Part XIL

ria7t Stone, and what the whole • So likewife in Sands, Helkbore, Wine, Meat, we can exprefs what they are relatively ; but the nature of the things chemfelves we cannot, by reafon of the difference which happens in coatpohtion. Gene¬ rally, healthful things are hurtful, if we take too much of them ; and hurtful things hurt not, if vve take but little of them. This is moft evident in Medicine ; a juft meafure in their Compoli- tion is beiaeficial; but fometimes, to put in ever fo little more or lefs, is not only not beneficial, but deftruiftive, and often deadly. Thus Quan¬ tities and Compofitions confound the exiftence of external Obje(fts, whereby we are juftly re¬ duced to Sufpenfion, not being able to affirm any thing of the external Qbjeft.
CHAP. XX.
The Eighth Common-Place.
r f "iHe Eighth-Place is, From Relation'^ for every
I thing having relation to fome other, what they arefimply intheir own Nature, wefufpend from affirming.' f The term [7/,] here and elfe- where we ufc improperly for Seems; which is as much as to fay. Every thing feems to-have re¬ lation to fome other.) This is faid to be two ways ; one is to the thing judging, for the Ex¬ ternal Obje-ft appeareth fuch to the thing judg¬ ing ; the other is to the things which aie con- fidered together with it, as Right to Left.
That all things are relauve, we argued be¬ fore, as well to the thing judging ; for the appear¬ ance of a thing is what it feems to this Animal, to that Man, to fuch a Senfe, to fuch a Habit : As likewife to the things feen together vsith ity for every tiling appears by fuch a Commiffion, fuch a Manner, fueh a Compofition, fuch a Quanti¬ ty, fuch a Pofition.
Tlaat all things are Relative, may alfo be ar¬ gued thus: Whether are different things different from Relatives, or not? If not different, then "they arer R'elatives ; if different , fmce every thing that differs from another is relative, ( as imphing arelation to that from which it differs) they are relative by difference.
Again, of things, feme, according to the Dogmacifts, areSupream Genus’s ; others, moft Special ; others, Ctnus s znAS fecks: But
all thefeare Relative, therefore there is nothing that is not Relative.
Moreover they fay , that of things, fome are manifeft, fome unmanifeff. Themanifeft (Phoe- fignify the unmanifeff ; the unnaanifeft are fignify’d by the Vhxnomena s^ for they hold Thcenomenas to be the fight of the unnranifeft things ; but the fignificant and the fignificate are relatives, therefore all things are relative.
Befides, of things, fome are like, fome unlike; fome are equal, others unequal ; but thefs are relatives, therefore all things are relative.
Even he who faith, All things are not relative, confirraech, thaj: they are relative : For by the Ar¬ guments wherewith he oppugns us, he ffieweth, that this AlTerdon, All things are relative, hath reference only to us, but not to all in general.
Thus all things being -relative, what every ob- jetft isinitsown nature we cannot fay, but- only
what it appears in relation: Whence it follows, that, as to the nature of the things, we fufpend.
CHAP. XXL
The Ninth Common-Place.
"the Tenth Common-Place.
THe Tenth-Place chiefly concerns Morals, as being d ra wn from Inptutionsflu^oms, Laws, Fabulom Perfwajions, and Dogmatick Of inions.
Injfitution is the eledion of a courfe of life; or any other thing, which is done by one or many 5 as by Diogenes, or the Lacedemonians.
Law is a covenant written by the Magiftrace, which whofoever tranfgreffech ispuniflied.
Cujlom or (TV vhQeia, they diflTer nothingjl is the approbation of fomething by the common confent of many, which he who tranfgreffeth is npt punilhed ; as, it is a Law, that we com¬ mit not Adultery j a Cuftom, that we lie not with our Wives in publick.
Fabulous Perfwajion is the approbation of feign¬ ed things which never were ; fuch are theftories of Saturn, which yet fome believe true.
Dogmatick Opinion is the approbation of fome¬ thing which feems to be confirmed by fome Reafon or Demonftration; as that Atoms, Ho- moiomeria’s, Leaft-parts , or the like, are the Elements of things.
Of thele, we oppofe fometimes one of the fame kind, to another of that kind ; fometimes one kind to another. For example, Cujlom to Cufiom, thus ; Some v^thiofiavs painc.the skins of their children, we do not fo. I'ne Ptrfans think it decent to wear Garments ftained like Flowers, we think
THe (a) Ninth- Place is, from freejuent or rare Contingence, thus deduced : The Sun is cer¬ tainly much more wonderful than a Comet ; yet becaufe one is feen every day, the other feldom, the Comet makes us wonder fo muclr, as to think fome ffrange thing is portended thereby, the Sun not fo. But if we fhould imagine the Sun to appear but feldom, and as foon as he had en- lightnedall things, prefently to withdraw, and leave all in darknefs, we fhould therein find much caufe of wonder. Earthquakes trouble us far more at firft, than when we are us’d to them. How doth a man admire the Sea at firft view ? Even corporeal Beauty ftrikes us much more at the firft fight, than after we have been accufto- med and acquainted with it. Moreover, things that ^re foarce are efteemed, the common not efteemed. If Water were hard to be got, how much would it be prized above all things, which vve now value at fo high rates ? If Gold were as common as Stones, who would hoard it up ? Since therefore the fame things are fometimes efteemed wonderful or precious, fometimes notfuch, ac¬ cording to their fcarcity orcommonneTs, we in¬ fer, that, Ho w things feem according to their fre¬ quent or rareContingenceSjVve may perhaps fay ; but fimply, what thefe external Objeds are in themfelves, we cannot ; and therefore fufpend.
^ This Ninth place La- ertitu faith that Pha- 'vorinus reckons the eighth, and Sextus and
(Idemus the tenth ; and that vhich if the tenth, Sextus makes the eighth , Phavori- nus the ninth. But in the Edi- tionsi and