Part VIII.

* Ethic. Scm.
J^8.
PL Je plat, Phil. I.
b Lctert.
Laft in the Catalogue of his Difciples riiuft .lofophy • but, a particle it is not, for it is not a be remembred an Eretrian youth (mention’d by part either of the Contemplative or the A^ive Stob£2^) who heard till he came to be a That which is a particle of any thing, ought to man : then returning to Eretrta^ his Father asked have the fariae matter and fcope with that wherc- him what he had learn’d all that time 5 he an- of it is a part. Logick hath neither of thefecom- fwered, he would Ihortly let him fee, and did fo: mon with Adivc Philofophy, the matter where- for, not long after, his Father in anger did beat of is humane things, and moderation of appe- him, Which he took quietly, faying. This I have \ the, the commop fcope, what in them is to be learned^ To bear with the Anger of a lather^ and j embraced or Ihunned j but the matter of Logick not to oppofe it. , is propofitions 5 the fcope, to demonftrate by a
In the Life of Zeno (for as much as he is Au- compofure of propofitions, that which neceffa- thor of thatSeft) it will be requifite to give ac- 1 nly falls out upon the CoUeaion. Neither is count of the DoQrine of the Stoicks in general 5 1 Logick a part of the contemplative the matter wherein, if the terms feem harlhly rendred, it I whereof is things Divine ^ the end,’ contempla- will eafily be forgiven by thofe, who confider I tion of them ; now, if it be not a p’art, either of the Stoicks were no lefs particular in their words, j the contemplative or the A£live,it is not a parti- than in their Doftrines. I cle of Philofophy, but equally feparate from both
thefe,and conlequently it muft be a part of it.
e The fecond Argument is thus. No Art fra- ^ meth its own Inftruments ^ if therefore Philofo- phy make Logick, it is not its Inftrument, but part thereof - •
/ is by Ibme compared to sif •Sext.Emp.
field which produceth all manner of fruit : Phi- *• lick to the foil and tall trees,Ethick to the mature
Sn "1 X I to the ftrong fence. Others
I vJ 1 Jv r Etl^ick to the yolk, which
^ 'fomeaihrmto be the Chicken: Phyficktothe white, which is the nourifhment of the Chicken Logick to the outfide or fhell. Toffidonius^ (be- caule the parts of Philof are infeparable from one another, but plants are diftina from the fruits, as Walls from Hedges) chufeth rather to * compare Philofophy to a living creature, Phy-
THE
DOCTRINE
O F T H E
The*’ F/ri? Part.
CHAP. I.
Of Philofophy in General^ and Particularly of\ fick to Blood and Flefh, Logick to Bones and DiakHick. Nerves, Ethick to the Soul. (Thus Sextus Em-
Xpiricus^ by whom, perhaps, Laertius is to be cor-
Wlfdom is the Science of things Divine reaed, who faith. They likened. Ethick to the and Humane i Philofophy is the excrei- j FZ?/Z>, Yhyfick to the Soul) Laftly, they compare ration of convenient Art. Convenient is the only j Philofophy to a City well Fortified and Govern- and fupream Virtue. Of Virtues in the moff j ed according to Reafon general Senfe there are three kinds, Natural-A g Some affirm, that none of thefe parts are Moraf Rational ; For which caufe Philofophy diftina from the reft, but all intermingled with ^ likewife hath three parts, Phyfick., Ethick., Lo- 1 one another, for which reafon they deliver gick: Phyfick, when we enquire concerning j them confiifedly. The greater part place Logick the World, and the things in the World .• E- j firft, Ethick next, Phyfick laft -, becaufe the Mind thick is employed about humane life : Lo- J ought firft to be fortified for the keeping thole gick is that part which concerns Reafon, which I things which are committed to it, fb as it be not is alfo called UialeHick b Thus eafily expugnable. The Dialeaick place is a for-
the Citiean firft divided it in his Book of SpeechAtTiCd.iion for the Mind. Secondly, to deferibe the and Chryfippus in his firft Book of Speech., and in I contemplation of Manners, that they may be re- his firft oi. Phyjicks y and Apollodorus in j formed, which is fafely undertaken, when the
his firft Book of Introdulfions intolOoHrines j and j Logical power is firft laid down. Laftly, to in- Eudromus in his moral Injiitutions., and Diogenes j duce the contemplation of Nature, for that is the Babylonian, and Pojjidonius. Thefe parts j more Divine, and requireth a .more profound Apollodorus calleth Places j Chryfippus and Eu* j attention. This method h Plutarch affirms to h De Plat, romus Species -, others Genuses. I have been obferved by Chryfippus.^ adding th.zt oj PhiL
That Logick is a part of Philofophy diftinft I PAy/zr/^, the la ji part., is that which treateth of from the reft , (wherein all the Stoicks agree) is I Goh^ for which reafon they call the precepts of Re-
c Ammoms A. ^ M ^ .J t— A ^ m, .... ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ LJ* I ^ ^ ^ ^ A ^ 7* ^ r-. ^ ^ ..-1- ... ^ .
