I. faith he,when the Soul firft apprehends a trian¬

gle and' a fquare, it will follow, that the l^une body, at the ftme time, muft have in it fell leve ral figures, which is abfurd. Again, wh-reas ma¬ ny phantafies are together confiftent in us, the the Soul mult have diverle figures, which is worfe than the former. ' He_ therefore conceived, that Zeno ufed the word Imprelfion, for Alteration, meaning thus: Phantafie is an alteration ot the Soul, whereby it is no longer abfiird j that the fame body (many feveral phantafies being at the fame time confiftent in us) Ihould receive feveral alterations. For, as the Air receiving at once innumerable different perculfions, hath pre- fently many alterations : fo the fupream part of Soul, receiving various phantafies, doth fome- thing which hath proportion and conformity thereto.
Some objefl, that this expofition is not right : becaufe, tho’ every phantafie is a-n exprelfion and and alteration in the Soul: yet, every imprelfion or alteration of the Soul,is not phantafie^ as when the finger fmarts or itches, and the hand is rubb’d, there is then an imprelfion or alteration in the Soul : but it is not phantafie, becaufe it is not in the fupream part of the Soul.
They anfwer. That in faying, an imprelfion in the Soul, is implied as in the Soul as fully, as if we Ihould fay, phantafie is an imprelfion in the Soul as in the Soul ; as when we fay, thfe white in the eye, we imply, as in the eye, that is, the white is in a certain part of the eye, which all men have fo by nature. So when we fay, Phantafie is an imprelfion in the Soul,we imply the impref- fion to be made in the fupream part thereof Others more elegantly anfwer, that the word Soul is taken two ways, either for the whole, or for the principal part j when we fay,man confifts of Soul and Body ^ or, that death is a leparation of the Soul from the Body-, we mean properly the fupream part, wherein properly confifts the motions and goods of the Soul.When Zeno there fore calleth phantafie an imprelfion in the Soul, he is not to be underftood of the whole Soul, but of part thereof-, as if he Ihould lay,phantafieis an alteration of the fupream part of the Soul. To this interpretation, fome objeift thus : Ap
petition, Alfention, and C9mprehenfio!'i,..are al¬ terations ip the fupream part of theSoulV but, thefe diifer from phantafie, that being q certain kind, of peifwation and affefilion, .whereas .this is more operation than-appetition, therefore the , definition is not good,-, being -compedble to ma¬ ny other things.- ... .
. They anfwer by recourfe to (firnpli-
anck-s)yh.'3iX-^ definition is underftood to be in all.
As he wfio fa.ith,', Loys . is; an application of the , . , Soul towards procurement of Friendlhip, im- plierh amongft young people ^ f > when we lay, that phantafie is an '.alteration in the fupream part of the Soul, we..iiT!ply^byperfwafion ^ for, alteration is not made by operation.
Of phantafies there are'., many kinds, dome ^ dXQfenJiblc^ox.\\Qi'i>notfenfiible.SjenJible2iX(iX\\oiL which are ^ received through one or more of the fenfes : .Ab/ fenfiible arethofe which are- received through the mind , as of incorporeals, and otha‘ things, comprehended by .realbn. The fenfible formed from things that are, are made widreon- ceffion and affent. There are • alfo apparitions of phantafies, proceeding from things which are. ■
Again, fome are Kat 'ional^ others Irrational ^
Rational., thofe of Reafonable Creatures ; irratio- nal., thole of Unrealonable. The Rational are in¬ telligence, the Irrational have no name.
Again, fome are ft/’/ibob/, oihtxs In artijicial-^ for, an Image is confidered by an Artift one way by him that is not an Artift, another way.
e Again, fome are Probable^ others Improbable-, e sext. e- The Probable are thofe which make an eafie mo- H’r 2. tion in the Soul ^ as, it is now day, I dilcourfe, and the like. The Improbable are of a contrary nature, averting us from alTent ^ as, it is day, the Sun is not above the Earth ^ if it is dark, it -is day. Both Probable and Improbable are thole, which, by relation to other things, are fome- dmesluchas in doubtful Ipeeches, neither pro¬ bable are improbable nor, fuch, as thefe, Thp Stairs are even, the Stairs are odd.
