Part XII.

SC Ei^T tC ISM.
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r.nd according to this, a Dog fnould be a Ivlan ; ioine :nen we know norland thereforethey (liould not be men. But indeed, according to this no¬ tion there will be no man at ail ; for if it be ne- ' cefiary that a man be known by all, there is no man known to ail men, and confequently there js no man at all. That vve fay not this fopbilH- cally, but as a confequence to his Do;iirine, is apparent ; for he holds that, nothi/ig re/iUy extfes hut Atoms avd I'^acuttm j which ( he faith ) exift rot in Animals only, but in all compounded things ; by thefe we cannot underOand the property of Man ; for they are common to all, but there is in thefe nothing elfe within our capacity ; we have nothing therefore whereby we may diftin- guifii Man from other Creatures, and underfand him limply.
Epicurus faith, that Alan is fuch a kind of figured animate Being : Now, according to this, feeing Man is only fuch a kind of Being, as is fliewn, (by him, who thus defcrlbes him ) that perfon who is not fuch, as is thus (hewn, is not a man ; and if a nian(in defcfibing Man after this man¬ ner) (I’.ew a Woman, the Man himfelf will not be a Man j or if a Woman Ihew a Man, the Wo¬ man will not be of Mankind ; The fame we may argue from the difference of circumft ar.ee s men¬ tion’d in the fourth Common-place of Sufpenfion.
Others fay, a man ts an Animal, Rational, Mor~ tal, capable of XJnderfiasidwg and Science : Now having fhewn in the Common-place of Sufpen- f on, that no Animal is irrational , but that all are capable of Underfianding and Science, by their own confeffion, we know not what they mean. Again, the accidents which are inferred into a definition, are meant either adual or po¬ tential. If ad ual, he is no Man who hath not at¬ tained perfed Science, and hath not perfed Sci¬ ence or difeourfe, and is not in the Bate of death, for that is to be mortal adually. If potential, he who hath perfed reafon, and hath attained Underfianding and Science, is no man, which were more abfurd than the former.
Tlato, who will have a man to be an Animal without feathers , with two feet , with broad nails, capable of political Science, dares not affirm this pofitively. For if a man be, * as he holds, one of thofe things which are generated, but indeed are not ; It is impoflible (as he acknowledgeth) to afiirm pofitively concerning things that are nor. Neither doth Rlato himfeif lay down this pofitlon as certain, but difeourfing, as he ufeth, according to the mod probable.
But though we fiiould grant, that Man may be underflocd , vve fhall neverthelefs find that he c.mnot be comprehended. For we confift of Soul and Body, but neither Soul nor Body (perhaps) can be comprehended, therefore not Man. That the body ts not comprehended, appears from this ; the accidents of a thing are didind from thething, to which they are accidents; now when colour, or the like, prefents it felf to us, the accidents of the Body are presented to us, but not the Body it felf. A Body, they fay, hath three dimenllons ; we mud therefore, to com¬ prehend the Body, comprehend the length , breadth, and depth ; but if this did prefent itfelf to us, wc might difeern filver that is gilt: There- fore the Body cannot be comprehended.
Belidcs this, a Man fhall be found to be in-
comprehenfible, becaufe his foul is incomprehenfi- ble. That his Soul is incomprehenfible, is ma- nifed, thus. Of thofe who have difeourfed con¬ cerning the Soul , ( to omit the great undeter¬ mined conted amongd them ) fome faid, that there ts m Soul , as the Followers of Dtcaarchm the Meffcnian ; others that there ts ; others ftsf- perded. This controverfie therefore, if the Dog- matids acknowledge to be indijudicable, they grant the incomprehenfibility of the Soul ; if dijudicable, let them fay, by what they judge and determin it. By Senfe they cannot, for they hold the Soul to be intelligible; if by In- tellcid, we objetd, the Intelled is the molt un- manifed thing in the Soul, as they drew, who agree in the Exidence of the Soul, but difagree concerning her Intelletd. If therefore they would comprehend the Soul, and determin the con- ti overfie concerning her by Intelled, they would determin that which is lefs in controverfie, by that which is more in controverfie, which is ab¬ furd. Therefore neither by Intelletd can the quedion concerning the Soul be judged and determined, therefore bynorhing; therefore it is incomprehenfible , and confequently, Man cannot be comprehended.
