NOL
The history of philosophy: containing the lives, opinions, actions and discourses of the philosophers of every sect. Illustrated with the effigies of divers of them

Chapter 143

I. 6Un(7/f, a fpontaneous Will.

CHAP. III.
Of firfi Natural Appetite.
a ’ I '' H E firfi appetite of a living creature is ^
X to preferve it fclf, this being from the beginning proper to it by nature, asChryfippus in his firft Book of Ends, who affirms that the care our felves, and the confeioufnefs thereof, is the firft property of all living Creatures. For, Na¬ ture producing a living creature, intended either to alienate it from it felf, or to commend it un¬ to its own care 5 but the firft is not likely ^ it followeth therefore, that Nature commendeth ’ to every thing the prefervation of it felf, where¬ by it repulfeth whatfoever is hurtful, and pur- fueth what is convenient.
h As foon therefore as a living creature com- ^ _
eth into the World, it is conciliated to it felfj commended to the confervation of it felf and its own ftate, and to the Eleflion of fuch things as may preferve its ftate -, but alienated from De- ftruflion, and from all fuch things as may de- ftroy it. This is manifeft, in as much as before the acceffion of Pleafure or grief, young creatures defire thofe things which conduce to their well- fare, and refufe the contrary-, which would nor be, if they did not love their own ftate, and fear deftru£lion. Neither could they defire any thing without having fome fenfe of themfelves, where¬ by they love themfelves, and what belong to them.
Hence it is manifeft, that the principle of this' love is derived from themfelves.
c Whereas Tome do hold the firft appetite ^ Laa-t. of a living creature to be that of pleafure, that is falle d The greater part of Stoicks conceive ^ ck. de fin. that pleafure is not to be placed amongll the natural principles of love to our felves-, for if Nature had fo ordered it, many dilhoneft things would have followed, e Pleafure is an after ^ acceffion, when as Nature enquiring by it felf intoitfclf^receiveth thofe things which are agree¬ able to its conftitution, after which manner liv¬ ing creatures are exhilarated, and plants fprout forth. Nature hath thus far made no difference betwixt plants and living creatures, that whereas plants are ordered without appetite or fenfe, there is in living creatures fomething according to the nature of plants ; But, there being over and above in living creatures an innate appetite,
whereby •
3
3-
V
Z E _ Part VIIL
Dancer^ yet, not any, but one certain kind : fo the life that is to be afted, is in one certain kind
whereby they go to thole things that are proper for them, the natural part in them is governed
by the appetitive. , r t.- u- u
fr- f f f That we naturally lovethofe things which / lu e piu 3. propofed unto us by Nature, may be ar¬
gued from hence, in that there is no man, if both w'ere put to his choice, but had rather have all his Limbs able and found, than ufelefs and im- perfeft. Thefe comprehenfions we conceive fit to * be acquired for their own fake,becaufe they have in themfelves fornething,as it were, complex, in¬ cluding Truth. This is difcernable in young ones, whom we fee delighted, tho it nothing concerns . them, if they themfelves find out any thing by reafon. Even the Arts we conceive to be affumed for themfelves, as well becaufe in thefe there is fomething worthy alTumption, as becaufe they confift of knowledge, and contain fome- things conftituted by reafon and power.
C H A P. IV.
Of Appetites conjequent to the firjl.
'■^Hus according a to the firft innate princi- 3* J_ pies Qf Nature, thole things which are ac¬ cording to nature being expetible in themfelves their contraries avoidable in themfelves, the firft Office is toconferve it felf in the ftate of nature;, the next, to obtain thole things which are accord¬ ing to nature.
Here beginneth good to be firft underftood, for it is the firft conciliation of man to things ac¬ cording to nature. This good, as foon as man re- ceiverh intelligence or notion thereof, and foeth the order and concord of Offices, he efteemeth far above thofe things which he formerly loved j and by rational knowledge colle£leth, that herein is placed the chief good of man, laudable and ex¬ petible in it folf. To this chief good, which con- lifteth in homologie or convenience, all honeft aftions having reference, honefty it lelf, which is reckoned amongft the good, tho it rife afterward, is notwithftanding alone expetible in its own power and dignity. But, of thofe which are the ^ . firft obje£f s of nature, none is expetible in it lelf
Now whereas offices proceed from the firft natural obje£ls, they muft necellarily be referred to th3 lame; fo as all Offices tend to the fulfil¬ ling of the firft natural appetites ; yet, not fo, as if therein confifted the ultimate good. Honeft affion is in the firft conciliation of nature, for it is confequent,and arifeth as we faid afterward ; yet, it is according to nature, and much more alleQive than all that go before it.
And feeing that all Offices proceed from the firft natural appetites, even wifdom it felf muft be derived from thence likewife. But as it often happens, that he who is recommended to ano-. ther .more efteemeth him to whom he is recom¬ mended, than the perlbn which recommended him .* fo it is not ftrange, that we being recom¬ mended to wifdom by the firft natural appetite, afterwards more efteem that Wifdom, than thofe things wliereby we arrived at it. And as our Limbs are given to us for a certain reafon of ■ living, fo the appetition of the Soul is given, not for every kind of life, but for one certain form of living; fo likewife Reafon and perfefif Reafon. For, as Abfion is proper to a Player, Motion to a
not in any, which kind we call convenient and confentaneous. Wifdom is not like the Art of a Pilot, or a Phyfician; but rather to that Action we mentioned, and to Dancing, that the extream, that is, the effefition of the Art be in the Art it felf, and not extrinfecal. There is another fimili- j
tude betwixt Wifdom and thefe Arts, for in them are thole things which are done rightly ; yet, are |
not all the parts, whereof they confift, contain’d therein. Things done rightly, or Reaitudes,con- '
tain all numbers of Virtue ; for, only Wildom I
is wholly converted into it ielf, which is not in- I
other Alts. But improperly is the Art of a Pilot 1
and a Phyfician, compared with the ultimate of 1
Wifdom: For, Wifdom includeth Fortitude and ■
Juftice, and judgeth all things that happen to !
