Part VIII.

x?jiroTHf, The Science of well-doing. '^vKmuvm’ieLy The Science of equality in com¬ munity.
’Euo-uuAAAct?**, The Science of contrafling ho- neftly with others*
b Laert b In like manner of Vices, feme are primary,
others fubordinate to the primary. The primary vices are. Imprudence^ Intemperance^ Vufillani- mityt Injujlice.
c stob. ’Affo- c Imprudence is the ignorance of things good, trwtiyfi iy- and neuter-, and the ignorance of things to roia-v d.yjtBvi'i ^e done, and neuter.
fj'JjCTJ." I Intemperance is the ignorance of things expe- 'kyroLv uv ^ tible, avoidable and neuter.
^oiifliovy 5 lEufillammity is the ignorance of things grie- /» vous, not grievous and neuter. puppy t ^ i„jiipce is the ignorance of diftributing to to every one according to his defer ts. d Stob! d.ThQ fubordinate vices to thefe are correfpon
dent to the fecondary Virtues, as, dicestcrici, C^^- j'vv'oiAy KctKo^vrU, which are defined anfwerably to their oppofite Virtues.
e Stob. e Thele Virtues are perfe£l,and confift in con¬
templation -, but, there are other virtues, which are not Arts, but Faculties, confilling in Exercife, as, health of the Soul, integrity, and ftrength thereof^ and pulchritude. For, as the health of the Body is a good temperature of hot,cold,dry, and moift ^ fo the health of the Soul is a good temperature of the Doflrines in the Soul. And as the ftrength of the Body confifteth in a tenfi- on of the Nerves -, fo the ftrength of the Soul in a proper extenfion thereof to judgment and aflion. And as the Beauty of the Body is a fymmetry of all the parts \p one another, and to the whole : fo the beauty of the Soul is the lymmetry of theReafon and parts thereof, to the whole, and to one another.
/All thofe Virtues which are Sciences and f Stob. common theorems, and the fame
end, wherefore they are (as g Zeno faith) infe- %tok' parable, connexed to one another, as
Apollodorus and Hecaton affirm. He who hath h Plut. repuff). one, hath all, ( faith h Chryfippus) and he who stoic. according to one, doth according to all. He
who hath virtue, is not only contemplative, but alfo praftick of thofe tihings which are to be done. Things vvhich are ’to be done are either •expetible, tolerable, diftributible, or retainable; fo that whofoever doth one thing wifely, doth another juftly,another conftantly,another tempe¬ rately 5 and fo is both wife, magnanimous, juft, and temperate.
i Stob. t Notwithftanding thefe Virtues differ from
one another by their heads: For, the heads of Prudence are, to contemplate and do well ; that which is to be done in the firft place, and in the lecond, to contemplate what things are to be a- voided, as obftruflive to that which is to be done. The proper head of Temperance is to compole our own appetites in the firft place, and to con- fider them ; in the fecond, thofe under the fub¬ ordinate virtues, as being obftruQive and diver- tive of appeties. The heads of Fortitude are in the firft place, to confiider all that we are to un¬ dergo ; in the Iccond, other fubordinate Virtues. The heads of Juftice are in the firft place, to confider what every one deferves ; in the fecond, the reft. For all virtues confider the things that belong to all, and the fubordinate to one^nother. Whence Panieti//sPd.lth,\t is in virtue as in many
V, 325
I Archers, who Ihoot at one Mark, diftinguifiied by divers colours : every one aims at the mark, but one propofes to himfelf the white line, ano- ther the black, and fo of the reft. For, all thefe place their ultimate end in hitting the mark but every one propofes to himfelf a feveral manner of hitting : fo all Virtues have Beatitude, which is placed conformably to nature for their end but feveral perfons purfue it feveral ways. *
^ As virtues are infeparable, fo are they thet lame fubftantially with the fupream part of the Soul, in which refpefl all virtue is laid to be a Body, for the Intellefl and Soul are a Body; for the Soul is a warm fpirit innate in us. Therefore our Soul is a living creature, for it hath life and fenfe, efpecially the fupream part thereof,called the Intellefl. Wherefore all virtue is a living creature, becaufe it is effentially the intelled.
And therefore isconfequent to this affertion.
I Between virtue and vice there is no medium / stob ( contrary to the Peripateticks, whoaflert a mean progreflion betwixt virtue and vice) for all men have a natural appetite to good ; and as a flick is either ftraight or crooked, fo man mull be ei¬ ther juft or unjuft ; but cannot be either more or lels juft or unjuft.
m That Virtue may be learned, is afferted by Chryjippusy in his firft Book of the End, and by ^ Cleanthes and Poffidonimm his Exhortations, and Hecaton.^ becaufe men of bad are made good.
n That it may be loft, is likewife affirmed by ChryJippttSy denied by Cleanthes. The firft laith, " it may be loft by Drunkennefs or Madnelk : the other, that it cannot be loft, by reafon of the firm comprehenfions of the Soul.
