X. TERRAIN.

Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ i — 13, deals with ^ J|5 , the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six cala- mities" are discussed in §§ 14 — 20, and the rest of the chapter is again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.
i. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of ter- rain, to wit: (i) Accessible ground;
Mei Yao-ch'en says: ^H* $fa ^ U "plentifully provided with roads and means of communication."
(2) entangling ground;
The same commentator says: $pj |g ^ ^ Q jfa jjfr $$ "Net-like country, venturing into which you become entangled."
(3) temporising ground;
Tu Yu explains ^JT as -^ . This meaning is still retained in modern phrases such as j|r ^, ^ ^ "stave off," "delay." I do not know
why Capt. Calthrop calls ^JT Jjjj "suspended ground," unless he is con- fusing it with ^ ^ .
(4) narrow passes; ($} precipitous heights; The root idea in |$g£ is narrowness; in |Jjpt, steepness.
(6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.
It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman's unques- tioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.
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2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called accessible.
Generally speaking, 2p ||j| "level country" is meant. Cf. IX. § 9:
3. With regard to ground of this nature,
The Tung Tien reads Jg *j± J^ . be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots,
See IX. § 2. The Tung Tien reads and carefully guard your line of supplies.
A curious use of 7Jc|J as a verb, if our text is right. The general meaning is doubtless, as Tu Yu says, fit >ffi& H£ jjjjb ^ ^H ^tf' "not to allow the enemy to cut your communications." Tu Mu, who was not a soldier and can hardly have had any practical experience of fighting, goes more into detail and speaks of protecting the line of communications by a wall ( trjg| ), or enclosing it by embankments on each side ( jfc ^ §§))! In view of Napoleon's dictum, "the secret of war lies in the com- munications," * we could wish that Sun Tzti had done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. § 10, VII. § u. Col. Hen- derson says : "The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duel- list who finds his adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's move- ments, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the com- mander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or the surrender of his whole army." **
Then you will be able to fight with advantage.
Omitted by Capt. Calthrop.
* See KPens ** "The Science of War," chap. 2.
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ttj ffn
4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called entangling.
Capt. Calthrop is wrong in translating :j|
5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue.
^f\ 7J?|J (an example of litotes) is paraphrased by Mei Yao-ch'en as jj£\ ^ ^j|J "you will receive a check."
6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called temporising ground.
'S^ -^ IP! ^l ffi 'Hf "tit "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the situation remains at a deadlock" (Tu Yu).
7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait,
Tu Yu says ^=j£ ^T* ^^ -^ "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our position. Here again ^pl] is used as a verb, but this time in a different sense: "to hold out an advantage to."
it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.
Mei Yao-ch'en paraphrases the passage in a curious jingle, the scheme of rhymes being aMdd: %. % ffi $fe ^ ft ft fa % ^ f |J fflj
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8. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first,
Capt. Calthrop says: "Defiles, make haste to occupy." But this is a conditional clause, answering to ^^ j^ -^Q ^ ~£ in the next paragraph.
let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.
Because then, as Tu Yu observes, f ft\\
$HJ iilfc "^ie initiative Wl^ ^e with lls> and by making sudden and unex- pected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy." The commen- tators make a great pother about the precise meaning of ^9£, which to the foreign reader seems to present no difficulty whatever.
9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.
10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are be- forehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.
Ts'ao Kung says: ^J ^ |^ H ^ ^ Pf ^ ^ A "The Par~ ticular advantage of securing heights and defiles is that your actions can- not then be dictated by the enemy." [For the enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. Chang Yu tells the following anec- dote of ^ ^j |jtt]r P'ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619 — 682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At nightfall he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P'ei Hsing-chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. 'How did you know what was going to happen?' they asked. P'ei Hsing-chien replied: 'From this time forward be content to obey orders without asking
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unnecessary questions.' [See Cte T^aw^ S>4«, ch. 84, fol. 12 r°., and -fltt« :T'0/*£- 67^ ch. 1 08, fol. 5 v°.} From this it may be seen," Chang Yii continues, "that high and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are immune from disastrous floods."
11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.
The turning-point of ^* |f£ ££ Li Shih-min's campaign in 621 A.D. against the two rebels, Ijjf ||| |j|i Tou Chien-te, King of W Hsia, and lE Ht ^j Wang Shih-ch'ung, Prince of J||J Cheng, was his seizure o the heights of jj£ 3p Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-te persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken prisoner. [See Chiu Tang Shu, ch. 2, fol. 5 z>°., and also ch. 54.]