Man to be below it, which happeneth not in
other Arts: but none can hold thefe Virtues
which we laft mentioned, unlefs he affirm there is * 1
nothing that*s different, but honeft and dilhoneft.
CHAP. V.
Of Good and III.
Hitherto of Appetites; come next to their
Objefits. a Things (according to i?f/7i?)are ^ siol. whatfoever participate of Effence. Of Things, fome 2XQgood^ Lome i//, fome indifferent.
b Good is leveral vvays defined by the Stoicks; ^ cic. defin.^: but their definitions tend all to one end. c Good is Profit, or that which difterethnot from Profit. 20*. ^ ^ Profit is Virtue, and a virtuous ablion ; not dif¬ ferent from Profit is aVirtuousMan,and a Friend.
For ^inMQh€\n^2iquodammodotative Hegemo- niack,and virtuous aflion being an operation ac¬ cording to Virtue, is plainly Profit. A Virtuous man and a Friend is not different from profit j for Profit is a part of Virtuous, as being the He- gemoniack thereof Now the wholes are nei¬ ther the fame with their parts, for a man is not a hand; nor difterent from their parts, for they fubfift not without parts ; wherefore the whole is not different from its parts, and confequently, a virtuous man being the whole, m relpea of his Hegemoniack, which is profit, is not different ftom profit-
Good is by fome defined, that which is expeti- ble in it felf; by others, that which aflifteth to felicity, or compleateth it: by dOiogenes,ih2.teck.defm.-^l^ which is abfolute by nature [or, / that which/ is perfefl:, according to the nature of a rational . •
creature. ] The confequent thereof is a benefi¬ cent motion, or ftate ablolute in nature.
Whereas things are known, either byufe, or conjunQ:ion, or fimilitude, or collation, by this fourth kind is the knowledge of good ; for when from thofe things which are according to nature, the Mind afoendeth by collation of Reafon, then it attaineth the notion of good.
h Good is knowm and armed, not by acceffion, /, , c ..
increaie,or comparifon with other things, but by ■ *
its proper power. For as Honey, tho it be moft fweet : yet, in its proper kind of taft, not com¬ parative to any other, we perceive it to be fw'eet:
So this good of which we Ipeak, is that which is moft to be efteemed ; but that eftimation con- fifteth in the kind, not the magnitude For efti- matioi) being neither amongft the good nor ill,
whatfoever
\
f A RT VIII.
ZENO.
1 Ltert- Stob. I^Lnert.
I Laert.Stob. mLacrt.
n Stob.
0 Stob.
p Laert. Stob. Sext. Emp. rjirrh. hypot. 3
SI.
q Scxt. Empir.
itaert. Stob.
whatfoever you apply it to, it will remain in its kind. Different therefore is the proper e- ftimation of Vertue, which confilleth in the kind, not in increafe.
/ToGi?^?a'belongeth all Vertue, as Prudence, Juftice, Temperance, Fortitude, and whatfoe- ver participates ofthole,as VertuousA£lions,and Perfbns. k Accelfions here are Joy, Cheerfulnefs, and the like.
/ Ilk are the contrary Vices, as Imprudence, Injuflice, Intemperance , Pufillanimity , and whatfoever participates of Vice, as Vicious A flions and Ferfons. m The acceffions hereunto are difcontent, affliffion, and the like.
’ 71 Of Goods.^ fome, as we have laid, are Ver- tues^ others not Venues.^ as Joy, Hope, and the like. In like manner of J/A, fome are H/'ccj, as thofe already mention’d j others not Vicos, as Grief and Fear.
Again, o Of Goods, fome are continual in all the \''ertuous, and at all times; fuch is all Ver¬ tue, found Senle, wife -appetition , and the like.Others are as Joy, Hope, and
prudent Counfel, which are not in all the wife, nor at all times.
In like manner of 7/A, fome are continual in all, and always in the- Imprudent, as all Vice , and imprudent fenle, and imprudent Appetite .• Others intermilfive, as grief, fear, and impru¬ dent anfwer, which are not always in the wick¬ ed, nor at all times.
p Again, of Good, there are three kinds. The hVifi'om which Profit cometh, as from its firft caule,fuch is Vertue ; The fecond, by which profit cometh, as Vertue, and vertuous AtFion : The third, that which onay profit, as Vertue, and Vertuous Aflions, and a Vertuous Man,and a Friend, and the Gods and good Demons, j Thus the lecond fignificationincludeth the firft ; and the third, both the firft and fecond.
r In like manner of 7//^-, there are three kinds : Firft, that from which hurt originally proceed- eth, as Vice : Secondly, that by which hurt cometh, as vicious AHions : Laftly , and moft largely, whatfoever is able to hurt.
f Again, of Goods, Ibme are in the Soul, as Vertue, and vertuous AHions ; Some without the Soul, as a true Friend, a good Country, and the like : Some tteither within nor without the Soul : As good and Vertuous Men.
t In like manner of Ills, Ibme are within the Soul, as Vices, and vicious Aflions ; fome with¬ out the Soul, as imprudent Friends, Enemies, and thelike;fome neithet'vtlxYim nor without the Soul,as wicked Men, and all that participate of Vice.
u Of Goods within the Soul, fome are habits, fome affeUions, Ibme neither habits nor affe¬ ctions. The Vertices themfelves are affections ; their Jiudies habits , not affections theire alls neither habits nor affections .
^ In like manner of Ills, fome are affeHions, as Vices ; fome habits only, as infirmities of mind, and the like -, fome neither habits nor affections, as vicious actions.
y Again, Of Goods, fome are final, fome efficient, fome both final and efficient. A Friend, and the benefits arifingfrom him, ziq efficient Goods. Fortitude, Magnanimity , Liberty De¬ lectation, Joy, Tranquillity, and all^ Vertuous affions, are final Goods. Both efficient and
319
f Laert. Stob. Scxt. Emp. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 23.-
t Laert. Stob.
u Laert. Stob.
