CHAPTER V

INSPIRATION AND INTUITION
[UST as Imagination may be called spiritual seeing, so may Inspiration be called spiritual hearing. We must of course be quite clear in our minds that by the expression “hearing” is signified a form of perception as far removed from sense- hearing in the physical world, as “ sight ” in the imaginative or astral world is from seeing with the physical eyes.
We may say of the light and colour phenomena of the astral world that they are as if the luminous sirrfaces and colours of sense-objects stood out from these objects, and, detached from them, floated
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freely in space. But this gives only an approximate idea; for “space” in the imaginative world is by no means the same as in the physical. Therefore it is a mistake to believe that we are seeing colour-pictures made by the imaginative faculty when we are observing only detached specks of colour floating in ordi- nary space. Nevertheless the building of such colour-images is the way to the imaginative life.
Anyone who tries to picttme to himself a flower, and then reject from the image everything that is not colour, so that a picture as of the detached colour-surface of the flower floats before his mind, may gradually acquire the imaginative faculty by means of such exercises. This is not in itself the imaginative picture, but is a more or less preparatory fantasy -picture. Imagination — that is, genuine astral ex-
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perience — does not come until not only is colour detached from sense-impression, but three-dimensional space has com- pletely disappeared. That this has hap- pened, can be realised only by a certain kind of feeling, which is best described by saying that one no longer feels “out- side” but “inside” the colour-image, and has the consciousness of taking part in its genesis. If this feeling is absent, if w'e seem to be looking at the thing as we look at a physical colour-picture, then we are not yet dealing with genuine Imagination, but with something purely fanciftd.
But it must not be said that such fancy pictures are altogether worthless. They may, for instance, be etheric images, — shadows, as it were, of genuine astral facts; and as such they have value in occult training. They may form a bridge to genuine astral imaginative experiences.
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but they involve a certain amoxmt of danger to the observer on this borderland between the senses and the sensible, unless he brings sound judgment fully into play. It is not to be expected that an unfailing test can be given to every one, whereby he may distinguish reality from illusions, hallucinations, and fancies on this bor- derland. Such a general rule would cer- tainly be convenient, but convenience is a word which the occult student should expunge from his vocabulary.
It can only be said that he who wishes to acquire clear discrimination in this sphere must in the first place cultivate discrimination in the ordinary life of the physical world. The man who takes no pains to think definitely and clearly in ordinary life will fall a victim to all man- ner of illusions when he ascends to higher worlds. We have only to consider how
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many snares beset sound judgment in ordinary affairs. How often it happens that people do not see calmly what exists, but what they wish to see ! In how many cases do they believe a thing, not because they have comprehended it, but because it pleases them to believe it! And what mistakes arise because people will not sift a thing to the bottom, but form a hasty opinion! All these causes of error in ordinary life might be multiplied indefinitely. What tricks are played on sound judgment by party feeling, passion, and prejudice! If such errors of judg- ment in ordinary life are disturbing and often momentous in their consequences, they are the greatest imaginable danger to the sanity of the super-sensible life. No general nile can be given to the stu- dent for his guidance in the higher worlds, beyond the injunction to do everything
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possible to develop a healthy power of discrimination and a sound and inde- pendent judgment.
When the observer in the higher w’orlds once knows what Imagination really is, he very soon acquires the conviction that the images of the astral world are not merely images, but manifestations of spiritual beings. He comes to know that these imaginative pictures belong just as much to spiritual or psychic beings as do physical colours to physical beings or objects. As regards details he vdll, of course, have much to learn. He must learn to discriminate between colour-pic- tures which are opaque and those which are quite transparent, and, as it were, illumined from within. In fact, he will observe some images which seem to be continually creating their colour-light from within, and which therefore are not
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only fully illuminated and transparent, but are continually raying forth light. He will refer the opaque images to a lower order of creation, and the transparent ones to intermediate entities, while those which radiate light from within may be taken as manifestations of higher spiritual beings.
If we would amve at the truth about the world of Imagination, we must not form too narrow a conception of spiritual sight. For in that world there are not only perceptions of light and colour, which may be compared with the sight- experiences of the physical world, but also impressions of heat and cold, taste and smell, and yet other experiences of imaginative “sense” to which there is no analogy in the physical world. Impres- sions of heat and cold are, in the imagina- tive or astral world, manifestations of the
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will and purpose of psychic and spiritual beings. Whether such a being is of good or bad intent is apparent in a certain effect of heat and cold. Astral beings can also be “tasted” or “smelt.” Only that which constitutes in a real sense the phys- ical element of sound and colour is almost entirely lacking in the true imaginative world. In this respect absolute stillness reigns there. But in place thereof, some- thing quite different is offered to one who is making progress in spiritual observa- tion, something which may be compared with sound and vibration, speech and music, in the world of sense. And this higher something enters only when every sound and tone from the outer physical world is wholly silenced, — in fact, when even the lightest psychic echo of anything in the outer world is silenced also. Then there comes to the observation what may
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be called an understanding of the mean- ing of imaginative experiences.
If we wish to compare what is now felt with anything in the physical world, we can only suggest as an illustration some- thing which does not exist there. If we could imagine that we could perceive the thoughts and feelings of a person without hearing his words by the physical ear, such a perception might be compared with the direct understanding by the imagina- tive faculty which is designated " hearing ’ ' in the spiritual sense. In that world, col- our and light impressions are speech. As the images grow bright or dull in colour, harmonies or discords are formed which reveal the feelings, ideas, and thoughts of psychic and spiritual entities. And just as sound grows into speech in the physical man when thought is impressed upon him, so do the harmonies and dis-
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cords of the spiritual world come into manifestation as the actual thoughts of these beings. And of course darkness must fall upon the outer w’orld if such thought is to be directly revealed.
The following experience thus presents itself. We see the bright shades of colour — red, yellow, and orange — fade away, and the higher world grow darker, through green, to blue and violet, at the same time we feel an increase of will-power in our- selves. We experience complete freedom with regard to time and space; we feel that we are in motion. We are conscious of certain linear forms and shapes, yet not as though we saw them drawn in space, but rather as if we ourselves were following every curve and form with our ego in continuous movement. In fact we feel that the ego is at once the draughts- man and the material with which they
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are drawn; and every turn of the line, every change of place, is equally an experience of the ego. We learn to recog- nise that we with our ego set in motion are bound up with the creative forces of the world. The laws of the world are no longer something outwardly perceived by the ego, but a real web of wonder which he is helping to weave. Occult Science sketches out for us all kinds of symbolic drawings and pictures. When these really correspond to facts and are not merely, figures of invention, they are founded on the observer’s experiences in higher worlds, which are seen in the manner described above.
Thus does the world of Inspiration take its place within the Imaginative world. When the imaginings begin to reveal their meanings to the observer in silent language, the world of Inspira-
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tion is opening within the Imaginative world.
