Part Xil|

When we fay, To every Speech an equal Speech iscppofue, we mean, to every Speech that we have examined. Speech, vjc take not fimply, but for that which alTerteth fomething dogmatically, that is, of a thing not manifelf, not only by premifes and conclufion, but any other way. Equal, ,we take not fimply, but as to belief and disbeii^. Is opfofitc, we rake generally for is repugnant, implying, as T think. When there¬ fore we fay , To every Speech, there is an equal Speech opp'ojite; the meaning is, To every Speech that I have examined, "which ajjerteth any thing dogmatically, there feemeth to me to be oppojite ano¬ ther Speech, averting likeWife dogmatically, equal to it for belief or disbtlkf. Thus , this ExprefTion is not dogmatical, but the fignification of an hu¬ man affection, which is that which appeareth to the perfon affedled. Some there are who pro¬ nounce it thus, To every Speech, to oppofe an equal Speech, laying this down as a Precept, That to every Spijech dogmatically afferting any thing, we fhbuld oppofe the Speech which dogmatically afferreth its contrary. Thus addreffing their words to the Sceptick, they ufe the Infinitive for the Imperative, To oppoje, for. Let us oppofe. They advis’d the Sceptick, not to be deceived by the Dogmatifis, nor to give over his Inquifi- 'tion, for the indiflurbance which they conceive accompanies thofe who fufpend their affent in every thing, as we- faid before.
It is net neceffary to alledge more of thefe Phrafes, ?ven of thefe alledged fome might have been fpared ; but take it for a Rule, In all the Sceptical Phrafes, we affirm not that the Phrafes themfelves are true ; for we fay, that fome may be taken away by others, and are circumferibed by thofe very things of which they are fpoken, as purgative Medicines expel not only Humors, but, together with the Humors, therpfelves out of the Body. Moreover, we fay, that we ufe them mot, as properly fignifying the thing to which they are applied, but indifferently, or fif they will fo call it) improperly; for, it becomes not the Sceptick to conteft about words. This we may the better do, in that the words are faid not to fignifie any thing purely in themfelves, but re¬ latively, and therefore as well in reference to the Scepticks. Furthermore, it muft be remembred, that wc pronounce them not generally of all things, but of the not-manifefi, and thofe which are dogmatically controverted. The Vheeneme- non fthat which appeareth to usj we declare; but of the nature of the external Objed, we affirm nothing. By what hath been faid, I con¬ ceive, that all Sophifnis brought againft the Sceptical Phrafes, may be rcfolved.
CHAP. XXVII.
Wherein Scepticifm differs from thofe Thilofophical SeBs which ar» mofi like itt, and fir jl wherein it differs from the Phildjcphy 0/ Heraclitus.
HAving declared the fignification of Scepti- cifin, its Parts, its Cnterie, its End, its Pla¬ ces of Sitfperfion, its P hr ajes, and its CharaBeri it folio weth that we explicate briefly, wherein it clifiers from thoje Seth which feem mojl like it, that by this means we may the better underftand it.
We will begin with the Philofophy of Hera- ' i]
clkus. That this differs from our Inftitution, is |
evident; for Hcraclitm afferteth dogmatically j]
concerning many things not- mantfeft, which (as I
I faid before) wc do not. But forafmuch as the followers of zyEnefidemus laid, the Sceptick, ij
Inftitution is the way to the Heraclitian Pholofo- phy , Becaufe th3.t Contraries appear in the fame J
Thing, is precedent to Contraries are in the fame ■
Thing : But the Scepticks fay. Contraries appear in the fame Thing, and the Heraclitians go on far- 1
ther, affirming Contraries are in the fame Thing ^ ;
We anfwer. That Contraries appear in the fame Thing, is not a Dodlrine of the Scepticks, but a thing evident by Senfe, not to the Scepticks only, but to all other Philofophers, and Men; as none dare deny,but Honey to the Sound is fweet; ^ j
to fuch as have the overflowing of the Gall, Bit¬ ter. Hereupon, the Heraclitians begin from the common Prrenotion of men, as we do a'lfo, and perhaps other Se taken this fentence. There are Contraries in the fame thing, as from this faying, All are hcomprehen- fible, or from, I determine nothing, or fome other of that kind, perhaps they might colledl rightly what they fay ; butfince they have fome Princi¬ ples incident not only to us, but to other Philo¬ fophers, and even to thecourfe of Life itfelf, why fhould any fay, our Inftitution is preparative to the Philofophy of Heraclitus, more than to any other Se feeing all of us ufe thefe in common? Neither know I whether the Sceptical Inftitution divert not from the Philofophy of Heraclitus, rather than conduce to it; fince the Sceptick reprehends, as temerarious, all that Heraclitus afferted dogmati¬ cally, contradiAing his Conflagration, concradi ing alfo his Tenant, That there are contraries in the fame Thing', and to every Doeftrine of Heraclitus, :>■
(deriding the temerity of the Dogmatics') he faith,
,l comprehend not, I determine not, ( as before ) which oppugns the Heraclitians. But it is abfyrd to fay, That an Inftitution, which oppugns ano¬ ther, is the way preparative to the Difeipline it oppugns. Therefore it is abfurd to fay. That the Sceptical Inftitution is the way to the Heraclitian Philofophy.
