PART xn:

taking away thQ rignifiK:ate, the liga cannot exift. Thus the Sign will be found to be mexiftent,if we fay that Signs only are apparent. It remains, we fay, than of Signs fomc are apparent, fome unap- parent, but this alfo incurs the fame difficulties ; for theSignificates of apparent Signs will be ap¬ parent, as we faid, not requiring any thing to lignihe them, and conlequently they will not be Signiiicates, Whence neither will the other be Signs, as ligoifying nothing •, The unmanifeft Signs requiring fornething to deted them. If they fay, they are fignifi’d by Unraanifeft, the Argument running into Infinite, they will be found to be Incomprehenfible, and confequently Inexiftent, as we faid. If by apparent, they will alfo be apparent, as being comprehended toge¬ ther with their apparent figns, and confequently W'ill alfo be inexiitent,for it is impoffible a thing fhould be by nature apparent and unapparent ^ but the Signs, of which our difeourfe is, being fuppofed una[)parent, will be found to be appa¬ rent, by retorting the Argument. If therefore / neither all Signs be apparent, nor all unappa¬
rent • nor fome apparent, others unapparent ; and . that there be nothing more than this, as they acknowledge, what they call Signs will be ‘ inexiflent. Thefe few Arguments , alledged out of many, may fuffice to ftiew, that there is no Endeidtick Sign.
Let us now lay down the Arguments of thofe who hold a Sign to be, that we may fliew the equivalence of contrary Reafons. Either the words alledged againft Sign fignifie fornething, or they fignifie nothing ^ if infignificant , How can they take away the exiftence of Sign ? If they fignifie what Sign is, they are demonftra- tive againfl: Sign, or not demonftrative ; if not demonftrative, they do not demonftrate that Sign is not ^ if demonftrative, demonftration being a Specks of Sign, deteftive of its conclu- fion, Sign will be. Whence is argued thus. If Sign be fornething, there is Sign ^ and if there be not Sign, there is Sign ^ for that there is no Sign muft be proved by demonftration,which is a Sign. Now either Sign is, or it is not, therefore it is not.
Upon this Argument followeth another in this manner • If there be not fome Sign, there is no Sign : and if a Sign be that which the Dog- matijis hold it to be, it is no Sign • for the Sign of which we difeourfe, according as it is under- ftood, and as it is relative to, and detedfive of, the fignificate, is found to be inexiftent, as we Ihcwed before. Now either Sign is, or it is not j therefore it is not.
As concerning the words which are fpoken of Sign, let the Dogmatifls anfwer. Whether they fignifie any thing, or not;, if they fignifie nothing, they prove not that there is Sign *, if they fignifie, the Significate followeth them, which is, there is Sign; whence it followeth, as we fhewed,that there is Sign, by retorting the Argument. Since therefore Reafons equally probable may be al¬ ledged, to prove there is Sign, and that there is not Sign, we ought not to fay either rather than the other.
CHAP. XII.
Of Demonjlration,
FRom what hath been faid, it is manifeft that neither is Demonftration a thing acknow¬ ledged. For if we fufpend as to fign, and De¬ monftration be a Sign, we muft neceflarily fuf- pend as to Demonftration ; For we Ihall find that the Arguments alledged againft Sign will ferve alfo againft Demonftration : It feemeth to be Re¬ lative to, and detediive of, its Conclufion,upoa which will follow almoft all that we alledged againft Sign. But if fornething muft be faid of Demonftration in particular,! will comprife the Difeourfe in a narrow compafs,firft laying down ^ what Demonftration, according to them, is.
‘ Demonftration ( as they lay ) is a Reafon ‘ which, by Colledion of acknowledged (indubi- ‘ tate ) Sumptions, detefteth a thing unmanifeft, j
‘ But clear mil it fe^m by this that followeth, Reafon I
‘ (or Argument) is that which confifts of Sumpti- ‘ ons and a Gonclufion •, Its Sumptions are laid ‘ to be the Axioms taken fuitably for eonftrudli- • |
‘ on of the conclufion concordantly.