The physical world is a manifestation of that other world which the spiritual observer penetrates in this way. That part of the physical world which is per- ceptible by the senses, and by the xmder- standing which is limited by them, is in fact only the outside of it. To take a single example: a plant, as it is observed by the physical senses and understanding, is not the total being of the plant. He who knows only the physical plant is in a similar position to one who could perceive the finger-nail of a man, but to whom the man himself was inaccessible. The nat- ure and construction of the finger-nail, can be understood only when explained by the whole human being. So, in reality, the plant is only comprehensible when that is known which pertains to it
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as the whole man pertains to the finger- nail. That which makes up the total plant cannot be discovered in the physical world. To begin with, there is something fundamental in the plant which can only be revealed by the imaginative faculty in the astral world, and something yet further which can only be manifested through Inspiration in the spiritual world. Thus the plant as a physical organism is the revelation of a being to be understood by means of Imagination and Inspiration.
It is evident from what has gone before that a path opens before the observer in the higher worlds which has its beginning in the world of sense. That is to say, he can start from the physical world and ascend from its manifestations to the higher beings behind them. If he starts from the animal kingdom, he can rise into the Imaginative world. If he makes the
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plant his point of departure, spiritual observation will lead him through Imagi- nation to the world of Inspiration. If this path is followed, there will soon be found within both those worlds beings and facts not revealed at all in the physi- cal world. We must not, however, think that in this way we become acquainted only with such beings of the higher worlds as have their manifestations in the physi- cal. A man who has once entered the Imaginative world comes into contact with a number of beings and events of which the merely physical observer never dreams.
There is another method, which does not make the physical world its point of departure, and which also makes a man directly clairvoyant in the higher regions. To many persons this method might be more attractive than the one above indi-
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cated; but in our present-day conditions of life the path upward from the physical worl4 is rather to be chosen. It imposes upon the observer the self-renunciation which is necessary, if he is first of all to look around him in the physical world and gather some sort of knowledge, and more particularly some experience there. And, indeed, in any case, it is the method best suited to our present-day conditions of culture.
The other way presupposes the pre- liminary acquisition of qualities of the soul extremely difficult to attain tmder modem conditions of life. Even though such qualities have again and again been strongly and clearly insisted upon in writ- ings on this subject, yet the majority of people have no idea — or at most, a very inadequate one — of the extent to which these qualities (for example, unselfishness
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and self-sacrificing love) must be acquired if they would attain to the higher worlds without starting from the sme ground of the physical. And if a person awakes in the higher worlds without having attained, to the extent necessary, the corresponding qualities of the soul, unspeakable misery must be the consequence.
It must on no account be thought that the qualities mentioned above can be dispensed with in cases where the start is made from the physical world ; to imagine this would be a false deduction. But such a beginning allows for the gradual acquisition of these qualities in the degree — and above all in the form — practicable under our present conditions of life.
Another thing in this connection has to be taken into account. If we start from the physical world in the manner indica- ted, we remain, notwithstanding our
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ascent into the higher worlds, in close touch with the physical plane. We keep intact our full understanding of all that is going on in it, and all our energy for work- ing there. Indeed, this understanding and energy increase in a most helpful way in consequence of oim knowledge of the higher worlds. In every department of life, even in what seems most prosaic and practical, the knower of the higher worlds will work better and more usefully than the ignorant man, if only the former has kept himself in living touch with the physical world.
The man, however, who awakens in the higher spheres without starting from the physical, is only too readily estranged from outward life; he becomes a hermit, confronting his contemporaries without understanding or sympathy. Indeed, it often happens that people who are imper-
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fectly developed in this way (of course not those who are fully evolved) look down with a certain contempt on the experi- ences of the physical world and imagine themselves superior to them. Instead of having their sympathy with the world in- creased, such people harden themselves and become selfish in the spiritual sense of the word. The temptation to do this is by no means small, and those who are striving to attain to the higher worlds will do well to be on their guard against it.
From Inspiration the spiritual observer may rise to Intuition. In the phraseol- ogy of Occult Science this word denotes in many respects the exact opposite of that to which it is often applied in ordi- nary life. People speak of Intuition as if they had in their mind some idea dimly felt to be true, but lacking any clear and exact confirmation. It is seen as a pre-
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liminary step towards knowledge, rather than knowledge itself. An idea of this kind may — according to that definition — illuminate a great truth like a flash of lightning, but it can only become know- ledge when confirmed by accurate judg- ment. Again, by Intuition is generally denoted something which is “felt” as truth, and of which a person is quite con- vinced, but which he will not enctimber with intellectual judgment. People who are acquiring a knowledge of Occult Science often say: That was always clear to me “intuitively.” But we must put all this entirely aside if we would fix our attention on the true meaning which the term Intuition here implies. In this connection Intuition is a mode of cogni- tion which is in no way inferior in clear- ness to intellectual knowledge, but far surpasses it,
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The experiences of the higher worlds reveal their meaning through Inspiration. The observer lives in the qualities and actions of the beings pertaining to those worlds. When he follows with his ego, as described above, the direction of a line, or the shape of a figure, he knows at the same instant that he is not within the being itself, but within its qualities and functions. He has already experienced in Imaginative knowledge the feeling of being no longer outside, but inside the colour-images, but at the same time he understands no less clearly that these colour-images are not themselves inde- pendent beings, but only the qualities of such beings. In Inspiration, he is con- scious of becoming one with the deeds of such beings, and with the manifestations of their will ; in Intuition, for the first time, he merges his own personality into that of
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self-contained beings. This can happen in the right way only when the blending takes place, not through the effacement, but with the full preservation of his own being. Any “losing of oneself ” in another being is wrong. Therefore only an ego which is fortified within itself to a very high degree can with impunity plunge into the being of another.
Something has been realised intuitively for the first time when the feeling arises with regard to it that some being is find- ing expression therein who is of the same nature as one’s own ego. A man w’ho observes a stone with his outer senses and seeks to understand its qualities by his reason, and by the usual scientific meth- ods, gets to know only the outside of the stone. As a spiritual observer he then proceeds to Imaginative and Inspirational knowledge. If he dwell inwardly in the
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latter, he may arrive at a further percep- tion, which may be described by compari- son in the following way. Let us suppose that we see a person in the street, who at first makes only a fleeting impression on us. Afterwards we get to know him bet- ter, then a time arrives when we become such friends that soul reveals itself to soul. With such an experience, when the veils of the soul fall away and one ego sees the other face to face, we may compare what happens when the stone first appears to the spiritual observer as an outward ap- pearance only, and he ultimately reaches something to which the stone belongs, just as the finger-nail belongs to the human body, and which lives its life as an ego after the same fashion as our own inner self.
