PART XII.

SCEPTICISM.
497
Buc we cntinuing our firfc defign , will dif- courfeoaely concer.iin:^ TVitev For Truth., which is faid to be the Science of slje knowledge, of things True , is included therein. Again , forafinuch as of arguments , fome are general by which we take away the fubftance of True ; others particular, whereby we Ihew that Truth is nei¬ ther in fpeech, nor in a dicible, nor in the mo¬ tion of the Intelleft, we conceive it fufficient to ufe oaely the General. For, as when the foun¬ dation of a Wall is taken away , afl the fuper- fcrudlures fall •, fo the {ubfiftence of True being takeaway, the particular conceits of the Dog- matifts are thereby excluded alfo.
CHAP. IX.
Whether True be fomthing in nature.
'T I "'Here being a difagreement amongft the
1 • Dogmatifts conce: ningTruth (fomehold- 4ng,chac True is fomthing, others that it is not ) the controverfie is not capable to be judged. For he who faith, that True is fomthing., if he fay it without demonitration, will not be credi¬ ted, becauie of the difagreement; if he alledge a demonitration, and acknowledge it to be falfe, be is increditable ; if he fay, that it is True , he, runs into the alternate Common place. It will be required of him, that he produce a demon- ftration to demonfcrate that to be True,and a- nothcr to prove this, and fo to infinite ; but it is impoITible to demonftrate infinites, therefore it is impoITible to know whether True be fome- thing. , , , ,
Again, this fomthing, which they hold to be the molt General of all things, is either True or falfe or neither True nor falfe, or both True and falfe. If they fay, it is falfe, they confefs that all things are falle ; For as becaufe an A- nimal is fomething Animate, therefore every A- himalin paiticular is Animate-, in like manner, if this fomthing, being the nioft General of all things, be fibe, all things in particular will be falfe and nothing true. Whence alfo may be inferred that nothing is falfe for this propolition a'l things are falfe, this other fomthing is fjfe , including all things, will be falfe. And if fom¬ thing be True, all things will be Trucjand con- feqaently nothing will be True; for this pro¬ polition, Nothing is true, will be True.
If fomthing be both True and falfe, every thing in particular will be both True and falfe, whence it will follow, that nothing is in its own nature True jfor that which is True in its own nature, cannot^byany means be falfe.
If fomething be neither True not falfe , they confefs, that all things in particular being faid to be neither True nor falfe, are not True, and therefore it is not manifeft to us whether this be True.
Moreover, either things manifell onely are True, or onely things not manifeft, or of True things’ fome are manifeft, others not manifeft ; But neither of thef;, as fhall be proved ; there¬ fore nothing is True, If onely things manifeft arc True , they muft lay that all the manifeft are True, or fome onely ; if alh the argument will be iCtorted, faying it is mdnifell, that no-
thing is True I fame , none can fay, without dijudication, this is True , that fdfe. If he ufe a Critcrie, be muft grant it to be either manifeft or unmanifeft ; not unmanifeft, for the manifeft onely are now fuppofed True if manifeit, wc demand, Which maniferr rhings are True, which falfe ? . The thing manifeft, alTnmed to judge thi^s manifeft, will it felf require another Cri- terie, and that another, and foto infinite ; but it is impoftible to judge to infinite ; therefore it is imoflible to comprehend, which manifeft things onelv are True. '
■ He who raith,0Ke^ unmmlf /t arc True,
holdeth not that all thiiig JMre True, ( for hp will not fay, that the fl.irs are even and that they are odd, is 'alike True ) if fame, by what 'hill we judge that chefe uoma'iifefi; things are True, thofe Falfe Not by any thing manifeft, and if by any thing unmanitefr, that unmanifeft thing will require another to judge, and this a- nother, and foto infinite. Wierefore, neither are onely things unaparenc True.
It remains , that we fay of the True, fome are manifeft, others unmaniftfe, which alfo is abfurd. For either all things both manifeft and unmanifeft, are True , or feme of the'manifeft, and fome of the unmaitefc. If all, the argu¬ ment will be retorted, granting it to be True , that nothing ic True. He likewife grants it to be True, that the Stars are even', and that they are odd. If of the manifeft feme onely are True, and of the unmanifeft fome onely, by what IhalL we judge that of the manifeft, tuefe arc True , thefe Falfe., if by a thing manifeft, we run into infinite. If by an unmanifeft, forafmuch as the unmanifeft requires dijudication alfo. By what fhall that unmanifeft be judged ? If by a mani- • feft, the alternate Common place occurs ; if by an unmanifeft, ' the Common place of infinite. The fame may be laid of the unmanifeft, for he who undertakes to judge it by an unmanifeft, is forc’d to run into infinite , he who by a manifeft, either afluriiing a manifeft , runs into the Com¬ mon place of infinite, oV paffuig to an unmani¬ feft, inro the alternate. • It i^ theiefore falfe to fay, thit.of the True fome are manifeft, others not manifeft.