0 Virtue is in it felf Virtue, and not for hope or fear of any external thing. It is expetible in ^ it felf; for which realbn, when we do any thing amifs, we are alhamed, as knowing that only to be good, which is honeft.
q In Virtue confifteth Felicity, for the end of Virtue is to live convenient to Nature. Every 1* Virtue is able to make a Man live convenient to Nature : for, Man hath natural inclinations for the finding out of Offices, for the compofure of Appetites, for tolwance and dilbibution. Virtue therefore is felf-lufficient to Beatitude, as Zeno Chryfippus.ydxA. Hecaton affert. For it, laith he. Magnanimity, as conceiving all things to be be¬ low it felf, is felf-lufficient, and that be a part of Virtue, Virtue it felf, which defpifeth all things that obftrufl her, muft alfo be lelf-lufficient to
reth the afliftance of health, ftrength, and necef- faries ; yet,th^ hold, that Virtue is always ufed, zsCieanthes affirms, for it cannot be loft, and is alwayspraflis’d by a perfeH: mind,which isgood.
s Juftice is not by nature, but by prefeription, as Law and right reafon : Thus Chryjippits in his ^ Book of Honefty.
/ Virtue hath many Attributes, it is called,
1. 'AyoL^h, a good, becaufe it leadeth us to right life.
2. becaufe it is approved without any controverfie, as being molt excellent.
cansS'euoVy becaufe ’tis worthy of much ftudy.
'’E'lraxvirhvy bccaufe it may juft^ be prailed,
5, KctAa»', becaufe it inviteth thofe that defire it. - 6,
526
rf Stah.
b Stob.
c Stob.
e Stob.
f Stob.
g Stob.
ZENO.
P A R TrVIII.
6. becaule it conduceth to goodnefs I our common Law. Right Reafon, which is
of Life. current amongft all, being the very fame that is
7. becaule it is uleful.
8. becaufe it is rightly expetible. p. dvciyiocuov, becaufe being prelent it profitethj
being ablent, it doth not.
10. Ai/(r ceeds the labour.
1 1. becaufe it is alone fufficient to him that hath it.
12- becaufe it takes away all want.
13. becaufe it is common in ule, and
extendethto all the ulesof life;
CHAP. X. ' ^
Of the End.

X ceSare done, butit felf is not done for the fake of any .• or that to which all things done conveniently in life are referred, it felf is referred to nothing. '
b The end is taken three ways : Firft, for the final good,ivhich conlifteth in rational converla- tion : Secondly, for the Icope, which is conve¬ nient life, in relation thereto .- Laftly, for the ul¬ timate of expetibles, unto which all the reft are referred.
c Scope and end differ 5 for Scope is the pro- poled Body, which they who purfte Beatitude aim at. Felicity is propoled as the fcope, but the end is the attainment of that felicity. If a man throw a Spear or an Arrow at any thing, he mull do all things that he may take his aim aright, and yet fo, as to do all things whereby he may hit : So when we fay, it is the ultimate end of Man to obtain the principles of Nature, we im¬ ply in like manner, he mult do all things necelTa- ry to taking aim, and all things likewife to the hitting of the Mark but, this is the laft,the chief good in life, that is to be leleQied, not defired.
Realbn being given to rational creatures, for the moll perfebl direStion, to live according to reafon, is in them to live according to nature, that being the Artificer of Appetite. Hence c Zeno firft (in hisdifcourfe of humane nature) affirms, that the end is, to live conformably, that is, to live according to ones own Reafon concordantly,- as on the contrary. Savage Beafts that are always at difference, live miferably.
/ The followers of Zeno., conceiving his ex- preflion not full enough, enlarged it. Frft Qean- thes his Succeftbr, zdAt^Lto nature., making it up thus. The End is to live conformably to Nature^ which is to live according to Virtue-, for Nature leads us to Virtue. Thus Cleanthes in his Book of Tleajure., and ToJJidonius., and Hecaton in his Book of Ends.
g Chryjtppus., to make the expreffion of Clean¬ thes more clear, expounds it thus, To live accord¬ ing to expert knowledge of things which happen na¬ turally ; F Qr our natures are parts of the Univerfe, our end therefore is to live conformably to Na¬ ture, which Chryfppus, in his firft Book of Ends, expounds, both our own proper humane Nature, and lAewife the common nature of the Univerle, But.Cleanthes~2Ll{ovjs only common Nature to be followed, and not.the particular. To live accord¬ ing to this knowledge, is all one, as to live accord- k^^^to Virtue, not doing any thing forbidden by
in God, the Governor of all. The virtue thereof and the beatitude of a happy man, is, when all things are ordered according to the cbrre- Ipondence of a mans Genius, with the will of him who Governs the Univerle.
h Diogenes defineth the End, a good ufe ofh stob. Reafon Jn the eleUionandrcfufal of natural things., chujing t hofe that are according to nature., and rc-* fufing thofe that are fepugnaiit to nature. So like¬ wife Antipater.