The kind of knowledge which takes us into the innermost nature of beings is first
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attained in Intuition. Something has already been said with regard to Inspira- tion as to the change which must be brought about in the inner psychic con- dition of the spiritual observer if he wishes to attain this mode of cognition. It has been stated, for instance, that an inaccurate conclusion must not affect the intellect only, but the feelings also, and must cause pain and grief. And the observer must systematically cultivate that kind of inward life. Of course, so long as such pain springs only from the sympathies or antipathies of the ego, and from partiality, it cannot be spoken of as an adequate preparation for Inspira- tion. Such mental contacts are very far removed from the inner sympathy which the ego must feel for pure truth, as truth, if he would attain the goal in question. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that
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all forms of interest which prevail in or- dinary life, as pleasure or pain in relation to truth or error, must first be silenced, and then a totally different interest, wholly free from self-seeking, must enter in, if any glimpse is to be had of Inspira- tional Knowledge. This quality of the inner spiritual life is, however, only one of the means of preparing for Inspiration. A great number of others must be added. And the more the spiritual obscrv'cr puri- fies himself with regard to what has already served him for Inspiration, the nearer he will be able to approach to Intuition.
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOSOPHY
A LECTURE DELIVERED AT STUTTGART ON AUGUST 17, 1908
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Authorised Translation by A.B.
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOSOPHY
y^FTER having come to the close of a long course of purely Theosophic Lectures, we will to-day assume a differ- ent tone. I must therefore ask you, from the very outset, to take into consideration that to-day’s address is not in the actual sense a Theosophic one, and that the purely philosophic tone which must be adopted may, to such as are unaccus- tomed to this mode of thought, seem somewhat abstract and difficult.
I have a definite reason for this depar- ture: it is, that again and again, and more especially in those circles possessing, or believing themselves to possess, a certain amount of philosophic training, the opin- ion must arise (and I use the word “must”
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advisedly) that Theosophy is tolerable only to persons who have been unable to pursue their philosophic, or scientific, studies beyond a certain point of amateur- ishness. It might easily be presiuned in such circles that a person possessing thor- ough philosophic training, and acquainted with what are the foundations of scien- tific asstunptions and convictions, could from the very beginning never concern himself with all those fantasies presum- ably accepted as "higher experiences;” that such things could but appeal to those who were as yet imripe for philo- sophic thought.
Now, in order to ascertain to what this opinion is due, we will, for once in a way, ourselves take a survey of the activities ■ of Philosophy. This can be done only in a perftmctory manner to-day, giving the merest indications; but when on some
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future occasion I may have the oppor- tunity of speaking in a more detailed manner about these things, you will be in a position to see for yourselves that such indications have been drawn from a great context.
Philosophy has been generally regarded, by those who concern themselves with the subject, as something absolute, not as something which was bound to come into existence in the course of the development of mankind.
It is, however, precisely when dealing with the Science of Philosophy that we are in a position to show, by means of exter- nal historic documents, the time at which it had its origin in the evolution of man- kind. Now that time has been fairly well determined, and more especially so by the older interpreters of the History of Philos- ophy. In all such presentations you will
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find that a beginning is made with Thales, and from him onwards in continuity down to our times.
A few newer writers on the History of Philosophy, desirous of appearing more particularly erudite and clever, have, it is true, attempted to place the beginning of Philosophy at a more remote date, drag- ging in all kinds of material from the early “Wisdom” teaching. All this, however, is due to a particular form of dilettanteism, wholly ignorant of the fact that every- thing that preceded it in the “Wisdom” study of India, Egypt, and Chaldea, was in point of method entirely different in origin from purely philosophic thought, with its leaning towards the speculative. This form first developed in the Greek world of thought, and there the first to engage our attention in this respect cer- tainly is Thales.
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We have no need to occupy ourselves with the characteristics of the various Greek philosophers from Thales onward ; neither need we concern ourselves with Anaxagoras, Heraldeitos, Anaximenes, nor yet with Socrates or Plato. We may begin at once with the personality w'ho represented the very first philosopher Kar’ iSoxvv (par excellence), and that was Aristotle.
All other philosophies are in reality but abstractions based upon the Mystery Wisdom; of Thales and Herakleitos this could easily be proved. Neither Plato nor Pythagoras is a Philosopher in the actual sense of the word, the sources of both being in seership; since Philosophy, when characterised as such, does not depend upon the ideas which a man expresses, but is determined rather by the sources whence he derives his information.^
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Pythagoras found his sources in the Ancient Mystery Wisdom, and trans- lated the knowledge thus acquired into definitions. He was a Seer, only it came to pass that what he saw as seer he clothed in philosophic garb ; and the same was the case with Plato.
But what constitutes the Philosopher, and what we happen to meet with for the first time in Aristotle is this, that he works out for himself a science of definitions, and of necessity either rejects all other sources, or has no access to them. And since this is found for the first time in Aristotle, there is no lack of historical reason for stating that it was precisely he who founded Logic, the Science of Think- ing. Everything else had been of a precursory natme only. The manner in which notions occur to us, in which our opinions are formed and our conclusions
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drawn, — all this was first set forth by Aristotle as a kind of Natural History dealing with subjective human thought, and everything with which we come in contact when dealing with him is closely associated with these foundations of Thought Method. As we shall have to revert to these things, which in his case are of fundamental importance for all later aspects of the subject, it needs no more than this historical intimation in order to characterise the point of depart- ure in a few words.
For later times also Aristotle remains the representative Philosopher. The out- come of what he accomplished permeated not only the later Aristotelian period of antiquity, up to the founding of Christ- ianity, but from the dawn of Christianity^^ onward to the Middle Ages it was to him that all turned in their efforts to formu-
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late a Conception of the Universe. By this we do not mean to say that men had Aristotle’s philosophy before them as a system, as a collection of dogmas (espe- cially in the Middle Ages, a time when the original manuscripts were not attainable). Yet they had, through his influence, ac- quired the way in which, by the aid of a purely technical form of conception, they might rise to the highest Divine Know- ledge. And thus it came to pass that Aristotle was more and more regarded as the teacher of Logical Thought.
It was somewhat in this way that a person in the Middle Ages would have put the matter to himself. Wherever the posi- tive perception of the world as a Fact may come from, be it due to man’s examina- tion of external realities by means of his senses, or, be it due to Revelation by Divine Grace, through Christ Jesus, these
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things have simply to be accepted : on the one hand as the deposition of the senses; on the other as Revelation. Should we, however, desire to substantiate this or that by pure definition, then, we must have recourse to that system of thought instituted by Aristotle.
And in very truth, of such value and importance has been the work done by Aristotle in framing this Thought Method that Kant was but right in declaring that “since the time of Aristotle Logic has not advanced by so much as a single sentence.” In all essentials, indeed, this statement may be endorsed at the present day. Nowadays too, the fundamental teach- ings embodying a logical system of thought will be found to remain almost unaltered, if compared with what Aris- - totle set down: such matter as persons may be inclined to add at the present day
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is the outcome of a somewhat amateurish attitude, assumed even in philosophic circles, in relation to the conception of Logic.