X Laert. Stob.
y Laert. Stob. Ck,de finib.' 3.
final, as all Vertues, as they perfe£l Felicity they are efficient, as they conftitute it as parts; thereof, final.
.eln like manner of 7/A, fome are final, fome iLacrt.stoi. efficient, fome both. Fear, bafenefs, fervitude;
Itupidity , ffowardnefs, grief; and all vi¬ cious actions, are final .• Participant of, are vi¬ ces, as they procure misfortune they are effici¬ ent, as they conftitute it as parts thereof, final.
a Again, Of Goods, fome are cxpetjble in ^ themfelves, notdefired for the Like of any other:
Others are preparatory to fome other, called effeaivbly expetible. The expetible in them¬ felves are ( according to Vnogenes ) of two kinds : i. Ultimately expetible, as Beatitude.
2. Thofe wlajeh have in them the caufe of be- ing'expetible, as every good hath.
Again, Of Goods fome ziq necejfary Bea-bstob. titude, as all Vertues and their AQs; others ' not necejfary, as Joy, delegation, and ftudy. Li like manner of Ills, fome are ncceftary to infeli¬ city, as all the vices and their A8cs ; others not neceffary thereunto, as all paffions aixi infirmi¬ ties of the Soul and the like.
Again, Of Goods, fome ccnfift in motioi], stob as Joy, delegation and the like -, Ibme in affe¬ ction, as quiet, imperturbation -, of thofe which confift in affection, fome are like wife in habit, as the Vertues ; others in affection only, as thd former. Neither confift the Vertues only in ha¬ bits, but other acts likewife, changed by a ver¬ tuous Man, in a manner into vertue. Of thefe Goods which are in habit, are thofe we call ftudies, as love of Learning, and the like. For thefe Arts by their affinity with Vertue lead di¬ rectly to our chief end.
Again, 7/ Of Goods, fome are ahfoluie, as Sci- ence ; others relative, as. honour, benevolence, " friendffiip, and the like.
e. Science is a certain infallible comprehenfion e stob, by reafbn. It is taken three ways. Firft, for a
ces, having a certainty. Laftly, for a demonftra- tive infallible habit of Phantafies by reafbn.
/ Wiendjhip,^ is a community of Life, andf confent of ftudies. The kinds thereof are fix.
1. yvaapccojcljn a Friendffiip amongft known perfons.
2. a-vraS-iict^ amongft: Familiars.
3. ijcLieia.^ Amongft thofe of the fame age.
4. towards Strangers.
5. avyyiviKri.^ amongft Kindred,
6. isdJiKi), from Love.
g Again, of Goods, fome are fwtple, as know-^-^^^'^^* ledg -, others tnixt, as, a good uft of
Children conformable to Nature, as Ivyma, ^ good ufe of old Age conformable to Nature,* ^(^«/ct,a good ule of Life conformable to Nature.
Exempt ion Jro77i Grief, dhvasr'ia..^ and confervati- on of Order, are the fame with, as the
mind is with prudence, and communion with goodnefs -, yet are otherwife referred , which is obfervable likewife in the other vertues. Hence are the lame diftinctions appliable to ill.
h Every good is beneficial, opportune, conduct: . j. ble,ufcful, comtnendablefair, helpjul, eligible, juji. ^
Beneficial, (rv(xoiepy, as conferring that wherC‘ by we receive Benefit.
Opportune, Eior, as compriling that whereof we ftund in need.
. Condit-
5 20
ZENO.
Part, VIII.
Stol.
?
^ Lao't.
I Eiert.
m LaerL nLacrt.
0 Laert.
fCic.defii. 3.
I C'c. ibid.
Conducible, as refolving in it Bf the
means, as the gain acquired by Tiamck ex¬ ceeds the charge. ^
as conducing to out proht.
Commendable^ the ufe. ^
Ka\ov^ as proportioned to the necemties
oi receivers.
Helpful^ wpU/uov ^ as it relieves us.
Eligible.^ cu^iloy, as being in reafon to be pre- ferr’d.
d'hcuav.^ as being conformable to Law.
On the contrary, every ill is unbeneficial, importune, inconducible, unufeful, uncommend- able, foul, unhelpful, avoidable, and unjuft.
k Perfeft good, is called Eair.^ becaufe it is abfolute in all numbers required of Nature, and perfeftly proportionate.
/Of (or Honejl) there are four Species, J///?, Valiant.^ Temperate, KnodJing-, in thefe are honeft a£tions confummated.
whereof he would perpetrate any Wickednels, he had not much attain’d unto (fetting afide all puniftiment) without all that wicked means ? What advantage or fruit do we aim at, in deli-' ring to know thofe things which are hidden frorh us,how they are moved, and by what caufes agi¬ tated in Heaven > Who is fo 4vage, fo obdurate to natural Studies, that he abhors things worthy knowledg, receives them without Pleafure, or fome benefit, and values them at nothing ? Who' is there, that when he heareth of the Actions, Speeches, Counfels of magnanimous Perlbns, e- minent in all Virtue, is not affefled with any Pleafure ^ Who is there, that being inftituted in an honeft Family, and ingenuoully Educated, is not offended at dilhonefty, though it bring no hurt to him ? Who is there, that looks without trouble upon I'uch as live impurely and flagiti- oufly ? Who doth not hate Ibrdid, vain, lights frivolous Perfons ? If diftionefty were not in it
m Likewife of (or dijhonefl) are felf avoidable,why Ihould Men, when they are
four Species, unjufl, cowardly, dijjolute, foolijlo. m the dark, or in a Wildernefs,abftain from any
n honed, is called , fair, firft, becaufe H^ing that is evil, but that the very deformity it renders thofe who are endued therewith, wor- pnd diftionefty thereof deters them.^ Nothing thy of Pi aife^Secondly,becaufe it is moft fuitable 1 therefore is more clear, than that honeft thmgs to its proper workjThirdly, becaufe ’tis an orna¬ ment ^ we lay a wife Man is only good and fair.
