PART XW

caufe of, proceeding to Infinite, or we alkdge Definitions not necefTary.
For .the Jame Reafons ftall we find, that nei¬ ther are: they neceflary to Inftruftion : For, as he who firft knoweth a thing, knoweth it with¬ out Definition ^ in like manner, he who teacheth it, may teaeh it without a Definition.
Moreover, from the things defined they judge Definitions, fitylng, Thofe are faulty Definiti¬ ons, which, include femthing which is not in the things defined, either in ail, or in fome. So -as it we fay, A Man vs a living Creature^ Ratio¬ nal^ Immorial *, Or, A living Creature^ Rational^ Mortal^ Ltarned^ forafmuch as there is no Man Immortal, and that there are fome Men not learned, they fay it is a faulty Definition The’-e- fore Definitions, perhaps, are indijudicable, by
CHAP. XVIII.
Of the dividon of a Word into Significations.
H E Sciences they hold to be by Nature,
_ not by Impofition ; and jufliy, for Science
mult be a thing liable and unmoveable .• But, thofe things which are by Impofition, are very fub/ed to Mutation, bdng varied according to the diverfity of Impofitions which are in our power, ^ Now forafmuch as words fignifie by Impofition, and not by Nature, ( otherwife all Men would underftand all Languages , both Greeks and Barbarians^ befides it is in our power to declare our meaning by other words ) how is it poffible there ftiould be a divifive Science
reafbn of the Infinity ot the Parriculars,by which of the word into Significations ? Or how can they ought to be judged. Befides, they cannot | Oiaie&ick be ( as fome conceive, ) the Science niske us comprehend and learn the things of of Significants, and Significates ? which themfelves are dijudicated, inafmuch as
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they are already known aiid.comprehended. Is it not therefore ridiculous to fay, That Defi¬ nitions conduce to Comprehenfien, or Inllrudli on, or Declaration, when they involve us in fuch oblcurity ? As for Example, ( to fport a little ) If one Man meaning to ask another, Whether he met a Man on Horfebacic, with a Dog following him, Ihould do it after this man¬ ner. O Living Creature., Rational^ Mortal., capa¬ ble of IntelleS and Science^ Didfi thou not meet a Living Creature^ Eifible^ Broad-nail' d., capable of Political Science, mounted upon a living Creature that hath the faculty of Neighing., leading a four, footed living Creature that hath the faculty of Bark ing. Who would not laugh to fee a Man, that Lnows the things themfelves, puzzled by their Definitions ? W'e muft therefore acknowledge Definitions to be unnecelTary, whether it be a Speech, which, by a fhort Explication, brings os to knowledge of the thing, meant by the words, ( which, by what we have faid, it ap- peareth, that it doth not ) or whether it be a Speech declaring what a thing is, li m Vt) or even what they pleafe. For when they go about to Ihew what Demonllration is, they fall out among themfelves irreconcileably, of which for Brevity’s fake, we will not take Notice. ’
CHAP. XIX.
Of Whole, and Part.
CHAP. XVII.
Of Divijion.
Forafmuch as fome of the Dogmatics fay. That Dialedtick ts a Science SyOo^ifltck., In- duihue., Definitive ; after our difeourfe of the Criterie, and of Demonfir ation, and of Syllogifms., and of Induliions, and of Definition^ we will •come to fay fomthing of Divifion^ conceiving it not to be from our purpofe.
They fay. That of Divifion., there are four kinds ^ Of the Word into Significations ; Of the Whole into Parts ; Of the Genus into Species ; Of the Species into Individuals. But that there is not a divifive Science of any of thefe, I think may eafily be Ihewn,, by examining them feve- Taily.
^I^Oncerning Whole and Fart^ we fhall diE-
_ courfe in that which they call Phyfick ; at
prefent, we (hall only fpeak of the divilion of the Whole into its Parts. We fay thus, When the Decad is faid to be divided into 0«e,and Troo.^ and Three., and Four., it is not divided into thefe, for as foon as the fir ft part (granting this by the way of fuppofition) is taken away, ( as the A/o- nad) there is no longer the Decad, but the Enne* ad, a thing quite different from the Decad ^ therefore the fubftraftion and divifion of the reft concerns not the Decad, but other Numbers according to the feveral Subftraftions.