Of probable and improbable phantafies, fome are true., Ibme are falfi'e., Ibme are neither true • • . nor falfe. TV^^’, are thofe, whole predication is* true, as. It is day, ftis light .* Palfe., whofe pre¬ dication is falle-. Both true and fialfiepsti, happened to Qrefites in his madnefs, meeting Eleblra-., that he met fomething, it was true, for it was bur, that it was Fury, was falfe; 'Neither true nor fialfie^ are thofe which are taken from theGe- for the Genus is not fuch as the Ipecies in
nus
all refpe^s As, of men, fome are Grecians., fome are Barbarous ^ but, Man in general is not Grecian., for then all men muft be Grecians -, nei¬ ther Barbarous, for the fame reafon.
Of true phantafies, Ibme are comprehenfiive^ others are not comprehenfie. Not-comprchcnfiive are thofe which happen through ficknefs, or per¬ turbation of mind^ many being troubled with Frenfie or Melancholy, attrabf a true Phantafie which is not comprehenfive, even from that which extrinfecally occurs cafually, for which reafon, they neither alTert it often, nor aflent unto it. Comprehenfiwe phantafie is that which, is imprelTed and figned by that which is, and conformable to that which is, fo as it cannot be of that which is nor.
To comprehenfive phantafie three conditions are requifire : i, Thar it arife from that which is-, for many phaptafies atife from that which isilot,
as
Pa R.T VIIL
ZENO.
305
/
f Plut‘ pNc. Phil. 4. 1 2.
as in mad men. 2. That it be conformable to that which is ^ for fome phantafies are from that which is, but reprefents the fimilitude of that which is not : As Orefies derived a phantalie from that which was, viz. from but not
according to that which was ^ for bethought her to be one of the Furies. Comprehenlive phanta- fie muft be conformable to that which is, and fo imprefled and figned, as that it may imprint ^ ar¬ tificially all the properties of the thing fancied, as Gravers touch all the parts of thofe things which they imitate, and the iinpreffion made by a Seal on Wax exacfly and perfe£fly,beareth all its characters. Laftly,That it be without impedi¬ ment i for fometimes comprehenlive phantalie is not creditable, by reafon of outward circum Itunces ^as Here uleshiouglVi AlceflistdkQn
out of the Earth, to Admetus.^ Admetus drew from Akejits a comprehenlive phantalie, but did not credit it -, for, he confidered, that Ihe was dead, and therefore could not rife again, but, that fometimes Spirits appear in the fhape of the deceafed.
/' 'Shantafie.^ Pha72faJion, Phantafticon., and Phantajm.^ according to Ch/yjippus^ differ thus : ^ Phantajie is a Paffion made in the Soul, which fheiveth it lelf,and that which made it as,when with our eyes we fee white, it is a palfion engen- dred by light in the Soul, and we may call this a palhon, becaule the objebf thereof is a white thing which moveth us ;■ The like of fmelling and touching.
Phantafion is that which maketh phantalie 3 as the white and the cold, and whatfoever is able to move the Soul, that is Phantafion.
Phantajiicon is a fruftraneous attra8:ion,a paf- lion in the Soul proceeding from nothings as in thofe who fight with fhadows, or extend their hands in vain : For, to phantafie is objeffed Phantafton, but Phantalficon hath no objedl.
Phantajm is that, to whicli we are art rafted by that iruftraneous attraftion, which happens in Melancholy, orMad perfons 5 as Oreftes in the Tragedy, when he laith,
Bring hither., Mother.^ I implore.,
The Snaky Bloody Maids no mere,
Whofe very looks twund me all ore.