‘ Inference or Conelufion is the Axiom framed i
^ out of the two Sumptions, as in this. If it is ;
‘ Day, it is Light ^ but it is Day, therefore it is ‘Light: Therefore it is Light, is the Conclufion,
‘ the reft are the Sumptions. Of Reafons, fome’
‘ are conclufive, others not conclufive .* Conclu- ‘ five, when the Gonnex, beginning from Com- ‘ plication of the Sumptions of the Argument,
‘ and concluding in the Inference thereof, is ‘ found 5 as the inftanced Reafon is ConcIufiTe ,
‘ becaufe to this Complication of its Sumptions,
‘ It is Day j and, if it is Day it is Light ; it is con-
^fequent^ it is Light, in this Connex, if it is Day^ - ‘
‘ and if it is Day, it is Light. Not conclufive arc ‘ thofe, which are not after this manner.
‘ Of the Conclufive, fome are true, others not ‘ true : True, when not only the Connex, as to ‘ Complication of the Sumptions and the Infe- ‘ rence, is,as we faid, found *, but the Conclufion, i
‘ and that which is a Complication of the Sumpti- ‘ ons is true, which is the Antecedent, and the ‘ Connex. ‘ A true Complication is that which ’
‘ hath all true, as. It is Day , and, if it is Day it j
‘ is Light. ‘ Not true, is, when they are noD ‘ thus • for this Reafon, if it is Night,it is dark ;
‘ but it is Night; therefore it is dark, is indeed ‘ Conclufive, becaufe the Connex is found, if it ‘ is Night, and, if it is Night it is dark ; but it ‘ is not true, for the confequent complicate is ‘ falfe, it is Night, and if it is Night it is dark,
‘ it containing this falfity , for it is a falfe com- • ]
‘ plicate whatfoever containeth in it felf a falfi- •ty. Whence they fay, A true reafon is that,
‘ which, from true Sumptions, inferreth a true ‘ Conclufion.
‘ Again, of true Reafons, fome are(^p(7(^(?i(7?ViI)
‘ Demonftrative , others not Demonftrative.
‘ Demonftrative, are thofe, which, from things ‘ manifeft, colled fornething not manifeft ; not ‘ Demonftrative are thofe which are not fo ,
‘ as this reafon, If it be Day it is Light ; but it is i i
‘ Day, therefore it is Light, is not demonftra- j ^
‘ tive, for its conclufion, it is light, is manifeft. ■]
‘ But this,if Sweat pierce through the Skin,there I
arc ' !
piART XIL
SCEPTICISM.
‘ are Pores intelligible , but Sweat pierceth ‘ through the Skin, therefore there are Pores ‘ intelligible, is demonftrative ; for its conclufion, ‘therefore there are Pores Intelligible, is unma- ‘ nifeft.
‘ Again, of thofe which collect fomething un- ‘ ittanifeft, fome bring us by the Sumptions to ‘ the Conclufion indudfively only, others indu- ‘ ftitely and deteftively.Indudively, thofe which ‘ leem td depend upon Belief and Memory, as ‘ this* if one tell you, that fuch a Man fhall grow ‘ rich, he fcall grow rich *, but this God (as fup- ‘ pofing Jupiter ) tells you, that fuch a Man fhall ‘ grow Tich,therefore he fhall grow rich. We af- ‘ fent to the conclufion not fo much for any ne- ^ ceflity of the Sumptions, as for that we believe ‘ what the God faith. Others not only induft- ‘ively, but detecfively alfo lead us to the Con- ‘ clufion j If Sweat iffue through the Skin, Pores ‘ are intelligible ; but the firft, therefore the fe- ^ cond i for this, Sweat iffueth forth, is deteft- ‘ ive of the other, there are Pores *, forafmuch ‘ as we preconceive, that moifture cannot pe- ‘ netrate through a Body not porous.
‘ Thus Demonftration muft be a Reafon con- ‘ clufive and true, and have an unmanifeft Con- ‘ clufion deteftive by the power of the Sumpti- ‘ ons, and therefore Demonftration is faid to be ‘ a Reafon, having indubitate Sumptions, and by ‘ Collection detecting an unmanifeft Inference. By this we may underftand the Notion of De- monftration.
CHAP, XIII.
Whether there is Demonfir atiorC
THat Demonftration is not, may be argued from what they themfelves fay, by over¬ throwing every Particular that is included in the Notion. For Example ; A Reafon or Argument | confifts of Axioms,but a compound thing cannot . exift,unlefs the things whereof it is compounded | coexift one with another(as a Bed,and the like:) ' But the parts of a Reafon are not coexiftent one with another j for whilft we are fpeaking the firft Sumption,the other Sumption nor the Infe¬ rence do not yet exiftjand while we are fpeaking the fecond,the firft is no longer exiftent, and the Inference exifts not yet ; and when we pro¬ nounce the Inference, the Sumptions are no longer exiftent. Thus the parts of a Reafon are ^ot exiftent with one another, and therefore the Reafon it felf feemeth not to exift.
