Part I.

THALES.
but whether that be argument enough, to deny, that Thales had it from the -Egyptians, I que
Tlie fecond reafon may be queftioned by comparing the a£ls of the memory.^ and renuni-
^ De myftcr. 'Julf. inh
pi.
ftion ; that they held it in the fame manner, WQ'fcence-., the firft occafion’d by exterior things yet
may learn by ^ yatnblichns^ Befides, Pythagoras and Plato (whom Plutarch ]ojns in the Tenet with Thales ) drew their learning from the fame fountain.
Se£l. 4. Of the Soul.
• Veplac. Phil. 4. 2,
De anima.
1. 2.
* Pinto in Tima.
objective only, lb that the motion is within her felf 5 but by the other Ihe moves her lelf, from a privation to a habit, without the help of any exterior,
It is worth notice, that among thefe and other reafons alledg’d by ' Arif ole to deftroy this ' De mmi. _ alTertion, one is the poflibility of the refurrefcdi- 3*
P Put arch 2.x\AStobi€//s that Thales Ji> ft af on of the Body; but this ^ mp'-pya.
firni’d the Soul to be «v78wy»7*V, a felf moving From the lecond part of the difference in the
nature. * Arijtotle that he calls in | definition f from moving other things) .
refpeQ to the motion it gives to other things, | les argued, that the Load-fione.^ and Amber had in which are included both parts of the defini- 1 fouls -, the firft becaule it draws Iron •, the le- tionofthe'^P/tf/^?^^T, a fubflance.^ having ivithin cond ftraw. He further ( faith Laertius^ ^ffer- it felf a power to move it felf and other things : { ted thofe things we count inanimate.^ to have fouls * which ^ Plato argues to this effeft : The frjt of arguing it from the loadftone and amber : The reafon
of which latter example, ^ Aldohrandinus iakh-A ly interprets its change of colour, and jarring as it were at Prilen ; But * Asiftole more plain-.'
for of thofe whom we mentioned., Thaks feems to have taken the Soul to be fomething apt
to move,, fine e he affirmed a flone to have a Soul., be- caufe it moved Iron.
He afferted likewile the Soul ( of Man ) to be immortal, and according to ^ was*
the firft that held ' lb. ^ Cicero aferibes the ori- ^ ginal of this opinion to Pherecydes, but it rather leems'to have been brought by Thales from the Egyptians; that they held fo *' Herodotus^ Lib. attefts.
» Slob. Ed. fhyf. lib, ifc
* Arifl. de am ma, I, 2.
^ Tiifcuh mfi. i.
motions n that whereby a thing moves it felf-., the fecond, that whereby it moves another : Eveiy thing that moves it felf lives •, eveiy living thing lives, hecaufe it moves it felf, therefore the power of felf ■ motion is the ejfence of that fubflance which we call the Soul, which Soul Is the caufe of the firji generation and motion of things which are, were, and fhall be-, and of all their contraries, as of all tr an f mutation, the principal of motion, and there¬ fore more antient than the Body, which it moves by a fecond motion. And afterwards declares thefe to be the names of the Souls motion, to will, to Confider, to take Care, to Confult, to judge Rightly, and not Rightly, to Joy, to Grieve, to Dare, to Pear, to Hate, to Love, and the like. Thefe which are the fi/fi motions, and fufeipient of the fecond corporal, bring all things into augmen¬ tation, and decreafe, converfion, or condemnation, and denfation,or rarefatfion. This opinion firft raf¬ fed by Thales, was entertained in the Schools with tire aflent of ^ Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Socrates, and Plato, till exploded by ^ Ariflotle, whofe chief arguments againft it were thele. i. That nothing is moved but what is in place, nothing in place but what hath quantity, which becaule the Ibul wants none of the four kinds of moti¬ on {viz. Lation, Alteration, Diminution, Ac¬ cretion ) are competible ( per fe ) to her. Se¬ condly, that fell-motion is not effential to the Soul, hecaufe Ihe is moved accidentally, by external objcHs. The firft, if underftood of Circumfeription, not only denies the motion of all things, that are definitively in place, as Spi¬ rits, but of the higheft Iphere, if compared with Arifiotle\ definition of place ; yet that Ibme of thele fpeciss of motion, though in a different ex¬ traordinary manner, are competent to the foul, and not accidentally, may be argued i. From the further dift'ufion of the Soul, according to the augmentation of the Body. 2. From intel- leclion, which is acknowledg’d a perfeHion, and conlequently a kind of alteration, which that Thales underftood to be one of the Soul’s moti¬ ons, is clear from that Apothegm aferibed to him by Laertius, the fwiftefi of things is the mind, for it over runs all things : Whence Cicero{con- felling almoft in every word of Thales, that nothing is fwif ter than we mind, that no fwiftnejs may compare wit h the fwiftnefs of the mind) would interpret the ot'Arifiole, a continued and
perpetual motion^
Laert,
Tufe.
I.
Laert.
Deplac,
I.
Se£l. 5 . Of the World.
T Hales held, (^) that there was but one World, * Plutarch and that (‘’) made by God-, which truth was pl‘^ follow’d by allPhilofophers; as Ariflole con-^ feffeth, untill he reje£led it, to defend , by the ' De Cxlo. contrary, an affertion equally falle; that the^* '\Noi\di\sQ\Qi\aRimg,which could not be, faith he, if it had beginning.
That ■* the Worldbe.ing God's Work, is thefaireji a of things, whatfoever dfpofedin lively order being apart thereof, for which reafon Pythagoras (accor¬ ding to ' Pultarch ) called it firft kGh©-.
That Night is elder than Day. This Circum- ftance of the Creation was held likewile by ^ Orpheus, and Hefiod, who had it from the^ Timth. Phoenicians : For this reafon the * ans, ^ Germans, and ^ Gauls reckoned hj mor.Germ. Nights. * c&far. de
TPaithe^ World is animated, and that ^God^^^^ in the Soul thereof, diffus'^d through every part, ^ whofe divine moving virtue penetrates through the element of Water. Thus explained by the Herme- tick Philolbphers, the divine Spirit who pro¬ duc’d this World out of the firft Water, be¬ ing infus’d as it were, by a continual inlpiration into the works of' nature, and diffus'd largely through, by a certain fecret, and continual aH:, moving the whole, and every particular accor¬ ding to its kind, is the Soul of the World.
That the *' World is contained in place. This ** Laett. agrees with the definition of place hj fpace RH" but they who with Ariflole define place a fuper-‘^'
/c/Vx, though they hold the parts ofthe World to be in place, as forced to deny the whole to be lb.
That
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