I'his he laith in his madnefs, for he law no¬ thing : wherefore Elellra anfwers him.
Ah ! guiet in thy Bed (anhapyy) lie.
Thou fee ft not what thou thinkft before thy eye.
By Conflitution -, True is conceived to be Ibme- thing uniform and fimple by nature ^ as. It is day, I difeourfe. Truth, as being a Science, con- liileth of many things, by a kind of conlervation. Wherefore as a People is one thing, a Citizen another a People is a Multitude confilting of many Citizens^ but, a Citizen is no more than one. In the fame manner differeth Truth from True. Truth refembleth a People, True, a Citi¬ zen ^ for. Truth conlifteth of many things col- lefted, True is fimple.
By Power-, £01 True doth not abfolutely ad¬ here to Truth : A Fool, a Child, a Mad-man, may Ipeak fomething True, but, cannot have the Science of that which is True. Truth confiders things with Science, infomuchthat he who hath it,is wife-, for,he hath the Science of true things, and is never deceived, nor lieth, altho’ he Ipeak falfe, becaule it proceedeth not from an ill, but good affeftion:
vJ St. Au£.. Kontra Acad, lib. 2. b Sext. Ettip
CHAP. V.
Of True and Truth.
True (according to Zeno) is that which is imprelTed in the Mind from that
whence it i^_ in fuch manner, as it cannot be from Pyrrb'.'fyJ.Zs. that which is not : Or, as others 5 b True is that which is, and is oppofed to fomething. Falfe is that which is not j yet, is oppoled to fomething alfo.
Truth and True differ three ways, bv Efenee, by Conflitution, by Power. By EJJenee, for Truth •is a Body bur, True is incorporeal, for it is a di- cible rzirrovy and therefore incorporeal. On the contrary. Truth is a Body, as being the enuncia- tive Science of all true things. All Science is in Ibme meafure the Ihpream part of the Soul,
which fupream part is a Body : therefore Truth^ good are underllood Naturally. in general is corporeal.
CHAP. VI.
Of Comprehcnfion.
Omprehenfion («*TaA«4/f) was fiill; ufed in a. ck. Acad. this fenfe by Zeno, by a Metaphor taken ^ ’ from things apprehended by the hand ^ b which b ck. Acad. allufion he exprelt by aftion.^ For, Ihewing his 4 hand with the fingers ilretched forth, he laid, fuch was phantalie i then bending them a little, faid, fuch was Affent ; then comprefling them and clutching his filt,fuch was Comprehenfion.
e Comprehenfion is a firm and true know- L/f ledg, non-comprehenfion the contrary 3 for fome^ * things we only think that we fee, hear, or feci, as in Dreams and Frenzies ; other things we not only think, but truly do lee, or hear, or feel.
Thefe latter, all but the Academicks and Scep- ticks) conceive to fall under firm knowledge 3 the other, which we imagine in Dreams or Fren- zie, are falfe.
d Whatfoever is underflood, is comprehen- ded by the Mind, one of thefe two ways, either „
hy evident Ineurjion (which calls by^ •. .-‘S’*
SenfeT or by Tranfit ion from evidenee (Taert i- t/s, Colleftion by Demonflration) of which lat¬ ter there are three kinds, hy Affimulation, by Compofition, by Analogy.
By Incurrent Evidenee is underflood White and Black, Sweet and Sowr, '
ByTranfitionTiom evidents; By Affimilation, is underftood Socrates by his Pifture:^ By Com- pofitwn, as of a Horle and Man is made a Cen¬ taur i for putting together the Limbs proper to both Species, we comprehend by phantafie that which was neither Horfe nor Man, but a Centaur compounded of both.
By Analogy, things arc underftood two waysj either by Augmentation -, or, when from com¬ mon ordinary men, we by augmentation pliancy a Cyclops, who not like
A\en that ivith Ccres’x gifts are fed.