Befides, M conclufive Reafon is incomprehenfi ble 5 for, if it be judged from the confequence of the Connex, but the confequence ofthe Con nex beundetcrminablycontroverted,and perhaps is incomprehenfible, ( as we fhewed in our dif- courfe concerning a Sign ^ ) conclufive Reafon will alfo be incomprehenfible.
Moreover the Dialeffich fay, that *A not- ‘ conclufive Reafon is made, either by Incohe- ‘ rence, of by Defect, or by being in an ill Fi- ‘ gore, or' by Redundance. By incoherence,
‘ when the Sumptions have no coherence with ‘one another, nor with the Inference, as. If it ‘ is Day it is Light, but Co^ is Ibid in the ‘ Market, therefore Dion wall^.
‘ By Redundance when there is found fome ‘ redundant Sumption, fuperfluous to colledtion ‘ of the Reafon, as. If it is day it is light, but it ‘ is day, and Dion walks, therefore it is light.
^ ‘ By being in an ill Figure ^ for thefe areas they ^ cab them SyUogifms. If it is Day it is Light fut So fupply the
it IS Day ^ there fore it is Light ^ And If i^ is wofTexf.
‘ Light it is not Day *, But it is not Eighty her fore ’ it is not Day^ But this is an inconclufive reafon,
‘ If it is pay it is Light, but it is Day, therefore ^ it is Light • becaufe the Connex promifing that
its Confequent is in its Antecedentjthe Antece- ‘ dent being afiumed, the Confequent is alfo af- ‘ fumed ^ and the Antecedent being taken away,
‘ the Confequent is alfo taken away ; for if the ‘ Antecedent be,the Confequent muft be alfo.But ‘ affuming the Confequent,the Antecedent is not ‘ always afiumed alfo *, for the Connex doth not ‘ promife that the Antecedent fhall follow upon ‘ the Confequent, but only the Confequent upon ‘ the Antecedent. Flereupon a Reafon, which ‘ collefts the Confequent from the Connex of ‘ the Antecedent, is faid to be Syllogiftick ; and ‘ that which from the Connex,and from the con- ‘ trary of the Confequent colledts the contrary ‘ of the Antecedent: But that which fr@m the ‘ Connex and the Confequent colleds the An- ‘ tecedent , is inconclufive , as we faid before.
‘ Whence its Sumption being true, it collcfts a ‘ Falfity, if it be fpoken in the Night-time by ‘ the light of a Candle •• for this,lf it is Day it is I ‘ Light, is a true Connex ^ and fo is this AlTum- ‘ ption,But it is Light ; but the inference,There- ‘ fore it is Day, is falfe.
‘ By defedt - a Reafon is faulty, when there is ‘ omitted fomething of thofe which are requifite ‘ to Colledion of the Conclufion jas this Reafon,
‘ bcing,as they conceive, found,Riches are either ^ good or ill, or indifferent *, but neither ill nor * indifferent, therctore good. This other is un- ‘ found by Defcd , Riches are either good ,
‘ or ill or indifferent i but not ill, therefore ‘ good.
Now if I fhall fhew,that according to them,no difference of inconclufive Reafons can be judged by the Conclufive, I fhall have cleared, that the Conclufive Reafon is Incomprehenfible, and that all their Oftentation in Dialedick is folly. I prove it thus, M Reafon Inconclufive by Incohe¬ rence, is faid to be known from its fumptions.^ not having any coherence one with another^ and with the Conclufion ^now forafmuch as the knowledge ofcoherents muft precede the judgment of the Connex, the Connex will be indijudicable, (ac¬ cording to our ufual Argument ) and confe- quently fo will the Reafon, Inconclufive by Inco¬ herence^ be alfo. For he who faith, That a Rea- lon is Inconclufive by Incoherence, if he do it by fimple Enunciation, we oppofe the contrary Enunciation if he demonftrate it by a Reafon, we fhall tell him, he muft firft demonftrate that Reafon to be Conclufive, and afterwards prove the fumptions of a Reafon defective by Incohe¬ rence, to be Incoherent j bat whether his Rea¬ fon be demonftrative, we cannot know, not ha¬ ving a generally acknowledg’d Judgment of the Connex, \vhereby to judge, whether the Con¬ clufion cohere with the Complication of the fumptions in the Reafon. Therefore we have not whereby to judge the difference betwitt
sc EVTICISM. PART.iXH'
t.he G^nclufive Reaibn, and the Defective by Incoherence.