Archidemus defineth it, To live., performing compleatly all offices,choofng of thfffe tfnngs'wbich * are according to p'ature, the greateft and moji ' principal, and not to be able to tranfgrefs them. ' - ' Tan given us by nature.
Tofjidonius, to live contemplating the truth and order of the Univerfe.
' Thus by living according to nature, the Sto-/ ck. dcfir.. 4. icks underftand three things .- Firft, to live accor¬ ding to the knowledge of thofe things which happen by nature. This is Zeno\ End, to live con¬ venient to nature. Secondly, to live, prelernng all, or the greater part of mean Offices. This ex- pofition differeth from tlie former ; for that is a ReUitude, proper only to a wife man, this is the office of a progreflive, not perfeU perfon, which may likwife be to the foolilh. The third is, to live in enjoyment of all, or the greater part of thofe things which are actording to nature. This is not conftituted in our aUion, for it confifteth of that kind of life which enjoyeth virtue, and of thofe things whfch are according to nature^ and are not in our power.
k The chief good therefore, is to live fuitably ^ to the knowledge of thole things which arrive by nature, eleUive of thofe which are according to nature, andrejeblive of thole which are con¬ trary to nature. I This is to live conveniently ^ and conformably to nature, when the Soul en- Urm. * tring into the path of Virtue, walketh by the fteps and guidance of right reafon, and foUow- eth God. That which is in other arts is artificial, is here epigematick and confequent. ’
m This End is Beatitc^. beatitude by Zeno, m Stob. is defined a good courfeoflife, which definition is ufed likewile hsp Cleanthes 2fdiChryJippus,2Lndi2L\\ . their followers, wfio affirm Beatitude to be no¬ thing but a happy life. *
Eai?\ and good, and Virtue,2LT\dL that which par¬ ticipates of Virtue,2XQ equivalent terms,whence it follows that n Beatitude is all one with living ^ according to Virtue. 0 And as Good, and Virtue ” cfc! * admit no degrees of increafe or diminution, nei¬ ther doth the ultimate end of all good and vir¬ tue increafe or diminilh. For, as they who are drowned, are no more able to breath, tho they are nearer to the top of the Water than they who are in the bottom ^ nor a little Whelp, the time of whofe fight approacheth, fee any more than one that is newly littered ^ lb he, wffio hath made Ibme little progrefs in Virtue, is no lefs in mifery than he who hath made none.
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C
H A P*
1
PA RT VIII.
ZENO.
327
CHAP. XL
Of Indiffcrents.
: Ck.
O’
i-acrU
C Ck. defin. 3
d Sext. Emf. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. %2. whence fupply Laertius and Scobxus.
F things, as we have Laid, Lome are good, fome ill, Lome indifferent, a To deny this difference of things, would be to confound all life, as Arifio doth ^ neither could there be anyfun£l:ionora8:ofWifdom, fincethat, if a- mongft thofe things which appertain to lite there were no difference, no eleflion were requifite.
Good and ill, as we faid,are thofe things which are honelf or dilhoneft. Of thele hitherto. Be¬ twixt both thefe, there are feme things which confer nothing to happy or unhappy life, called Indifferents. b To profit is a motion or Bate pro¬ ceeding from Virtue ^ to hurt is a motion or Hate proceeding from Vice ; but Indifferents neither profit nor hurt ^ fuch are Life, Health, Pleafure, Beauty, Strength, Riches, Honour, Nobility ,and their contraries •, Death, Sicknefs, Grief, Defor mity, Imbecillity, Poverty, Difhonour,Meannefs, and the like. Thus Hecaton in his feventh Book of £'/?^/j',and Apollodoriis in his Ethicks^'dindChry Jippus. Thefe therefore are not goods, but indif¬ ferents. For, as the property of heat is to warm, not to cool *, fo is it of good to profit, not to hurt. But health and wealth do not hurt more than they profit, therefore health and wealth are not goods. Again, that which we may ufe ill as well as well, is not good ^ but health and wealth may be ufed ill as well as well, therefore health and wealth are not goods. Yet Eojfidonhis reckons thefe amongft goods. ButHecaion in his ipth of Good, and Chryfippus of Pleafure, will not allow Pleafure a good : For Pleafures are diflionefl:,but nothing dilhoneft is good.
