Greater, If there¬ fore it be requfite, that wdiat is Detrafted from another, be contained in the thing from which it is Detradfed , but neither Equal is contained in Equal, nor the Greater in the Lefler, nor the L.effer in the Greater ^ Nothing certainly is Dc- tradfed from any Thing.
Again, ifSomthing be Detradfed from Som- thing, either tlft Whole is Detracted from the Whole, or Part from Part or the Whole from the part, or part from the Whole. But to fay. That the Whole is Decradted from the Whole or from Part, is abfurd ; it remains therefore to fry, That the Part is Decradted from the Whole, or from Part, which is abfurd alfo. We will inftance ( not to change our Example in Num¬ bers, as being raofl pcrfpicuoiis, ) in the Num¬ ber Ten, and let us fuppofe One to be fubltra- dted from it. This One cannot be fubftradted from the whole Ten, nor from the remaining part of it Nine, is 1 fhall prove ^ thetefore is it not fubftradted. For if One be fubftradted from the whole Ten, forafmuch as Ten is no¬ thing elfe but Ten Unites, not any one of the Unites, but a Combination of all, this .Unity to be fubftradted out of the whole Ten, muft be fubftradted out of every Unite .• But firft, from an Unite nothing can be fubftradted, for Unites are indivifible, and therefore One cannot be fubftradted from Ten in this manner. Bm: if we grant an Unite may be taken from every Unite, an Unite will have Ten parts, and ha¬ ving Ten Parts, will be an Unite;, how there being Ten other Parts remaining, .from which Were fubftradted the Tea Parts of that which is called an Unite, thofe Ten will be Twenty : But it is abfurd to fay, that One is Ten, and That Ten is Twenty, and chat what is Indivifi¬ ble ( according to them ) is divided, therefore it is abfurd to fay. That an Unite is fubftradted from the whole Number Ten. But neither is the Unite fubftradted from the remaining Num¬ ber Nine, for that from which a Thing is fub¬ ftradted remainech not intire, but the Nine re- mainech intire after the Subftradtion of the Unite. ^ Befides, the Nine being nothing elfe but nine FTnices, if the Unite be faid to be taken away from the Whole, the Nine itfelf will be taken away • if from a part of the Nine , as from Eight, the fame Abfurdities will follow If from an Unite, which is the laft, they muft fay that an Unite, is divifible, which is abfurd ; therefore the Unite is not fubftradfed out of the Nine. Now if it neither be fubftradled from the whole Ten, nor from a Part thereof, nei¬ ther can a Part be fubftraded from the Whole, nor from a Part. If therefore neither Whole can be fubftradted from Whole, nor Part from Whole, nor Whole from Part, nor Part from Part, Nothing is fubftradted from another.
Likewife Addition is reckoned by them amqngft Things impolTible : For fay they. That which is added, is either added to itfelf, or to fome Subjedt prteexiftent, or to that which con- , fifts of both 3 but none of thefe is true, there- . fore'
IjU^ t 'XII.
^ c E\p. T. r m i s Ml
5^^
-A- -
fcM-e’riwHifi^ is added- toiajwitber. For laftanee,- fopyiofe cho quantity of four Pints, and thereto let be added one Pint, I demand*,. To what it, is added ? To it felf it cannot, for that which is added is diverfe from that to which it ts added, but nothing is diverfe from.jt fell But neither is it added to that which confifts of both, the meafureof four Pints and one Pint, foi how can any thing be added to that which is not yet ? Befides, if to the four Pints, and to .the one Pint, be added a Pint, it \\\\\ make, i\p'E)S Pints^ from the quantity of four . Pints, .and .the one Pint and -the additionakPint. • Nowdf fp.the, four’Pirfts only, be added one Pint, foratoch. as that which is coextended -vvith auQtber.imwft- be equal with that to.- which it is coe^tend^: if one Pint be coextended with four Pints,, it: Will double the quantity of the four Pints, fo.as the whole meafure will be eipt Pints^ whicdt we fee to be otherwife. If therefore that is faid to be added, be neither added to itfeify. nor to. Tome other Subieft, nor to that wiiich.confifts of both thefe, and befides^tbef?, there.bempthing ; certainly there is no addition of one ;thmgto. another. . . i ’
, : . ; ■ La . J! M
C H A P. ‘ XI.
Of Tranf^ofition. > : ■
TRanfpofition comes within the compafs of Addition, and Detraftion, and . Local Motion, for it is Detraftion from one thirigi^and Addition to another, tranfiently. 1 ' -ja,, -
. ■ -Tr
CHAP. XII. ’
Of Whole and Part.
The like may be faid of Whole and Part, for the Whole feemeth to be made by con¬ vention, and addition of the Parts • but by de- tradfion of any one, or more of them, itleaveth to be Whole.