0 Only that which is good, is fair or honeft :
SoHecato in his third Book of Good and Chry^
Jippiss cF Fair. This is Virtue, and what par¬ ticipates thereof, which is all one as to fay, that whatljbever is good, is honeft likewife^ and reciprocally whatlbever is honeft, is good.
p That vi^Iiat is honeft,only is good, is prov’d thus, Whatfoever is good, is laudable 3 What- foever is laudable, is honeft; therefore whatlbe¬ ver is good is is honeft. Again, there is no good which is not expetible, nothing expetible v^hich is not pleafantandamiable,thereforeapprovable, therefore laudable , therefore honeft. Again , no Man can glory in a Life that is miferable or not happy, therefore to glory is proper to the happy, but to glory relateth only to that which is honeft, therefore honeft is happy. And as he who is laudable, hath fome eminent mark of re¬ nown and glory,tor which he is juftly ftiled hap¬ py, the lame may be faid of the life of fuch af Man, whence if a happy lifeconlift inHonefty, only that which is honeft is to be efteem’d good.
Moreover, what Man can be termed conftant, firm, magnanimous, unlels we grant that pain is not an ill ? For, he who leckoneth Death a- mongft the Ills, cannot but fear it j fo no Man in any thing can negleff and contemn that which he accounted! ill. This being granted, the next alTumption is this, he who is magnanimous and valiant, defpifeth, as if they were nothing , all ‘things that can arrive to Man-, whence it follow- eth,that nothing is ill which is not notdiftioneft; and this lliblime, excellent, magnanimous Per- fon,accounting all humane things below him, confideth in himfelf and his own Life paft and future, knowfing that no Ill can happen to a Wife Man. Whereby we fee that what is ho¬ neft only is good, which is to live happily and hofteftly.
q On the other fide, nothing is good, but w^hat is honeft for who i§, or ever was fofer. ven-rly covetous, and of fuch difordinate affefli- ons, that the fame things, for the attainment
ICk.ibid,
are expetible in themlelves,and diftioneft things avoidable^in themfelves.
Hence it followeth,that what is honeft,is more eftimable than thofe mean things which accrue by it. And when we fay, that folly, temerity, injuftice, and intemperance, are avoidable, in re* lpe£l: of thofe things which are confequent to them, it contradi£fs not the former aflertion, that what is diftioneft ^only is ill, becaufe they relate not to the hurt of the Body, but to difi honeft a0:ions which proceed from Vice.
r All good is equal, and every good is high- b laert: ly expetible, and admits neither increafe, nor decreale. f Herecometh in a great Controver-^^^*^* fie betwixt the Stoic^s and the Peripateticks^ which though Carneades affirms to be only ver¬ bal, holdeth to be more things than words.
t The Peripateticks hold, that all goods are requifite to happy Life ; the 5’r^/V.^j-,that what¬ foever is worthy eftimation,comprehendeth hap¬ py lifc.Thofe holding pain to bean ill, it follows, that a wife Man cannot be happy upon the Rack.
Thele who account not pain among the Ills, hold, that a wife Man continueth happy in the midlt of Torments : For, if fome bear thofe Pains with greater Courage for their Country, or fome Tighter caufe, opinion,not nature increa- feth or diminiftieth the power of the Pain.-Again, the P eripateticks afferting three kinds of good, affirm a Man to be fo much the more happy,the fuller he is of external corporeal goods -, or, in the 5/wV/^x Expreffion, he who hath moil corpo¬ real eftimables, is moft happy, for as much as by them Beatitude is compleated. On the con¬ trary, the Stoicks hold, that thofe goods which they call of Nature, make not by their frequency a life more happy, or are more expetible, or more eftimable:For thenwifdom being expetible, and health expetible, both together would be more expetible than Wifdom alone whereas either being worthy eftimation, both are not more worthy of eftimation than wifdom alone.
For the SToicks,\d\\o held Health to be eftimable, but place it not amongft the goods, hold likewife, that no eftimation is to be preferr’d before Ver-
tue.
Pa rt VIII.
ZENO.
321
tue. From this, x\\zFeripateticks diflent, aflert- ingthatan honeftaction without Pain, is more expetible than the fame action with pain ; the Stoicks otherwife. For,as a Taper is darkned by the light of the Sun, and as a drop of Water is loft in the vaftnefs of the JEgean Sea, and as in the riches of Crcefus the acceftion ot one far¬ thing, and one ftep in the way between this and India., fo in that end of all good which the Sio- icks affert,all the eftimation of corporeal things muft neceffarily be obfcur’d, overwhelm’d, and perilhjby the fplendor and magnitude of vertue. And as opportunity not made any thing
greater by production of time, for whatfoever is opportune hath its mealbre ^ fo right affecti¬ on, of 9 that it be conformable to Nature, admitteth no accelfion of increafe. For as that opportunity, to thofe ofwhich wefpeak, are not made great¬ er by production of time, for which reafon the Stoiaks conceive, that a5happy Life is not more to be defired,ifit be long, than if it be fhort *, and they ufe this Simily:As it is thepraife of a fliooe to fit the Foot, neither are many Shooes preferr’d before two, nor the greater before the lefs ; So in thofe things, whole good is confin'd to' oppor¬ tunity and convenience, neither are the more to be preferr’d before the fewer, nor the longer be¬ fore the ftiorter. Nor do they argue acutely , who fay, if long health be more to be efteem’d than fhort, then likewife a long ufe of wifdom, more than a fhort ^ they underftand not, that the eftimation of Health is judged by fpace,that of vertue by opportunity^ as if they ffiould fay likewife a good death, or a good labour to a Woman in Travel, is better long than fhort j fo that they fee not, that fome things are more efteemed for their fhortnefs, others for their length.
ny fubordinate paffions ^ fo are there fecondary Eupathics fubordinate to thofe.