Let us now fee, Whether it be polTible to di¬ vide the Whole into thofe things, which they fay are its Parts. If the Whole is divided into its Parts, the Parts before the divifion either are contained in theWholc,or not contained : To ufe our firft Example, the Decad They fay, that 9 is one of its Parts, for it is divided into i. and 9. fo is 8 alfo, for it is divided into 8. and 2. So alfo is 7. and 6. and 5. and 4. and 3. and 2. and I. Now if all thefe are contained in the
Decad, and compounded with it, they making 55. the Dec Therefore are not the Parts, as they call them, contained in the Decad •, neither can the Decad be divided into them, as a Whole into Parts, fince they are not to be found in it. The fame may be objeded againft Magnitudes, as if we fhould divide a Magnitude into ten Cubits ; perhaps therefore it is not poflible to divide i:he Whole into Parts.
CHAP. XX.
Of Genus and Species.
JT temains to treat of Genus and Species, of
_ which elfevyhere we (hall fpeak more large¬ ly, but now compendioufly. If Genus and Species are Notions, the Arguments which we brought againft the Hegemonick, and Phantafie, fub-
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SCEPTICISM.
J» A R T XII.
507
vert them ; but if they allow them to have a pe¬ culiar fubfiftence^What will they anfwer to this? If there are Gemls^ either there are as many as there art Species^ or there is one common Species^ or in all thofc which are called Specks.
If there be as many Genuses., as there Species., oi them there will not be one common G'e’wr«,which is divided into them ^ but if it be faid, there is one Genus in all its Species., then every Species muft participate of the Whole or of Pat t
thereof ^ but not of the Whole^for it is impofli- bJe, for one thing contained at once, in one, and another, to be wholly in one. If of Part only, firlt, the whole Gekus will not follow the Spec/w, as they conceive it doth, for Man will not be a living Creature,but part of a living Creature, as a fablidnce,but neither animate nor fenlible. A- gain, either all the Species will be laid to parti¬ cipate of the fame Parts of their Geniis^ or fome of fome Part, others of others. That they Ihould participate of the fame is impolTible, for the Realbn aforefaid. If fome of fome, others of others, theSpeerw wdll not be like to one ano¬ ther, according to their Genus, f which they will not admit) and befides, every Genus will be infi¬ nite, being divided into infinite, not only as to Species, but as to Particulars, in which it is con- fider’d with thofe Spectes • for Eton is not only faid to be a Man, but a living Creature, But if thefe things be abfurd,aeither do the Species par¬ ticipate of . Parr of their Genus, it being one ^ but if neither doth every Species participate of its Genus in Whole, nor in Part, how can one6’e- nus be faid to he i.n all its Species, fo as to be di¬ vided into them. None fure can fay any thing hereto, unlefs he frame fome kind of Images ^ and yet even thofe will be fnbverted, according to the Sceptical Method, by their own indeter¬ minate conlequences.
Welhall add this, Species’s are either fuch or fuch, their Genus’s are either Inch and fuch, or they are fuch and they are not fuch, or they are neither fuch nor fuch. As for Inftance ; Foraf- much as of thefe or thofe , fome are Corporeal , others Incorporeal, and fome True, others Falfe, and fome perad venture White, others Black, and fome very Great, others very Little .* This word Thing, for example, which fome fay is moll g:'ncral, will either be All, or Some, or Nothing^ but if It be abfolutely Nothing , neither will it be Genus, and fo there is an end of the Coritro- verlie. If they fay it is All , befides that it is impoffible It Ihould he fo, it muR be all the Spe¬ cies, and every particular in them. For becaufc an Animal, as they fay, is an Animate, Senfitive Subrtaiice, therefore each of its Species is faid to be both a Subllance, and Animate, and Senfitive : So if Genus be both Body, and Incorpoi'eal, and Falfe and True , and Black and White , and Little and Great, and all the rcfl , each of its Species and particulars will alfo be All , which we do not find tobe fo; therefore this alfo is Falfe. But if it be only fome , then that which is the Genus of thofe,win not be the Genus of the reft j as if Thing be Body, it will not be the Genus of lncorporeals;,and if living Creature be Rational, not of Irrationals; fo that neither will an Incorporeal be a Thing, nor Irrational & Creature, Therefore Genus is neither fuch and fuchjUor fuch and not fuch, nor neither fuch ftpr
fnch ; And if fo,neither is Genus any thing at all.