But tho’ we diould grant, that Man may be comprehended, yet perhaps it cannot be proved, that things fnould be judged (and determined) by him. For he who faith, that things Ihould be judged by Man, faith it either without de- mondration or with demondration. Not with demondration, for demondration ought to be true and adjudged ; but, we knowing none, who by the confent of all, is able to judge the de¬ mondration, ffor the Criterie in which is in quedion) we are not able to judge the demon¬ dration, and confequently cannot denrondrate the Criterie 777 which, fubjetd of our difeourfe. If it be laid, that things may be judged by Man without demondration, it will be increditable, becaufe we have not any thing whereby to afeer- tain, tliat the Criterie tn which is Man. From what fhall it be judged, that the Criterie in which is Man? For if they fay it without judgment and determination, it will not be admitted; if as determined by Man, the quedion is begged ; if, as by any other Creature, how can any fuch be allow’d, to determin that Man is the Criterie? If without determination, it is no credit; if with determination, that Criterie mud again be judged by feme other, to be capable of deter¬ mining ; If by it felf, the abfurdity continues, for the thing in quedion is determin’d by the thing in quedion. If by Man, the alternate Com¬ mon-place comes in. If by any other befides thefe, we fhall again require a Criterie in which, and fo to infinite. Therefore, vve cannot fay, things are to be determined by Man.
But if it be granted, fhat Man ought to de¬ termin things ; yet feeing there is fo great dif- fention amongd Men , the Dogmatids mud agree among themfelves , what one Man they ought to follow before they impofe it Upon us. Otherwife, if.
As long as ftreams Jhall fiow, and tall Trees bloom,
they are like to difagree upon this, why do tliey prefs us fo earnedly to affent to any one perfon ?
If
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SCEPTICISM.
If fay they, We muft believe a Wife man ; we fliall aek. What kind of Wife man, whether an Epicurejfi, or a Stotck, or a Cjr.ick ? They cannot agree Which. If any require us to lay down this Queftion concerning the Wife man, and ilmply to believe him who is wifer than all others ; fii ft, they will herein alfo difagree. Who is wiser than the red ; and, tho’ they could a* gree in fome one perfon , acknowledging him v.'ifer thvin all that are, or ever were, yet nei¬ ther will he be w’orthy to be credited ; for there being a great, and, almoft infinite intenfion and remiffion, as to Wifdom, we fay, it is poilible, there may be another wifer than this Man , whom they hold to be wifer than all , that either are or were. As therefore they require of us to give credit to him, that is faid to be wifer than all that are or ever were, in refped: of his Wifdom ; fo, if one comes after him wifer than he, this laft is to be believed before him ; and vvhilfr this fecond lives, we may hope for another wifer than he ; after whom, another ; and fo to infi¬ nite. Now whether thefe will agree with one another, no Man knows. So that tho’ it were granted, that there is one Man wifer than all that are, or ever were 5 yet b'ecaufe we cannot affirm, there ffiall never be any one wifer than he ; ( for that is uncertain,) we ought always to ekped the judgntent of that future wifelf perfon, and notaffent to him who is wifelt at prefent.
But tho’ we Ihould grant, that there is not, was not, nor ever [hall be, any perfon wifer than him whom they fuppofe, yet neither is it convenient to believe him ; for wife perfon t af fedi moft C in the conflruciion of things ) to maintain Paradoxes, making the unfound feem found and true. When therefore the fagacious perfon favs any thing, we cannot tell whether he fpeaks it according to the nature of the thing it fclf, or alledgetb a falfity as if it were a truth, peifwading us rc believe it, he being wifer than all Men, and therefore we not able tocontradidl him. Thus ought we not to alfent to him, 'as judging thirigs rightly, becaufe we may imagine, The things which he ftith are not true, but re- prefented as fuch, by the extraordinary advan¬ tage he hath over us in lagacity. For thefe rea- fons, we ought not in the judgment of things to believe him, who feeineth the moft fagacious of all Men.