But, fome tall Hill eretls bis head.
Or by diminution, as a Pigmy, e Likewife c Uen. the Center of the Earth is underftood by Analo gy from lefler Globes.
To thefe kinds add, / Comprehenfion by Tranf f Laert. fere nee, as eyes in the brealt^ by Contiariety, as Death ^ jby Transference, as dicibles, and place^ by Privation, as a Man without hands -, juft and
CHAP.
504
ZENO.
Pa r t. VIII.
CHAP. VII.
Of Afjent.
a cic. acad. ^"T^Hefe things being enough known, which qu,eft. 4. J|[ we have already explained, let us now
fpeak a little of AJJent, and Approbation, term’d not that, that is not a large place, but the grounds thereof have been already laid, For when we explained the power that was in the Senfes, we likewile declared, that many things were comprehended and perceived by the Senles, which cannot be done without Affent . Moreover, feeing that betwixt an inanimate and an animate being, the greateft difference is, that the inanimate doth nothing, the animate doth fomething *, we muft either take away fenle from it, or allow it affent, which is within our power. When we will not have a thing either to per¬ ceive or affent, we in a manner take away the Soul from it ; for as it is neceffaiy, that the Icale of Ballance which is laden, fhould tend down¬ wards ; fo is it that the Soul fliould yield to things that are perfpicuous,
h Ck. lib. de b Altho’ Affent cannot be made unlefs it be fato. moved by phantafie, yet when that phantafie
hath an immediate caufe, it hath not (accord¬ ing to Chryfppuf) this principal reafbn 5 not that it can be made without any extrinfecal excitati¬ on (for it is neceffary that Affent be moved by phantafie)but it returns to its Cylinder and Cone, which move not by impulfionj then of their ■ own nature the Cylinder feems to rowl, and the
Cone to turn round. As therefore he who thruft the Cylinder, gave it the beginning of motion, but did not give it volubility •, fo the obje£fed phantafie imprinteth, and as it were fealeth in the Soul its Species, yet the affent is in our pow¬ er, and that (as he faid in aCylinder)extrinfecal- ly impelled, the motion is continued by its own power and nature.
c Agdl. 19. 9. c Phantafies, wherewith the Mind of Man is W /pom prefently affefted, are not voluntary or in our ^f. «- own power, but infer themfelves by a kind of
violence, approbations by which
thefe phantafies are known and judged, are vo¬ luntary, and made according to our arbitrement. So as upon any dreadful noife from Heaven, or by the fall of any thing, or fudden news of fome danger, or the like •, it is neceffary that the mind of a wife Man be a little moved, and con- traQed, and appalled, not through opinion per¬ ceived of any ill, but certain rapid and incon- ficjerate motions, which, prsevert the office of the Mind and Reafon. But prefently the fame Wife Man appro veth not ToidvlAi (fctvjAa-U?,
thofe dreadful phantafies, that is, « o-vyKAlAVds- TM but rejects and refufes
them 5 nor is there any thing in thefe, which feemeth to him dreadful. Thus differ the Souls of wife and unwife men : The unwife, when phantafies appear cruel and difficult at the firft impulfion of the mind, think them to be truly fucli as they appear, and receiving them as if they were juftly to be feared, approve them by their affent, ^ (this word the Sto-
icks ufe upon this occafion: J But a wife man fuddenly changing Colour and Countenance, « avyKAlATiMoi, affcnts not, but retaineth the Bate and vigour of his judgment, which he al¬
ways had of thefe phantafies, as nothing dread* ful, but terrifying only vvith a falfe fhew, and vain fear.
vit.
CHAP. VIII.
