Part Xll

EFT 1C is M
4
fTianner hy the Mcthodick?, may be referred to the inipuiiion of oar Paflions , as well tbofe which arp agreeable to Natare, as tbofe which are not. Herein indeed thefe two InPiitutions agree , both difclaim Opinion , and both ule words indifferently j as the Scepjjck, J dtfign no- ibh’g , 1 comprehend nothing ; the Methodick , xo/fOThty T/mny, and the like. The word alfo he takes without Opinationj for an Atfionj whereby we are deduced from apparent Paffions,
Natural and Preternatural, to rluf- W'.ich n convenient, .is I (hewed in Tiiirff and Hanger. The Methodicks therefore are neirer al.y d tO the Sceptichs than any oth.cr Medicinal Sedf, as appears by compaiing them. Thus having dif- courft'd of thofe, which arc of neare.^ refem- blance to the Scepfick Inditution, we conclude the general part of Scepietjm, and the firft Book of our Summary.
Gf DI ALEC TICK.
THE SECOND BOOK.
CHAP. I,
Whether a Sceptick can examine and difpute agaivfl Jj]lrtions ?
Having undertaken an inquifidon of the Dogmatifts , we will briefly, and by way of Summary, examine every part of that which they call Philofophy. But firlf, let us Anfwer them who cry, A Sceptick is not capable to examine or comprehend Dogtnatick ajj'trtions. They argue thus , A Sceptick either comprehends aJJ'ertions , or net 5 if he comprehend them, how can he doubt of that, which hy his own confejjion he comprehends^ If he doth not comprehend them, he camiot dijcourfe upon that which he compre¬ hends not. For, As he who knows not (for example) what is ro 0 7!^eaaa^isy.ivv, or, Theorem by two Topicks, is not able to fay any thing of ihesn : So, he who knows not the particular ajfertion of the Dog matifs, cannot difpute againfi that , of which h knows nothing j therefore a Sceptick cannot examine or difpute again f the affertions of Dogmatics.
Who argue thus, Let them fay, in what fenfe they ufe the word [^comprehend,] whether fim- ply , for to tfnderfand without affrming ought , concerning the beings of the things whereon we dif- courje ; or not only to underftand, but to grant the being of thoje things. If they fay. To compre¬ hend, is by dtjcourje to affent to comprehenfive pbanta- Jle, forafmuch as comprehenfive phantafie pro¬ ceeds from a thing that hath being, impreffed and fealed accordingto the being thereof, in fuch manner as cannot be derived from that which hath no being, perhaps even they themfelves will not be capable of examining or difpucing againfi that which they comprehend not ; As when the Stotek difputes againfi the Epicurean, who afilrms, that Subfiance ts divided ; or, that God orders not th* World by providence’ or, that Pleajure is a goo4 ; Doth he comprehend, or not ? If he comprehend, he, in faving thefe things are, wholly fubverts theSVotH DoClrine; if he comprehends nor, nei iher can he fay any thing againfi it The fame may be obfeded to thofe of all other Seds, when they otff-r to difpute againfi Opinions, which they conCei' C heterodox ; fo as none of them can diGaate ag.iinlt another, upon any pretence whatfoev'T. BcHdes, (not ro trifle) in a word, all their Dt-gmatick learning will be fubverted, and] the Sceptick Philofophy firmly eflablifhed, if it
be granted, that none can difpute of any thing, which is not thus comprehended. For whofo- everafferts Dogmatically concerning a thing not certain,afrerts, either as having comprehended if, or not; if he hath not comprehended it, w'hat he faith will not be creditable ; if he hath compre- hendediCjhe muflfay,that he did it either through the very thing it felf, and by fome ad incident to it, or by fome inquifition and examination. If through it felf by fome aSt incident to it a thing not-manifefl be comprehended, it cannot be faid to be not-manifefl, but equally apparent to all, granted and nor controverted. But concerning every thing not-manifefl, there is an irreconci¬ lable difference amongft them ; wherefore the Dogmatifl, who afferts concerning the being of a thing not-iiaanifeft, doth not comprehend it through it felf, and by an Ad incident to it- Bur, if by fome incjuifition , how is he capable of en¬ quiring or difputing, before he comprehends the thing it felf, according to the hypothefis pro- pofed ? For inquifition requiring, that the thing after which we enquire be exadly comprehend¬ ed ; and on the other fide, the comprehenfion of the thing whereof we enquire, requiring firfl in¬ quifition, by the alternate Common-place of Suf-' penfion, it will be impoffiblefor them, to enquire and afifert Dogmatically, concerning things not- manifeft. If they would begin from compreben- fon, we objedr, that they niufl firfl enquire be¬ fore they can comprehend ; if from inauifitlon, that they mull comprehend before they can en¬ quire. Wherefore they can neither compre¬ hend, nor pofitively affirm concerning things not-manifefl. So that thisfoolifh Dogmatick-flou- rifii will be taken away, and, as I conceive, the EpheBick Philofophy come in of it felf.
Now/ if they fay, They conceive it not necef- fary, that fuch comprehenfion precede inquifiti¬ on, but firaple inteiiedion only ; it is not im- poffible but they, who fufpend as to things not- manifefl, may difpute alfo ; for the Sceptick, as I think,is not excluded from inteiiedion, which arifeth from Phosnomena’s that occur, and adu- ally affed us. Neither doth this ncceffiirily in¬ fer, that intelligibles are exiflent ; for we un- derftar.d not only things exiflent , but the in- exiflent ; whence the Ephedick, whether enqui- j ring or underflanding, continueth in his Scep¬ tick Inflitucion. For, that he aflents to things
R. r r 2 that
SCEPTICISM.