Part Xil.

One to the 0^he^. Wherefore, to include all Oppoficions, we lay, ail' manner cfwjtys. Or, ail manner of ways, cf V hsncmaia^ s ,ahd Intel- ligibles, not enquiiing how Thmcniemf^s feem, or how Intelligibles are undQilf ood-, • but taking them fimplv. . By contratj' Speeches, wfe mean not only Affirmatipn, and Negation, but fim- ply thofe which are repugfiant. we call an equality as to Belief or Unbelief j fo as neither of the repugnant Speeches is pre¬ ferred as more credible than the other. Sufpen- fion is a fettlement of the Intellect, whereby we neither affirm nor denysany thing. Ipdifiurhame is a compofure and tranquilitv of Mindr how Indifturbance is induced by Sufpenfion, -vye.ihall difcourfe when we come.to fpeak of the End.
A fprrhonian Philofopher is wholly addidired to the Sceptick Inftitution ; for he is fuch an one as participates of this Faculty.
CHAP. V.
The Principles o/Scepticifm.
THe final Catife (EnJ or Jim ) of Sceptidfm we hold to be, Hope of Indifturbance : for Man\Mind being troubled at the unfetled- nefs in things, and doubting what to affent unto, enquireth what is true and whaf falfe, that by determination thereof it may be quiet. But the chief ground of Sceptidfm, is, that to every Rea- fon there is an oppoftte Reafon equivalent , which makes us forbear to dogmatize.
C H A P. VI.
Whethtf the Sceptick dcgmatizeth, and hath a SeB, and treats. of Phyjick.
WE fay, The Sceptick doth not dogmatize :
not underftanding Dogma as fome do in the general acceptation, an ajjent to any thing ( for the Sceptick aficnteth to thofe Affedions [or Impreffions] which are neceflarily induced by Phantafie , as ( being hot or cold ) he will not fay, I think I am not heated or ceofd j but we fay, he doth not dogmatize in their fenfe who take Dogma, for an Jjj'ent to any of thofe non-ma- mfefi things which are enquired into by Sciences. For a Pyrrhoman Philofopher affentsto nothing that is not manifeft : neither doth he dogmatize when he prdnounceth the Sceptick Phrafes con¬ cerning things not manifeft-, as. Nothing rather, or, 1 ajfert nothing^ or any of the reft, of which hereafter. For he who dogmatizeth, aflerteth the thing, which he is faid to dogmatize, to be fuch y but a Sceptick ufeth thefe, expreffions not as pcfitive, for he conceiveth that this Propofi- tion, Jll things are falfe, ( amongft the reft ) declareth if felf alfo to be falfe; in like manner this. Nothing is true ; fo this , Nothing rather, ( amongft others ) implies icfeif is nothing rather to be, credited ; fo as ( together with the reft ) it circumfcribeth it felf. The fame we hold conceriiing the reft of diQ Sceptick Phrafes. Now if he who dogmatizeth, alTerteth that which Jie dogmatizeth to be fuch ; but the Sceptick delivers his expreffions in fuch manner as they
may be circumferibed by themfelves, he cannot be faid- to dogmatize. Moreover, in thefe Ex- preflions he fpeaketh that which appeareth fo' to him, and declareth how he is affeded, with¬ out engaging his Opinion, [or Judgment) butaf-' certaining nothing concerning external objeds.
The fame courfe we obferve, being demand-r , ed IFhether the Sceptick hath a SeB', If a Man underftand SeB, to be an inclination to many Dogma’s or Tenents, which have a mutual , confequence , and likewife Phxnomtna s , and rake Dogma to be an afient to foruething not manifeft; we fay he hath not a SeB. But ta¬ king SeB to be an Inftitution , which accor- , ding to the Phxnomencn, adhereth to fome kind ’ of Reafon, that Reafon {hewing how to live rightly ( meaning rightly, not only according to Virtue , but more fimply, and tending to Sufpenfion of Aflsnt ) we fay, he hath a SeB ; for we follow fome certain reafon according to the Phenomenon, which {heweth how to live ac¬ cording to the Rites, Laws, and inflitutes of our Country, and our own Affedions.
The like we fay to thofe who enquire, the Sceptick treats of Phyfick ; as to Aflention grounded on a firm belief of any Pbyfical dogm,* we have nothing to do with Phyfick : But, as to equal oppofition of all Speeches, even in Phyfick, we obtain Indifturbance, and thus alfo we deliver the Lcgick and Ethick parts of that which is called Philofophy.
CHAP. VII. j
Whether the Scepticks take away PhcEnomena’s.
T Hey who fay, the Scepticks take away Vhcetio- mena’s, feem not to underftand what we have faid : For we fubvert not thofe Pathetjeks ;
in Phantafy, which force us againft our Wills *
to an Affent, (as we faid before } Such are ncmenas ; For, when we enquire whether the Subjed be fuch as it appeats, we grant that it ' ,
appears; but we enquire (not ihetPhenome- ‘ ,
non, but ) of that which is faid concerning the Pbcenomenon. For inftance, Honey feemeth to |
us to be Sweet; this we grant, for we find it |
fuch to our Senfe ; but whether Sweet come I
within the reach of Reafon, we doubt : this is j
not the Phenomenon, but that which is faid con- :
cerning the Phenomenon. Moreover, when we i
raife queitions concerning the Phenomenon, we j
endeavour not to fubvert the ('thefe i
we prefuppofe) but only to difeover the Teme¬ rity of the Dogmatifts. For if reafon be fofal- I
lacious, that it almoft takes away Phenomena’s |
from our Eyes, how can we but miftruft it in. ■
things not manifeft , . rather then precipitately |
follow it ? ■ • );
CHAP. VIII.
The Criterie 0/ Scepticifm.
THat we acquifee in Phenomena s, is mani¬ feft from what we fay concerning the Cri¬ terie of the Sceptick Inftitution. Criterie is un- derftood two ways ; One is, that whereby we be¬ lieve a Thing so be, or not be, ( of this here¬ after.
SCEf Tic ii.M.
^77