Part XL

ZENO.
45^
CHAP. III.
His Opinions,
a Ariflot. TT E held, (tfj That it is itppofSble, that
di Zenon. XJL if there be any thing, it c;^n be genera¬ ted, or made ; afTerting this of God : For it is neceffary, that whatfoever is generated, is ge¬ nerated either of things like^ or of things un¬ like ; bat neither of thefe is poffible : For a thing like may as well generate its like, as be generated of it, forafmuch as amongft things aqual and alike, all things are in a like refped: to one another. But neither can an ui>iike be generated of a like ; for whether a ftronger be made of a weaker, or a greater of a lelTer, or a worfe of a bett^ ; or on the contrary, the bet¬ ter be made or the worfe, of a non Ens will be made fomething, which can no way be. For this Reafon, He afferted God to be Eternal : And if God be that which is the moft excellent of all things, it is requifite, faith he. That he be One ; for if there were two or more, he could ^by no means be the moft excellent of all, fofaf- much as every God of them, being like him, would be fuch as he. Now God, and the power of God is fuch, as that it governs, but is not governed ; it governs all things, fo that if there were any thing better than he, he could not be God. If therefore there were many, and of thefe fome were better, others worfe, they could not be Gods, for God cannot be inferior, or fub- jetfted , or governed. Neither if they were equal , could God be more excellent than all , things elfe ; for what is equal muft neither be better nor worfe than that to which it is equal ,• therefore if there be a God, and He be fuch, this God muft be Onely One ; otherwife, he could not do all things that he would ; becaufe, if there were more, the one could not be of abfolute power. Now God being one, he further af¬ firms, That he is every way like himfelf, as to feeing, and hearing , and all other fenfes ; for otherwife, the parts of God would not be moft excellent, but exceeded by one another, which is impoffible. Now being every way alike, he muft be round, for he muft not be partly of one fafhion, partly of another. Thus being eter¬ nal, and one, and round, he is neither finite
nor infinite; infinite he is not, for that hath neither middle, nor beginning, nor end, nor any other part, but an Ens cannot be fuch as is a non Ens. If there were many, they would bound one another ; but Om is neither like to a non Ens, nor to many, for One hath nothing where¬ by it may be bounded. Moreover, God bein^ fuch an One , is neither moved nor immovable, for that which is immovable is non Ens, Nei¬ ther can any thing pafsinto it, nor it into ano¬ ther. Again, the Things which are moved are more than one; for a Thing muft be moved into another ; now if that which is not, is not moved, forafmuch as that which is not, is no where ; and thofe things which are moved, muft be more than one; hence he affirmeth. That thofe which are moved arc .two, or more than one ; and that non Ens refts, for it is immova¬ ble , but One neither refts nor moveth , foraf¬ much as it is neither non Ens, nor many. Thus he alferted. That God is Eternal, and One, and'
Like, and Round; neither Infinite, nor Finite; neither Quiefcent, nor Movable.
(h) Moreover he afferted. That there are b many Worlds ; that there is no Vacuum; That the Nature of all things confifts of Hot and Moift, and Cold and Dry, mutually interchang¬ ed ; That Man was made of Earth, and his Soul contemperated of thofe Four , neither of them being predominant.
(c) Againft Place he argued thus ; If every c Arifltt. Ens be in a Place, there muft be a Place of that Phf’ Place, and fo to Infinite. '
AgainfPMotion, he alledged four Arguments :
The firft, that Nothing is moved ; for what¬ foever makes a Progreffion , muft come to the Middle, before it comes to the End. The fe- cond is that which is termed Achilles , that a flow Thing will never be overtaken by a fwift; for the thing which followeth muft neceflarily come to the place from which that which went before departed, therefore that which went be¬ fore makes a continual Progreffion as well as the other. The third, if every thing refts when it is in its juft place, and, in every moment, every thing is in its juft place, an Arrow flying is im¬ movable. The fourth , that if Things were moved, as for Example, if equal Bulks were mo¬ ved, one from the Beginning of the Rac^ ano¬ ther from the Middle, alike fwiftly, it would • come to pafs, that the Half of Time would be equal to the Whole.
Mmm 3 LEV C IV TV S.
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