XIII. THE USE OF SPIES.

is really a vulgar form of |j|j , and floes not appear in, the^ Shuo In practice, however, it has gradually become a distinct character with special meanings of its own, and I have therefore followed my edition of the standard text in retaining this form throughout the chapter. In VI. §25, on the other hand, the correct form |JJ] will be found. The evolution of the meaning "spy" is wprth considering for a moment, provided it be understood that this is very cjoubtful ground, and that any dogmatism is out of place. The Shuo' W£n defines [Jf] as |5j| (the old form of jjjj^) "a crack" or "chink," and on the whole we may accept ^ ^g- Hsu Ch'ieh's analysis as not unduly fanciful : -^ Pj ^ ^
^fJB^^Tfeft^liPlifc "At ni§ht' a door is sh"^ if'
when it is shut, the light of the moon is visible, it must come through a chink" From this it is an easy step to the meaning "space between," or simply "between," as for example in the phrase :££ ^jj ffl] §!| "to act as a secret spy between enemies." Here §ffi is the word which means
K^V
"spy;" but we may suppose that constant association so affected the original force of |gj , that ^ could at last be dropped altogether, leaving U|] to stand alone with the same signification. Another possible theory is that the word may first have come to mean jsjjj "to peep" (see -jf^ jj|| , quoted in frang Hsi), which would naturally be suggested by "crack" or "crevice," and afterwards the man who peeps, or spy.
i. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching- them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver.
Cf. II. §§ i, 13, 14.
There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways.
J§£ J£ St $& ' which is omitted by the Yti Lan, appears at first sight to be explained by the words immediately following, so that the obvious translation would be "(enforced) idleness along the line of march." [Cf. Too Te Ching, ch. 30: gjfj %, W( & ffl $$ ^fe H "Where tro°Ps have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up."] The commentators, however, say that Jt£ is here equivalent to |g? — a meaning which is still retained in the phrase ^ Jg^ . Tu Mu refers Jg^ to those who are engaged in conveying provisions to the army. But this can hardly be said to emerge clearly from Sun Tzti's text. Chang Yii has the note: "We may be reminded of the saying : 'On serious ground, gather in plunder' [XI. § 13]. Why then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the highways? — The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of munitions of war have lo be conveyed to the army. Besides, the in- junction to 'forage on the enemy' only means that when an army is deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow of sup- plies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts (5j| [^ ^ ^tfa)» where provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed with."
As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labour.
Mei Yao-ch'en says; |§ J^ ^ 3JR "Men w^ be lacking at the plough-tail." The allusion is to ^ |jj the system of dividing land into nine parts, as shown in the character ^ , each consisting of a -^ or fc|| (about 15 acres), the plot in the centre being cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. [See II. § 12, note.] These groups of eight peasant proprietors were called |SK • In time of war> one °f tne families had to serve in the army, while the other seven contributed to its support
( — ' ?? 4& $ -fc ^ ^ 2)' Thus> by a levy °f I00'000 men (reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 families would be affected.
2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving
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for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honours and emoluments,
"For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the ettect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned at this point.
is the height of inhumanity.
Sun Tzti's argument is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of the enemy's condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for years. The only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose, when every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a crime against humanity.
3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign,
An inferior reading for ^ is fc , thus explained by Mei Yao-ch'en :
no master of victory.
This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the na- tional temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., these memorable words were uttered by Prince tj Chuang of the Ch'u State :
Bt 41" ifc "The character for 'prowess' (jj£) is made up of jj- 'to stay' and ^ 'a spear' (cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth." [Tso Chuan, *g ^ XII. 3 ad Jin.}
5. ft BE
e. # Jl* ** A *» « 2 IS *&
4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond
the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. ^Lfchsinw^
&*^ That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what he means to do. (
5 . Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits •,
J£t SI JnE "ky Prayers or sacrifices," says Chang Yu. J^ are the disembodied spirits of men, and jjjjjj supernatural beings or "gods."
it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,
Tu Mu's note makes the meaning clear: ^j|, he says, is the same as reasoning by analogy; "SaflLJtJRrffiSfc "[know'
ledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by reasoning from other analog- ous cases."
nor by any deductive calculation.
Li Ch'iian says : ^ -g £g p] ffi $jj[ jj£ /J\ ^ §P "Pf ,|^ ^ 1^ J^liA^11W^>S^il^J'tfc "Quantities like
breadth, distance and magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human actions cannot be so calculated."