Oj Notions.
d T^Rom Senfe, the Rule of Science, Notions, 4 ck. acad. 1.
i are imprinted in the Soul, by which, not only principles, but larger ways to Realbn are found out. I
b A man when he is born, hath the fupream b Piut.de pUc, part of his Soul, like unto clean paper, upon I'bil- 4- > 2- which every notion is infcribed. The firft man¬ ner of infcription is by the Senfes-, as for exam* pie .• They who perceive a thing that is white, after it is taken away, retain the memory there¬ of but, when they have conceived many remem¬ brances of one Species, then they fay, they have experience, for experience is a multitude of fi- militudes.
Of Notions, fome are Natural, which are in fuch manner as we have faid, and without Art :
Others gained by Learning and Induftry : Thefe are properly called Notions other Anticipati¬ ons. I’he reafon for which we are called rational, is faid to be perfebfed by anticipations in the firft feven years.
Intelligence is the phantafm of the IntelleGof a Rational Creature; for phantafm, when it lighteth upon a rational Soul, is then called «>'- Intelligence, a word taken from the Intel- left. For to other Creatures there happen not phantafms ; to the Gods only, and to us thefe are incident* Thofe which belong to us, are phan¬ tafms, as to their genus ; notions as to their fpecies ; as denaries and ftaters, when paid for tranfportation, are called Nau/a.
c Common Notions are planted in all men, ^ anian. 1. 22. fin which they all agree together) one is not re¬ pugnant to another; for, who holds not, that good is profitable, and ought to be chofen with utmoft endeavours > Who holds not, that what is juft, is fair and well befeeming? Whence then proceed contentions and differences ? To wit, from the application of firft notions to fingular , things.
d Thefe Notions, and whatfbever is of kind, which right reafon conformeth in us, being long examined, are true, and fuitable to the na¬ tures of things.
CHAP. IX.
Of Science and Opinion,
a 'T^Hat which is comprehended by Senfe, Ze- a. deer. Acad.
i no called Senfe -, and if fo comprehend- *• ed, as not to be plucked away by reafbn. Science^ otherwife Ignorance ; from which proceedeth 0- pinion, which is weak and common, to the falfe and unknown.
b Thefe three are joyiirf together, Science, q,. Opinion, and Comprehenfion, which borders Logic. upon the other two. Science is a firm, ftable, immutable comprehenfion wnth- Reafon. Opi¬ nion, an infirm, weak affent ; Comprehenfion, which eometh between both, is an affent to comprehenfive phantafie. Comprehenfive phan¬ tafie
Pa B.T Vlll.
ZENO.
305
c Ck» (lead, qn^jl !•
tafie is true, in fuch a manner, that it cannot be fdlfe. Therefore Science is in wile Men only, Opin ion in Fools ^ Cotnprehenfion is common to both, as being that by which Truth is judg¬ ed ^ c and is for this Reafon reckoned by Zeno, neither amongft the right ( nor a-
monglt the bad ( but betwixt ■ Science and Ignorance, affirming, that this on¬ ly is to he credited.
b Laert. ( Laert.
d Laert.
e Laert.
f Laert.
g Dtert.
CHAP. X.
Of - Voice, Speech, and Words.
a 'Sext. Emp, adv. Log. cap. de veto.
'■J^Hefe three are joined to one
h Sext. Emp. Adi . log. c.ip. de vero. i Varro de Hug. lat. lib.$
another ^
that which is lignified, that which lig- niheth,and the contingent. Ihat which JigmJieih, is the Voice, as Dion Thai which is fignified, is the thing declared by the Voice ^ it is that which we apprehend, and is prelent in our , Cogitation. The contingent is the outward Subjefl, as Dwn himfelf
h Dialcflick being converfant about that which fignitieth, and that which is lignihed, c is divided into two places .• One, Oj Signijicats, the other ofVoice.D^Q place of Signilicats is di¬ vided into Phantajies, and Jdli/ijients on 'Fhan-i tajie, Dicibles, Axioms, Stc.