Categ.
d Philop. in lib. t. Anal, prior.
proved by two Arguments, the firft this ; ^ E- j ligion nKdtif. It feems therefore, that there is very thing whidi ufeth another, if that which jfome miftake in L the thing ufing, ufeth, be neither part nor par- j place Logick firft, Phyfick next, and Ethick laft. tide, nor part of part of' any other, it muft belciteth Zeno in his Book of Speech., and Chryfp- part or particle of the thing ufing ; as Medicine and Archedemus, and Eudromus. But Dioge-
ufeth the art of prefcribing diet, which art be- j nes the Ptolemxan (continueth he) begins with ing neither part nor particle of any other, is con- j Ethick ; Apollodorus puts Ethick in the fecond fequently a part or particle of Medicine j of part, I placd ; Panatius and Pojfdonius begin with Phy- as to the Cure -, of particle, as to the Pradice. I fick, as PW/^y, companion of Pojfdonius affirtns ^ d Philofophy is converfant about Logick j Lo I in his firft of Pojfdonius' s dijfertations. gick therefore is either a part or particle of Phi- 1 i Of Logick, Cleanthes affigneth fix parts,
DialeHicL
rt.
Pa a T VIII.
ZENO.
501
Laert.
I Laert.
m Laert.
n Laert.
Diale&ick., Rhetorick^Ethick^ FolitlcA^ Phy/lck^ Theologick : Some affirm, thefe are not parts of Logick, but of Philofophy it felf : So Zeno of Tarfis. The Logical part is by fome divided in¬ to two Sciences, Rhetorick and Dia/e&ic^ j feme the definitive part., fome divide the defini¬ tive into that which concerns invention of truth (by which the, differences of Phantafies are dire- fted)and that which conztivs knowledge of truth; for things are comprehended by notions.
k Rhetorick is the fcience of well fpeaking, by dilating upon the thing comprehend^. Dia- leSick is the Science of well fpeaking, (that is true and confentaneous) or well -dilputing by j Queftion and Anfwer. It is defined by Rojfidoni- ^ z/j, the Science of True., Ealfe., and Neuter. | / Rhetorick is of three kinds^De/iberative^fu- dicial., Denjonfirative : The parts of Rhetorick are Invention., Stile , Difputation., Pronunciation'. Rhetorical Speech is divided into, Proem., Nar¬ ration^ Confutation., Epilogue. j
m Dialeftick is necelfary, and a virtue within its fpecies, containing other virtues, aTefidlaxTU, a'Science whereby we are taught when to alTent, and when not ; dmx.aiijt)f, a firm reafori, where¬ by we refill appearances, and are not led away j by them, : a Fortitude of Reafon
which keeps us from being tranfported with the adverfe opinion.- a habit direfling phan- ,
tafies to right reafon. |
n Dialeflick is a Science or certain compre- ' henfion, or a habit, not erring by realbn in rece* , ption of phantafies ; but without Dialeflick, a wife man cannot be infallible in reafon -, for by this, we difeern the true, falfe, and probable, and diftinguifh the ambiguous.
not evident. In which fenfe, thofe things which belong to the aflions of life, are not faid to be things judging, but the logical only, and thofe which dogmatical Philofophers alledge for the invention of truth.