If any (hall fay, that Genus is all Potentially ; we anfwer, that what is any thing Potentially, muft be fomthing Actually alfo ^ as none can be a Gratnmurkn Potentially, if he cxift not Actual¬ ly - now if GiHits be all things Potcntially,we de¬ mand of them what it is Actually , and thereupon occur the fame inextricable difficulties, for ic cannot be all Contraries A’Ctually. Again neither can it be fome Actually, others Potenti- ally,6nly as a Body Actually, Incorporeal Poten¬ tially; for a thing is Potentially, fuch as it may be ACtuaUy,biit w.hat is Actually a Body cannot be Actually Incorporeal ; fo as; for example If it be a Body aCtuSlly, it is Incorporeal Potenti¬ ally, and on the contrary. Wherefore we can¬ not yay that Genus is fome things Actually others Potentially , only. Now if Actually ic be nothing at all, it exifts not ; and therefore the Genus, which they affirm to be divided into its Species, in nothing.
This likewife is worthy confidcration. That as becaufe Alexander and Paris are tfic fame , therfore it is impoffibie, if it be true that ulkx~ under walks, itltiouicFbe falfe that walks. In like manner. If to be Man, be the lame thing inTkow,and in D;ow, this Appellation, Man.fi\- ledged in the framing of any Axiom will make the Axiom either True or Falfe in both , but this wc find not to be fo, for when fitteth,^ and Theon walleth, thk A^xiom, a .AunJmeth, fpoken of one,, is True ; of the othef, .Falfe ; wherefore this Appellation , Man, h not com¬ mon to both ^ not one and the fame in boch,biic proper to each.
CHAP. XXI. ' bf Common Micidents.
THe like may be faid of Common Accidents. .
For if one and the fame accident belong to Dion and Theon, for exainpT'e, Seeing ; if Dion die, and Theon furyive and fee, either they muft fayjthat the fight of Dion is not fnbjeCl to periih, which is abfurd, or that the fame fight is peri- ffied,and not periled, which is irrational alfo : Therefore the fight of Theon is not the fame with the fight of Dion, theref:>i e pi'oper to each. For if the fame Refpirationhappen to Dinn and The¬ on, it cannot be that ic Ihoukl be in Theon, and not in Dion ; but one may die and the other fur- vive, therefore ic is not the fame. But of thefe, let what we have briefly faid fbffice.
CHAP. XXII.
IT will not haply be abfurd to infift a little up¬ on Sophifms^in regard that thcy_whocry up DialMick fo much, lay, It is necefiary for t'.ic So¬ lution of them. For, fay they, Jflt d'ifcdrn Speeches True and Falfe, and Sophifms be falfe Speeches ; it is dijudicative of thefe, which corrupt Truth with an apparent likelihood. Wherefore the DialeSiikSj as affiftingand underpropping the .failing cOurle of life^ with much labour, teach tlie Inferences,
T t c 2. and’
SCEPTICISM. PART XII.
and Solutions of Sophifms, faying, A Sophtfm is a Keafon probable and deceitful *, fo as it receives an- Inference^ either Falfe^or like to Falfe, orVn- certain, or. othertpife not to be received. Falfe^as in this Sophifm,
No man giveth a Categorem to be Drunk.,
But t-his., to Drink Worm wood., is a Categorem., Therefore^No man giveth Worm-wood to be drunk.
Dike to Falfe, as in this ^
That which could not be., nor cannot be, is not abfurd.
But this, a Fhyftcian, as a. Fhyftcian, kills • nei¬ ther could, nor can be, ; ■
Therefore this fPrope/ition:,T a Phy/ician^ as a Phyfician, kills, is not abfurd.
Vneertain, as this ;
I did not ask thee fomething firji, and the Stars are not even in Number,
But I did ask thee fomething firfi •,
Therefore, the Stars are not even in Number,
Not otherwife to be received, as thofe Speeches which are called Solcecifns, as, '
That which, thou feef, is.
But thou feef him Mad,
Therefore he is Mad.
^Again,
That which thou feef, is.
But thou feef many Houfes burning]
Therefore many Houfes are burning.^
'f
Then they endeavour to Ihew their Solutions, faying, That ‘ in the firft Sophifm, one thing is ‘ granted by the Sumptions, another inferred ^ it ‘ is granted that a Categorem is not Drunk, and ‘ that to drink Wormwood is a Categorem, but ‘ not the Wormwood it felf.So that, whereas the
* Inference ought to be,Therefore no Man drinks ‘ this [[Categorem, 3 To drink Wormwood
‘ which is true, it Inferreth, I'herefore no Man ‘ drinketh Wormwood, which isfalfe,and is not ‘ colleded from the granted Premifes.
