Part XU.

.ifter, when we come to refel the opinions of others concerning it ; ,) the other is of Adlon, whereby we judge in the courfe of Life what things are to be done, whatnot 5 this laU is that of which we now fpcak. We fay the Criterie of Scepticism is the Vbmiomerycn^ fo call we Pban- tafie in pow'er ; for when it proceeds to Perfwa- fion and coadlive Paffion, it is not queftionable. As to the appearance, whether the fubjedl be fuch or fuch, perhaps none doubteth ; but whe¬ ther it be fuch as it appcareth, is queUioned. Thus acquiefcing in Vhccnomena we live ( v;ith- out engaging Opinions or Judgments ) accord¬ ing to the ordinary courfe of life, in regard we cannot; be free from adting [ as we may from aflenting. ] -r..
This courfe of Li^ fee ms to be four- fold j converfant partly in natural InfiruBiony partly in the Impul/ion of Tajfions, partly in giving Laws and Cufoms, partly in teachhig Arts. In Natural In- firuliiofif by. which we are naturally en.dued with Senfe, and Ihtelledx ; ’in Impulfion of Pafions, as Hunger leads us to meat, Thirft to drink ; i» gi¬ ving Laws and Cufioms^ by which we learn that to live Vertuoufiy is Good, to live Vicioufly, ill; in teaching ArtSy by which we are not idle, in thofe Arts which we receive. All this we fay, without engaging our Opinion { or judgment.}
CHAP. IX.
7‘he end of So.Q'pticSm.
IT Follows that we treat of the End of Scepti- cifm. The End is, * *rhat for which all things are aSled or contemplated, hut it felf is not for any ether ; or the laft of things appetihle. We fay that the End of the Sceptiok is Incitfiurbance,
* in whatfoever belongs to Opinion, and (AJeiom-
Moderation, in whatfoever belongs to Com- pulfion. For beginning tolfudyPhilofophy, that he may defeern and comprehend which Phanta- '-Ji fies are True, which falfe, and by that means
I not to be difquieted , he lights upon an equiva¬
lent Contrariety, of which not being able to judge, he fufpends ; and whilfl: he is acciden¬ tally in this Sufpence, there follows itanlndi- llurbance as to things Opinionative: Forhewho is of Opinion there is fomething Good or Bad j in its own nature, is continually difturbed ; when
, thofe things which feem to him good, are not
a Pertaps prelent, he imagineth himfelf (a) tormented j ^ro/HAa- things Ill in theirown nature, and purfueth «/h taiped, he falleth into more Troubles. For being j unreafonably and immoderately tranfported,and
I fearing a change, he ufeth all endeavour that he
' may not lofe thofe things which he conceives
Good. ' Whereas he who defines nothing con¬ cerning Things naturally Good or Bad, neither hyeth nor purfueth any thing eagerly, fo that ' he remains undifturbed.
Thus it happens to the Sceptick, as to Apelles the Painter, who having drawn a Horfe, and ' trying to Paint his Fome, it fucceeded fo ill, that in Defpair he threw the Spunge, wherewith he ufed to bloc out Colours, at the Pidure ; which lighting upon the place , made an exad reprefencation of Fome. In like manner, the
Scepticks hoped to obtain Indifturbance by ing of the Unfetlednefs in Vh.-:ncmen:T s and in- telligibles ; which not being able to do , they fufpended, and whil’ff they were in Sufpence, as ic^jv^re accidentally, Indifturbance overccok tl>em, as a Shadow follows the Body.
Yet we conceive not the Sceptick to be.abfo- lutely free from trouble ; we grant, he is trou¬ bled by external Impuifions,. he fuffers Cold, Thirft, andthelike. But inthefe, thd.ordinary fort of men are doubly Affsded, firft With the? Paffions themfelves ; and again, no IcTs due thefe things are naturally ill, whereas the Scep¬ tick, taking aw'ay the opinion chat. they are na¬ turally ill, undergoes them more moderately. Hence wefay, that the SceptkFs end is, in Opi- nionacives, Indifturbance ; in Impuluves', Mo¬ deration ; to v/hich fome eminent Scepticks add SufpenfioH in difquijttives. ■
C H A P. X.
'The general Ways (or Places ) of Scepticifln.
IN Difturbance following Sufpenfion, it is re- quifite that we declare how we attain Suf- penfion.
It arifeth, ('to (peak generally) from the oppo- fition of things ; we oppofe either Phxnomcna’s to Phenomena'’ s, or Intellsgthles to Intelligible s, or the former to the latter. Pbosnomena^s to Phseno- mena s, when we fay, the fame Tower feemeth afar off, round, near, fquare : Intelligibles to In- telligibles, as when to him, who from the order of the Celeftial Bodies, argues, there is a Pro¬ vidence, we oppofe, that Good Men are often Unfortunate; Bad Men, Fortunate, and thence infer, there is no Providence : Intelligibles to Phee- nomena's, as Anaxagoras, to Snow is white, oppo- fed that Water is Snow concrete', but Water is black, therefore Snow is black.
Again, we foraetimes oppofe things Prefent to the Preje«f, as thofe we laft inftanced ; fometimes ihQPrejentiothQPafl, ovihQ Future, as when an Argument is propofed, which we are not able to refolve, we fay; ‘ As before^ rhe Author of the ‘ Se ‘ the Teafbn thereof did not feem found, and yec ^ the thing was the fame in nature ; fo it is like- ‘ ly, that a Reafon (or Argument) contrary to * this which you have alledged, may be fubfi- ^ftent in Nature, and not yet appear to us; ' wherefore we ought not to affent to any Ar- ‘ gument, how convincing foever it feems.
To fhew thefe oppofitions more exacftly, I will lay down theegmmon places by which Suf¬ penfion is collected, not afferting any thing of their Number or Power; for it ispoffible, they may be of no force, or more in Number than we reckon.
CHAP. XL
The ten Common place: of Sttfpenfon,
THe ancient Scepticks have delivered ten Moods, whence Sufpenfion feems to be Coilei'ted, which they call alfo Reafens zn6 (a)
places.
/
a Re. dlng perh.’ps Acres, for fo Lasrt. rS-ivt airj,
Acres,
sc EPT 1C ISM.