Part XII.

SCEPTICISM.
495
nttlck, imigins they hear others difcourfing j with thcfn, who:Ti we hear not. The fame wa¬ ter to thofe who are troubled with an Infllama- tion feems exceffive hoc, to others moderately warm. Now whether jhall we fay. All thefe phantaHes are true, or all falfe ; or fome falfe, feme true.^ To fay, that all are falfe is impoffi- ble,for we have not any Criterie uncontrovert¬ ed, whereby to deternhne that which vve pre¬ fer j neither have we any true determined de- monftration, feeing that the Criteiie of Truth, whereby true demonftration ought to be deter¬ mined, is ftill in queftion, For this reafon, he who conceived we ought to give credit to thofe who are well, and not to thofe who are not, fpeaks abfurdly for faying this without demon¬ ftration, he Ihall not be believed ; but a true ad¬ judged demonftration, he cannot have, for the reafons alledged.
But though we fhould grant that the phan- tafies of thofe who are well, are creditable, others not ; neverthelefs it will be found, that exter¬ nal Objedls cannot be judged by the Senfes on¬ ly. The Sight, in perfons that are well, judg- cththe fameTower fometimes toberoundjfome- times fquare ; the Tafte judgeth the fame Meats upon Repletion Sowre, in Hunger pleafant ; the Hearing perceiveth the fame voice in the night loud, in the day low ; the fmell, what moft Men declare to be ftinking, in Tanners com¬ monly denies it; the fame touch when we en¬ ter a Bath is warmed by the Paraftas, when we come out cooled by it. Wherefore feeing the Senfes of fuch as are well, difagree amongft themfelves, and their difagreement is indeter¬ minable, (for we have not any thing univerfal- ly acknowledged, whereby they may be deter¬ mined) the doubt muft neceflarily be infolvable. Many other things might be alledged out of the Common places of Sufpenhon. Thus perhaps it is not true, that Senfe alone can judge of ex¬ ternal Objeds.
Let us now come to IntelleB, They who con¬ ceive, that Inteiled only is to be followed in the judication of things; Firft, they cannot deraon- ftrate it to be comprehenfible, that there is In¬ tellect; for Gorgiasy in faying, There is r.otbi-ngy faith, that there is not Intellect. Others aftert.
It exifis. How will they determine this contro- verfie? Not by Incelledt, (for that w’ere to beg the queftion) nor by any other ; for they fay, there is no other (according to the Hypothe- fis) by which the things may be judged. It re¬ mains therefore indeterminable and incompre- henfible, whether there be Intellect or not. Whence it followeth, that we ought not to re^ lye upon Intellect only, in the dijudication of things, being itfelf is not yet comprehended.
But let us admit Intellect to be comprehend¬ ed, and grant by way of fuppoficion, that it exifts ; notwithftanding, I fay, it cannot deter¬ mine of things ; for if it feeth not it felf exactly, but difagreeth concerning its own Eftence, and the manner of its Generation, how then can it exaihly comprehend other things } Befides, though we grant Intellect to be capable to de¬ termine of things; yet we (hall not find how to determine by it. For there being much difference as to Intellect; one Intelledl of Goroias, accord¬ ing to which he faith, Notbivgis'y another of
Heraclitus, according to which he faith , things are t, another of thofe who affirm, Sovse- tbings are, others are not : We (hall not find any way to dijudicate thefe differences of Intellecils, nor be able to fay, This Intellecf-i: is to be pre¬ ferred before th.u, or that not to be preferred be¬ fore this. For if we would judge it by zvy In¬ tellect, we yield to Parties in the difference, • and beg the Queftion : if by any other than by Intellect, we are deceived, becaufe we ought to judge things by Intellect only. A-loreover, from what we faid upon the Criterie by vAjich, may be demonftrated, that we can neither find a Sagacity exceeding the Sagacity of others :
Nor if we could find an Intellecii' more Sagacious, than any ever had, or have been ; yet, (foraf- much as it is uncertain whether there will not be one mors Sagacious than it) we ought not teJ follow it. And though we fhould fuppc.^e an Intellect more Sagacious, than any ihali ever be hereafter, yet ought w-e not to follow him who judgeth by it, left aliedging (bme falfe reafon, he perfwade us by the acutenefs of his W'ic, that it is True. Therefore neither doth Intellect only judge things.
