PART XII.

SCETTICISM.
511
Of Phyfick.
THE THIRD BOOK.
Itherto byway of Summary we have fpoken of the Logical part of Phi-
__ _ lofophy ; we fhall obferve the fame
cocrie in examining the Thyfical part, not con- futing every particular, but endeavouring to overthrow the more- general, wherein the e* thers are comprehended. We will begin with the Principles’, And forafmnch as the gveateft part bold, that fome of them are Material, others Efficient, we will firlt fpeak of the Efficient , thofe being faid to be Principles more properly than the Material.
G H A P. 1.
Of GOD,
''W TOw feeing that molt of the Dogmatifh hold God to be the moft Efficient caufe, let us firff: enquire concerning God ; profeffing, that, following the courfe of Life •, we fay , (without engaging our Judgment) that there are gods, and we worfhip the gods, and we fay, that they have Providence. Only, to confute the temerity of the Dogmatifts, we fay as fol- loweth.
Of the things which we underftand, we ought to confider the Subffances, as, whether they are Bodies, or Incorporeal likewife their Forms. For none can underiland a Horfe, if he hath not firft learnt what the Form of a Horfe is. Likewife , that which is underflood, muff: be underftood as being fom where. Now foraf- much as, of the Dogmatifts, fome fay, That God is a Body^ others. Incorporeal; fome, that he hath a Human form ; others, not ; fome, that he is in place ; others, that he is not in place : And of thofe who fay, he is in place, fome, that he is in the World 5 others, that he is be¬ yond it. How can we have a notion of God, not having an indubitate knowledge of his Subftance, nor of his Form , nor of the Place wherein he is.Let them firft agree amongft themfelves,What God is ? and then they may reprefent hiin to us, and require , that we receive fuch a notion of God ; for, while they difagree ifreconcileably amongft thcmfelves,we cannot receive any thing from them as undoubtedly true. But, fay they, tonceive with your felf fomthing incorrupti¬ ble and bleffed, and think God to be fueb. This is fooliffi. For, as he who knoweth not Dion^ Cannot know the Accidents that are competent to him, as Dion ; fo, not knowing the Subfftnee
of God, neither can we know his Accidents.
Moreover, let them tell us what is Bleffed .* Whether that which ads according to Virtue, and hath a providence over the things fubordi- nate to it; or that which is unaftive,aud nei¬ ther hath any bufmefs it felf, nor affords bufi- nefs to any other. ' For, differing irreconcila¬ bly even about this, they (hew, that what they call Bleffed is not to be found out, and confe- quently not God bimfelf.
But though we fliould admit the notion of God, yet is it neceflary we fufpendj whether he is, or he is not, even from what the Dog¬ matifts fay, bccaufe it is not manifeft that there is a God ; for, if chat were felf- evident, the Dogmatifts would have agreed,Who,and What, and Where he is; whereas OH the contrary,there is an undeterminable conttoverfie amongft them, whereby we fee , that his Being is unmanifeft to us, and requireth Demonflration. Now be wh6 faith, that there is a God, tnuft etcher demon- ftrate it by a thing manifeft , or by an unmani¬ feft ; not by a thing manifeft, for if that were manifeft which demonftrates there is a God^ forafmuch as that which demon ftrateth is rela¬ tive to that which is demonft rated, and confe- quently is comprehended together with it, (as we have formerly proved ) that there is a God will be manifeft alfo,as being comprehended to¬ gether with the unmanifeft thing that demon¬ ftrates it. But this is not- manifeft , therefore neither can it be demonftrated by a manifeft thing.
But neither by an unmanifeft, for the unma¬ nifeft that fhould demonftrate there is a God will require a Demonflration. if demonftrated by a manifeft, it will no longer be unmanifeft^ but manifeft, that there is a God. Therefore the unmanifeft demonftrativc cannot be demon¬ ftrated by a manifeft. But neither by an unma¬ nifeft ; for he who faith fo, will be driven in¬ to infinite^v^c continually requiring a Demonflra¬ tion of the unmanifeft, that is alledged for De¬ monflration of the thing propofed. Therefore it cannot be demonftrated from any other ; that there is a God ; and if it neither be nrani- feft in it felf, nor demonftrable from any others it will be incomprehenfible whether there be a God.