12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal,
The Tung Tien reads it is not easy to provoke a battle,
Ts'ao Kung says that ^ Ifffe means $[£ jj|£ "challenging the enemy." But the enemy being far away, that plainly involves, as Tu Yu says,
$$, Hfc "&°ing to meet him." The point of course is, that we must not think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, at the end of which
xfe $5 fci I§£ IPt "we should. be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."
and righting will be to your disadvantage.
13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. § 8.
The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.
Capt. Calthrop omits Eg will be noticed that nos. 3 and 6 have really no reference to the config- uration of the country, and that only 4 and 5 can be said to convey any definite geographical idea.
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15. ^c^J^JlJJl— I* + 0
14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes,
The T*u Shu reads
but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (i) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6) rout.
I take exception to Capt. Calthrop's rendering of |Sjg and jjfo as
"distress" and "disorganisation," respectively.
15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the flight of the former.
Cf. III. § 10. The general's fault here is that of ^ ^ J] "not calculating the enemy's strength." It is obvious that life cannot have the same force as in § 12, where it was equivalent to Ji ^J . I should
not be inclined, however, to limit it, with Chang Yu, to t|^ ^ ^ Jj| -& ~£ ^|J 3p£ "the wisdom and valour of the general and the sharpness of the weapons." As Li Ch'iian very justly remarks, -^ ^ ^ >gj
2. *tfe ffl ^ ft Z It R'J "ST ^ "Given a decided advantage in position, or the help of some stratagem such as a flank attack or an am- buscade, it would be quite possible [to fight in the ratio of one to ten]."
1 6. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is insubordination.
iffll "laxity" — the metaphor being taken from an unstrung bow. Capt. Calthrop's "relaxation" is not good, on account of its ambiguity. Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of J|J ^ffj T'ien Pu \Hsin T'ang Shu, ch. 148], who was sent to ^| Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against I /Ji ip; Wang T'ing-ts'ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T'ien Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when,
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after some months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.
When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse.
Ts'ao Kung says: g* f}% ^ *g T£ || $Bl Pi "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and sud- denly collapse." Note that j$j is to be taken literalb of physical weak- ness, whereas in the former clause it is figurative. Li Ch'iian makes [^ equivalent to j£ , and Tu Mu explains it as |lg ^ ^ Tft ^jj "stumb- ling into a death-trap."
17. When the higher officers
~fc |tl ' according to Ts'ao Kung, are the >J> jj^ "generals of in- ferior rank." But Li Ch'iian, Ch'en Hao and Wang Hsi take the term as simply convertible with j|^ or -^ 4^.
are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resent- ment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position • to fight, the result is ruin.
Ts'ao Kung makes -fc i^, understood, the subject of ^R , which seems rather far-fetched. Wang Hsi's note is:
"This means, the general is angry without just cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head." He takes |^ , therefore, in the sense of ^ • but I think that Ch'en Hao
is right in his paraphrase ^ jjjj| j||;! ^ "they don't care if it be pos- sible or no." My interpretation of the whole passage is that of Mei Yao- ch'en and Chang Yu. Tu Mu gives a long extract from the Tso Chuan, Hf lost for the ^ Chin State through the contumacy of -^Q |^ Hsien Hu and the resentful spite of |J| |^- Wei I and ^g ^ Chao Chan. Chang
Yu also alludes to the mutinous conduct of |f| B Luan Yen [ibid.
1 8. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct;
Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 4) says: ±^^4,|lJ^^Zl|i, jfjf fiffi H ^ ^ H(J ^ Jfi 31 ^ "If the commander gives his orders with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice ; if his moves are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty." General Baden-Powell says, italicising the words: "The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell — in the clearness of the instructions they receive." * As- suming that clear instructions beget confidence, this is very much what Wei Liao Tztt (loc. cit.) goes on to say: ^ ^ ^ >g 3t J$ jjft g|
#*;&*&• Cf. alsoWuTzuch.3: ffl J« £ W » * H ~k — ® ^
••"i^ _/ > — — r— ^^*f sf > — 1_ V ~\ «w»» /y*»
tary leader is diffidence; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation."
when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men,
|J* ^X ^ ^ ~ffij ^ ^ "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine" [Tu Mu].
and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganisation.
19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be a rout.
Chang Yii paraphrases the latter part of the sentence ^ j|3| ||j| Jj|
£ ± H! H» 3t & & & & * til > and c°ntinu ffl » » ft to H ^ - RIJ }|t ^- ^ - RIJ « ^ ^ -&
"Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be * "Aids to Scouting," p. xii.