It remaineth we fay, that things are judged by both, which likewife is inipoffible; for the Sen¬ fes are fo far from guiding the Intellect to com- prehenfion, that they contradict one another.
Honey feems fweet to fome, bitter to others ; Democritus held, it is neither fweet nor bitter ^ He¬ raclitus, that it is both. ’Tis the fame in other Senfes, and other Senfibles. So as the Intellect, impelled by the Senfes, is conftrained to affirm things different and repugnant. But fuch a kind of Criterie is far from comprehenfive.
Moreover, they muft fay, That they judge things either by all the Senfes, and all * Intel- ""Readhere lects; or, by fome. By all,icis impoffible; there appearing fo great controverfie amongft feveral Senfes and Intellects, (liktwife the Intellect of Gorgias declaring, that neither the judgment of Senfe or Intellect ought to be foUevseJ, the argument will be retorted:) If by fome. Who can judge, that we ought to adhere to the Senfes, and this Intellect, and not to thofe, not having an ac- I'.nowledged Criterie, by which to judge different Senfes and Intellects. If we fay, that they judge Senfes and Intellects by Intellect andSenfe,t they t Betwixt beg the queftion, which is. Whether we can judge by thefe. & ttot j
Again, either he judgeth Senfes and Intellects by Senfe; or Senfes and Intellects by Intellect; defea:, la or Senfes by Senfe, and Intellects bv Intellect ; the m.ss. or Intellq^cts by Senfe, and Senfe by Intellect, li of they fay, they judge thefe by Senfes or Intellect, they judge not by Senfe and Intellect, but by one of them, which they make choice of, and con- which the fequently incur the difficulties alledged former- ly. If Senfes by Senfe, and Intellects by Intel- lect, there being fo great repugnance of Senfes notice of, to Senfes, and intellects to Intellects, which fo- confounds ever they take of the repugnant Senfes to judge thefenfe. the reft of the Senfes, they beg the queftion ; for they afi'ume part of the diiference, as cre¬ ditable, for dijudication of things equally cor:- troverted with it. It is the fame in Intellects. If they judge Intellects by Senfes, and Senfes by Licellects, the alternate Common place OGCursJhew- ing, that to judge Senfes we prejudge Intellects,
496
SCEPTICISM.
and to cxamin Intellects we muft prejudge Senfes. i Wherefore feeing that Crkeiies of one kind' cannot be judged by Criteries of tlie fame kind, nor both kinds by one kind, nor reciprocally one kind by the other kind 5 nor can we prefer Intellect before Intellect, or Senfe before Senfe; it follows. That wc have not any thing where¬ by to judge. For if we cannot judge by all Sen¬ fes and intellects, not know by which we ought to judge, and by which not to judge, we itiall not have any thing by which to judge things. Wherefore there is no Criterie -which.
CHAP. VII. of the Criteria According to which.
Let us next examine thzChntQUQ according fo vibich things are judged. In the firft place we may hold that ph.antafie is unconceivable; for they fay Vhantafie is an imprejjion in the He- gemofiick part of the Sou!. Seeing therefore that the Soul and the Hegemonick is a Spiritjorfome- thing morefubcle than Spirit, as they thcmfelves hold ; no Man can conceive that there is in himfelf an impreflion, either byextuberanceand depreflion, as we fee in Scales; or by the won¬ derfully invented Heteracotick , for he could retain in memory fo many Theorems, as make up an Art, becaufe by fucceeding Heterxofes, the precedent would be defaced.
But tho’ there were fuch a thing as Phan- tafie, yet would it be mcomprehenrible,tor itis a paffion of the Hegemonick ; the Hegemonick, as we fiew’d, is not comprehended ; therefore neither can w'e comprehend its affeCfion.