Under Joy are i. Delegation. 2. Cheerful- nefs^ 3 . JEquanunity.
Under Caution, i , Refpehf. 2. Clearnefs. Under fF/7/ are, Benevolence. 2. Salutation. 3. 'Charity.
Notwithftanding that Eupathies and Paffions are contrary ^ yet are there but three Eupathies, though there are four Paffions ^ for there is no Eupathy contrary to Grief.
C HAP. VI.
Of Eupathies.
4 ck Tufc ^ A S foon as any object is prefented to us,
J\. which feemeth good, Nature \_as we faid'] drives, us on to the acquilition thereof, which being done conftantly and prudently, is call’d Willj imprudently andexcelfively,Defire. b Ck. ibid. b Moreover, while we are fo moved, that we are in fome good,that happeneth alfo two ways, when the Soul is mov’d quietly and conftantly according to reafon, this is called Joy •, when c ck. ibid, vainly and excelfively, Pleafure.
c In like manner, as we defire good things by nature, fo by nature we decline the III This declination, if done according to reafon, is cal- dck.ibid. led Caution, if without reafon, Eear. d Caution
Laert. is'only in a wife man, of Fear he is not capable.
Hence it appeareth, that there are three kinds e Laert. of good a&ctions of the Mind, called c Eupa-
fck. thies, or/ Conjiancies ^ Joy, Caution, Will, i Laert. i. g Joy is contrary to Pleafure, as being a
rational Elevation of the Mind.
2. is contrary to Fear, as being a ra*
■ tional declination of ill;
3. Willis contrary to defire, as being a ra¬ tional Appetite.
Thefe are the primary Eupathies ^ and as un¬ der tie primary ralfions are comprehended ma*
F
CHAP. VIE Of Paffions.
Romfalfitiesproceedeth a perverfity ofln-"*
telleU, hence fpring up leveral paffions, and caufes of diforder.
b Zeno defineih paffion, a preternatural mo-^ . . tion of the Soul, (or as ^ Cicero renders it, commotion oj the boul,averfe from right Reafon.^ againft JCature.) Others more briefly, a more ve¬ hement Appetite. Aiore vehement they call that, which recedeth from iheconflancy ofjKature, and d'\s contrary to nature, wherefore all d Laert.
is an ex'ceffiveftupid defire.
e The kinds of Paffion arife from two opini- ^ onated goods, and two opinionated Evils, fo they are four. From the good, defire divA pleafure', pleafure from prefent good, defire from fiiturej from the ill, fear and Grief fear from the fu¬ ture, grief from the prefent 5 from thefe things; whole coming we fear, when they docome,grieve us. Pleafure and defire arife from an opinion of . good things, defire is fervently rranfported to that which feemeth good, pleafure rejoic- eth when we have obtained whar wedefire.Thus f deflre znd fear go foremoft, that to apparenty-_5^^j^ good.^this to apparent ill -, pleafure and grief fo^ lows ^ pleafure, when we attain what we de¬ fire, grief, when we incur what we fear. * nv7rl/M orav g All paffions arife from Judgment and Opi- nion,'whencQ they are more ftriQly defined, it may appear not only how vicious they are,^ ck.md. but alfo that they are in our power) thus *, h Griefs a frefh opinion of prefent ill,where- ^ck. in it feemeth fit that the Mind be contrasted . and dejeSled, or i a contraSfion of the SouH'^^^^* caufed by opinion of prefent ill.
k Pleafure is a frefh opinion of prefent good, wherein it feemeth good that the Mind be exalt¬ ed, or / an irrational elevation of mind to iomz-l Laert. thing that feemeth eligible.
m Pear is an opinion of eminent ill, which feemeth to be intolerable j or a contraftion of the Souldifobedient to Reafon, caufed by expe- Sfation of ill.
n Defire is an opinion of good to come, « ck. that if it were prefent, it were fit for our ufe, or ^an appetite difobedient to Reafon, caufed by 0 stob. the opinion of confequent good.
Thefe four are, as hecato faith, primary paf¬ fions, under each of which there are fubordinate paffions, feveral fpecies belonging to their pro¬ per genus.
Under Grief are thefe kinds, p Envy, f inv'identia a grief at the p profperity of others, q which doth no hurt to q ckerf him that envieth,’^ for fome Men defire to fee *. cont.
Sf their
f
222
ZENO.
Pa
R T
iCk.
s Laert. t Cic.
u Laert.
X Cic.
y Laert. Cic. ^ Cic. Stob.
a Cic.
b Cic. Laert.
c Cic.
d Cic. e Laert.
f Cic.
g Cic. b Cic.
j Laert. k, Stob,
I Laert.
m Cic. Laert. whence fup- ply Stobeus where (Plea- fure being o- micted) thefe are applied to a wrong Head. n Cic. Laert.
e Cic.
j Laert. q Laert.
r Stob. s Stob.
i Laert. Stob. u Laert. Stob,
* Laert. Stob.
y Laert.
X Laert.
a Laert.
t Stob. c Stjb.
their neighbours fupprefled , that themfelvgs might be advanced above them. For if a Man grieve at the proiperity of another, whereby he is damaged, he is not properly laid to envy, as that of UeUor to Agafnemnan • but he who is nothing damaged by the profperity of another, yet grieveth thereat, truly envieth.
r JEnndation.^ (not here taken for the imitation of Veitue, for that is laudable) a grief that another Man enjoyeth that which we delire and want, or as Laertius^d. grief for another’s fe¬ licity ,which we wilh to our felves, and an emu¬ lation thereof, as greater than our own.