Now if neither thelnanifeft onely are True,’ nor onely the unmanifeft, nor fome of the ma¬ nifeft, and fome of the unmanifeft, then nothing is True ; and if nothing be True , the Criteric conducing to the judgment of Truth, would be ufelefs and vaine, tho’ we fhould grant it had a being. Now if we muft fufpend concerning this qneftion, whether True be fom'hing , it will follow, that they who fay, Diale&ick is the Science of things True, Falfe , and Neuter, fpeak ralhly ; fince the Crirery of Truth appeals to be unde¬ terminable; neither can we affirm any thing, ei¬ ther concerning thofe things which {eem evident as the Dogmacifts call them , or concerning the unmanifeft; For fince the later, ( as the Dog- raatifts conceive ) are comprehended by the for¬ mer , if we are inforced to In f pend concern¬ ing the Evident, how dare we alTert concerning the Uumanifeft ?
But we fhall ( over and above ) alledge our Argumentsagainft particular things ; and foraf¬ much as thefe feem to be comprehended by Sign, and DemonftratiorL w'e fhall fhew that ought
Sff t©
498 S C E P T
to fnfpend onr Affent concerning Sign and De- monftration. We will begin with Si^w,for De- monftration is a fpecies of Sign.
C H A P. X..
Of Sign.
OF things ( according to the Dogmatifts ) /owe are manifeft, others unmanifeft. Of the untnanifcfi^ fame are abfolutely unmanifell, others unmanifeh; for a time, others unmanifeft by nature. Mamjeff ihey hold to Le thcfe things which of ihemfeives come into our knowledge., as ft is day. udbfqlutcly unmanifeft thofe which come not within the reach of our cvmprehenfion, as^ that the number of the Stars is even, Vnmamfefl fos a ifne.^ thofe which are numifeji in their own nature^ but by rea- fon of fome external circumfianccs^ they ure for a time not manifefl to us^ as the City of Athens '.s to me at this prefent. Vnmanifefi by naturctdre th.fe,^ which have a nature not fubjed to be manifeft to us^ as Pores for thefe never appear to us of thetnfelvcs,^ but a"e comprehended from fome others ,^.as by fiveat or the like. Manifeft things^ fay they, require not a fign, ( for they are comprehended of themfelves ) neither thofe which are abfolutely unmanifeft, for they are no way to be comprehended •, but the unmanifejt for a time, and the unmanifeft by nature, are com> prehended by figns, yet not by the fame •, the unmani- ' f^*" ^ time, by the PJypomneftick (^admonitive )
the unmanifeft by nature, by the Endidick (indica- • tive. ) Of Signet therefore, fome are according to them, Hypomnefick, others Endidick. A Hypom- neftick fignfhey call that which being obferved to be iogetlser with a fignificate, evident, ajfoon as ever the fign evidently incurreth to our fenfe, tho' the fg~ nificate appear not, yet it caufeth us to remember that which was concomitant to it, thd* at prefent not evident, as fmoak and fire.
An Endidick ftgn, ffay they ') is that , which * M. S. Qj- is not obferved together with an evident ^ fignifi'- turnip cate, but of its own nature and confiitution fignifieth that whereof it is a fign thus the motions of the body are figns of the Soul.
Hereupon they define Sign thus. Sign is a dcmonjlrative axiome,mtecedent in a found connex, detedive of that which foUoweth.
Of thefe two kinds of figns, we oppofe not both, but onely the Enoiftick, as feeming to be forged by the Dogmatifts •, the Hypomneftick is creditable in the coarfe of life » for whofoe- ver fees fmoak, knows that fire is fignified • and feeipg a fear, faith, it had been a wound. So as we not onely not contradid the common courfe of life, but maintain it,afrenting inopinio- natively to that in it which is creditable, but op- pofing what is particularly forged by the Dog¬ matifts. Thus much it was requifite to fay for explication of the queftion. We now proceed to confutation, not endeavouring to (hew that the Endidick fign is wholly inexiftent, but the apparent equivalence of arguments oa both lides, for its exiftence and inexiftence»
•
* •
I G I S M. PART XII.
CHAP. XI.
Whether there be any Endidick Sign.