Moreover, tho’ we Ihould grant that phan- tafe is comprehended, yet things cannot be judged according to it; for it doth not (fay they) apply it felf to externals, and conceive Phantafies in it felf, but by the Senfes. Now the Senfes comprehend not the external objeds, but their affedions only ; For Honey, and my being fweerly atfeded, are not all one thing ; neither is Wormwood the fame with my bdng bitterly affeded ; they differ. But if the af- fedion differ from the External objed, thePhan- rahe will nor be of the External objed, but of fome other thing different from it. Therefore if the Intelled judge according to the Phanta- he, it will judge amifsjand not according- to the objed; whence it is abfurd to fay, External ebjedsare judicated according to the Phantafie.
Neither can it be laid, that the Soul compre¬ hends lenfible ohjeds by fenfible affedions, be¬ caufe the affedions of the Senfes arc like their External objeds ; for how can the Intelled know whether the affedions of the Senfes are like the fenfible objeds, when as it felf meddles not with External objeds, neither do the Sen¬ fes declare the natures of them to her, but on¬ ly theirown affedions, as we argued in the Com- ■ tmn places of Su pevfiov, For as he who knows not Socrates, if he look upon hispiduie knows not whether it be like6'tc»v.rrj; fo that Intelled, ' beholding the affedions of the Senfes, but not feeing the External objeds themfelves, cannot tell whether tlie affedions of the Senfes are like their External objeds. Therefore neither
by affimilation can it judge thofe tilings accor¬ ding to the Phantafie.
But let us grant, that the Phantafie cannot only underlland and comprehend, but is able alfo to judge things of it felf, (t!io’ wq have proved the contrary) it follows, that either we muff believe .all Phantafies, (one whereof faith, thatall Phantafies are i.ncrcdible, by which means the argument w'ill be retorted, that all Phanta¬ fies by their own acknowledgment, are not capable to judge things) or if we muff believe only Ibrne, How fhall we judge, Which Phan¬ tafies are to be believed, which not? If without Phantafie, then they grant, that Phantafie is no: requifite to the judgment of things, in as much as they fay they can judge things without it. If with Phantafie, How will they affume that Phantafie by which they mean to judge all other Phant.ifies ? Or again, they will need ano¬ ther Phantafie to judge the Phantafie by which they judge all Phantafies, find another to judge that, and fo to infinite; bur it is impoflihle to judge to infinite ; therefore it is impoflible" to find what Phantafies ought to be ufed as Cri¬ teries, what nor. Since therefore, which way foever we grant that things ought to be judged according to Phantafies, the argument will be retorted, whether by all, or by fome only. We conclude, that Phantafies ought not to be ufed as Criteries, to judge tilings.
This may fervefor an Anfwer by way of Sum¬ mary, to the Criterie according to which : But take notice that our purpofe is not to prove there is no Criterie of truth exiftent (for that were Dogmatical) but becaufe the Dogmatifts feem probably to have evinced that there is a Criterie of truth, • we have propofed a.^^guments that feem probable againft.them ; not that we think them true, or more probable than the con¬ trary ; but forafmuch as tbefe arguments, and thofe of the Dogmatics, feem alike probable, we are driven to Sufpenfion.
CHAP. VUI.
of True and Truth.
E |i "^FJough we fliould grant, (by way of fup- JL poficion) that there is fome Criterie of truch, yet will it be ufelefsand vain, if we prove,
(even out of what the Dogmacifls themfelves fay) that truth is not, neither can it be We fhew it thus: True is faid to differ from Truth three vf ays by Eff^nce, by Confiitution, by Power.
By Ejfence, jor True is Incorporeal, (as being an axiom and a dicible) but Truth is a Body, as being the enunciati've Science of all tr-ue things ; but Science is the Hegemonick after Jtich a manner, as the fji is the b.-ind after fuch a manner ; but the He^e}no~ nick is a Body, for (according to them) it is a Spirit.
By Co7.fi If ut ion, for True is Jometbing fmple, as,
I d.'jcourle^ but Truth confifis of the ksso’wledge of many Tru ' things.
By Power, for Truth adhereth to Science, T-ue doth net ahjolufely ; whence they fay that Truth can' only be in a wtje perjon, but True in a VHcked^ for a wicked man may (peak jotnething that is True... 1.
Thus the Dogmatiils.
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