Moreover, he who faith there is a God, holds, either , that he is provident over the things ia the world, or not provid4|nt. If provident, ei¬ ther over all, or over fame. If over all, there would be no ill or wickednefs in the V/orld 5 but all things ( as they confefs ) are full of ill j therefore God cannot be faid to be provident
ovto'
SC EPTICISM. PART XIL
over all.U over fome only, Why is He provident over there,and not over thofe? For either He both will ’ and can be provident over all , or He will, but cannot •, or He can, but will not •, or He neither will nor can. If He both will and can, then He would be provident over all ^ but He is not, as is nianifeft from what we laft alkdged •, therefore that fie both will and can provide over all, is not Co. If He will , but cannot. His Power is exceeded by that Caufe, which hinders Him from being provident over the things over v/bich He is not provident but it is abfurd, to Imagine God to be wea¬ ker than fome other. If He can be provident over all, and will not. He may be thought en¬ vious : If He neither will nor can, both envi¬ ous and infirm ^ which to affirm of God, were impious. Therefore God is not provident over the things of the World ^ and if He is not provident over them, neither performeth any Work or Effeft, none can fay by what means He comprehends there is a God, feeing that it neither is manifefc in it felf, nor comprehended by any Effeds. For thefe Reafons therefore it is Incoinprehenfible, Whether there be a God or No.
Hence we alfo argue, That perhaps they who lay there is a God . cannot be excufed from Impiety ^ for in affirming. That He is provi¬ dent over all things, they fay, that God is the Author of EviT, and in faying, that He is provident over fome, and not over all, they will be forced to confefs. That God is either Envious or Infirm ^ which cannot be faid, with¬ out manilefc impiety.
CHAP. II.
Of Caufe,
Blit that the Bogmatifts , not being able to extricate themfelves out of thefe difficul¬ ties, may not charge us with Blafpheray ^ we will in general examine Efficient Caufe., firfc, endeavouring to lay down the Notion thereof.
From what the Dogmatijls fay, none can un¬ derhand what Caufe is. Some' hold it to be a Body ^ others, Incorporeal. It feems to be, ac¬ cording to their moft general Opinion , That by which the Effelf is operated ; as the Sun, or the Sun’s heat is Caufe that the Wax is melted, or Caufe of the Liquefadion of the Wax ; for even here they differ. Some will have the Caufe to be of the Abftrad, as Liquefadion •, others of the Concrete, as to be Liquefied. Thus, as 1 faid, according to the moft general and re¬ ceived Opinion, a Caufe is that by which the Effed is operated.
Of^hefe Caufes , they hold fome to be Conti¬ nent ( or Solitary ; ) others , Con-caufal ; others. Co-operative. Solitary are thofe, which being pre- fent, the Effed is prefent ■ and being taken away, the Efftii is taken away -and being Dimini/hed , the Effed is Dimini/hed, Thus , the knitting a Halter about the Neck is p/e caufe of Suffocation. Con-canfal is that which joinetb with another Con-, caufal, towards produdion of the fame Effed , thus. Every one of the Oxen that draw tloe Plough , is taufe of the drawing thereof. Co-operative is that
which affords .Affifiance , hut very little to the Ef¬ fed -, as when two Men carry a Burthen^ and a third helps them a little.
Some fay. That things prefent are impulfive Caufes of the future, as the vehement heat of the Sun is of'a Feaver,* but fome will not admit thefe for that a Caufe, being relative to its Effed, cannot, as Caufe, precede it.
CHAP. HI.
Whether there be any Caufe of a Tiling.
IT is probable , there is fuch a Thing ai Caufe 5 For how can Augmentation, Dimi¬ nution , Generation ^ Corruption , Motion of natural and fpiritual Agents; in a word, the ordering of the whole World be, if not from fome Caufe, Fot , If none of thefe be really* fuch in their own Nature, we muff fay ; That they feem to us, by reafon of fome Caufe, to be fuch as indeed they are not. Again, All Gene¬ rations would be promifeuous, if there were no Caufe ; Horfes , of Mice -, Elephants , of Pif- mires. At Thebes in Egypt, there would be great fhowers of Rain and Snow -, in the Southern Parts none, unlefs there were fome Caufe that produced extraordinary Cold in the Southern Parts, and made the Eaftern dry and hot.