The Logical is fubdivided into that from which, that by which, and application or habitude. Eron which, the man ; by which, the fenfe ; the third is the application of phantafie or fight. For as in the Staticks, there are three things which judg, the weigher, the ballance, and pofidon of the ballance : The weigher is the judge from which, the ballance the judge by which, the pofition of the ballance, as it were a habitude. And again, as to difeern right or oblique things is required an Artificer, a Ruler, and the application thereof; in like manner in Philofophy are required thofe three things mentioned to the difeernment of true and falfe ; the man from whom the judg- mefit is made, is like the Weigher or Artificer ; to the Ballance and Ruler anfwer Senfe and Co¬ gitation, by which the judgment is made.- to the habitude of the forenamed inftruments, the application of phantafie, by which a rrian com- eth to judge.
e The Judge of Truth, they affirm to be com- e laert. prehenfive Phantafie, that is, proceeding from that which is ; fo Chryfippue in the 12th of his Phyficks, and Antipater, and ApoUodorus. But Boethus holds many Judicatories, the Alind, znd Senfe, and Appetite, and Science ; from whom Chryfippm difienting in his firft Book of Reajhn, affirmeth the Judicatories to be Senfe and Anti¬ cipation. Anticipation is a natural notion of Uni- verfals. Others of the more ancient Stoicks (as Pofjidonius faith in his Book of Judgment s)2SPqix. right Reafon to be the Judicatory.
CHAP. II.
Of the InJiruments and Rules of Judgments
4 Laert. TN the firft place, they put the difeourfe con" cerning phantafies and fenfe, as a Judicato¬ ry, whereby the truth of things is difeerned.
h Cic. Acad. 1. b The Senfes (according to Zeno, who made many alterations in Dialeflick, and aflerted ma- ■ ny things of the Senfes that were wholly new) are joyned by a certain - kind of extfinfecal im- pulfion, termed phantafie. To thefe phantafies received by the lenfes, is added an auention of the mind, which is placed in us voluntary. The phantafie, when feen, is comprehenfible, when received and approved, comprehenfion ; and, if fo comprehended, as that it cannot be plucked away by reafon, fcience.
c Galen, bifl. c Judgment is a perfeflion which difcerneth a thing.
i Sen. Emir. ^ which judgeth is taken two ways:
*dv. log. I. By which we lay, fome things are, others are not; thefe are true, thofe are falfe. 2. OfEflence only ; and this is underftood three ways, com¬ monly, properly, and moft properly. Commonly, for every m^afure of comprehenfion, in which fenfe, even thofe things which judge naturally, have this appellation, as fight, hearing, taft. Pro¬ perly, for every artificial meafure of comprehen- lion ; thus a cubit, a ballance, a ruler, a pair of compaffes, are called things that judge; but fight and hearing, and the other common Inftruments of Senfe, are not. Moji properly, for every mea¬ fure of comprehenfion of a thing, uncertain, and
CHAP. III.
Of Senfe.
a X^Ialeflick is derived from corporeal fenfes; a st. Aug. civ.
JL/ for, from thence, the Soul conceiveth 8. 7. notorious of thofe things which are ex¬
plained by definition, and from thence is propa¬ gated and connexed the whole reafon of Learn¬ ing and Teaching.
b Senfe is a Spirit, proceeding from the fupream b Laert. part of the Soul, and permeating to the Organs.
'c Whatfoever things are comprehended, zxQcOrig. contra manifeftly comprehended by Senfe; allconcepti-^^^f* 7- ons of the Mind depend upon Senfe.
d Comprehenfion made by the Senfes is true ^ and faithful, (according to Zeno) for as much as Nature hath given it as a rule for Science, and principle of her felf.
e Nothing is more’clear than this ^
dence, there cannot be any Speech more perfpi- f ’ cuous :
f Of Senfibles and Intelligibles, fome are true, y Empir. bur, not direflly fenfible ; .but, by relation to F^rrh. hyp. z.s. thofe things which are next, as falling under In¬ telligence.
CHAP.
502
ZENO.
.Pa'rt V
CHAP. lY. OJ Fhantdjie.
a Lm t.
b Plut.-plac. Phil. 12.
c SexU: Emp. Pprh. hyp. 1.2
IN the firft place (faith ^ Dia-/a'the Md£- nejian) they put the reafon concerning phan- tafie and fenfe, as a judgment, whereby' the truth of things is difcerned. It is phantafie as to its genus, and likewnfe ih^aS inuch as, the rfeamn of affent, comprehenlion, and intelligence (which is more excellent than the relt) confifts hot without phantafie ; for pfiantafie goeth firft, then the mind endued with elocution, declateth by words what it fuifers ftom the phantafie.
h Phantafie is fo called from light ^ for as light fheweth it felf, and with it lelf all thole things which are contained within it ^ fo phanta¬ fie fheweth it felf, and t.hat which maketh it.
c 'Phantafie is ah' imprelTipn in the Soul : Cle- . anthcs adds, an imprelfion by deprelfion and emi¬ nence, as that imprelfion which is made in Wax by a Seal.
Chryfiippus conceives this to be abfurd For