PART XII.

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SCEPTICISM.
and every one in particular, it feemeth pcfTible to be proved, that every Man is a living Crea¬ ture. For it thete be but one particular, which feemeth contrary to the reft, the univerfal Pro- pofition will not be found. As for Example, Although the greateft part of living Creatures move the lower Jaw, only the Crocodile the upper, this Ptopofition is not true ; all living Creatures move the lower Jaw. When there¬ fore they fay. Every Man is a thing Creature^ Socrates is a Man., therefore Socrates w a living Creature •, intending from this univerfal Propo- fition. Every Man is a living Creature., to colleft this particular Propofition, ihereforc Socrates is a living Creature • this being one of thofe, by which the univerfal Propolltioa was ( as I laid) indnftively proved, they fall into the Alternate Common Place, proving the univerfal Propofiti¬ on bv the Particulars, and the Particular by the Univerfal In like manner in this Reafon. Socrates is a Man ; but no Man is Four-footed, therefore Socrates is not Four footed. This Pro- polition, No Man is Four-footed, endeavoring to piove induftively by Particulars , and to prove every Particular fyllogiftically out of this, they run into the Alternate Common Place in¬ extricably.
In like manner, let us examine the reft of the Rcafons, which the Peripateticks call De- monftrable^ for this. //’if be Elay , it h Light , they fay, is conclufiVe of this, it is Light -, and again, this, it is Light, together with the other, It is EI)ay, is confirmative of this. If it is Day, it is Light : For the aforefud Gonnex would not be thought found, if the firft part. It is Light, were not always coexiftent with, it is Day. If therefore it mu ft fiift be comprehended , that when there is Day, there is neceflarily Light, for the framing of this Connex , If it be Day., it is Light, hence is inferred, that in iheEe,When it isDay,tt is this Connex, If it is Day, it is Light, (as far as concerns the prefent in- deninnfirable Reafon ) proving the coexiftence of this. It is Day, and of this. It is Light ; and reciprocally their exiftence, confirming the Con- nex here again, by the Alternate Common Place, the exiftence of Reafon is fubverced.
The fame may be faid of this Reafon, If it is D^y, it is Light ■, but is not Light : therefore it it not Day •, For , inafmuch as there connot be Day without Light, this is conceived to be a found Connex, // if be Day, it is Light', But if we ftiould fuppofe fome Day to be ; and Light not to be, it will be faid to be, a falfe Connex. Now as to theforefaid Indembnftrable, that, If there is not Day , there is not Light, is collefted from this, that, If there is Day^ there is Light fo as either is rcquifite to the proof of the o- ther, and incurs the Alternate Common Place.
Likewife, Forafmudi as lome things are incon- liftent one with the other, as Day and Night, and the Negative of the Complicate, {It is not D.-?^, and it is not Night, ) and the Dis/unft is thought to be found •, but that they are incon- fiftent, they conceive to be proved by the Ne¬ gative of the Complicate, and by the Disjund, faying. It is not Day and Night-, but it is Night, therefore it is not Day. Or thus. Either it is Day or Eight j but it is Night, therefore it is not Day. Or, but it is not Night, therefore it is
Day. Whence we again argue, that if to Con¬ firmation of the Disjunct, and of the Negati¬ on in the Complicate, it be necelfary that we firft comprehend the Axioms contained in them to be inconfiftent , but that they are Inconliftent, feems to be colleded from the Disjunft, and the Negative of the Complicate, they run into the Alternate Common Place, feeing that we can neither credit theforefaid Modals, nnlefs we firft comprehend the Inconfiftence of the Axioms that are in them, nor can alHrm their Inconfiftence, before we can affirm the Coargu- tion of the Syllogifms which is made by the Mo¬ dals. VVherefore not having whereupon to ground our Belief firft, ( they being Reciprocal ) we mnft fay, that neither the Third, nor Fourth, nor Fifth , of the Indemonftrables ( as far as appeareth by this , ) have Subfiftence. Thus much for Syllogifms.
G H- A P. XV.
Of Induction,
INduCHon, as 1 conceive, niay eafily be over¬ thrown • for , feeing that by it they would prove an Univerfal from Particulars , either they muft do it , as having examined all Par- ticularsj Or only fome. If fome only, the In- duHion will not be valid, it being poffible, that: fome of the omitted Particulars may be found contrary to the Uriiverfal Propofition. If they would examine all, they attempt Irapoffibles,i for Particulars are infinites and undeterminate. Thus it happens, that lududion cannot fubfift either way.
C H H P. XVI.
Of Difimtions.
FOrafmuch as the Do'gmatifls are highly con¬ ceited of themfelves, ds to the framing of Definitions. ( which they rank under the LogiJ- cal part of Philofophy ) let ns difeourfe a lit¬ tle hereupon. The Dogmatifls fay, that Defies nitions conduce to many things, but perhaps all their neceflary ufe may be reduced to two ge¬ neral Heads ; they (liew that Definitions are neceflary , either to Comprehenfion, or to Inftrudion. Now if we firove they are ufeful to neither, we overthrow their vain Labor. We argue thus: If he who knoweth not that which is defined, cartnot define that which he knoweth not , and he w^ho knoweth firft, anci afterwards definetb, comprehends not, by the Definition, that which is defined, but applies the Definition to that which he already compre¬ hends -, then Definition is not neceflary to the Comprehenfion of things. Andferafmuch as if we would define all things, we cannot define any, becaufe, we fhall run into Infinite ; and if we fay, that fome things may be comprehended without Definitions, we fliew, that Definitions are not neceflary to Comprehenfion .• As thofo which are not defined are comprehended, fo we might comprehend all the reft without Defini¬ tions* either we (hall define nothing at all, be-
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SCEPTICISM.