Now it was not alone the study of Aristotle, but above all the finding one’s way into his Method of Thought, that became of immediate moment for the central period of the Middle Ages, or for the Early Scholastic Era, as we may also term it, when Scholasticism was in its prime, — a period which came to a close with Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century.
Speaking of this time of Early Scholas- ticism, it must be clearly understood that at the present day allusion to it can only be made, in terms of philosophy, if unhampered by all authority and all dog- matic belief. It is, indeed, more difficult nowadays to speak of these things
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purely objectively, than disparagingly, for, when speaking with disparagement, we do not encounter the danger of being dubbed “heretics” by so-called “free” thinkers: but, in speaking objectively, we run the chance of being misunderstood, the reason for this being that in the pre- sent day an ecclesiastical movement of a positive and most intolerant kind has based its appeal upon totally mis- understood Thomism. \Vhat to-dav stands for orthodox catholic Philosophy should in no wise affect us; nevertheless we should be just as little disconcerted by the reproach we may possibly have to encounter, that we ourselves are con- cerned with what is both followed and advised in dogmatic quarters. Let ug rather seek to characterise, regardless of aught else that may impose itself on our attention, the attitude of Scholasticism
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at its zenith towards Science, Thought Method, and Supernatural Revelation.
Early Scholasticism does not allow of the characterisation usually applied to it in these days. Early Scholasticism is Monism, and not in the remotest sense of a dualistic nature. To it the world’s Primal Source is undoubtedly a Unity: only that for the recognising of the Primi- tive Element the Scholastic employs a special kind of perception. He says: “There is a certain property of super- sensual Truth that has primarily been revealed to Hiunanity.” “Human Thought has in spite of all its efforts not yet been able to press through to those regions whose existence is the subject-matter of the highest revealed wisdom.”
Thus, there existed for the early Schol- astics a certain fund of Wisdom to which
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by no method of thought could they im- mediately attain: it becomes only attain- able in so far as the thought is capable of interpreting that which has been revealed.
This portion of the Wisdom, then, the thinker is bound to accept as revelation, using his thought power for its interpre- tation only. All that man can evolve from his own inner consciousness has its being only in certain subordinate regions of Reality, and here the Scholastic has recourse to active thought in pursuit of his research. He pushes forward up to certain limits where Revealed Wisdom meets him. Thus • the contents of his own research and revelation unite in an objective unified and monistic conception .. of the universe. That a kind of dualism, owing to human limitations, is associated with the matter, is of only secondary importance : it concerns a dualism of per-
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ception, not a dualism of Cosmic Causes.
The Scholastic therefore explains thought method as a means of being able rationally to elaborate that which empiri- cal science acquires by the observation of the senses, as well as a means of helping to penetrate further, even into Spiritual Truth. And here the Scholastic, in all humility, presents a portion of that Wis- dom as “Revelation,” not as discovered by himself, but as that which he is called upon to accept.
Now the special method of thought here used by the Scholastics had most emphati- cally sprung from a basis of Aristotelian Logic. There was, in fact, a twofold necessity for the early Scholastics (whose period came to an end with the thirteenth century) to concern themselves with Aristotle. The first necessity was due to historical developments: Aristotelianism
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had become acclimatised : the second necessity arose from the fact that, as time went on, an enemy to Christianity sprang up in another quarter.
The teachings of Aristotle had not found expansion in the Occident only, but in Oriental lands also, and everj’thing that found its way into Spain by means of the Arabs, and which thence penetrated still farther into Europe, was, in as far as “thought method” was concerned, per- meated with Aristotelianism.
More especially was this the case with that particular form of Philosophy known as Natural Science, which embracing Medicine, had also been imported, and which was in the most emphatic sense Aristotelian. Now an opinion had been formed that nothing but a kind of Pan- theism could be the consistent outcome of Aristotelian teaching, which, especially as
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to its philosophy, had evolved itself from a very vague mysticism.
There was, therefore, in addition to this special reason, — the fact that Aristotle’s influence still animated thought method, — yet another reason for men to concern themselves with his teachings, for, in the interpretation placed upon them by the Arabs, Aristotle is made to appear as the opponent and foe of Christianity.
What we have to ask ourselves is this : — Were the ideas which the Arabs imported as the interpretation of Aristotle a true interpretation? Aristotelianism would then indeed be a scientific basis adapted to contradict the teachings of Christian- ity. Now let us picture to ourselves what in face of such conclusions must have been the feelings of the Scholastics: upon the one side they adhered firmly to the truth of Christianity, yet upon the
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other they were boxind by all their tra- ditions to acknowledge nothing less than the Thought Method of Aristotle — namely, Logic — as true and correct.
And out of this dissension arose the task of the Scholastics: the proving that even while philosophising it was still pos- sible to apply the Logic of the Greek sage, aye, that it was exactly he who had pro- vided the instrument by means of which Christianity could really be conceived and understood. It was a task which owed its inception to the development of that day. Aristotelianism had to be treated in such a manner as to make it evident that what the Arabs had im- ported and put forward as the teachings of Aristotle was only to be considered as erroneous when it showed a tendency in- imical to Christianity; that, in short, one had but to interpret him correctly in
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order to find in his philosophy a basis for the true conception of the Christian religion. And this was the task Scholas- ticism set itself, to the achievement of which the entire writings of the 'Thomists were devoted.
Now, however, something else hap- pened. When the day of Scholasticism had drawn to its close, there occurred in the course of time a complete rupture along the whole philological line of evolution in human thought. The most natural thing would have been (and be it understood that this is not put forward in any sense as a criticism — ^it is not even suggested that it could have happened in this wise, for the actual course taken was the absolutely necessary one, the case therefore is put thus hypothetically) — the most natural thing would have been to have expanded Thought Method even
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further, so that ever higher and higher portions of the supersensual world should have been grasped by thought. But the next development was not this. The fun- damental Thought which, with Thomas Aquinas, for instance, was applicable to the highest and most exalted regions, and which might have been so developed that the limits of human research would have been enlarged, embracing ever re- moter and higher realms, this fundamental Thought became distorted to a caricature of itself, its existence prolonged in a con- viction only. The highest spiritual truths withdraw themselves entirely from the area of purely human thought activity, from any elaboration into definitions.
By such means a division occiirred in man’s spiritual life. Supersensual know- ledge was regarded as something inaccess- ible to every effort of human thought, as
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something that could not be attained to by any subjective effort based on know- ledge, but that was compelled to have its roots in Faith.
This tendency was evinced in earlier times, but it ran to extremes towards the close of the Middle Ages, as the division between the faith that had been attained by subjective conviction and the faith that, as the foundation of a so\md judg- ment, had to be the resvdt of logical activity, became more and more accent- uated.