Jealoufie.^ ohtreUation.^ a grief
left another enjoy what we t love and polfefs.
u mifencordia., a grief for
the milery another lufFers undefervedly,_y for no Man compaflionates thepunifhment of a Par¬ ricide or Traytor.
y Angtiijh^ Anger., an oppreflive grief z Mourning., , Ludus , grief for the
death of a Friend that was dear to us.
a Wailing., Alceror, a grief accompanied with Tears.
b Trouble., oS'mn, ^erimna, a laborious piercing grief ^ j
c SorrowJAoloryii vexatious grief, perhaps the fame which in Stobeeiis is termed a grief^ i with conflift of Spirit. i
dTamenta'tion, a grief with thoughtful- 1 refs, e proceeding from, and encrealing by con- fideration and dlfcourfe. j
/ Alolefiia, a permanent grief !
£ AfflliBion, a grief with corporeal torment. h Defperation, a grief without any hope of amendment.
; Lvox^Mic, an urgent grief 'attended by dif ficulty.
‘ k a grief taking away the voice.
/ , ail irrational Grief corroding,
and hindring us from enjoying the prefenc. Under ^leafure are,
7)1 Malevolence, hmxn-i^i>iAAA , a Pleafure at another’s III, without any good to our felves. j This hath no real fubfifterrce^lbr no good man was ever known to rejoice at the harm of another.
/? Delegation, Pleafure afFe6fing and
foothing the Mind by the Ear, and in like man¬ ner by the Eye, touch, fmell, ortafte, which are all of one kind.
0 JaBation, a boafting Pleafure, with infolent, behaviour.
p quafi Tfe-f/f, an inclination of the
Mind todiffolutenefs.
q csid.yv(/.tt, the DilTolution of vertue. r'A(Ty.ivt(Ty.oc,^ pleafure from things not expefled.
J ron7«*, a Pleafure caufed by Sight, without Deceit.
Under Fif^zr, are
t Dread, a fear caufing TiG-. u Sloth, wt'of ?igritia, a fear of future A£fi- on, or fufception of Labour.
Shame, od^vv^, a fear of Ignominy.
a fear of fome unufual Phantafie. 2 ©ofvpof, a fear vvith lofs, or trepidation of voice-
a ^yf^ylct, a fear of fomething uncertain, or a fear of offending or falling.
^ a fear of Gods 'Or Demons.
£■ a fear cf fome grievous thing.
dTerrour,z Fear, which by ftriking the Mind d ck. caufeth rednefs, palenels, trembling, or gnalh- ing of the Teeth.
e Timor, a fear of approaching ill. cic.
fTavor, a Fear thrufting the Mind out off ck. its Place.
g Exanmatio, a Fear confequent, and as it ^ were companion to Tavor.
h Conturbatio, a fear, which difperfeth all our f, oc. Thoughts.
I I'ormido, a permanent Fear. iCk.
The Pallions fubordinate to Dclire, arege- , „ . nerally two, Anger and Love. ^ ^ ’
I Anger is a defire of taking revenge upon/^derf. thofe by whom we conceive our felves wrong’d. m The Species thereof are , m stob.
n Bvia'of, or as Cicero, excandefeen- „
tia. Anger beginning.
0 xinos. Anger encrealing. o Laert.
p Umc, odium. Anger inveterate. f Ck. stob.
q ^'olo{ Inimicitia, anger watching the occa- ,
fion of Revenge. ^
r anger breaking forth into aUion. Umf&Kolof
s MjVof, a delire whereby we wilh ill to an- confound-t other, with continual progreflion. eAh'jiaertht
t Alalice, Di/cordia, a bitter anger, with ut- ] ^aert. moft hatred, conceived in the Heart. tcic. *
it^troninU^ a. delire converfant in difference « of opinions
Love is an impulfion of good-will for ap- * stob. parent Beauty, jy whereby it is diftinguilh’d^irferf. from the love of the Vertuous, which i s a vo¬ luntary fufception of labour for true Beauty.
The Species of love are,
z ’Zrrivic , indigentia, an (inexpleble) defire ^ Laert. of that which we want, and being feparated from it, in vain incline to it.
a Tio^&-,deJideriu)a,z defire to fee that which is not prefent. They b diftinguifh thefe two thus; b ck.!
Defire is of thofe things which are faid, or prat- dicated of any thing which they cMCalegorems, as to have Riches, to take HonourSjlndigence is of the things thcmfelvcsjas of honours of money •c defire of converfation of that which is c stob. abfeut.
d ^tMS'oviA, defire of Pleafure. dstob.
e $/AoTA«|l«t, defire of Riches. e StoJ).
f defire of Glory.
g In all thefe PalTions there is Opnion.s-S'ts^- h Opinion is a weak alTent. i Hence pallions, f, inert.
(as Chryjippus in his Book o^TaJJ^ons3.mltt)s)2XQ ck. Judgments ; for Avarice is an opinion, or falfe*-^'*®'^- Judgment that Money is goodj Drunkennefsand Intemperance, are the like, k Opinion is like- st»i. wife fudden from the contraSive motion of an unreafonable elation of the Mind, unreafona- ble and pratternatural, in as much as it is not o- bedient to reafon. For every paffion is violent:
Wherefore oftentimes, though we fee in thofe that are tranfported by paffion, the inconve¬ nience, thereof yet notwithftanding, the lame Perlbns that condemn it, are carried away by it, as by a headftrong Horfe, and therefore pro- ;
perlv’niay ule that laying:
Againji my Judgment Nature forceth me, j Meaning by Judgment, the knowledge of right . things i for Man is carried beyond Nature by Paffion, to tranlgrefs natural reafon and right.
I All thofe who are led by Paffion, are di-/^^^ verted from Reafon.but in another manner than
thofe
P art VIII.
ZENO.
323
tt Ck. Tkfc. quej}. 4.
b Laert> Stob. .Ck.
c Laert. Sfob.
Ck,
d Ck. Tkfc. iKeJl. 4. .
thofe who are deceived. For the deceived, as for example, They who think Atomes to be the principles of all things, when they come to know that they are not, change their Judgment; Bur, thofe that are in paflion, although that they are taught not to grieve, or fear, or give way to any paflion in the Soul, yet they do not put them off, but are lead on by their paflions,un* til they come to be fubieQ: to their tyrannical iway.
