Chapter 256
Part Xll. SC EPTICIS Mt 48 a
And the Poet.
hi feveral ABionSj feveral Men delight.
The Tragedians are full of this, as
If all Men ‘ivbat is good did fee Alike, they VJould not Dif agree.
And again,
Alas I that fame Men take delight In things ii'hich grieve another s fight.
Since therefore Appetition and Averfion con- fifl: in Pleafure and Hatred , but Pleafure and Hatred confifts in Phantafy ; and fince the fame things are purfued by fome, fliunned by others ; we may infer this Confequence, That they are not alike affeded by the fame things, other- wife they would all alike defire to Ihun them. Now if thefe things affecft differently, according to the diverficy of Men, there may juftly be induced Sufpenfion, fince what every fubjedt ap- peareth, every one perhaps according to his par¬ ticular Apprehenfion may exprefs ; but what it is in its own Nature, we cannot alTert. For we muft either give Credit to all Men, or to fome few ; if to All, we undertake Impoffibilities, and admit Repugnancies; if to fome Few, let them tell us, which thofe Few are, The Vlatcnifis will fay, wemuft affentto j the Epicureans, to Epicurus ; and by their confufed Difagree- rnent, reduce us again to Sufpenfion. If any Man alledg , we ought to affent to the greater Number; he argues Childifiily, fince None can over-run all Men, and examine what every one thinks beft; and it is pofiible that in Countries unknown to us, what things are rare to us, are there frequent ; and what happens frequently to us, happens there very feldom. As for in- ftance, in fuch a Country there are many who receive no Harm by the Biting of Phalangies, Few who receive Harm thereby. And fo in all other ConIHcutions ; wherefore it is alfo necef- fary to induce Sufpenfion, by reafon of the di- verfity of Men.
. CHAP. XV.
The third Comtnon'place,
FOrafmuch as Dcgmatifs are fo felf-conceited, as to affirm, That their Judgment in things ought to be preferred before all others ; though we know how abfurd this Poftulation is, ( for they are Parties in theControverfie, and having firfl: prejudged themfelves, if then they judge Vhosnomena s , even before they begin to judge, they feize on the Vhcenomena s as already judg¬ ed : ) yet that, in our Difpute, fixing the Dif- courfe upon one Man ( that wUe Man they dream of ) we way arrive at Sufpenfion, let us examine the third Common-place.
This we derive the difference of the Senfes.
That the Senfes differ from one another is ma- nifeft. TiHures feem to the Eye rifing and fal¬ ling, but not fuch to the Touch. Manyefteem Honey pleafant to theTongue, unpleafant to the Eye ; whence it is impofible to fay, whether it is firaply pleafant, or unpleafant. The like of Unguents, they pleafe the Smell , difpleafe the
Tafte. Euphorbiur/i is hurtful to the Eyes, but not to any other part of the Body; therefore, whether it be firoply hurtful to the Body, we cannot fay. Rain-water is good for the Eyes,- but frets the Arteries and Lungs; asOyl doth alfo, though it finooths the Skin. The Sea-Tor- toife, applied to the extream parts of the Body^ caufeth Numbnefs, but laid to any ocher pare makes no alteration. Thus, what each of thefe things is in its own nature, we cannot affirm; but how it appears to others, we may. We might inftance more ; but, not to infift longer hereon than our defign permits, let us fay. Every fen- fible Vhcenomenon feemeth to incur a feveral way into our Senfes, as an Apple fmooth, fragrant, fweec, yellow. It is therefore unmanifeft, whe¬ ther it really hath thefe qualities, or whether it hath but one quality, which feemeth diffe¬ rent, according to the diverfity cf the Senfes ; or whether it hath many more qualities, fome of which incur not to our Senfes. For, that it hath but one quality, may be argued from what was faid before, concerning the Nutri¬ ment of living Creatures, the growth of Trees by Rain, the unequal found of the Breath in Pipes, and other Inftruments. It is therefore poffible, the Apple may have but one quality^ and yet be looked upon as different, by reafon of the difference of the Organs of Senfe, by which it is apprehended. Again, That it is poffible, the Apple may have more, qualities than appear to us, we argue thus : Let us fup- .pofe a Man, endued from his Birch with Touch, Smell , and Taffe ; but wanting Sight and Hearing, he will think there is nothing Vifible, nothing Audible: So it may be, that we having Five Senfes, of all the qualities of an Apple, perceive only thofe, whereof ourfelves have the apprehenfive Faculty; yet in the mean time, it may have other qualities, incident to other Organs of Senfe, which we have not. There¬ fore neither can we perceive what their fenfi- ble Operations are.
But Nature, may Some objedf, hath equally commenfurated the Senfes according to the Sen- fibles. What Nature? there being fo confu¬ fed a difagreement among the Dogmatifis con¬ cerning her Effence ? For if any Man judge what Nature is, if he be one of the Unlearned, he is, according to them, not worthy Credit; if a Philofopher , he is interefs’d in the Diffe¬ rence, being one of the Parties to be judged, not the Judge. Now if it be nothing abfurd to fay. The Apple hath all the qualities we feera to apprehend, and more than thefe ; or, on the contrary, that it hath not even thofe which incur to our Senfes, it will be unmanifeft to us, how the Apple is qualited. The fame of other Senfibles. And if the Senfes comprehend not External Objeds, neither can the Intelled com¬ prehend them. Thus Sufpenfion may be indu¬ ced from External Objeds.
C II A P. XVI.
The fourth Common-place.
THat as well over- running in our Difeourfe every Senfe, as receding from Senfe, and Q q q receding
SCEPriCISM.