It was but natural that before this yawning chasm Knowledge and Belief were forced fiuther apart, nor was it unnatural that Aristotle and his method of thought should have been dragged in to fill up the gap occasioned by historical developments. This was done more es- pecially at the beginning of the Modem
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Era. Thus upon the one side men of science maintained — (and here I am quite ready to admit that much of what they said may be regarded as reasonable enough) — that no mere spinning out of what had already been placed on record by Aristotle could lead to any advance in the search for empirical Truth.
Besides this, the sequence of historical events showed that it might be inadvis- able to make common cause with the fol- lowers of Aristotle; for, indeed, as, the time of Keppler and Galileo approached, misconceived Aristotelianism had become a veritable plague in the land.
It has proved to be the case again and again that those who called themselves adherents of some particular conception of the Universe have, times out of num- ber, destroyed an incalculable amount of that which the founders themselves had
10
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presented in the right way. Instead of looking to Nature herself, instead of bringing observation to bear, it was, at the end of the Middle Ages, found easier to make use of the old books of Aristotle, dwelling, at all academic lectures, en- tirely on the written letter of the Greek Logician.
The following story is characteristic of this habit. An orthodox Aristotelian had been invited to see for himself, by assisting at the autopsy of a body, how utterly he had misconceived the sense of Aristotle in maintaining that the nerv’es proceeded from the heart, when, as a matter of fact, the nervous system had its centre in the brain. Yet, in spite of ocular demonstration, the Aristotelian’s reply was: “Observation certainly shows me that this is actually the case, but Aristotle states the reverse, and I have
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOSOPHY 147
greater faith in him.” Thus it will be seen that followers of Aristotle had become a positive nuisance. It was imperative for empirical science to rid itself of this false Aristotelianism and base its authority upon pure experience, and we find the strongest impulse in this direction given by the great Galileo.
On the other side an entirely different development took place. Those who, so to speak, sought to save their Faith from this threatened invasion of independent thought, developed a kind of aversion to Logic. They were of opinion that this method of thought was powerless in the presence of Revealed Wisdom, and when the worldly empirics supported their assertions by referring to the books of Aristotle, their opponents confronted them with arguments they had taken from a different, but, of course, equally
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misunderstood Book, namely, the Bible. This was more particularly the case in the beginning of the New Era, as we may gather from Luther’s bitter words apos- trophising Reason as “a deaf and pur- blind fool,” that should have naught to do with Spiritual Truths, adding further that a pure conviction of faith can never be kindled by such means as reasoned thought founded upon Aristotle, to whom he applies such opprobrious names as: “Hypocrite,” “Sycophant,” and “Stink- ing Goat.” These are indeed hard words, but when considered from the standpoint of that new era they may be better under- stood.
What had taken place was that a deep chasm had opened between Reason and its allied Thought Method on the one hand, and supersensual Truth on the other; and this chasm has foimd its final
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expression in the person of a philosopher whose influence has, as it were, caught the nineteenth century in a web from which it finds some difficulty in extricating itself; this philosopher is Kant. He is, virtually, the last adherent of opinions re- sulting from that division which occurred in the Middle Ages.
He made a marked division between Faith and that to which man is capable of attaining by means of Knowledge. Externally, “The Critic of Pure Reason’’ stands, as it were, side by side with “The Critic of Practical Reason,’’ and Practical Reason ever seeks to acquire what may be termed a standpoint of rationalistic thought, as opposed to that which may be termed knowledge. On the other hand, Theoretical Reason, as advanced by Kant, is stigmatised most emphati- cally as incapable of realising the Actual
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— the “ thing in itself’ {Das Ding an sich). The “thing in itself’ makes impressions upon man, it is true. These, however, can live only in man’s self-representation, in his own concepts of such impressions. Now, we should be obliged to delve deep down into the history of the philosophy of Kant should we desire to characterise his distinctive fundamental error, but this would lead us too far away from our present object; moreover I have already dealt with it in my book entitled Truth and Science {Wahrheit %md Wissenschaft).
What is of far more interest to us at the present moment is this “web’’ in the meshes of which the philosophic thought of the nineteenth century has found itself entangled. Let us enquire how this came about.
Kant felt above all things the necessity of demonstrating to what extent some-
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thing absolute might be connected with the process of thinking; something, that is to say, concerning which there could be no uncertainty, “for,” said he, “all that has its origin in experience is of uncertain quality.” Our judgment can derive certainty only from that factor in recognition which originates with our- selves,— not from external things or objects.
We see things, or objects, therefore, in the Kantian sense, as through a col- oured glass; and within ourselves we gather recognition of these things in their lawful connection, dependent upon our own consciousness. Our faculty of recog- nition has certain conventions, those of space and time, as well as of cause and effect: these have no meaning for the “thing in itself,” at least we have no knowledge as to whether the “thing in
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itself” has any existence in space, time, or causation. These are conventions which arise only in the subjective mind of man, and which he evolves concerning the “thing in itself” in the moment of its appearing to him, so that the “thing in itself ” remains unknown to him. Where- ever, therefore, the “thing in itself” confronts man, he clothes it with the con- ventions of space and time, and applies to it the law of cause and effect, casting his entire network of concepts and con- ventions about the “ thing in itself.” For which reason man may be said to have a certain surety of knowledge, since, as long as he is as he is, Time, Space, and Causa- tion possess a meaning for him. And what man puts into things he has to extract from them again. Nevertheless, he is unable to know what the “thing in itself” is, for he stands for ever baffled
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before his Idea of it. Schopenhauer recognised this, and has placed his con- viction upon record in those classic words of his: “The World is my Conception.”
Now the sum of these conclusions has been carried over into the entire thought of the nineteenth century, not only in regard to the Theory of Cognition, but also as affecting the theoretical ground- work of Physiology, and here certain experiences contributed their aid.
If we look at the doctrine concerning the specific energies of the senses there would seem to be a corroboration of the Kantian opinion. At all events, that is how the matter was regarded during the nineteenth century.
Thus any one might say: “ The eye per- ceives light:” yet if the eye is affected by some other means, say by pressure, or by an electric shock, it also becomes aware of
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light. Hence it was said: “The percep- tion of light is generated by means of the specific energy of the eye and transferred to the ‘thing in itself.’ ’’
More especially did Helmholtz in the crudest manner lay this down as a physi- ological-philosophical axiom, declaring: “All we perceive cannot be supposed to have even so much as a pictorial resem- blance to those things which are exterior to us. The picture has a semblance of that which it represents, but that which we call perception cannot have so close a resemblance to the original as has the picture. Therefore,’’ he further contin- ues, “that which man experiences within himself cannot be otherwise expressed than by calling it a symbol of the ‘ thing in itself,’ for a symbol need have no actual resemblance to the thing it ex- presses.’’ Thus, what had long been in
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preparation* entered so completely into the philosophic thought of our times that men became incapable of perceiving, in- capable of even thinking, that the truth of the matter might be othenvise.