In the other place, conceriiingT'h/Vc’, is decla¬ red literal Voice, the parts of Speech, the na¬ ture of Solcecijms and Barbarijms, Voems, Am¬ biguities, Song, Alufick, and (according to fome) Dijinitions and Divifions
d The Phantalies of the Mind precede Speech, ( Of the/e therefore we have already treat¬ ed ) then the Mind endued with the Faculty of fpedking , declareth by Speech what it receiveth from the Phantalie : For this Reafon, e the conlideration of Dialeftick, by thejoint conlent of all,feems as if it ought to be firif taken from the place of Voice.
f Voice is Air perculTed, the proper fenlible objeft of Hearing, (as Diogenes the Babylonian, in hisil;-/ of Voice.) The Foice of a living fen- litive Creature, is Air perculTed with Appetite ^ the Voice of Man is Articulate, proceeding from the Mind : At his fourteenth year it is perfefled.
Speech (as g Diogenes faith ) is a literate Voice; as, it is Day. Word is a lignificative Voice proceeding from the Mind. Language is a Speech according to the variety of Nations, whereof each uleth its peculiar Dialeff ; as the AttickWiih, Sararla, the lonic/c Voice and Speech differ, in that Voice is found, but Speech articulate only. Speech and Word dif fer •, for Word is always figniheative; bur, Speech I'ometimes fignifieth nothing, as Blitiri, which is no word. To fpeak and to pronounce dif fer ; Voices are pronounced, but things only are fpokeii; h for, to fpeak, is to pronounce . a ligniheant Voice of a thing that is laid.
^ i Hence Chryjippus laith. That he who be- ginneth to fpeak and pronounce Words, before he can put them in their right place, doth not I'peak, but think that he fpeaks ; as the Image of a Man is not a Man : So in Crows,Daws and Children, when they firll begin to fpeak, the words which they fay are not words. Fie only fpeaketh whoknoweth to put a word in the right place.
They (particularly k 'Zeno) I took much k. ckero. pains in the Invention and Explication of words, ^ itaiu. m wherein they diftinguilhed very fubtilly.
Hence calleth the Srwc/fi- Architeffs of ”'
\N Olds. Ammonius, iho Grammarians, followers of the Stoicks.
n Tire Elements of Speech are the 24 Lot- n Laert. ters. Letter IS taken three ways: Firlt, for the Charafler or Figure which is formed. St^- condly, for the Element or Power. Thirdly, for the Name, as A. Of the Elements, leven are Vowels as u ovt fix Alutes, S' nor
0 Of Speech there are Hve parts, as Dioge-o Laert. nes faith in hisBook o{Voice,2.\\dChryfippusp. At k Dhnyj.Halk. firft they reckoned but four, leparating the Ar¬ ticles from the Conjunctions, afterwards the lat* ter Stoicks dividing the Appellatives from the AJouns, made them five, Noun,Appellation,Verb,
Conjunction, Article. (Antipater in his Book of Speech added the medium.) Appellation ( as Dio¬ genes faithjis a part of Speech fignifying a com¬ mon quality ; as, Man, Horfe. Noun, a part of Speech denoting a proper quality -, as Dio¬ genes, Socrates. Verb, ( as Diogenes faith) a part of Speech fignifying a thing, which is pre¬ dicated of one or'more things, incompofed ; or, as fome fay, an Element of Speech without ca¬ fes, whereby the parts of Speech are connect- » ed ; as I write, I fpeak. Conjunction is a part of Speech without Gales, conjoining the parts of Speech. Article is an Elerhent of Speech, having cafes ; difiinguifhingthe kinds and num- ' bers of Nouns ; as, a, « to, 0/, a/,
q Every word, by reafon of that which it q s. ^ugujl de fignifieth, called four necellary things into que- mded. cap.6. ftion, its Origin, Dower, Declination,Ordination.