Again, he who faith. There is no Caufe, is confuted either way .• If he fay it fimply, with¬ out a Caufe, ( or Reafon ) he is not v/orthy cre¬ dit i if upon any Caufe, let him fhew a Caufii why there is no Caufe, and by that very reafon he will prove that there is a Caufe.
That they likewife fpeak probably who deny Caufe, we ffiall (hew, by alledging fome Reafonsi out of many; As thus.* It is impoffible to underftand the Caufe , before we comprehend the Effed as its Effed ; but neither cm we comprehend the Effed of the Caufe as its Ef¬ fed, if we comprehend not the Cmfe of the Effed as its Caufe ; for then we feem to know that it is its Effed, when wc comprehend the Caufe as its Caufe. Now if to underftand the Caufe, it be necelfary that we firft know the Effed ; and to know the Effed ( as I faid ) it be neceffary , that we firft know the Caufe , the ./Alternate Common Place comes in, to fhew , that neither of them can be known ; not the Caufe as Caufe, nor the Effed; as Effed *, for each of them requiring the other to its credit , we fhall not know upon which to ground our know¬ ledge firft. Wherefore we are not able to af- fert, that there is any Caufe of a Thing.
But though wc fhould grant there is a Caufe, yet will it appear to be Incomprchenfible, from the Controverfies about it. For he who faith. That there is Somthing Caufe of Somthing, ei¬ ther faith it fimply, not moved by any Caufe or Reafon, or dfe is moved to this Aflcntby fome Caufe. If fimply, he will be nothing the more creditable, then he who fimply faith. There is no Caufe of any Thing. If he alledge any Caufe, why he thinks there is a Caufe, he endea- voureth to prove that wHich is in dueftion by that which is in Qiieftion. For the Qi.ieftion be- ing. Whether there be any Caufe of a Thing, he taws it for granted that there is a Caufe ,
when
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^^l^en he alle^eth' a Caufe, why there a Caufe. Moreover, the Queftlon being conceiving the Exiftence of Caufe, if we prove it by any Caufe,' it wili be reqnifite to alledge another Caufe to prove that, and lb to Infinite • -but to alledge infinite Caufes, is impolTible. It is therefore i'mpollible to affert, That there is fomething Caufe of another.
Moreover, a Caufe prodllceth the Effect, ei¬ ther when it already is^ and exills as Caufe, or when it is not a Cahfe ^ not the later ; and if when it already is, it niuft firft exift, and be a CahTe, and then produce the Effect,- which is faid to be the Effedt thereof, the Caufe already cxifting. But Caufe being relative to the Ef¬ fect, it is manifeft, that, as Caufe, it cannot exift before it. Therefore a Caufe, even when it is already a Caufe, cannot produce that whereof it is Caufe. And if it produceth not any Thing, neither when it is not a Caufe, nor when it is a Caufe, then there is no Caufe at all for a Caufe cannot be underftoed as Caufe, unlefs it produce fomething.
Whence fome argue alio thus • A Caufe muft exift either together with the Effedt, or before it, or after it ; now to fay, that the Caufe begins to exift after the produdfion of the Effedt, we^e ridiculous. Neither can it exift before- it, as b?ing underftood in relation to it •, but Rela¬ tives, as Relatives, coexift, and are underftood together •, but neither can it coexift with the Ef- fedf , for if it be its Efficient, and that whatfoever is effedited, muft be effedkd by fome other that hath a Being, it is neceffary, that a Caufe firft be a Caufe before it produce the Effedf. Thpre* fore if a Caufe exift not either together with, or before, or after the Effedt, it cxifts not at all.
Moreover, the Notion of a Caufe may haply be overthrown thus. For if we cannot under- ftand a Cauf€(forafaiuch as it is relative,)before its Effedt j and,to underftand it, as Caufe of the Effedt, it benecelfary to underftand it, as being before the Effedt : But it be impoffible to under¬ ftand any thing to be before that, before which we cannot underftand any thing to be, then it is impoffible to underftaiid that there is Caufe.