If any ftiall fay. We ought to believe the agreement of many. We anfwer, That to do fo is foolifh } for ftrft, Truth perhaps is rare, and therefore one may be wifer than many. A- gain, every Criteris hath more adverfaries , than thofe who agree in defence thereof. For ail thofe who maintain any other Criterie what- foever, oppofe them who agree in the defence of one, and are therefore of much greater num¬ ber than the others. Befides, they who agree, either are in different affedions, or in one. In different they are not, at ieaft as to this, for then they would not agree in it. If in one, fcc- in that he who affirmeth any thing, different from this wl:ich they agree in, hath one affedi- cn, and.Tll rhey who agree in it have but one; as to the aifedions which we follow, there is no advantage in the number : Wherefore we ought not to follow many rather than one. As alfo, becaufe the difference cf judgment, as to their
multitude, is incomprehenfible, as we Ihew'ed from the fourth Common-place of Sufpenfion ; for there are infinite Men, if we confider them fing- ly, neither are we able to examine the judg¬ ments of all, and fo to fay whit the greater part holds, what the feweft. It is therefore in this refped abfurd alfo, to prefer fome Judges be¬ fore others, becaufe of their number. And if the judgment of all in general is not to be fol- low'ed, neither (hall we find any at all by whom things may be judged, tho’ we [hould grant ne¬ ver io much ctherwife. Wherefore by all this, the Criterie in v'hich all things are judged, appears to be incomprehenfible ; and the other Crireries being circumferibed by this, (for each of them is either a part, or a paflton, or an adion of Man) it followeth, * we need not perhaps fpe.ik ^ of them, having here difeourffd of them al- , ready. But left we (hould feem to decline the confutation of every one in particular, we will ^ fay fomething over and above of them ; and firft of the Criterie called, By ■u-'bich.
CHAP. VI.
Of the Criterie^ By which.
GReat, aln;oft infinite, is the difagreement amongft the Dogmatifts concerning this ; but we, obferving our firft method, [hall on¬ ly fay ; Forafrnueh as, according to them, Man is the Ciiteiie in ii>hich things are judged, but he hath nothing hy ivhich he can judge (as they all agree) befides Senfe and Intelled ; if we Ihew he cannot judge neither by Smfe alone, nor by IntelhH alone) nor by both together, we lhall com- pendioufly refute all their particular Affertions.
Let us begin with the Senfes. Whereas fome hold, that the affeTlions of the Senfes are vain, (and that none of thole things which we think that we perceivcjare fubjeded to them.) Others, that all the things by inhich the Senfes think they are mo¬ ved, are [ubjcHed to them. Others, that fome of them are fuhjcBed to the Senfes, others not. We know not to which of thefe we Ihould affent, for we cannot determine the controverfie, neither by j Senfe, (for the queftion is, whether that be vain- I ly affeded, or comprehend truly) nor by any other ; for there is no other Criterie whereby it ought to be determined, (according to the Hypothefis) it will therefore be indetermina¬ ble and incomprehenfible, whether Senfe be vain¬ ly affeded , or comprehendeth any thing. Whence it followeth, that we ought not to re¬ ly wholly upon Senfe in rhe determination of things, when as we cannot fay, that it compre¬ hendeth any thing.
But let us grant the Senfes to be comprehen- five, yet will they be found to be nothing the leff uncr editable, as to determination concerning ex¬ ternal Objeds. The Senfes are contrarily mo¬ ved by externals, as the tafte by the fame Ho¬ ney is fometimes affeded (weedy, fometimes bit¬ terly. The Sight thinketh the fame colour fome- times red, fometimes white „ Neither doth the fmell agree with it left. He who hath feme kind of obftrudionsin the Head, tl i kech Unguents not to be fweet; he who hath not, faith they arefwect. Perfons Divinely infpired, and Fa-
natick.
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