As concerning the firlf, which the Greeks call ErvyrrKoyiA.^ they ■ conceiv’d that Names are gi¬ ven by Nature : the firft: pronounced Voices, imitating the things themfelves, from which the Names were afterwards impofed, by which reafon they derive Etymologies, conceiving that there is not any word, for which there cannot be given a certain Reafon. They there¬ fore fludioufly enquired whence words are de¬ duced -, much pains was taken, firlf by Zeno, then by Cleanthes, afterw^ard, by Chry/ippirs, to give a reafon of commentitious Fables, and to explain the caufes of Words, why they are cal¬ led lb and fo.
This beginning is to be fought, until we ar¬ rive fo far, as that the thing agree in fome Si¬ militude with the found of the word, as when we fay tinkling of Brafs, the neighing of Horfes, the of Sheep, the of Chains.
Thefe words by their Sound, exprels the things which are fignified by them.
But for as much as there are things which Ibund nor, in thele the Similitude of Touching hath the fame Power .• As they touch the Senfe fmoothly or harlhly,the fmoothnefs or harlhnels of Letters in like manner touches the hearing, and thereby occafioneth their Naines. As when we fay fmooth, it founds linoothly; So who will not judge harfhnefs to be harffiby the very word.^ it is fmooth to the Ear, when we fay Lleajure ; harlh, when we fay Crux, ^ Crofs -, the things themfelves make good the Ibund of the Words. honey, as Iweetly as the thing it felf affeffs our Tafte,fo fweetly doth the name touch our Hear-
Q. q . ing;
j
i
ZENO.
506
A R T-
VIII.
ing : Sou7\ as harfh in both. Wool and ^Bryers^ as, the Words are to the hearings the Things are to the touch. Thefe are conceived to be the In¬ fancy, as it were of Words, when the Senfe of the thing concords with the Senfe of the found.
From hence proceeded the licence of Naming, according to the Similitude of the things among themfelves j as when,for example. Crux., a is therefore fo called, becaufe the harflinefs of the word concords with the harlhnefs of the Pain which the Crofs affefteth. But, Crura.^ Thighs, are fo called, not from hard inefs of pain, but, becaufe in length and hardnefs, they are, inrelpeOiof other Limbs, like unto the Wood of a Crofs. Hence it comes to abufe, that the Name is ufarped, not of a like thing, but as it were near j for what likenefs is there between the Signification of little and minute., when as that may be little., which not only is nothing -minute., but isfomewhat grown ^ yet, by realbn of a certain nearnels, we fay minute for little. But, this abufe of the Word is in the Power of the Speaker i for he may ufe the w^rd ///// and not minute. This Example belongs to that which we will fhew, when we call that a fijh- fonclv^lhoh hath no Flfh in it, nor any thing like a Fifh : It is denominated from Fifhes,by reafon of the Water wherein Fifties live. So the word isufed by Tranflation, not from Similitude, but a certain kind of Vicinity. And if anyoneftiould lay. That Men in Swimming refemble Fifties, and that from thence a Filh-pond is fo named , it were foolifh to lefufe it, lince that neither is repugnant to the nature of the thing, and both are occult. But, this is to the purpole, which we cannot dilucidate by oneExample,how much •'the Origineof the Word, which is taken from Vicinity, differs from that which is derived from Similitude.
From hence there is a Progreffion to the con¬ trary, hucus is thought to be fo named, mtnime luceat ^ and helium, quod res hella non Jit and foedus, quod resfceda non fit. But if we de¬ rive as fome do a focditate, it returns to
that Vicinity, when that which is made, is named that by which it is made.
For this Vicinity is very large, and divided into many parts either by efficiency, as this word porcus kfceditate from which likewife fcedus-, theeffeQ: thereof is ^ or by that it con- taineth, as urbs ab orbe, becaufe in a place which they liked, they firft made a track about it with a Plough, as Virgil faith of 2Eneas.
-Urbem defgnat Aratro.