For such reasons Eduard von Hartmann was quite unable to find a way out of his own web of definitions. For instance, in a conversation I once had with him, it was absolutely impossible to get beyond this: “We must,” he said, “surely pro- ceed from the conception, and when we define the conception we have to say that it is that by means of which man is enabled to perceive the non-conceivable {ein NichtvorgestclUes)V' And yet, if the conception from which we must proceed is something subjective we are again un- able to get beyond the subjective. It did not seem to occur to him that he had, in the first place, constructed this defini-
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tion, and now found himself unable to escape from his own carefully arranged structrure. Indeed, the whole of his Transcendental Realism rests upon his having enmeshed himself within a web of •his own making, and one which he takes to be an objective truth.
Along these lines no one can get beyond the statement that, “what I conceive with my perception never goes beyond the con- fines of the ‘thing in itself it is there- fore only subjective.” This habit of thought has in the course of time become so firmly rooted that all those theorists who take to themselves credit for under- standing Kant, now regard every other person as being of limited intelligence if he does not consider their definition of conceptions and of the subjective nature of observation to be the right one. And all this has been the result of that split which
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I have already described as occurring in the spiritual development of humanity.
Now any one who really studied Aris- totle would easily perceive how entirely different a conception, both as to principle and theory, might, in place of a distorted one, have been the result of a direct devel- opment onward from Aristotle.
Aristotle had already accepted, in the regions of theoretical perception, those ideas to which man in this day is but slowly and gradually ascending, through all that tangle of academic undergrowth which has been the outcome of the influ- ence of Kant. We have, above all things, to learn to understand how it was possible for Aristotle, by means of his method of thought, to put forward definitions which are rightly conceived, and lead immedi- ately to the overstepping of those self- imposed limits.
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We need concern ourselves with no more than a few of the fundamental concep- tions propounded by Aristotle in order to recognise this. It is entirely in conform- ity with his views to say, “If we analyse the things about us, we find in the first place that what provides us with a con- ception of these things is the fact that we perceive them with our senses : sense pre- sents each separate thing to us.” If, however, we begin to think, the things group themselves ; we gather divers things together into a unit of thought. And here Aristotle finds the right relation- ship between unity of thought and objec- tive reality — the objectiveness that leads to the “thing in itself” — in showing that when we are thinking consistently we are bound to imagine the world of experience about us as composed of matter and what he terms form.
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Matter and Form are to Aristotle two conceptions which he defines in the only true sense in which they permit of defini- tion. We might go on talking for hours, if we wished to exhaust these two con- ceptions, together with all they involve. Still we may at least contribute a certain portion of what is elementary to this subject, so as to understand what it is that Aristotle defines as Form and Matter.
He is confident himself that with re- spect to all things immediately about us, — the things that make up our world of experience, — the conception of all these things depends upon an apprehension of Form, since it is Form that gives to objects their reality, not Matter. The Form is to Aristotle the Reality.
There are even in our day persons endowed with a true comprehension of
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Aristotle. Dr. Vinzenz Knauer, who in the ’eighties was lecturer at the University of Vienna, explained to those attending his classes the difference between Matter and Form, and upon what this difference depended, illustrating his meaning in a forcible if somewhat grotesque way.
“Imagine,” he said, “that for a con- siderable portion of his existence a wolf had eaten nothing but lambs: would he not practically consist of lamb only? And yet, no wolf ever becomes a lamb ! ’ ’ This, if only rightly followed up, points out the difference between Matter and Form. Is the wolf a wolf by reason of Matter? No! His being has been imposed upon him by his Form, and his Form is not the form of this particular wolf alone, but that common to all wolves. Thus, by means of conception, we find Form to be something universal, in contradistinction
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to that which the senses are able to con- ceive of separately.
According to the meaning of Aristotle we can distinguish accurately, by means of a true theory of conception, what is universal, in three ways. We can say : this universal is the actual, is that whereon it depends. But is that which has its being in hiunan thought the same as that which we, in the true sense, allude to as Form? No. Man, approaching those separate wolves, perceives what is com- mon to all wolves from a study of these single examples of the species. Never- theless, that which he here conceives of as a something made up of certain similar characteristics is but the representation of what is actually universal.
(All this can of course be but suggested in the most fragmentary way.)
We have therefore to differentiate: a
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“Universal” which is anterior to those units confronting us externally ; next, since this is the essential : a “Universal” com- prised within these units ; and further: a third form of the “Universal” which man subsequently evolves from out his own thoughts.
We have therefore:
1 . UniversaUa ante rem.
2. UniversaUa in re.
3. UniversaUa post rem.
The latter unroll themselves within the subjective mind and are “ objectively- real universals” representing our inner experiences.
Until we approach these threefold differences, no right conception can be arrived at, upon this basis, with regard to that which is important here. For only consider for a moment what is involved.
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What is involved is the conception that man, in so far as he remains within the “ Universalia post rent” is possessed of a subjective. Yet at the same time some- thing intrinsic is implied, namely, that man’s conception is a “ representation ” of that which as actual form (Entelechy) ‘ has universal duration, and into this “ Universalia in re" such things only have entered because as “ Universalia ante rem ” they already existed prior to those objects.
Thus we have a Universalia ante ran which we must accept in the Deity, as existent in the Wisdom of God.
The Christian Theologist, the Scholas- tic, conceived this in a similar manner, the only difference being that he did not ascend directly to the Highest Di- vinity. As Theosophists, we are aware
‘ Greeks meaning the actual being of a thing as opposed to simple capability or potentiality.
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that the Universalia in re, when dealing, for instance, with brute creation, means the “group souls,” and thus we have in Aristotelianism actually a fundamental- ising of that which Theosophy is able to support by definition.
There is, however, in addition to all that we meet with in Aristotle, something else that has become increasingly anti- pathetic to these modem times. It is this: that it is imperative for us to habituate ourselves to thinking in concise and finely chiselled forms of definition; in conceptions that we have first carefully prepared; and it is necessary, in order to do this, that we should have the patience to advance from conception to concep- tion ; above all things, also, that we employ clearness and neatness of definition; that we be aware of what we are speaking of when we use a definition. If, for instance,
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in the Scholastic sense, we speak of the relation of a conception to that which it represents, we are obliged in the first place to work our way through the lengthy definitions in the writings of the Scholastics. We must understand what is meant when we find it stated that the idea is, as to form, groxmded in the sub- ject, and has its foundation based on the object: that which defines the actual appearance of the idea being derived from the subject, whilst what it contains is derived from the object. This is but a small example, — a very small one; for, if you were to go through the works of the Scholastics, you would have to labour through ponderous volumes of definitions, a matter which would be exceedingly tedious to the scientist of to-day, — for which, reason he looks upon the Scholas- tics as learned humbugs and leaves them
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severely alone. He is quite unaware that true Scholasticism is nothing else than the careful elaboration of the Art of Thinking, in order that this may form a foundation for a true conception of the Real.