Hence we argue thus •, Forafmuck as the Rea- fons by which we proved, that there muft be a Caufe, are probable ; and thofe alfo are proba¬ ble on the other fide, which prove there is no Caufe ; and of thefe Reafons we cannot poffibly know, which ought to be prefered, fince we neither have a Sign, nor Criterie, nor Demon- ftration, ackowledged indubitate, ( as we (hew¬ ed formerly. ) Therefore we muft ncceffiarily fufpend, as to the Exiftence of Caufe, faving. That from what the Do^ntatifis affirm of it, it appears nothing rather to be, than not to be.
•CHAP. IV.
Of Material Principles.
Hitherto of the Efficient ; we Ihall next fpcak briefly of thofe which are called Material Principles. That thefe are incomprehenfible , is manifeft, from the difagreement of the Dogma- tifis about them. Pherecides the Syrian, afierted Earth to be tbs Principle of all Things j Thales.,
the A-lilefjan., Water ^ Anaximander, his Difciple, infinite • Anaximenes and Diogenes Appollionates, Air • Hippafus, theMetdoonttne, Fire Xenophanes, the Colophonian, Earth and Water* Enopidcs, the Chian, Fire and Air *, Hippo, of Rhegiuni, Fire and Water ; Ommiacritus, in his Orphicks, Fire, Watei >aad Earth ; not to fpeak of Matter vpicl of quality, ( which fome have prodigiouOy fan-r cied, but not underftood ■, ) the Followers of Arijlotle ( zhQ Peripateteks,) a circular moving Bo¬ dy coillifting of Fire, Air, Water, and Earth, j Democritus andirpftwrMi, Atoms j Anaxagoras,z\iQ Cias^omeman, iloinoionieria’s ; Dio(^orus Cronas, leaft and indivilibie Bodies ; Heraclidcs, of Fontus, and Afolcpiades , of Bithynia , unconi pounded Bulks (. or little Bodies the Pythagoreans, Numbers ; the Mathemaiicians, xlie Terms of Bodies Strata, the Naturalift, (^lalitics.
Such, ( or, yet greatelr ) being the Cqntro-. verly amongft- them conceriuag the Material Principles, we muft either .aflent to all their Opinions, or to fome. To all is impoffible, for we cannot hold with Afcltpiadcs , that, they are tangible and qualitcd, and with Democritus, that they are Atoms, and void of quality ^ and with Anaxagoras, who aferibes all fenfible qualities to his, Homoiomeria s. But if we muft of our own judgments make choice of fome of thefe Opinions,, we muft do it either without Demonftration, or with Dsnionftration. If withr out Demonftration, it will not be credited ^ if with Demonftration, that Demonftration muft be true But it will not be granted to be true, unlefs it be judged and determined by a true Criterie, but the Criterie muft be proved to be true by an adjudged Demonftration. If there¬ fore, to prove that which preferreth one Opini¬ on before the reft to be true, it be requifite that its Criterie be demonftrated ; and, to demqn- ftrate that the Criterie is true, it be requifite that its Demonftration be firft adjudged, it runs into the Alternate Common Place, which vvill fuf-. fer the Argument to proceed no further, the Demonftration continually requiring a Criterie and the Criterie, adjudged Demonftration ; But to judge a Criterie by a Criterie, and a De- inoiiftration by a Demonftration, were to run into Infinite. Now if we cannot alPent to all Opinions concerning the Elements, vior to fome of them, we muft necefl’arily fulpend.
This perhaps is fufficient to fiiew the Incom- prehenlibility of the Elements and Material Principles. But to refute the Dogmatifis more* fully^ we will infift longer hereupon. Their Or pinious concerning Elements are fo many, that to examine every one in particular is more than our defign will allow, but what we fliall alledge may ferve to confute all .* For feeing that in all ControveiTies concerning the Elements they are held either to be Bodies or Incorporeal, we conceive it fufficient to prove, that both Bodies and Incorporeals are incomprehenfible fot thence it will follow. That the Elements muft be Incomprehenfible,
Xt a U C H A K
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sc E P T I C I S M.