The fame we object to him, who faith, that a Reafon is faulty by being in an iU Figure : For he that gocth upon this Ground, that there is fome Figure ill, will not have acknowledged con- clufive Reafon, whereby to collect what he faith.
In the fame manner may thofe be confuted , who fay, that a Reafon is Inconclufive by defeiij for if the Perfect be inclijudicable, the Defe¬ ctive mult be fo alfo. Again, he who would prove by fome Reafon, that there is foraething wanting to Reafon, unlefs he hath an acknow¬ ledged V’b-scation of the Connex, whereby he may 'judge the Coherence of the Reafon which he alledgeth, he cannot judicially and rightly fay, that the other is defedive.
Likewlfe,ihat Reafon which is faid to be faul¬ ty by Redundance, is not dijudicable by the De- monftrative ^ for as to Redundance, even thofe very Reafons, which the Stoicks cry up as Inde- tnonjirdhle^ will be found to be inconclufive , which, if’they fhould be taken away, all Dia- ledick will be overthrown. Thefe are they, which (they fay), need not Demonftration to edablilh them, but by them are demonftrated the other Gonclufive Reafons. That thefe are redundant, will appear plainly if we lay them dowMi and difeourfe upon them. They dream ,
*■ that there are many Indemonftrables, but af- ‘ fert chiefly Five, whereto all the reft feem to ^ be referred, d he Firft, from theConnex and ' the Antecedent, colleds the Confequent, as,
‘ If it is Day it is Light, but it is Day,thereforc ‘ it is Light. The Second, from the Connex ‘ and the contrary of the Confequent, colleds ‘the contrary of the Antecedent , as. If it. is ‘ Day it is Light, but it is not, Light,therefore ‘ it is not Day. The Third, from the nega- ‘ tive Complicate, and one of the Parts of th.e ‘ Complicate, colleds the contrary of the other ‘ Part, as, It is not Day and Night alfo, but it ‘ is Day, therefore it is not Night. The Fourth,
‘ from the Disjund and one of the Conjunds ,
‘ colleds the contrafy of the other, as, Eitlier ‘ it is Day or it is Night, but it is Day, there- ‘ fore it is not Night. The Fifth, from the ‘ Dis/und and the contrary of one of the Con- junds, colleds the other, as. Either it is Day ‘ or it is Night, but it is not Day, therefore it * Is Night. Thefe are the Reafons which they cry up as Inderaonftrable • but they all feem to me Inconclufive, by Redundance. For to be- ^in with the Firlt , Either it is acknowledged Has undoubted 3 that this part, it is Day, follow- eth upon this other, it is Light, which is the Antecedent in this Connex , if it is Day it is Light ; or, it is not Manifeft : If Unmanifeft, we (hall not allow the Connex as acknowledged but if it be manifeft that if this be, it is Day , this other rauft necelTarily be alfo, it is Light, in faying, it is Day, we colled: the other, it is Light, and this Connex, it is Day, it is Light, is Redundant.
, The fame may be faid of the fecond Indemon- . firahle, for either it is polfible the Antecedent may he, the Confequent not being, or it is not poffib’e. If polfible, it is not a fourfd Connex •, if not poffible, as foon as ever the word Not is . fpoken in the Confequent, it declareth the Not in
the Antecedent, fo as this is a redundant Con¬ nex, It is not Light, therefore it is not Day.
TheTame may be faid of the third Indemon- f ruble • either it is manifeft,tb3t thofe which are in the Complication cannot polfibly coexift, or not manifeft- if not manifeft, we (hall not al¬ low the Negative of the Complication • , if ma¬ nifeft, as foon as one is laid down, the other is taken away, whereby the Negative of the Com¬ plicate is redundant thus. It is Day, therefore it is not Night.
The like we fay of the fourth and fifth Jnde- monfirables either it is manifeft,that in the Dif- juuct one is true, the other falfe, with perfed: ©ppofition, ( as the Disjund promifeth, ) or it is not manifeft. If unmanifeft , we (hall not grant the Disjunct ; if manifeft, as foon as one is laid down, the other is taken away, and one being taken away, it is manifeft that the other is, as. It is Day, therefore it is not Night ; It is not Day. therefore it is Night.