CHAP. viir.
of Sicknefs and Infirmities.
a E Fountain of all paffions is Intempe-
X ranee, which is a total deletion from the Mind, and from right reafon, fo averle from the prefeription of Reafon, that the appetites of the Soul can by no means be ruled, or contained. As therefore Temperance allayeth Appetites,and caufeth them to obey right reafon, and preiei'- veth the conliderate judgments of the Mind •, fo Intemperance, the Enemy thereto, enflameth, troubleth, and inciteth the Rate of the Soul. Thus Griefs and Fears, and the reft of the paf fions, all arife from this. For, as when the blood is corrupt, or ftegm, or choler aboundeth,fick- nelfes or infirmities arife in the Body *, So the diforder of ill opinions, and their repugnance to one another, divefteth the Soul of health,, and troubleth it with Difeales.
b By paffions the Mind becometh indifpo- fed,andas it were lick. Sicknefs of Mind, vo is an opinion and defire of that whith feemeth gr^tly expetible, but is not fuch, as love of Women, of Wine, of Money. Thefe have likewife their contraries in the other ex- tream, as hatred of Women, of Wine, of Mo ney.
c This ficknefs of mind happening with im- becillity, is called 4p infirmity. For, as in the body there are Infirmities, as Gouts, Con- vulfions, and the like ^ fo are there infirmities in the Mind, as love of glory, love of pleafure. And as in Bodies there is a propenfity to fome particularDifeafes ^ fo in the Mind there is a proclivity or \vKAra.(pvtU ^ to feme
particular paffions, as propenfity to
Envy., propenfity to unmercifulnefs,
and the like.
d In this place, much pains hath been taken by the Stoicksf chiefty by Chryfippm, -to com¬ pare the Sicknefles of the Mind with thofe of the Body.
Paflion (for as much as opinions are incoii- ftahfly and turbulently tofifed up and down) is always in motion •, -and when this fervour and concitation of the Mind is inveterate, and, as it were, fetled in the Veins and Marrow, then ari- feth Sicknefs and Infirmities , and thole averli- ons which are contrary to thofe infirmities and difeafes. Thefe differ only intentionally, but re¬ ally are the fame, arifing from defire and plea¬ fure*, for when Money is defifd, and reafon not immediately applied, as a Socratick Medicine to cure that defire,the evilfpreadeth thro’ the veins, andcleaveth to the Bowels, and becometh fiek- nefs and infirmity, which when they grow in¬
veterate, cannot be plucked away. The name of this ficknefs is Avarice. In like manner a- rife other Sickneffes, as defire of Glory, defire of Wornan, p^oyvma,.^ and the reft of Sicknef¬ fes and infirmities. Their contraries arife from fear, as hatred of Women, hatred of
Mankind, inhofpitality, all which are infirmi¬ ties of the Mind, arifing from fear of thofe things which they fly and fhun.
Infirmity of Mind is defined ,a vehemenf opi¬ nion , inherent, and wholly implanted in us, of a thingnotto be defired,as if it were exceedingly to be defired. That which arifeth from averfion, is defined a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, of a thing that ought not to beftiunned, as if it ought to be Ihunned. This opinion is a judging our felves to know what we have not.
Under Infirmity are thefe fpecies,L(?uc of Mo¬ ney., of Honour, of Womenpf curious Meats, and the like. Love of Money, Avarice, is a vehe¬ ment opinion, inherent, and throughly implant¬ ed in us, as if it were exceedingly to be defi¬ red. In the like manner are all the reft defined.
Averfions are defined thus, Inhofpitality is a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly im¬ planted in us, thatGuefts ought to befhunn’d. In like manner is defined hatred of Womankind, fuch as was that of Hippolitus -, and of Man¬ kind, as that of Timon.
As fome are more prone to one Sicknefs than to another ^fo are fome more inclinable to feaf, others, to other Paffions ; in fome is anxiety , whereby they are anxious in others choler, which differeth from anger *, for it is one thing to be cholerick, another to be angry, as anxie¬ ty differs from grief ^ for all ate not anxious who are fometimes grieved, nor are all that are anxious griev’d always As there is a difference betwixt Ebriety and Ebriofity,and it is one thing to be a Lover, another to be Amorous.
Thispropenfity of ftreral Perfons to feveral Sicknefles, is call’d from an Analogy to the Bo- dy,Infirmity, whereby istinderftood a propenfity to be Sick : Butin good things,becaufe fome arc more apt to fome goods than to others, it is Ai¬ led Facility, in ill things Proclivity, implying a lapfion -, in neuters it hath the former name.
As there is ficknefs, infirmity, and defeU in the Body, fo in the Mind. Sicknefs is the corruption of the whole Body. Infirmity is Sick¬ nefs, with fome weaknefs. DefeU is, when the parts of the Body difagree with one another, whence arifeth pravity, diftortion, deformity of the Limbs ^ fo- that thofe two, ficknefs and in¬ firmity, Mfe' from the confufion and trouble of the health of the v/hole Body ^ defeU is feen in perfeU health. But, in the Mind, ficknefs is not diftinguifhed from infirmity, but by cogi¬ tation only. ^
Vitiofity is a habit or affeaion, inconftant in it felf, and oft differing in the whole courfe of Life; fo that in one by the corruption ofopini- ons,isbred ficknefs and infirmity ; in the other, inconftancy and repugnance. For.^every vice hath not difanreeing parts, as of them who are not far from Wifdom, that affeUion is different from felf, as being unwife, but not diftorred nor depraved.
/
Sf
Sicknefs
524
ZENO.
ART!
VIII.
a Laert.
c Stob,
Sicknefs and Infirmities are parts of \ itiofity-, but, whether PaflTionsare parts thereof alfo, ins a queftion. For Vices are permanent affeQions, Palfions are moving Aiie£tions, fo that they cannot be parts of permanent Affe£lions.