A Sign therefore, by what the Dogmatifts fpeak of it, is unintelligible. The Stoicks, wno have difeouried with moft exadnefs here¬ upon, to fhevv the notion of fign, fay, “ A Sign is an Axiome anteqedent in a found Connex, detedivsiof that which follows. Axiome,
“ is a Dicible , Self-perfed, Enunciative “ as.it b within it felf, A found Connex ^that tvfiich fcfeginneth not from true, and endeth “ in falfe •, for a Connex eitlier b'e^niieth from ‘‘ true, and endeth in true -, as, it it is day, it is “ light •, or, it beglnneth from falfe, and endeth “ in falfe, as, if the Earth flyeth,-;the Earth has “ Wings: Or, it beginneth from true, and “ endeth in falle as, it the Earth is, the Earth ' “ files .• Or it beginneth from falfe, and endeth in “ tri’.e ^ as, if the Earth fiyeth, the Earth i^. Of “ thefe, they hold that only to be unfound, which ■“ beginneth from true, and endeth in falfe, the “ reft are all true. Antecedent they call that,
“ which goeth foremoft in a Connex, beginning “ from true, and ending in true ; it is Deted- “ ive of that which followeth, for in this Con- “ nex. If file hath Milk, fhe hath Conceived j “Thefe words. She hath conceived, aredecla- “ red by thofe, She hath Milk. 7'hus they. ”
Now we fir ft fay. That it is uncertain whe¬ ther there be a Dicible : For feeing that of the Dogmatifts , the Epicureans fay , there is no Dicible the Stoicks , that there is j when the Stoicks fay, that a Dicible is fomething, either they ufe Aflertion only, or Demonftratioa alfo. If Affertion only, the Epicureans will op¬ pofe it with the contrary Aflertion, that a Di¬ cible is nothing, ff by Demonftatron, foraC- much as Demonftradon confifts of Dicible Axi- oxms, nothing that confifts of Dicibles can be alTumed to prove that a Dicible is fomething. For he who allows not a Dicible to be. How will he grant a colledion of Dicibles to be ? Thus , whofoever fliall endeavour by a colledion of Dicibles to prove that there is a Dicible , goes about to prove a thing controverted, by a thing controverted. If therefore neither limply, nor by Demonftration it cannot be proved, that there is a Dicihky it is not manifeft that there is a Dicible, and confequently that* there is an Axi¬ ome • for, an Axiome is a Dicible.
Yet, though by way of fuppofition we fhould grant,that there is a Dicible-, an Axiome will be found notwichftanding to be inexiftent, which confifts of Dicibles not coexiftenj^with one ano¬ ther. As for example in thefe. If it is day, it is light, when I fay, it is day, I have not yet faid it is Hght • and when I fay it is light, I had before faid that it is dc^. If therefore vvhatfoever is compounded of any thing cannot exift unlefs its parts coexift with one another, but the parts whereof an Axiome is compounded coexift not with one another, therefore an Axiome will not exift.
But befides all this, a found Connex will be found to be incomprehtnfible. For, Philo faith. That is a found Connex which beginneth not from True and endeth in Falfe^ as(i it being day and I
difputing
^ART XII.
499
^ C E T T I C I S M.
difputing ) this^ Jfit is day 1 difpute. But Dio¬ dorus faith^ Thk beginning frofn True it neither could nor can end in Falfe^ according to whom that Connexion feenteth io be, Falfejor it being Day and J being plenty it will begin in True and end in Falfe. But this vs a True on'e^ Ifjhe Elements of things are not indivifible ^ the FAements of things are indiviftble^ for beginning always from Falfe (the Eitrnents of things are not indivifible) it will end ip. True ^ the Flements of things are tndiviftble.
- But they who introduce Synartefis,ya^, That is a .found ConneXy when that which is contrary to that which^ends in it^vs contrary to that which vs antecedent in it ^according to whomthefe Connexes which we have inftanced are unfound •, but this vs aTrue one^ Jfit vs day it is day. They who judge by Emphafts^ fay That is a true Connex whofe Confequent is potenti¬ ally contained in the Antecedent ^according to whom this.^ If it be day it. is day., and every reduplicate connex' d Axiome perhaps will be falje^ for a thing cannot contain itfelf.Thm this controverfie feems indeterminable, for neither lliall we be credita¬ ble, if we prefer any of the fore- mentioned Pro- pofitions without Demonftration, nor with De- monftration : For the Demonftration feemeth then to be found, when its conclufion followerh^ the conjunclion of its Sumptions or Premires,as the Confequent the Antecedent. As thus; If it is day it is light, but it is day, therefore it is light. But if we demand how the confequence • of the confeqent to the antecedent ihall be judg¬ ed, they incur the alternate commonplace; for to demonftrate the Dijudication of the Connex the Conclufion as we faid muft follow the Sump¬ tions of the Demonftration. Again,that this may be credited , the Connex and the Confequence ought to be determined, which is.abfurd.There- fore a found Connex is incomprehenfible.
