Part X!I.

492
that occur to him by paffive phantafie^ as they l appear to him, is manifelh ;
Let us now {ee, whether the Dogmatics them- felves are not excluded from Inquifition. It is not Incongruous, that they Who confefs tliem- felves ignorant of the nature of things, fhould / yet enquire after them, but that they who think ^ they know them exa(5ily fhould do fo ; for thefc ’ are arrived, as they think, at the end of Tnqui- I fition, the others ftill retain the ground of In- j quiiition, to think they have not found. We lhali j briefly enquire into every part of that which they call Philofophy. And forafmuch as there is great controverfie among the Dogmatifts, con¬ cerning the parts thereof ; fome alTerting one, others two, others three, (which it is to no pur- pofe here to enlarge, )we will explain the opinion of thofe who feem moft peifedly converfant therein, and accommodate our difcourfe to that.
C'H A P. II.
From 'whence the InevFfiiion againf Dogneatijis (hould' begin. .
TH E Stoicks and fome others fay. The parts of Philofophy are three, Logick, Vhyfck, Et.hick ; they begin wdch the Logick, teaching that firft ( yet there is no little controverfie, which of them they fhould begin wdthal.) Thefe we fhall follow, without engaging our opinion. And becaufe the affertions in thefe three parrs require judgment and a Criterie, and the dil- courfe concerning the Criterie feemeth to be¬ long to Logick, we will begin with the Logical part j and firfl of the Criterie.
CHAP. III.
Of the Criterie.
WHereas they call a Criterie, that ‘whereby effence and exifence ( as they fay ) arc judged j as alfb, that •wherein ive acquiefee in the ‘comfe of life : Our purpofe now is to difcourfe of cliat which they call. The Criterie of Truth ; for of Criterie in the other fenfs, we difeourfed * chap. S. formerly * in the firft Book.
The Criterie of w'hich we now difcourfe is ta¬ ken three ways, Commonly, Properly, Mof properly. Commonly , for eviry meajure of comprebenpon j in which f mje, Naturals alfo arc called Crit cries, as, Sgbt. 'properly, for every art if dal mcafure of compreherfon ; iss, a Ruler, a pair of Compajfes. Mof properly, for every artifdal meafure of comprebenfion of a th'iny not roan in which JeiijC, thofe things •which belong TO the aaions of life, are not called Crit cries, but the rational only, and thofe which Dogmatick Philofophers alledge for invention of truth. Our defign is, as we faid, to ditcourfe of the rational Cntertet, and of this alfo there are three kinds, in which, by which, according to voh'ich j as, in which, the man ; by which, the fenfe, or the intellecftj according to which, the application of the phantafie, accord¬ ing to vvhich a man attempts to judge by one of the fore-named. This it was neceflary firit to laydown, for underflanding the fubjedt of the quefiion. It remains we confute thofe, who unadvifedly affirm, they comprehend the Criterie of truth j we will begin with that.
CHAP. IV,
Whether there be any Criterie of Trfith.
OF thofe who have difeourfed concerning the Criterie, fome hold, that it is, as the Sto¬ icks and others ; fome, that there is none, as (among the reft) Xeniades of Corinth, and Xeno¬ phanes of Colophon, who faith,
- — — in every thing cpirdon's frantd.
But we fufpend, whether there be, or be not. This controverfie they muft hold to be either dijiidicable, (that is, determinable) or indiju- dicable, ( indeterminable. ) If indijudicable , they grant, we ought to fufpend in it ,• if dtju- dicable, let them fay whereby it ftiall be judged, whenas we have not a Criterie acknowledged by all, neither know we whether there indeed be one, but enquire.
Moreover, to judge this controverfie of the Criterie, it is requilite we have a Criterie ac¬ knowledged, by which we may judge it ; and to have a Criterie acknowledged , it is neceflary, that the controverfie concerning the Criterie be firft judged. The difpute thus incurring the alternate Common place , it cannot be refolved whether there be a Criterie or no. For we grant them not a Criterie by luppofition ; and if they judge a Criterie by a Criterie, we force them to go on into infinite.
Again , Demonftration requiring a Criterie dqmonftrated , and the Criterie a Demonftrati¬ on dijudicated, they fall into the alternate Com¬ mon-place.
This we conceive fufficient to confute the confidence of the Dogmatifts, in what they aflTerc concerning a Criterie. It is not from the pur- pofe to infift longer hereon, and to ftiew feveral other ways, whereby they may be confuted ; but we fhal! not mention all their particular opinions herein, ( for it cannot be exprelTed, hov/ much they differ among themfelves concerning it ; and this would put us out of the right method in our difpute.) Becaufe therefore the Criterie after which we enquire Teems threefold, in which, by vihich, according to which, we fliall examine every one of thefe apart, and fhew its incomprehen- fibility. Thus our difcourfe will be moft Me¬ thodical and perfect. We will begin with that in which, for the reft feem in fome manner du¬ bious by reafon of it.
CHAP. V.
Of the Criterie, in which.
NO W Man, (in my opinion) by what the Dogmatifts fay, is not only not to be compi'ehended, but not to be underftood ; for we hear Socrates ( in Plato) plainly confeffing, he knows not whether he is a man or fome otixr thing. And when they would declare the notion of man, they firft difagree among themfelves, next they fpeak fooUftily j for Democritus faith, Man is that which we all knew ; by which we cannot know what Man isj for ws know a Dog,
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