Or by that which is contained, as if horreum were derived from hordeum ; or by abufe, as hor- deum for Wheat ^ or the whole from a part, as mucro, which is thepoint,for the whole Swordj or a part from the whole, zscapillus quafi capitis pilus,'Yl\).dX need we go any further Whatfo- ever elfe can be reckoned, we may lee the Origin of the w ord contained, either in the Similitude betwixt Things and Sounds, or in the Simili- tudebetwixt Things themfelves , or in Vicinity or Contrariety, which Origin we cannot pur- fue beyond Similitude.
But this we cannot do always *, for there are
innumerable Words, the Reafon of which lie hid.
To the Infancy, or rather Stock and Seed of fuch Words, beyond which no Origin is to be fought, neither if a Man do enquire can he find any, they proceed in this manner. The Sylla¬ bles, in which v hath the place of Confonant, as in thefe Words, venter, vafer, velum qoinum, vomis vulmrs, have a thick, and as it were, a ftrong found, which the very cuftom of lpeaking confirmeth, which from fome Words we take them away, left they Ihould burthen the Ear ; for which reafon we lay ^;;;^y?/,rather than ama- vijii and abiit, not ^^^/^;;>,and innumerable of the fame kind. Therefore when we fay F}>,the found of the word having, as we faid, a kind offeree, fuiteth. Now from this Vicinity, by that which they affeef, that is, becaule they are violent vincula feem to be named, and vimen quod ali- quid vinciatur. Thence vites, becaufe they clafp about thofe things by which they grow.
Hence alfo by Simiiitude,T^;r/?^:^’ calls a crooked old Man vietum. Hence the Earth, worn into winding Paths by the Feet of Paffengers, is call’d via •, but if via be fo named, quafi vi pedum trl ta, the Origin returns to the Vicinity : But let us fuppofe it derived from the Similitude it hath with vitis or vimen, that is, from its winding ; one asketh me why it is call’d via ^ I anfwer, from the winding and crookednels thereof, which the Ancients called vietum j thence the Rounds of a Wheel vietos. He demands how vietum comes to fignifie winding > I anfwer, from the Similitude oWitis a Vine : He requires whence vitis is fo named ^ I lay, becaufe it doth vincire thofe things which it comprehends. Hequeftions whence vincire is derived ? We lay, a vi. He asks whence vis ? We give this reafon, becaufe the word in its robuft and forcible found agreeth to the thing which it fignilieth. He hath no¬ thing more to demand.
tin like manner, in this word Ego ; as Q)ty-*^En. de fippus obferves, in pronouncing the firft Sylla- 2
ble, we deprefs the under-lip, as if it were to ^ ’ * ‘
point to our felves j then by motion of the Beard vve point to our own Breafts •, of which u Ni- u jgel. 10. 5. gidit/s hath given more Inttances, in his Gram¬ matical Commentaries.
The fecond Queftion concerning Words, is of their Power, -sTsei ff>iu-ui/ovjuv^ofSigntfcants-,\vhence X Chry fippus divided Diale£lick into two parts, * '
Teel arnixctivovjuv ^ etip.a.mfiyuv^ of Significants,and Significats. Here they enquire how many ways every thing rqay be laid, and how many ways a thing faid may fignifie ?
Here is examined the Ambiguity of Words. y Ambiguity (or Amphiboly ^ is a word figni-^ lying two or more things, naturally and proper¬ ly, according to the Language of the Nation, in fuch manner, that many Senfes may be colle« fifed from the lame Words, as a.vKd\exi TWlcoKe , which one way fignifies, the Pot fell thrice ^ an¬ other way, the She-Minjlrel fell.
z Every word (according to Chryfppi/s) is^ jiiel.9. 12- by nature ambiguous, for the lame may be taken two or more ways ; y Neither is that any thing > D. Augufi, to thepurpofe which Calumniates in'^^ ohleil.
Cicero, Thus, they affirm that they hear Ambi¬ guities acutely, explain them clearly. The lame perfons hold, that every Word is Ambiguous j how then can they explain the Ambiguous by
the
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