c Moreover, Riches, as Diogenes conceiveth, have not only this power that they guide to Pleafure and good health, but that they com- prile them. They do not the fame in Virtue nor in other Arts, whereto Money may be a guide, but it cannot contain thejtn. Thus if Plealure or health were good, Riches likewife fhould be num- bred amongft the good ^ but if wifdom be good, it followeth not that Riches likewife be good, nor that any thing which is not reckoned amongft the good j that which is good cannot be contain¬ ed by any thing which is not amongft the good. And alfo for this reafon, becaufe Sciences and comprehenlions of things, by which Arts are pro¬ duced, move appetition j but if Riches are not reckoned among the good, it followeth that no Art can be contained in Riches, and much lefs any Virtue, for Virtue requireth far more ftudy and exercifethan Art, and comprifeth the firm nefs, ftability, and conftancy of all life, which Art doth not.
d Things are laid to be indifferent in three re- fpeffs .- Firft, if they move neither appetite nor averfion, as, if the Stars be of even number, or to have even or uneven hairs on our head, to ftretch out the finger this way or that way, to take up a ftraw, and the like. Secondly, things are faid to be indifferent which move appetite and averfion equally,, not one more than the o- ther-, as in two pieces of Silver of equal value, no
petition to the election of one, but. not more of this than of that. The third kind of indifferents are thofe which are neither good nor , ill, expe- tible nor avoidable, conducing neither to happi- nefs nor unhappinefs. In this Senfe all things are called indifferent, which are betwixt Virtue and Vice, as Health, Wealth, Strength, Glory, and the like^ for we may be happy without thefe, tho their ufe hath fome relation to happinefs, their abufe to unhappinefs. In this fenle whatfoever we may fometimes ufe well, other times ill, is, indifferent, which kind appertaineth chiefly to Ethick.
Again, of indifferents feme are NaturaA
and move appetite, as health, ftrength,foundnefs ^ of fenfe,and the like -, fome Fraternaturalyvhich move averfion, as ficknels, infirmity, and the like i feme Neuter., -which move neither appe^ tite nor averfion, as the conftitution of the Soul and Body, one capable of receiving Phantafies, the other wounds. , ,
/ Of Natural and prcEternatural indifferents,/ fome are primary, others by participation.Frma- ry natural indifferents are motions or affeElions convenient with reafon, as health and ftrength, Farticipant are thofe by wliich that motion or af feOiion is communicated, as a healthful Body, found Senfe. g Fraternatt(ral\vA\^QiQXiXS'3iiQX]xt g stoBl. contrary to thefe.
CHAP. XII.
Of Ejlimation.
I
Estimation, dgU, is a certain concurrence with convenient life, a which concerns all good. b Eftimation is twofold •, one, a mediate power ^ or ufe concurring with life according to nature^ iicli we call health or wealth, as far as they con¬ duce to life, according to nature. The other is the valuation of the Eftimator, impofed by him who is skilfull in fuch things. ^
c Ag2i\n,EJlimation is taten three ways: Firft, ^ ^oidEiolu-XQ donation'. Secondly, ioi return of ap¬ probation-. Thirdly, as calls \x,Eledive,
by which, when feme things are propofed, we rather choofe thefe than thofe •, as health before ficknefs, life before death, and riches before po¬ verty. In like manner, difeftimation is taken three ways, the terms only changed to the contrary.
Donation according to Diogenes, is a judgment, that a thing is according to nature, or conferreth ufe thereto. Approbation is in man, not in things.
EleUicrn only in the good, not the indifferent.
d Hence followeth another diftinfton of in- ^ st»b. differents, whereof fome are preferred, fome re- Sext. Empir- jebfed, FomQ neither preferred nor reje^ed. Fre- Fytrh. fyp. 3. f erred are thofe, which tho they are indifferents, have neverthelefe a fufiicient reafon why they are to be had in eftimation, as health, feundnefe of fenfe, exemption from grief, glory, and the like. RejePled are thofe, which are not worthy any eftimation, as poverty, ficknefe,and the like.
Neuter are thofe, which are neither preferred nor reie8:ed, as to extend or contract the fin- ger-
_ , _ _ _ ... .... _ Thefe terms preferred, and reje£l-
vvay different, which to him who comes to make I cd, ^ were invented by Zeno, up-
choice of either, are indifferent. There is an ap- / on this ground .* t As when we Ipeak of the ^
( Court,
328
ZENO.