The like may be faid of the Categoric^ Syilo^ gifms ufed chiefly by the Peripateticks,{uch a? this, * jufi is Honefi, tlonefi is Good, therefore jujl is Good • either it is manifeft that Honeft is Good, or it is doubted and unmanifeft i If unmanifeft, it will not be granted upon this Argument, and cpnfequently the SyUogifm will not convince • if it be manifeft, that whatfoever is Honefi is Good:, in faying, it is Honeft, is implied,it is Good aU fo fo that this were enough , Jufi is Honefi , therefore Jufi is Good -, and the other Sumption , in which Honefi is faid to be Good, is redundant.- The like in this Reafon, Socrates is a Mm,every Man is a living Creature, therefore Socrates is a living Creature. If it not manifeft in it felf , that whatfoever is (Man is alfo a living Crea¬ ture, the univerfal firft Propofition will not be acknowledged, neither (hall we grant it in the Argument. But if from being a Man it follOw- eth, that he is a living Creature, and therefore the firft Propofitfon, Every Man is a living Crea- turey is acknowledged true,thcn, as foon as ever Socrates is faid to be a Man, it is imply’d, that e is living Creature • and therefore the firft ropofition is redundant. Every Man is a living Creature. The like method may be ufed againft all Categorical Reafons,not to infift longer here¬ on : Seeing therefore thefe Reafons whereupon :he Dialeftick ground their Syllogifms are re¬ dundant, as to Redundance all Dialectick will be fubverted, we not being able to judge the redundant inconclufive Reafons, from the con- clufive, called Syllogifms. And if any will not allow Monolemmah Reafons, (that have but one Sumption, ) they will not be more creditable than ydntipater, who allows them.
Thus a true Reafon is impoflible to be found, as well for the Caufes alledged, as becaufe it ought to endiin true for the Conclufion which is faid to be true, muft be either apparent or unapparent not apparent, for then it would not require the Sumptions to detect it, it being of it (elf manifeft to us, arid no lefs apparent than the Sumptions themfelves If unapparent, forafmuch as there is an undeterminable Con- troverfie concerning Unapparents, (as was faid formerly) it is therefore incomprehenfible.Thus the Conclufion of the Reafon which they call true, will be incomprehenfible, and if that be
incomptfr*
SCEVTICISM.
I’AR T XII.
irtcomprchcnfible, we fhall not know whether | that which is colleded be true or falfc, there- j fore we fliall not know, whether the Reafon be true or falfe *, and confequently the Reafon which they call true cannot.be found.
Moreover, that Reafon which collefts a thing unmanifeft from a manifelt, cannot be found j out ^ for if the Inference follow the Complica- j tion from its Sumptions, that which followeth | Qhe confequentd is relative to the antecedent ; j but relatives are comprehended together with one another, as we faid before. If therefore the conclufion be unmanifefl:, the Sumptions will i alfo be unmanifeft .- If the Sumptions are mani- feft, the Conclufion will alfo be manifeft, as be ing comprehended together with the manifelt,
( Sumptions ) So as nothing unmanifeft can be collected from ivhat is manifeft. Hereupon the Inference cannot bedetedfed by the Sumptions, whether it be unmanifeft and not comprehended, or manifeft and not needing detection. Now if Demonftration be faid to be a Reafon according to Connexion^ that is, conclusive by fome acknow¬ ledged true thing, detecting an unmanifeft Inference-, and we have proved, that it neic^ier is a Reafon nor Coriclurive,nor true,nor by fome things ma¬ nifeft colieding an unmanifeft, nor detedive of the Conclufion ; it appeareth there is no fuch thing as Demonftration.
Likewife we fhall other-ways find Demonftra¬ tion to be inexiftent and unintelligible : For he who faith, there is Demonftration, afferts either general Demonftration of particular, but nei¬ ther general nor particular Demonftration are poflible, (as we fhall prove •) and befides thefe, there is no other can be underftood therefore no Man can affert Demonftration to be exiftent.
That there is no general Demonftration, we prove thus. Either it hath Sumptions and an inference, or it hath not ; if it hath not , it is no Demoftration ; if it hath, forafmuch as eve¬ ry thing that is demonftrated , and alfo that which doth demonftrate is particular, it will be a particular demonftration, therefore there is no general demonftration.