Befides, If there be aWhole, either it is a thing diverfe from its Parts, or its Parts are the Whole, but it feems not to be diverfe from its Parts ; For, the Parts being taken away, nothing remaineth whereby we may think that the Whole is any thing befides them. Now if the Parts are the Whole, the Whole is only a word, and an empty name, but hath no proper fub- fiftence, asDiftance is nothing more than things diftant, and Continuity nothing but things con¬ tiguous ^ Therefore the Whole is not any thing. But neither the Parts alfo ; for if there are Parts, cither they are Parts of the Whole, or Parts ot one another, or each is Part of it felf. Not of the Whole, for that is nothing more than the • Parts themfelves. Befides, the Part? would then
be Parts of themfelves, becaufe every Part is completive of the Whole. Neither of one ano¬ ther, for a Part feemeth to be contained in that whereof it is a Part, and it were abfurd to fay, that the Hand ( for example ) is contained in • the Foot. Neither is each of them a Part of it felf for then, as containing, and contained by it felf, a thing will be greater, and lefs thail it
felf. Now if thofe which we call Parts, neither be Parts of the Whole, « nor of themfelves, nor of one another, they are not Parts of any thing, and if Par^s of nothingj, neither are the^ Parts, for Relarive-s are taken aVay together. This, by. way, of digrelDqn 4 .for we treated .qf^Ly^hole and Par t.qnce before. , . a . ,
_ . [ ii: ,1;’’
-■ ■T ' C H;A’^i' XIlLj ' ■
■ ' ' ij • .
' U ■ Of-y^htration: . . ,
. ' ^ * ' C' ' ' ' ' . ' ‘ ^ b ' ■ ■ - , r ;
Ome alfo deny that- therg is any. .Alteration or riatmal; Mutation, ^(aS'they t;erai.i.t,)!;argu-. ing thusj •. If Sbmethingrbe changecj^; eiclier thaC'
'which is changed is. a Br^y, or Incqrpqrpjil ; but neither of thefe is. determ.inable, fhergfqre Al- Watioa itfelf is indeterminable. , If Thing alter, by operating as a Gaufe.; it alters^, as i).ging the Patient ^ and the fubflftcnce of ,it, as Caufc, Subverted:, together with which the patient alfo is fubverted, nor. having a thing from which to duffer, therefore nothing isalter,ed>, „ . >
! Moreover, If ther«rbe Alteration, it js either of a.Being,. or of a Not- being but a Not-bcs ihgis infubliftent, and can'neither fuffer nor aft, therefore it- is not capable of Alteration, If chat which is changed he a. Being, it is either changed as a Being, or as a Not^ being. As a Not being it is not changed, for Not.-beings-Sre not. If it be changed as a Being, it becomes di^ft'.eim sfrbm a Being,- that is, it will not be a Being r But to fay that Being is a Not- being,' is abfurd. Therefore a B&ing is not chahged.
Now if neither a B^ng, be changed, nor a Not-* being, . and beiddes. thefe there is nothing, .it re¬ mains to faf, thafnathing is changed;
Some argue thus ; That which is changed, muff be changed in fomecime, but neither is any thing changed in the timepaft, nor in the fu¬ ture, nor in the pf efent, (as we lhall ilicw j )
■ therefore, nothing is changed. In timepaft or future, nothing is changed ^ for neither of-thefo is prefent,’ but it is impoffible for any thing to aft or fuffer in a non-exiftent and noti-prefent time. But neither in the prefent, for perhaps the prefent alfo is inexiftent. This ri m, ATbip, is mdihilible .• But it is impoffible to imagine that I Iron (for Example) can be changed from hard to foft, or that any other Alteration san be made in indivifible time, for they feem to re¬ quire Succeflion. No’w if nothing be changed either in the time paft, nor in the prefent, nor in the future, nothing, at all is changed.
Moreover, If there be Alteration, f cither it is fubjeft to Senfc, or to Intelleft j hot-'to Senfes, for they receive only fingle Notions, but this effeii. Alteration hatha twofold Refpeft, both t;o that out of which the Alteration is,- and to that into which it is. If they fay. It Is Intelligible, Tor- afmuch as there is an indeterminable Contro- verfie concerning Intelligibles, as we have al¬ ready faid, vve cannot affert the Being ot Alte¬ ration.
tBAf.
G E P T I C I
0 M*
3lJX1\.L AUi
c H A p. XIV.
'Of ' Cvn^Ation^ afid Vortu^tioA.
i
G' Eiiefation, a'nd x:otraption, are fabverted together with Addition, and Detraftion, a«4 Alteration ^ for without thefe, nothing can be generated, nor corrupted .• As for Example . Ot the corruption of thelSlumber Ten, fay they, is generated the Number Nine, by SubEraflion of One ; and of Nine corrupted is generated Ten, by addition of One *, and Canker, ( by al¬ teration ) of Brafs corrupted ^ therefore the forerlamed Motions being taken away, perhaps if nec^flafily followeth, that Generation and Corruption are alfo taken away.