CHAP. XXVIII.
Wherein Scepticifm differs from the Philofophy of Democritus.
IN the like manner,the Philofophy oi Democritus is faid to be all one with Scepticifm, in that it feems to ufe the fame matter ; for from the ap¬ pearance of Honey , to fome Sweet, to fome Bitter , Democritus argued, that in itfelf, it is neither Sweet nor Bitter, and thereupon ufed to fay, not more, a Sceptick-phrafe. But this Phrafe, not more, is taken by the Scepticks, and by the Democritians, after a different* manner. The Democritians fignifie by it, that neither is, but we, that we know not whether both of the Phoenornena’s are, or whether neither is : Herein we diffent from, them. But far greater is the difference in that Democritus faith. Atoms, and Vacuum, trMy aret, That herein, he differs from us, (though he be¬ gin with the inequality, and difagreement of Phenomena %) I conceive it needlefs to prove.
CHAP.
J
p
Pakt XH,
SCEPTICISM.
4^9
CHAP. XXIX.
li'basin Scepticifm differs from the Cyrenaick St^.
SOme affirm the Cyreraick Se(3: to be the (atrie with Scepticifm, for as much as it I'.oldSj that the /iff eB ions themj elves only arc comprehended, Neverthelefs it is different front Scepticifm ; for it holds Vleafure, and a light moticn of the Flejh - to be the End ; we, Indifhirbance, to which the End they propofe is contrary. For whether Pleafure be prefent or abfent, he who affert^'it to be the End, is difturbed, as we faid * befare. *chaf.j.' Befides, we fufpend only from afferting any thing concerning external Objeeffs ; but the Cyrenaich affirm they are of an incompre- henfible Nature.
CHAP. XXX.
iVherein Scepticifm dff'ers from the Inffitution of Protagoras.
PRotagortts will have Man to be -mvTwv
(liTesVy ^he meajure of all things ; of Heings, as they are ; of not Beings, as they are not. By /wa- nfov, he means the Criterie ; by ©ejef-
fjLihur, of things ; which is as much as to fay, Man ts the Criterie of all things ; of Beings, as they are ; of not Beings, as they are not. Hereupon, he afferts the Vhosnomena's to be particular to every one, and thus brings in the relative Common place, whereby he feems to have community with the Tyrrhenians ; But he differs from them, as we fliall eafily find in explicating his Opinion. He faith, Matter is ffuid, and betng in perpetual Fluxi¬ on , Appofftions are made inffead of SubffraBions, and the Senfes are tranfmutated and charged , ac¬ cording to the feveral ages and confiitutions of the Body. He faith alfo, The Reafons ( or Powers) of all Pheenomena’s are fubjeBed in Matter ; that Matter , in it felf,’ is all things which it appears unto all. But Men at different times perceive things different, by reafon of their different Habits ; He •whofe Conflitution is found , of the things which are in Matter, perceiveth tbofe which are capable of appearing to jucb Perfons J they who are otherwije dijpofed, perceive the things which are capable of appearing to Vtrfons of a contrary Conffitu- tion. The fame Reafon there is in the difference of. Ages, in Sleeping and Waking, and in all kinds of Habits. Man therefore, according to him, is the Criterie of things that Are ; For all things which appear to Men, Aret, thofe which appear not to any Man, Are not. Thus we fee, he dogmatically afferted, that Matter is fluid, and that the Reafons of all PhiCnomena’s are fubjeBed in tt, wherein we, as being things not manifeft, fufpend our affent.