And when I state this you will under- stand what an immense boon it will be if efforts should arise within the Theo- sophical Society which should, in the very best sense, have for their object the ela- boration of the principles governing the Theory of Perception. And as here in Stuttgart we happen to have in Dr. Unger a worker of exceptional importance in this field of labour, we may well regard it as a proof of a favourable tendency appar- ent within the immediate confines of our movement. For this movement will not make its true depth felt in the world at large by appealing to those whose only
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desire is to hear of facts concerning the Higher World, but by the labours of such as have the patience requisite to press forward into the intricacies of a Thought Method; who are possessed of definite motive for accomplishing solid work, such as provides the frame-work for yet fur- ther labours in the Higher World.
Thus, perhaps, it may come to pass that within the Theosophical movement — from out Theosophy itself — Scholasticism, twisted as it has been both by its adher- ents as well as its enemies into a grim caricatme of itself, may once again be presented in such a manner as to be understood.
It is of course far easier to apply a few ready-made definitions to everything con- fronting us as a new truth, — ^far easier than to labour at constructing a solid founda- tion by means of a Method of Thought;
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but what are the consequent results? Taking up a philosophical book of the present day one is left with a dubious impression: men no longer understand each other when conversing on higher matters; they are not clear in their own minds with regard to the definitions of which they make use. This could not have happened in the time of the Schol- astics. In those days men were com- pelled to be accurate as to the form in which they clothed an idea.
As you may have perceived, there was at one time in very truth a Way by which to probe to the depths of a genuine Thought Method, and had this Path been pursued further, no one would have become entangled in the web of the Kan- tian "thing in itself,” with its supposedly subjective conceptions.
Two results would then have been
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attained. In the first place man would have arrived, within himself, at a reliable theory of conception, and in the second place, and this is of great importance, the accepted Centres of Learning could not have misunderstood so absolutely the great philosophers whose labours came after those of Kant.
Kant was succeeded by Fichte, Schel- ling, and Hegel, — what are they to the man of to-day? They are assmned to be philosophers who sought to present a world by means of purely abstract defini- tions. Such an idea never occurred to them.
But people were firmly imbued with the Kantian conception, and for that reason incapable of understanding the world’s greatest philosophers, either rela- tively or philosophically.
Hegel spent his youth here in Stutt-
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gart; the house where he lived stands opposite as you enter this street in which we are holding our present meetings. A tablet commemorates the fact. But only gradually will people ripen to an under- standing of all that Hegel has given to the world, and only when they have emanci- pated themselves from this hampering self -woven web of theoretical conceptions will they be capable of understanding him.
Yet this would be so simple ! It is only necessary to accustom oneself to a natural and unconstrained mode of thinking, and to free oneself from the tendencies now prevalent in philosophic literature, which, imder the confusing influences of the Kantian School, have developed into set habits of thought.
We must ourselves be able to answer this question clearly: Is it really the case
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that man, who proceeds from the subject, constructs his conception within the sub- ject and then weaves that conception, as it were, about the object? Is this really so?
Yes, it is so.
But, does it follow as a consequent necessity that man is unable ever to penetrate into the “thing in itself”? I will put forward a simple example:
Imagine, for instance, that you have a seal, and upon that seal the name of Miller. Now, press your seal on to some sealing-wax, and again remove it.
Now you are, I take it, quite certain in your mind that this seal, being, let us say, of brass, no property of the brass will pass over into the wax. Were the sealing-wax conscious in the Kantian sense, it would say: “I am entirely wax; no brass passes over into me, I can there-
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fore have no knowledge concerning the nature of that which has approached me.”
And yet, one thing has here been left out of the question entirely — ^the very thing, moreover, that really counts ! That is the name of “Miller” which remains objectively imprinted upon the sealing- wax, yet without any portion of the brass having adhered to it.
So long as people think and believe materialistically, that in order to estab- lish a connection, matter is bound to pass over from the one to the other, just so long will they in theory maintain:
“I am sealing-wax, and that other is ‘brass in itself’; and as none of the ‘brass in itself’ can enter me, therefore the name of ‘Miller’ can be no more than a sign. Although the ‘thing in itself ’ that has impressed itself upon me.
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SO that I can read it, this ‘ thing in itself ’ remains unknown to me.”
And there you have the final argument that is made to serve for all. Were we to continue this illustration, it would work out thus :
“Man is all sealing-wax (conception). The ‘thing in itself’ is all seal (that which is exterior to the conception).
“Now, as I, being wax (the person con- ceiving), can but attain to the outer sur- face of the seal, (the ‘thing in itself’) so nothing concerning the ‘thing in itself’ can reach me.”
So long as people insist on carrying materialism and the theory of definition to these extremes, so long will they be unable to recognise that upon which the question depends.
The matter stands thus : We do not get beyond our conception, but that which is
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transmitted to us may be defined as Spirit, and that stands in no need of material atoms for its transmission. Nothing of matter enters the subject, yet in spite of this, the idea transfers itself to the subject, as indeed was the case with the name of Miller on the seal- ing-wax.
It is from this point that the start towards a healthy study of the Theory of Definition must again be made, and it will then be seen how much the material- ism of recent times has (quite uncon- sciously to itself) acquired a hold upon the conceptions pertaining to the Theory of Knowledge.
The result of unprejudiced observation amounts to this : that Kant can only con- ceive a “thing in itself” materially,— grotesque as this statement may at first
seem.
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But in order to survey the case in its entirety, something further must be indi- cated. We have said that Aristotle has pointed out the fact that in everything surrounding us it becomes necessary to differentiate between what is Form (En- telechy) , and what is Material. N ow what we can say is this: that the process of con- ception takes us as far as the Form, in the sense above indicated. But, is there any possibility of reaching that which is the substance? For we must bear in mind that to Aristotle material means not alone matter, but also that substance which, though spirit, yet forms the bed-rock, as it were, of Reality. Is there any possi- bility, not only of conceiving that which, so to speak, “ flows across,” but of “creep- ing within” the interior of things, and so identifying oneself with matter? This is an important question with regard to the
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Theory of Cognition, and it can be an- swered only by one who has immersed himself within the nature of thought, that is, of pure thought ; and to the conception of pure thought man must first ascend.
Pure thought we can determine as Actuality, as indeed Aristotle himself did. It is pure Form, as it first presents itself and without context in respect to those separate and immediate objects which exist externally in the Reality of the senses. And why? Let us get a clear comprehension as to how pure con- ception comes into being, in contradis- tinction to perception.
