Part Xl

448 Parmenides.
CHAP. III.
Of Idaai, >
BUt the Affertion for which he became moft eminent, was that of Uaasy delivered by Tlatoio. a Dialogue, which he entitled Parmeni¬ des, or of Idea's ; the fum whereof is this :
All is One, and Many ; One the Archetype, Idaea ; Many the Singulars.
There are Idea's, that is, certain common Natures, which include all Singulars, and are the Caufes of them, from which they have both their Effence and Name. Tbefe ^re Species, the Many exift, as they participate of One, in thefe Species,
The Species fo include all Singulars, as that they may combine them, and difference them j for there is a twofold power of fpecifick Diffe¬ rences, Compoficive and Diferetive.
The vifible things (Kew the power of this One ; all Singulars are reduced to a One, that is, to their refpedtive Communities; and fo particular things can neither fubfift nor be ap¬ prehended, but in this community of Species ; therefore the Species is one thing, the Individna contained in the Species, another.
Thefe Idea's fubfift two ways; in our Minds, as Notions ; in Nature , as Caufes, In our Minds they exift, as they arevarioully compre¬ hended by us, according to divers manifold re- fpeds. In Nature they exift, as they are I^a:al forms, and have the power both of exiftence and denomination. All Beings are reduced to this unity of Idaa. Thus are they infen fible vilible things, and the kinds of them are Simili¬ tude, Diffimiiitude, Unity, Multitude, Reft, Motion, &c. Things vifible are, or are denomi¬ nated Like, inafmuch as they participate of Si¬ militude, which is the Id^a of things Like ; Great or Little, inafmuch as they participate of the Idaa of Greatnefs or Littlenefs, &c. The like of Man himfelf, for many Individual Men are fuch by participation of the Idaa of Man, ( as if we flrould fay Homineity ) which hath a perma¬ nent Subfiftence, whereas particular Men are in perpetual Fluxion and Mutation.
The fame power of the one in Uaa's, is alfo in things comprehended by difeourfe: they like- wife have a Form fubfiftent by and of it felf ; fo that to know the nature of Intelligibles, they triuft be recalled to the unite of Idaa. For in- ffance ; if we would underftand the nature of Good things, we muft proceed in fuch manner as that we may arrive at the Uaa of Good, which is the very Form of Good, whence all things that participate thereof, are, and are cal¬ led Good^ So that there aretwodiftindt things, the Form of things, winch fubfifts of it felf, and the Things jhemfelves, fenfible or intelligible Idaa is twofold, dvA 70 0 457 ly ts dyi^v,
the fair, -which ts alfo the good, and all the things which we underftand as being Uaa's ; The firft is God, the fecond the Species of things in the Older of Nature.
As concerning tl',e fecond Uaa's, there is a One, that is the foundation of all Singulars ; out of which, as from a Thread, the whole Web ( as it were J qIl bidividmm' s is woven.
One and the fame Species in many Individu¬ als, which exift feparately, is wholly together One, and not feparate from it lelf, but whole in it felf.
The Many fthatis. Singulars/ fo parti ci}).ite of their Uaa's, in fuch manner as that the Uaa's are not divifible, but preferve their own Effence in themfelves, over and above.nl! the Singulars ; that is, they have their Effence in themfelves, and not in reference to us.
Uaa's are notions of the Mind, and fubfift iri our Mind ; yet fo, as that primarily, and of themfelves they exift in Nature. So as thefe Notions fubfift no otherwife in our Minds than as tliey refemble thofe eternal Forms of Nature, that is, not as real Beings, but as Similitudes and Images of Beings. So that from thefe which fubfift of themfelves, as a communication is derived to the Notions that are in our Mind; for otherwife, if the Ida I's themfelves, or the whole Species, were in our Minds, Notions would not be Notions, and Ens, non Ens,_ forafmuch .as the things themfelves arevaric^ufiy perceived by fevera! Men.
Befides, there would follow a great confufi- on and diforder in the things themfelves, if there were continually produced new Forms of things at Man’s pleafure; which muft needs be, iftlie Mind of Man could form them, and that what- foever a Man imagined in hia Mind, became immediately a Species.
Again, by tliis means, the moft excellent Sci¬ ence of all things, that is in God, would be de¬ nied to be in Him, whofe Mind is the Original of all things ; fo as it were a great abfurdicy to attribute to Man, a Mind procreative of Species, and to deny it to God, who governs all things.
Therefore Species have not their dependance on the Mind of Man ; on the contrary, they are unknown to human Nature, or Mankind. The Gens/s and Effence of every thing is of it felf, not exifting in the Singulars, but the fupport and foundation of the Singulars.
Moreover, if there were not certain Species of things, there would be a great confufion in all Sciences, they being of Univerfals ; for no Man comprehends in his Mind all Individuals; it were infinite and full of diforder to take that courfe ; fo that all Philofophy and differtation would lofe the truth and certain knowledge of things: whereas, on the contrary, in all Sci¬ ence, the true courfe of Learning is to reduce Particulars to their proper Species, whence may appear their Nature and Qualities.
Of the Primary Archetypal Uaa, the Effen- cial Properties ; and they are thefe.
Firft, It is not Many, ( that is, it is not in¬ termingled widi generated Beings, of whichjt is the Original ;) for it is voidof Parts and Fi¬ gure, being infinite.
Secondly, It is void of all Motions and Muta¬ tion, remainirig always immovable and the fame.
Thirdly, It is void of all Age and Time, be¬ ing eternal, neither elder nor younger, nor any way partaking of Time, fubjscft to no circum- ftances of Time, all things being always pre- • fent to it.
Fourthly, It partakes not of that Effence by which Singulars are faid to be, but communicates the power a^id faculty of Being to all Singulars,
icfelf
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