Likewife the antecedent is undeterminable. For the antecedent, (fay they,) vs that which goeth foremofl, in fuch a Connex as beginneth from True and endeth in True. Now if it, be a fign dete- dive of the Confequent, either the Confequent is manifeft or unmanifeft ; if manifeft, it needs no deteftive, for it will be comprehended toge¬ ther with the other, neither is it a fignificate and therefore this is not its fign ; if unmanifeft’ forafmuch as there is an undetermined Contro¬ verfie concerning things not manifeft, which of them is true, which falfe, and whether any of them be true, it will be unmanifeft whether the. Connex fpeak true ; whence it followeth , that it is alfo unmanifeft, whether the antece¬ dent in it precede ( rightly. )
But befides this, Though there be a fignificate to the fign,yet it cannot be detedive of the Con¬ fequent even for this reafon, becaufe it is com¬ prehended together with it For Relatives are comprehended together,as Right cannot be com¬ prehended before Left, as being right in relati¬ on to left, not on the contrary Right without Left. The like in all other Relatives •, fo it is impoffible that the fign can be comprehended before the fignificate ; but if the fign be not comprehended before the fignificate , it cannot be detective of it, the fignificate being compre¬ hended together with it, and not after it. Thus from their difagreeingOpinions, we may gather that a fign is unintelligible, for they fay that it is relative, and detedive o/,the fignificate to which
It IS relative ; whence it followeth, That if it be relative to the fignificate, it muft neceffarily be comprehended together with the fignificate, as right with left, upwards with downwards and the like .- But if it be detedive of the fignifi’eate It is necefiary that it be comprehended before it, that, being firft known, it may bring us to the notion of the thing whkh is known by it- but it is impoffible to underftand a thing which cannot be known but by the fore-kiiowledge of another thing which cannot be known before it. Therefore it is impoffiible to underftand any thing which is not only relative to, but deted, ive alfo of, that to which it is relative .• But d fign, fay they, is both relative to, and detect¬ ive of the fignificate, therefore it is impoffiible to underftand the fign. ^
^ Moreover, it was a controverfie before our fime, fome affirming, that there is an Endeict- ick fign, others that there is none ; now he who faith that there is an Endeictick lign,either affirm- eth it barely without demonftration, or with de¬ monftration. If with bare affirmation, he will not be creditable ; if he would demonftrate it, he be^^s the Qiieftion.For the Genus of demonftration be¬ ing fing,when we queftion whether there be fine we queftion whether there is demonftration as If we queftion whether there be an Aniraal,we ’que¬ ftion whether there be a Man, for Man is an Ani¬ mal ; but to demonftrate a thing controverted by 'a thing controverted, or by it felf, is abfurd 1 therefore it cannot be demonftrated that there is a fign. And if it can neither beaffirmed fimply nor dcmonftratively, it is impoffible to frame i comprehenfive enunciation of it. Now if lign bd not exadiy comprehended,neithcr can it be faid to be fignificant of any thing, it not being ac¬ knowledged it felf ; therefore there will be nd fign. Whence, according to this argument fign is unexiftent and unintelligible. ’
Again, Signs either are apparent only or unapparent only, or fome apparent, others’un- apparent- but none of thefe is true, therefore there is no lign. That figns are not unapparent n ffiewn thus. What is unapparent is not mani- fefted by it felf, according to the Do.gmatifts but occurreth to us through fome other; a figa therefore ifit be unapparent will require another ' fign, which alfo will be unapparent ( for accord¬ ing to the propofed Hypothefis, no fign is ap¬ parent ) and that another, and fo to infinite • But it is impoffible to take infinite figns there¬ fore it is impoffible to comprehend a fign it be¬ ing unapparent. For which reafon it will be inexiftent, not capable to fignify any thing aS to be a fign, becaufe it cannot be comprehen^d. On the contrary. If all figns are apparent, for¬ afmuch as the fign is relative to the fignificate and relatives are comprehended togfether with one another, the fignificate being comprehend¬ ed together with the apparent, will he alfo ap¬ parent. For as right and left incurring to us together, right is not faid to be more apparent than iefc, or left than right ; in like manner the lign and the fignificate being comprehended to¬ gether, it cannot be faid that the fign is raori apparent than the fignificate : But if the figni¬ ficate be apparent, it is not a fignificate, as not needing any to fignifie and detect it. U^ience taking away right, we take away left alfo ; fd
S f f 2 takjj^g
500
SCEVTICISM.