Imagine some one desiring to form the conception of a circle. This can- be done by going out to sea so far that nothing save water can be perceived around : you then by means of your perception form the conception of a circle. There is,
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however, another way of arriving at the conception of a eircle, and that is if, with- out appealing to the senses, you say to yourself: I will make a mental note of all those places which are equidistant from one particular spot. Now, this piece of mental construction which is carried on within yourself needs no appeal to any- thing external, and this is an example of pure thought, as Aristotle conceived it — of pure Actuality.
But here we are confronted by some- thing of peculiar importance. Pure thought thus conceived fits in with ex- perience; without it experience itself is inconceivable. Imagine Kepler evolving by means of a theory of pure conception such a system as shows the elliptical courses of the planets, in one of the foci of which the sun is situated, and then imagine observation by such means as the
178 PHILOSOPHY AND THEOSOPHY
telescope subsequently confirming that which previous experience had presented in the realms of pure thought !
Surely this clearly demonstrates to every unprejudiced thinker that Pme Thought is not without significance for Reality, for it is in accord with it. A dis- coverer such as Kepler illustrates by means of his actions that which Aristotel- ism has theoretically affirmed by means of methodical thought. He takes that which belongs to the Universalia post rem, and finds upon nearer approach that the Universalia post rem was even prior to this, that is to say, that it was already contained within itself as Universalia ante rem.
Now, if the Universalia be accepted in the right sense (not merely subjectively accepted, after the perverted sense), they will then reveal themselves objec-
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tively in things, and to these ends they must first be formulated after the manner in which Aristotle conceived them as the very foundation of the world.
Thus you will find that what at first seems the most subjective and which was confirmed as independent of all experience, is after all that which in the most objec- tive manner leads the way to the Actual. Now, what is the reason why the subjec- tive could not reveal itself first in the world? The reason is that its way is barred by a “thing in itself.”
When you construct a circle you do not knock up against any such obstruction, because you are living within the thing itself, though but formally so, to begin with.
The next question is, can we by means of such subjective thinking arrive at any kind of Reality, at aught that is perma-
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nent? The point on which the whole matter hinges is that the subjective (as we have already characterised it) when constructed in thought, is a formation, that objectively presents itself as some- thing additional. We may of course say that it is after all a matter of utter indif- ference to any circle, or to any sphere in this world whether we think of it, or not ! Our thoughts concerning the Actual are matters of indifference to the surrounding world of experience. This exists in itself, quite irrespective of our thoughts. Our thinking may therefore be objective as far as we are concerned, and yet be of no moment to the thing.
How are we to get rid of this apparent contradiction? Where is the opposite pole we must now take hold of? Where is there a Way within the domain of Pure Thought by which we may conceive,
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not alone the Form, but together with the Form also the Reality? For as soon as ever we have anything that together with the form constitutes reality, we then have a fixed point at which to set up our theoretical knowledge.
We are everywhere in the same posi- tion as in the case of the circle. When we construct the circle we can say : “What I know respecting this circle is objectively right, but whether it is appli- cable to ‘ things ’ depends on whether when I meet those things, they prove to me that they are subject to the laws which I myself have formulated.” If the total of all Entelechy resolves itself into pure thought, then a residuum must remain, a residuum known to Aristotle as Matter, where it is not possible by the process of Pure Thought itself to reach Reality.
i82 philosophy and THEOSOPHY
And on this point Aristotle may be cor- roborated by the philosopher Fichte. By the Aristotelian method we may arrive at the following formula: “Everything about us, including all things belong- ing to the invisible world, necessitates the postulating of a material in order to account for the formative Entele- chy.”
To Aristotle the idea of God is a pure Actuality, a pure act; that is to say, an act in which Actuality, that which is for- mulative, is at the same time endowed with power to bring forth its own ma- terial; not something that exists apart from the material, but something that by reason of its own activity is one with the material.
The image 'of such pure Actuality is to be found in man himself, when by pure thought he arrives at the definition of
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the “I” (the Self — the Ego). In con- ceiving this “I” he has, according to Fichte, performed an act, or deed. He • has within his own consciousness arrived at something, which, seeing he lives in Actuality, similarly brings forth both this Actuality and its material. Now, if we conceive this " I ” in pure thought, we are then in a centre where pure thought brings forth, or evolves, the essentials for its own material being. If you conceive this “ I ” in thought, then a threefold “ I ” becomes apparent: the pure “I” belong- ing to the Universalia ante rent; an “I” wherein you yourself are, and which belongs to the Universalia in re: and an “I” which you conceive, and which belongs to the Universalia post rent. But here again is an important point: for the “I” is so constituted that when we ele- vate the mind to an actual conception
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of it, the threefold “I” becomes merged into one.
In conceiving its true definition the “ I ” lives within itself, being able to exist as the reality in the definition. What is accomplished by pure thought is imma- terial to the “I,” for the pure thought is the creator of the “ I. ”
Here the definition of the Creative coincides with that of the Material, and we have to acknowledge that, while in all other processes of conception we come to some limit, this is not the case with the “I.” This we embrace in its inner- most being when we enfold it in pure thought.
We may therefore by means of theo- retical conception lay down this funda- mental axiom, namely, “that by dint of pure thought a point is attainable where Reality and Subjectiveness are in
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complete union, where, in short, man experiences Reality.”
If one stops at this point, and allows one’s thoughts so to fructify that they again evolve from out themselves, then has one grasped those things from within. There is, therefore, something in this ” I ” conceived, and at the same time created, by an effort of pure thought, an effort by which we force the boundary which has to be placed for all other things between Entelechy (Form) and Matter.
By such means, a theory of cognition logically pursued becomes something that can also, by means of pure thought, point the Way into Reality. If you pursue this Path, you are eventually bound to find that it leads to Theosophy. There are, however, but few philosophers who have any understanding of this Path. Most of them are entangled within their
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self-spun web of definitions, and as they know the definition only as something abstract, never apprehending that point where it becomes the archetype of the creative, they are incapable of finding aught by means of which they may come into direct contact with the “thing in itself.”
You see therefore what will be necesi sary before we can expect philosophers to cease regarding Theosophists as the merest dilettanti. Philosophers must first have philosophy enough to acknowledge the existence of a Philosophy that goes to the foundation of things. It is not really that Philosophy contradicts Theosophy, but rather that philosophers themselves do not understand Philosophy. They know nothing of the deeper foundations of Philosophy. They are blinded and lost in a labyrinth of their own theories
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out of which they are unable to find an exit.
When once they extricate themselves from their present coil, they will find their way to Theosophy. It is not that Theosophy is really so amateurish a thing to the philosopher, since he cannot under- stand it; — what is far more to be ac- counted amateurish in the present day is the sort of philosophy which largely domi- nates the world. When at length this philosophy becomes capable of entering its true province of thought, then also will a bridge have been thrown across, spanning the gulf and leading from Philosophy to Theosophy.
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