‘ As to the Second, It feems to lead to Falfe,
* (infomuch as they who mind it not well, doubt ‘ whether they ought to affent to it or not,) but ‘ it colledls Truth, therefore this is not abfurd.
* A Phyfician5as a Phyfician, killeth, for no Pro- ‘ pofition is abfurd ; but this, A Phyfician , as a
* Phyfician, killeth, is a Propfiotion. ^ therefore ‘ it is not abfurd.
‘ That which leadeth to Uncertainty, is, they
* fay, of the Nature of reciprocal Reafons ; for ‘ if nothing were asked before , then the Nega- ^ tive of the Connex were true , the Connex it
* felf being falfe, becaufe this , [| 1 asked thee fom- ‘ thing firftd which is falfe, is inferted into it- but ‘ after asking, (the Aflumption being true, £ I ‘ asked thee firftd by teafon the asking was be-
* fore the Alfumption) the Negative of the Con- ‘ nex is falfe, fo that a Conclufion cannot any ‘ way be gather’d, the Negative of the Connex ‘ being inconfiilent with the Aflumption.
! ^ The laft kind being by Solcecifm, ( fome ‘ fay,) infers abfurdly, and contrary to common
V
Tims fome Dialedicks difeourfe of Sophifns (others otherwife) which may perhaps tickle the Ears of the lighter fort of Perfons, but arc indeed fup&rhuous, and forged by themfelves to no p-drpofe. This perhaps may be obferved , from what was faid formerly -, for we fhetved , that neither True nor Falfe can be comprehend- ed,^according to the DialeTtcks, as many other ways, fo particularly, by overthrowing Demon- ifration, and indemonftrable Reafons, the props of their Syllogiftick faculty. Many other things might be alledg’d againft the Subjeft in handjof which we Ihall only fay briefly thus.
Of all thofe Sophifns, which DialeHick feems properly to confute, the Solution is unprofita¬ ble- but thofe, the Solution whereof is profita¬ ble, it is not within the power of a DialeBick to folve, but of thofe who are converfant in the particular Arts of each feveral thing As for in- fl:ance,lf this Sophifm were propounded to a Phy- lician, ‘ in theremilhon of a Difeafcjthere ought ‘ to be variety of Diet, and Wine allowed Buc on the third day, there ufually happens a Re- *■ miffion i Therefore before the third day, there ‘ ought to be variety of Diet, and allowance ‘ of Wine. A DiakBick can fay nothing to all this, but the Phyfician can folve the Sophifm ^ knowing that Remiffion is taken two ways,either of the whole Difeafe, or for any particular incli¬ nation towards amendment. Before the firffc third day it happens for the moft part , that: there is a Remiffion of fome particular Intcnfe- nefs ; now we approve not variety of Diet in this Remiffion , but iu the Remiffion of the whole Difeafe. Whereupon he will fay. That one of the Sumptions of the Argumenc is disyoyned from the other, viz., that which concerns the whole Difeafe , from the other which concerns part ^ Again, to this Argument concerning an intenfe Feaver, ‘Contraries are th«
‘ remedies of Contraries •, but Cold is contrary ‘ to the Heat of the Feaver, therefore cold things ‘ are convenient for the Cure of it ; a DialeBich will not know what to fay ; but the Phyfician, knowing that fome are AfFedions adherent to the Difeafe, others Symptoms of thofe Affeftions , will anfwer , that the Queftion is not to be un- derftood of the Symptoms, ( for it ufually hap¬ pens that Heat is encreafed by pouring on cold things,)but of the adherent Afredednefs,and that Conftipation is an adherent AfFeftion, which re¬ quires not Condenfation, but rather Opening ; but the Heat which follows upon it, is not pri¬ marily adherent, wherefore that which is Cold is not convenient to be applied. Thus to So- phifms, whofe Solution is profitable, the Dia* leBick will not know what to fay ; but to fuch as thefe, ‘ If thou haft not large Horns, and haft ‘ Herns, thou haft not Horns • but thou haft noC ‘ large Horns, and haft Horns ^ therefore thou ‘ haft not Horns. ^«(^,If a thing be moved,either ‘ it is moved in the place wherein it is, or in that ‘ wherein it is not ', but neither in that whereia ‘ it is, (for there it refts •) not iji that whereia it ‘ is not,( for it cannot ad,where it is not^ therc- ‘ fore nothing is moved : And, Either that which ‘ is generated, or that which is not, but that ‘ which is not generated (for is is already ) not ‘ that which it is not ; for that which is gene-
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