CHAP. xxxr.
wherein Scepticifm differs from the Academick Philofoph).
SOme hold the Academick Philofophy to be the fame with Scepticifm, let us therefore examine it. It is faid, there were more than
three Acamsdies ; One, the moH: Ancient, in- flituted by Plate); the Second, a.v.‘S middle Aca¬ demy, by Arcefilaus, Difciple of Vokrnon; the Third, and new Academy , by Carneades and Chtomachtss ; there are who reckon a Fourth, in- (fituted by Tbilo, and Cbarmides; fbme alfo a Fifth, by Antiochus. We vvill begin with the moft Ancient. Some hold Plato to be Drg- mattek, others Aporematick (dubitafivc ; ) Others in fome things, Dogmatick, in fome, Aporematkk. For in his Gymnadick Difeourfes, where 5’ccr^- tes , is introduced deriding or difputing with ^the Spphifs, they fay he hath a Gymnafiick, and Aporematick Charader ; but when he decla- reth his own Opinion in the Perfon of Socrates, Timaus, or the like, a Dogmatff. As for thofe, who fay he is a Dogmatift, or in fome things Dog¬ matick, in others Aporematkk, we Hiall not need to meddle with them ; for they acknowledge, that he diffents from us. Whether he be purely Sceptick, we difeourfe at large in our Hypomnema- ta; wc ffiall now only examine it briefly, ac* cording to Fermedotus, and ^yEnefidemus, (tor they chiefly undertook this Task) who fay, that Plato, when he afferted concerning Uaa's, or that there is Trcvidence, or that Life joined vnth Virtue, is to be preferred before Life joined with Vice : If he affent to thefe as exigent, he averreth dogmatically : if he affent as to the more probable, be differs from the Sceptick Cha- raAer, in preferring one before the other, as to Belief and Disbelief, as is manifeft from what hath been faid already. iVor though he pronounce things Sceptically in his Gymnafheks, is he therefore a Sceptick, for he who affertech any one thing dogmatically, or preferreth any Phantafie before another, for Belief, or Disbe¬ lief, of a thing not manifeft- , follow’ech the Dogmatick Charadler, as Timon Ihew'eth, fpea- king of Xenophanes: For (having often com¬ mended him, irifomuch that he writes his SHU . in his Perfon) he maketh him to complain, and fay ;
I wijlj my Soul were fultle, and her F.ye So fbarp, as might * both ffJes at once defery.
Loft in the doubtful way, I long have fir aid ; Even though f grown old) 1 had vsith care effay'^ d Every opinion, fearch’d all Theory,
For unto which could I my mind apply ?
All into one refolve, and this one ever Drawn into one like Nature, doth perfever.
Whence alfo he calls him -iadrstpov, and not ab- folutely, aTjfov, void of Bride, thus;
t Xenophanes, not wholly free from Bride,
The fixions of old Homer did deride ;
And fram'd a God, * whofe Figure doth diffent From Men; equal each way: Intelligent.
He calls him and ImnaTrlw, for that he reproach¬
ed and blamed the t fabulous way of Homer. Now Xenophanes afferted, bsfldes pr^notions (as others alfo) that the Univerfe is one, and that God IS of the fame Nature with all things ; that He is Spherical, Impaffible, Immutable, and Ra¬ tional; Whence it is eafie to ihew that Xeno¬ phanes differs from us. Moreover, from what R r r we
* xM. S,-
'ApLipo-n-
"i* Laert,
Smtipd.-
vns.
* M. S.
’E»7!iV,
perhaps
Laertius filth. He' held, That God if of a Spbertek Form, KO- tkir,g like to men. This feems to be meant cLTidivb^ce-^ •my, to the figure rcfeTldoy
d.7rxfja,, fuch is a Globe,
-j- His Sto¬ ries con¬ cerning the gods,
Laert. in Xenoph.
490
SC E PI 1C ISM.