And as in ail things the Soul refembleth the Body, fo in good likewife. In the Body, the chief eft are Beavty, ftrength,health,foundnefs, agility; lb likewife in the mind. And as the good tem¬ per ®f the body is, when thofe things whereof we confift, agree well among themlelves : fo thehealtli of the Soul is, when the Judgments and Opinions thereof agree. This is the virtue of the Soul, which fome affirm to be Temperance ; others, a Soul obedient to the precepts of Tem¬ perance, and obfequious thereunto, not having any fpecioufnels of her own. But, whether one or other, it is only in a wife man ; yet there is one kind of health of the Soul,which is common alfo to the unwife, when by the pare of Phyfici- ans, the Diftemper of the Mind is removed.
And as there is in the Body an apt figure of the Limbs, together with a fweetnefs of Colour, which is called Beauty ; fo in the Soul, equality, and conftancy of Opinions, and Judgments fol¬ lowing Virtue, with a certain firmnefs and ftabi- lity, or, including the very power of Vertue, is called Beauty.
Likewife correfpondent to the Powers,Nerves, and efficacy of the Body, in the fame, terms are named the Powers of the Soul. Agility of Body is called quicknefs ; the fame commendation is alcribed to Wit, in relpecl that the Soul over- runneth many things in a ffiort time.
Only there is this difference betwixt Souls and Bodies : ftrong Souls cannot be Affaulted by Di- feafes, ftrong Bodies may. But the offenfions of Bodies may happen without any fault; thofe of the Soul cannor,all whofe Sickneffes and Paffions proceed from contempt of Reafon,and therefore are in Men only ; for, tho’ Beafts do fome things like this, yet, they fall net into Paffions.
Betwixt acuteand obtufePerfons, there is this difference, theIngenious,as Corinthian Brals ruft- eth, llowly falling into Sicknefs,and more quick¬ ly get out of it; the dull do not fo ; neither doth the Soul of an Ingenious Perfon fall into every Sicknefs and Paffion ; for, there are not many things extreamly Savage andCruel,and fome al¬ io have a ffiew of Humanity, as Compaflion, Grief, Fear.
But the Infirmities and Sickneffes of the Mind are lefs eafily rooted out, tha^^ thole great Vices which are contrary to the Virtues ; for, the fick- nefles remaining, the Vices may be taken away, becaufe the Sickneffes are no fooner healed, than the Vices are removed.
as.
V'
d Stob.
iS
C H A P. IX.
Of Virtue and Vice.
"Irtue is ^convenient Affeftionof the Soul throughout all Life.
Of Virtues there are three kinds.* The firft^/?- neral.^ taken for any perfeflion of a thing, as of a Statue ; The fecond are c Sciences, or Contem- p/^?/w,which,according tolIecaton,c.oT&.^ in fpe- CMY^QVi,diSVrudence zvA fuflice. d The third not Sciences, or not Contemplative.^ which are
con-
confidered as confequent to the fpeculative ; Health,St7-ength.^Hope, Joy, and the like.Health is confequent to Temperance, a Theoretick 'Vir¬ tue, as Strength to the Building of an Arch. They are called not- contemplative, becaufe thy require no affent, but are by after accefiion, and com¬ mon even to the wicked, as health and ftrength.
Vice is the contrary to Virtue, e for the ratio- ^ naJ creature is perverted fometimes by the per- fwafion of exterior things, Ibmetimes "by the counfel of thofe with whom he converfeth,con- trary to nature, who gives us inclinations un¬ perverted.
OfVices therefore there are two kinds; The.
M,f Ignorance of thofe things whereof Virtues f laert. are the knowledge ; as Imprudence, Intemper¬ ance, Injuftice, ; The fecond not -ignorances ; as, Pufillanimity, Imbecillity.
g Vanmus afferteth two Virtues, Tbeoreticki zn^VraVick: others Rational, 'Natural,
Moral. Rojfdoniiis four ; CIcanihes,ChryJippus,
Antipater vnoiQ-, Apollodorus om ohIy, Pru¬ dence,
h Of Virtues,fbme are primary, others Juhor- h Laert. d’lnat e. The primary are four. Prudence, Tem¬ perance, Yortitude,Juftice-, the firft converfant in Offices, the fecond in Appetite, the third in Tolerance, the fourth in Diftribution.
i is the Science of things that are to * Latrt.
be done, and not to be done, and neuter ; or the knowledge of good, bad and neuter in civil life.
^ The Virtues fubordinate to Prudence are five. ^
/ The Science of things that are to / £^0^. 5^^^. be done, how they may be done beneficially.
LvhoyiTia, The Science of comprehending s'tofc things to be effe£l;ed.
’A>'5^;)'wct,The Science of finding out our office.
The Science of attaining the fcope in every thing.
’EvfAiixa-vU, The Science of finding out the if fues of things.
m Temperance, is the Science of things expe- stob. by tible, avoidable, and neuter. Under Temperance whom correfl are thefe Species. Laertius, who
’Evja^ia,, n The Science of time and order for the well doing of things. TeSipSlJ?
Ko neft motions. 0 stob.
A/J'ti/xoiriwti, p The Science of avoiding iuftP blame.*
q Fortitude, is the Science of things grievous, ^ not grievous and neuter ; the Species under it thefe :
’EyKed-leieti r A Science tenacious of right Rea- r stob. fon.
’Kct/leela, s a Science perfifting in right judg- ^ stob. ment.^ ^
t A Science whereby we truft. t stob. u The Science of OYQvcommg „ stob. Laert. thofe things which happen to the good and bad.
’Eu4vxi ders her invincible.
y ThcScience of going through t6J' the attainment of that wheih we propofe to our felves.
z Juft ice is the Science of diftributing to every ^ one according to his defert ; under Juftice are four fubordinate Virtues.
’Evtrt^eicty a The Science of Worfliipping the gods.
9
Xf»jre7«f>
ZENO.