But neither is there any particular demon¬ ftration. For either they muft fay , it confifts of Sumptions and an Inference, or of Sumpti¬ ons only, but neither of thefe , therefore there is no particular demonftration. That which con¬ fifts of Sumptions and an Inference, is not a de- monfcration ; Firft, as having one part unmani- fefc ( the Inference ) it will be unmanifeft, which were abfurd for if the decnonftration be unma- nifefc, it rather will require to be demonftrated by fomthing, than be .capable to demonftrate by fomthing. Again, forafmuch as they fay , the demonftration is relative to the Infe¬ rence, and Relatives, as they alfo fay , are dif¬ ferent, from one another •, the thing demonftia- ted muft be differ^ent from the demonftration. If therefore the conclufion be the thing demon¬ ftrated, the dcmoiTftration will not be under¬ ftood together with the conclufion. For cither the conclufion conferreth fomthing towards demonftrating itfelf,or no • if it confer, it will be detective of it felf if it confer not , but be rcdundant,it will be no part of the demonftra¬ tion, for fuch a demonftration will but fortifie redundance. Neither is that which confifts of
Sumptions only a demonftration ; -for, who will fay that this, /f it is day it is lightfbut it is day, it is light, either is a reafon or indeed infer reth any thing? Wherefore neither is that which confifts of Sumptions, only a demonftration 5 whence it follows, that there is no p^ticular demonftration. Now if there be no paruculat demonftration nor no general, and befides thefe is no demonftration iatellgiblCj there cannot be demonftraiion. i
Moreover, the inexiftence of demonftration may be proved this way •, If there be demonftra¬ tion, either an apparent detefts aii apparent, or an uumanifeft an unmanifeft or an unmaniftfc an apparent, or an apparent an unmanifeft but nOne of thefe can be underftood it ii there¬ fore unintelligible. For if an apparent deted an apparent, the thing detedling will be at once apparent and unmanifeft ■ apparent, or being fuppofed fuch ^ unmanifeft, as requiring foju- thing to deleft it, and not .manifeftly'of it felf incurring to us. If an unmanifeft an unmanifeft, it felf will require fomthing to detect it, rather than be capable of detefting another*, which is inconfiftenc with the nature of a demonftration. Neither can an unmanifeft be the demonftration of a manifeft, nor a manifeft of an unmanifeft, for this reafon, becaufe they are relative. Re¬ latives are comprehended together with one a- nother ; if that which is laid to be demonftrated be comprehended together with the manifeft de¬ monftration, it is manifeft it felf. Thus the reafon will be retorted, and it will not be found, that the manifeft can demonftrate the unmanifeft. If therefore there be not dernonftration, neither of an unmanifeft by an unmanifeft , nor of an unmanifeliLby a manilefc, nor of a manifelt by an unmanifeft, and more than thefe, they lay,' there is not any, we muft fay, that demonferati- on is nothing.
Moreover, there is controvcrfie concerning demonftration -, fome fay, that it is not, as they who held, that there is none -, others, that it is , as moft of the Dogmatifes ■, we fay neither ra¬ ther that it is, or that it is not. Again, demon¬ ftration muft necelfarily contain fome Dddrine, but every Doftrine is controverted, and there¬ fore every Demonftration muft be controverted. For if, for example, the demonftration to prove Vacuum being acknowledged , Vacuum alfo be acknowledged, it is manifeft , that they who doubt whether there be Vacuum, doubt alfo the demonftration thereof. It is die fame in all other demonftrated Doftrines, Thus all demonftra¬ tion is doubted and controverted. Since there¬ fore demonftration is unmanifeft , as appears by the controverfie concerning it, ( for things controverted, inafmuch as controverted, are un¬ manifeft ) it is not evident in it felf, bnt muft be evinced to us by demonftration. Now an acknowledged indubitate demonftration to prove demonftration, there cannot be ( the Que- ftion being} Whether there be any deraonftrati- on at all ?) but if it be controverted and unmani- feft, it will require another demonftration, and that another, and fo to infinite but it is impolfi- ble to demonftrate Infinites, therefore it is im- poflible to prove, there is Demonftration.
Neither can it be detefted by a fign *, for it being qneftioned whether there be a Sign , and
the
5°4
SCEPTICISM.