MOreovar, fome argue thus. If Socrates were generated, hrc was generated either when Ire was not Socrates^ or when he was. Socrates : If when he was, he muft have been generated twice ; if when he was hot, he was, and was not, at the fame time. He was, as being generated ; he was not, according to the Hyfothefis. Again, if Sncrates’ Dyed, either he Dyed when ce Lived, or when he was Dead«j not when he Lived, for lb the fame Perfon (hould be both Dead and Alive ; neither when he was Dead, for lb he Ihould Dye twice. Therefore Socrates Died not. By this Argument, upon every thing that isfaid to be generated, or corrupted, Generation and Corruption may be fubverted.
Some argue thus; If there be Generation, that which is generated, is either a Being, or a Not-Being •, not a Not-Being, for to that, which is not, nothing can happen, not fo much as to he. Neither a Being, for if a Being be generated, it is generated either as it is a Baing, or as it is a Not-Being. As it is a Not-Being, it is not generated, and if it be generated as a Being, forafmuch as a thing is generated of fomthing different from it, that which is generated muft be different from a Being, that is, a Not-being. Therefore that which js generated lhall be a Not-being, which is abfurd. Now if neither a Being, nor a Not-being be g€a€rated,f nothing at all is generated.
Upon the fame grounds alfo nothing is cor¬ rupted. For if Something be corrupted,' it is cither a Being, or a Not-Bein,^ ; not a Not- Being, for that which is corrupted muft fuffer Something • not a Being, for either it is corrup¬ ted, as continuing in the ftate pf a Being, or as not continuing. If as continuing in the ftate of a Being, the fame will be at once a Being and a Not- Being-, becaufe it is not corrupted as a Not-Being, but as it is a Being ; and as it is corrupted, it is different from a Being, and confequently a Not-Being. But it is ablurd to fay, the fame thing is a Being and a Not-Be- ing ; therefore a Being is not corrupted whilft it continuetb in the ftate of a Being. But if a Being be corrupted, not whilft it is in the ftate of a Being, but firft reduced to a Not-Being, and afterwards corrupted it is not a Being, but a Not- Being, that is corrupted-, which (as we faid before ) is impoflible. If therefore nei¬ ther a Being is corrupted, nor a Not-Being, and befides thefe there is Nothing, Nothing is corrupted. This may ferve, by way of Sum¬
mary, to fay of Motions 1 whence it followeth. That thfe Phyfiologie of the Dogmatifis is inexi* ftent, and unintelligible.
■f;
I r
" CHAP. XV.
X)f Re^.
IN like manner fome doubt as to the Nature of Reft, faying,; That whatfoever Moves, Refts not ; but every Body continually Moveth, according to the Opinions of the Dogmatifis, vtho fay. That Snbftance is Fluid, and hath conti¬ nual Evacuations and Recruits ; ( Whence the Platmicks chufe rather co call Bodies, Things generated, than Beings • and Heraclitus compa¬ red the Mobility of • our Matter, to the rapid courfe of a River.) ^Therefore no Body refts. Again, that which is faid to reft, feeemethto be contained by the things that are about it - that which is contained fuffers, but there is no Patient-, for, as we proved, before, there is no Caufe, therefore nothing Refts. Some argue thus ; That which Refts Suffers, that which Suf¬ fers is moved -, therefore that which is faid to Reft Is moved, and if moved, it Refts not. Hence alfo it is manifeft. That an Incorporeal Refts not j for if that which Refts Suffers, and to fuffer be proper to Bodies, and not to Incor- poreals, no Incorporeal either Suffers or Refts ; therefore nothing Refts.
Now forafmuch as none of the fore-named are underlftood without or Time, we mull: proceed to Difquifition of thefe; and if we prove, that thefe Exift not, the others will ap¬ pear to be Tnexiftent upon that account alfo,' Let us begin with Place.
CHAP. XVI. Of Place:
I
PLace is taken two ways, Properly, and Im¬ properly; Improperly for Place at large, as a City ; Properly, for that in which we are exadly contained. We inquire of Place in the proper exaft Senfe ; fome have afferted it, others deny’d it, others fufpended. Of thefe, they who af- fert it, recur to Evidence.- For who is there, fay they, who will affirm, there is not Place, when they behold the parts of Place, as. Right, Left ; Upwards, Dowwards ; Before, Behind ? and that the fame Perfon is at feveral Times in feveral Place ? and that where my Mafter taught, tliere do I now teach? They argue al¬ fo, That there is Place, becaufe things are na¬ turally light or heavy ; and for that the Anti- entsfaid, Chaos was firft for they hold. That Chaos is Place, becaufe it contained all things that were made in it. And if a Body be any thing, fay tliey, fo is Place alfo ; for without this, there will be no Body .- And if there be a from which, there is alfo an of which, and an which, that is. Place. The iirfl: is in either, the fecond therefore in both.
But neither do they who take away Place grant, that the Parts of Place are ; for Place is nothing elfc but it’s Parts : And he who afferts
that