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The history of philosophy: containing the lives, opinions, actions and discourses of the philosophers of every sect. Illustrated with the effigies of divers of them

Chapter 261

Part XII.

SCEPTIC iSM.
487
• What Axioms are, (eein the do- ftrine of
a Phoenomenon, or a not-apparent for reafon of a not-apparent, he runs into Infinite. If he prove one kind by the other, he incurs the Alternate flace. If he make a ftand any where, or fay, that the caufe (or reafon) isfuch, as that it con- fifls with the thing by him alledged, he falleth into the place of Relation, taking away that which is according to the proper nature of the thing j or if heaffume fomething by way of fup- polition, we lhall difallow it. Thus alfo may the Temerity of the Degmatifis in iEtioIogy be confuted.
CHAP. XXVI.
The Phrafes of the Scepticks.
FOrafmuch as in ufing thefe places of Sufpen- fion, we exprefs ourfelves by fome particu¬ lar Phrafes, which declare the Sceptical affe and our own paflion, as Not more. Not to be defined, and the like, it follows, that we treat of thefe.
Let us begin with this,JVof wore, for which fome- times wtiny, Nothing more j not ufing (as fome conceive) not more in particular quettions; and no¬ thing more, in the generaljbut both promifcuoufly. We therefore will treat of them both under one. It is an imperfed: exprcffion, as when we fay i'i'irKn, wc imply ; and when TKet'jeia,
we imply fo when we fay, Not
more, it is as much as to fay. Not more this than that, upwards nor downwards. There are fome Scepticks, who for the Interrogation i, ufe 7?, Which more, this or that ? taking v, cafually, as if they Ihould fay, cT/a 77, Why more this than that? Interrogations are commonly ufed for * Axi¬ oms, as.
To "what Man is the Wife 0/ Jove unknown ? and Axioms for Interrogations, as, I would know where V>\oT\ dwells? and, 1 demand for what caufe tkeStcicks. ^ admir'd. Menander ufeth ts for J'ia 77,
as, Ti j55 eyl
This Phrafe, Not more this than that, declareth likewife our affedion, by which we are brought, by reafon of the equivalence of contrary things, to i we mean Equivalence, in that which
appeareth probable to us. Contraries are thofe which generally oppugn one another ; is an inclining to neither. Now this Phrafe, Not more, though it feem to imply affent or denial. We ufe not that manner, but indifferently and improperly, either by way of queftion, or for I know not to which of thtfe I (hould ajjent, and to which I (hould not aJJ'ent. But being required to declare what feemeth to us, we ufe the Phrafe by which we declare it indifferently. Know like¬ wife, that when we fay, Not more, weaffert not that the doubt is true, but only exprefs what ap¬ peareth to us.
The next isAj>hafia;Phafis is taken two ways, ge¬ nerally and particularly : generally for any fpeech, declaring affertion or denial, as, It is day. It IS not day : particularly, for Affertion only ; in which acception, the Negatives are not cal¬ led (fdmf. Afhafia therefore is a renunciation of Pbajfs, in the general fignification, which com¬ prehends both Affirmation and Negation. It is that affeffion by which we neither affert a thing, nor deny it. We affume Afhafia, not be-
becaufe the nature of things is fuch, as necef- farily move it ; but declaring, that at prefenc we are thus affedled, as to thefe or thofe quefti- ons. Always remember, that we neither affert nor deny any thing unapparent, but yield to thofe which move us pathetically, and necef- farily compel us to affent.
Thefe Phrafes, ^ » 'rd^, ix.
^ «« Perhaps, and Not Perhaps,
we ufe for, perhaps it is, perhaps it is not. Thus, for brevity, we take, not perhaps, for, perhaps it u not. Here again we conteft not about words, nor enquire what they naturally fignifie, but take them indifferently. Thefe Phrafes declare an Aphafia, for he who faith. Perhaps it is, implies its contrary to be as probable, becaufe heaffents not that this is. The fame of the reff.
'Eniya, I fufpend, WQ take for , I cannot fay whether I ought to believe or disbelieve the thing pro- pofed, declaring, That the things feem equal to us, as to Belief and Unbelief; whether they are equal in themfelves,we affert not, but fpeak of the Phxnomenon, as it incurs into our Senfe. 'Evoyf, Sufpenfion, is fb called, Ijm n .tIu' Nttvoiar,
from tbe mind's being held in Sufpenfe, betwixt af- ferting and denying, through equivalence of the thing queftioned.The fame we fay concerning,
OuSiv osx((a,l determine nothing ; oel^ny, we COn* ceive to be, not fimply to fpeak a thing, but to pronounce an unmanifeft thing with affent. Thus perhaps the Sceptick will be found to determine nothing, not fo much as this, I determine nothing. For it is not a Dogmatical Opinion: (that is, an affent to fomething not manifeft) but a Phrafe de¬ claring our affection. When therefore the Scep¬ tick faith, I determine nothing, hemeaneth, lam fo afifelted at the prefent, as not dogmatically to ajfert or deny any of the things controverted. This he faith, as expreffinghow they appear to him, not pro¬ nouncing it enunciatively with perfwafion.
'Aees^jet is a paflion of the mind, whereby we neither affert nor deny things dogmatically con- trovetted, that is, not-manifeft. When there¬ fore the Sceptick faith , All are undefinable, he taketh are ior appear fo to him; he faith not beings, but thofe not controverted by the
Dogmatifis. Indefinable, that is. Not to be preferred before their Contraries, or common repugnant s, by belief or disbelief. And as he who faith, Amhulo, impli- eth. Ego ambulo ; fo he who faith , Ad things are indefinite, implieth, as to us, or, as it feemeth to me. The Meaning therefore is this, All things contro¬ verted by the Dogmatifts appear fo to me , as that I think none of them more worthy belief than its contrary.
The fame is our meaning when we lay. All are incomprehenftble^ we take [all] in the famefenfe,', and imply [to me;] as if we Ihould fay. All things controverted among the Dogmatifis feem to me incomprehenfible. We affirm hot, they are incomprehenfible in their own nature, but de¬ clare our own affedion, th^t we conceive we underftand them not, by reafon of the equiva¬ lence of Contraries.
Likewile the Phrafe, drJJaArfSd, and Si AetpCetyu , declares our own affection, by which the Sceptick, for the prefent, neither afferts nor denies any of the things not-manifeft that, are in Controverfie. This is evident from what hath' been faid upon the other Phrafes,
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SCEPTICISM.