Part Xil.

Senfible, will require another, and fo to infinite : But if a Senfible require to be determined by an Intelligible, forafn^uch as Intelligibles alfo are controverted, that (as being Intelligible) will re¬ quire adjudication and proof ; which way fhall it be proved? If by an Intelligible, they run, as before, into Infinite. If by a Senfible, foraf- much as Intelligible was aflfumed for proof of a Senfible, and a Senfible for proof of an Intelli¬ gible, the Alternate common^flace is brought in.
But if, to avoid this, the Difputant would af- fume fomething as granted , without demon- ftrating it, whereby to demonftrate theConfe- quent, the hypothetical place occurs, which is inex¬ tricable. For if he be creditable in things which he requires to be granted and fuppofed, we like- wife may be creditable, in requiring their Con¬ traries to be granted. If that be true which he fuppofeth, he renders it fufpicious by fuppoling (not proving I it; if falfe, his foundation is hn- found. Further, if fuch a fuppofition conduce any thing to proof, let him fuppofe the thing in quefiion, rather than another thing by which he . would prove it. If it be abfurd to fuppofe the thing controverted, it is alfo abfurd to fuppofe the ground upon which we build it. That all Senfibles arc Rtlaii'vts, is manifelr, for (as fuch) they relate to thofe who have Senfe. Itisthere- fore evident , that whatfoever Senfible thing is propofed to us, may eafily be reduced to one of theie five Places.
So likewife we argue concerning Intelligibles. If the Controverfiebe indijudicable, we (hall be allowed to fufpend ; if di judicable by an Intelligi¬ ble, it runs into Infinite’^ if by a Senfible we drive them to the Alternate place: For the Senfible being Controverted, as not capable of being judged by itfelf, becaufe of running into Infinite, will require an Intelligible, as the Intelligible the Senfible. He who hereupon would affume any thing as granted, is as foolifli on the other fide. Further, an Intelligible is relative, for it is fuch in reference to the Intelligent ; and if it were in¬ deed fuch as it is named, it would not be contro¬ verted. Thus we reduce Intelligibles alfo to thefe five Places. Whereupon we are neceflita- ted to fufpend our Affent upon any propofition. Thefe are the five Places introduced by the later Scepticks, not to exclude the other Ten, but more varioufly to refel the Temerity of the Dog!?2atiJls.
CHAP. XXIV.
The Two other Common-Places.
THey likewife deliver two Places more of Sufpenfion; for feeing that whatfoever is comprehended, feems to be comprehended (or underffood) either through it jelf^ or through feme other’ they feem to introduce an abfolute Inex- tricability of all things. That nothing is com¬ prehended through it jelf , they fay, is manifeft, from the Concroverlie aniongft N3tur.1l Philo- fopher.s, concerning (I chink ) all Senfibles and In- telligibles: v^hich Controverfie is indijudicable, , (not to be determined) by reafon that we can¬ not ufe either a Senfible or an Intelligible Cri- terie; for, whichfoever we take, it will be un- credicable , as being controverted.
For the fame Reafon they conceive that no¬ thing can be comprehended through fame other \ for if that through which it Is comprehended, will continually require to be comprehended through fome other, they run into the Alternate place, or into Infinite. But if a man will afl’ume any thing as comprehended through itfelf, by means whereof he would compreherrd fome other thing, to this it is repugnant, that nothing can be comprehended' through itfelf, for the reafons before alledged. But how that which is repugnant can be comprehended either through itfclfj or any other, we doubt, fmee there appeareth no Criterie of Truth- or Com- prehenfion ; but without Demonftration, ligns are deftroy’d, as we fhall prove hereafter. Hi¬ therto of the Places of Sufpenfion.
CHAP. XXV.
The Places fior Confutation of .^tiologicks.
IN like manner, as we have delivered thefe places of Sufpenfion, fome have laid down others, particularly againft .Etiologies, ( Alle¬ gations of Caufes or Reafons) becaufe the Dog¬ matics pleafej themfelves exceedingly therein. iy£nefidem!is delivers eight Places, whereby he conceives all Dogmatick iEtiology may be refel¬ led, as defedive.
The Firjl, for that the kind of .Etiology, which is converfant in things not apparent, hath notan acknowledged proof from apparent things.
The Second, for that there are many great Reafons to induce an Inclination, and but one alledged.
The Third , for that of things dqne orderly, Reafons are given thatfliew no order.
The Fourth, for that taking Phoenomena's as they are, they think they comprehend things not apparent, as they are likewife ; for things not apparent are perhaps effected the fame way as Pheenomena s, perhaps fome other peculiar way.
The Fifth, for that all (very nigh) give Rea¬ fons, according to their own particular fuppo¬ fed Grounds, not according to the general and univerfilly received ways of difpuration.
The Sixth, for that they often take for grant¬ ed fuch things as are eafily comprehenfible; but omit their Contraries, tho’ equally probable.
The Seventh, for that they alledge Reafons not only repugnant to Pboenomenas, but even to their own Suppofitions.
The F.ighth, for that the things which appear, and thofe which are controverted, being equal¬ ly dubious, they would prove their opinion con¬ cerning doubtful things, by things as doubtful.
He addeth, that it is poffible, in Etiologicks fome may err by other places dependent upon thefe.
But perhaps, the five places of Sufpenfion are fufficienc againC Etiolcgicks. Fora man muC either alledge a Reafon which agreeth with all Sects of Pbilofophy, and with Scepticifm, and with P hoenomcnon $ , or not ; But tO alledge fuch a Reafon is im poffible, for all P hoenomena' s and not- apparents difagree;' and difagreeing, it will be required, that a caufe or reafon thereof be given., \ Now il he alledge a Phxnome-ier. for reafon of \ a Phse-
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