6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men.
Mei Yao-ch'en has rather an interesting note: J^ jjjty ^ ff| Iff J^j[
.
ledge of the spirit- world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning ; the laws of the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation : but the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies alone."
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7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (i) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted .spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.
8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system.
g£ is explained by Tu Mu as 3t ff| fifr ^ ff £ ^ "the way in which facts leak out and dispositions are revealed."
This is called
'Jjft is the reading of the standard text, but the Tung Tien, Yu Lan and Tu Shu all have ||} .
"divine manipulation of the threads."
Capt. Calthrop translates jjjjjj ^ "tne Mysterious Thread," but Mei
Yao-ch'en's paraphrase ^j(jj j$ ^ Jjj|jjjj ^j* shows that what is meant is the control of a number of threads.
It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.
4 Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry leaders, had officers styled 'scout masters,' whose business it was to collect all possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy's moves thus gained." *
9. Having local spies
^P|5 Rlj ig ^e emended reading of Chia Lin and the Tu Shu for the unintelligible jjj PJJ , here and in § 7, of the standard text, which never-
theless reads ^|K Rfl in ^ 22.
means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district.
Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win people over by kind treat- ment, and use them as spies."
* "Aids to Scouting," p. 2.
10. Having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy.
^!f includes both civil and military officials. Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot
in each boat (jjj$ g ^ §£ ^ ^ pg ^ £ & % )• Officials of these several kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to one's interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy's country, ascertain the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers." The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: "j|S l8f Lo Shang, Governor of ^ ^| I-chou, sent his general [^ >f£j Wei Po
to attack the rebel ^ $j| Li Hsiung of -§J Shu in his stronghold at fjiJJ P'i. After each side had experienced a number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services of a certain ^\ •jfig P'o- t'ai, a native of jj£ ^ Wu-tu. He began by having him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to co-operate with him from inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these promises, marched out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their head with orders to attack at P'o-t'ai's
bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung's general, ^ ^ Li Hsiang, had prepared
an ambuscade on their line of march; and P'o-t'ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po's men raced up on seeing the signal and [began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo Shang's soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy completely." [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that of his father 'Li T'e, Chin Shu, ch. 120, 121.]
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ir. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes.
By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the enemy's service, and inducing them to carry back false information as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. Thus Tu Yu:
On the other hand>
JJ£ gjj? Hsiao Shih-hsien in denning the ^ ^j] says that we pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false impression of what is going on ( j|£ $J \ %£ fj| ^ J£ f^ ^ £fl B5 7T* i5>l Ift ^ )• Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative definition ; but that it is not what Sun Tzu meant is conclusively proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously (§21 sqg.\ Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used with conspicuous success : i) by T'ien Tan in his defence of Chi- mo (see supra, p. 90); 2) by Chao She on his march to O-yii (see p. 57);
and by the wily ^jj $|| Fan Chii in 260 B.C., when Lien P'o was con-
ducting a defensive campaign against Ch'in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P'o's cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were already in Fan Chii's pay. They said: "The only thing which
causes Ch'in anxiety is lest jjjjj^ j^ Chao Kua should be made general.
Lien P'o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the famous Chao She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao, This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother and the veteran statesman j||j ^ig $ff Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed Lien P'o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the redoubtable Po Ch'i and the great military power of Ch'in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into two and his communi- cations cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the sword. [See ^ j^ |g ^ ^ g|, ch. 19, ff. 48—50].
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12. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them to the enemy.
^ is Li Ch'iian's conjecture for 3£ , which is found in the T'ung Tien and the Yu Lan. The Tlu S/iu, unsupported by any good authority, adds ffl -fy after &£. In that case, the doomed spies would be those of the enemy, to whom our own spies had conveyed false information. But this is unnecessarily complicated. Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do things calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy's lines, they will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take measures ac- cordingly, only to find that we do something quite different. The spies will thereupon be put to death." Capt. Calthrop makes a hopeless muddle of the sentence. As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released by Pan Ch'ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also refers to ^ ^ T'ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T'ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Khan §| TJcjJ Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T'ang Chien, but this is a mistake, for we read in both the Old and the New T'ang History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on until 656. J|$ ^ l|t Li I-chi* played a somewhat similar