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20.
appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to demoralise the enemy." Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44 et a/.). There seems little to distinguish ^ from j^jr in § 15, except that ^ is a more forcible word.
20. These are six ways of courting defeat,
Ch'en Hao makes them out to be: (i) 'jfc -fa jjf J&J "neglect to
» / I -T^. >5^- >T>
estimate the enemy's strength;" (2) 2J£ ^ JflJ ^ "want of authority;" (3) £ J* gfl| |& "defective training;" (4) # 3g jft & "unjustifiable anger;" (5) £|i ^v ^ ^ "non-observance of discipline ;" (6) ^ ^ HH J|| "failure to use picked men."
which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post. See supra, § 13.
21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally;
Chia Lin's text has the reading ^ for JJjff . Ch'en Hao says: ^ ^ >P $fj i^ ^c|J "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to those connected with ground."
but a power of estimating the adversary,
The insertion of a "but" is necessary to show the connection of thought here. A general should always utilise, but never rely wholly on natural advantages of terrain.
of controlling the forces of victory,
wl )$af ^s one °f those condensed expressions which mean so much in Chinese, and so little in an English translation. What it seems to imply is complete mastery of the situation from the beginning.
and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, The Tung Tien and Yu Lan read ff @ fa £ %\]
I am decidedly puzzled by Capt. Calthrop's translation : "an eye for steep- ness, command and distances." Where did he find the word which I have put in italics?
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22. #» it m ffl a ^ $ 0 * #« lit
23.
constitutes the test of a great general.
A somewhat free translation of ^ . As Chang Yu remarks, these are ^ £ $ "the essentials of soldiering," ground being only a helpful accessory.
22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises them, will surely be defeated.
23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding.
Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch'in dynasty, who is said to have been the patron of EM ^ Chang Liang and to have written the ^ |5§, has these words attributed to him: |jj jj? ^j gj|
JJUJ "The responsibility of setting an army in motion must devolve on the general alone ; if advance and retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country's cause [///., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This
means that |gj #\* £ ^ $£ j|F gjj ^ "in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander must be absolute." Chang Yu also quotes the saying: ^^^P^^'T'^sS "Decrees of the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp." Napoleon, who has been accused of allowing his generals too little independence of action, speaks in the same sense: "Un general en chef n'est pas a convert de ses fautes a la guerre par un ordre de son souverain ou du ministre, quand celui qui le donne est eloigne du champ d'operation, et qu'il connait mal, ou ne connait pas du tout le dernier etat des choses." *
* "Maximes de Guerre," no. 72.
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24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace,
It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for a soldier is to retreat.
whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign,
^, which is omitted by the Tu Shu, is said by Ch'en Hao to be equivalent to ^ . If it had to be separately translated, it would be something like our word "accrue."
is the jewel of the kingdom.
A noble presentment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior." Such a man, says Ho Shih, fj= ~fc S -Iff ^ »$| ^ "even if he had to suffer punishment, would not regret his conduct."
25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.
Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging pic- ture of the famous general Wu Ch'i, from whose treatise on war I have frequently had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch'i himself sucked out the virus. The soldier's mother, hearing this, began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: 'Why do you cry? Your son is only a com- mon soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison from his sore.' The woman replied : 'Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the same for my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where'." Li Ch'iian mentions ^ -^ the Viscount of Ch'u, who invaded the small state of ||| Hsiao during the winter. ^ ^ The Duke of Shen said to him : "Many of
1 1 1
1 . j? BO ^ HI $ s ffi 7 si 4 ii ro
27.
the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he made a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and straight- way they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined with floss silk. \Tso CJntan, j|£ ^. , XII. 5]. Chang Yii alludes to the same passage,
26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands ; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder :
Capt. Calthrop has got these three clauses quite wrong. The last he translates: "overindulgence may produce disorder."
then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose.
Cf. IX. § 42. We read in the \&- ffi $g , pt. 2 : =j| ^ =f ^
"Injury comes out of kindness." Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Q ^^ Lii Meng was occupying the town of yT [|fe Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a fellow- townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat ( ^ ) belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation helmet as a pro- tection against the rain. Lii Meng considered that the fact of his being also a native of VrT tvj Tu-nan should not be allowed to palliate a clear
Y?* rrJ J
breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered his summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did so. This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up. \SanKuo Chih, ch. 54, f. i3r°.&*°.].
27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
That is, as Ts'ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."
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29.
2 * ^ ifc 0 £ ^ -tit
so.
28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
Cf. III. § 13 (i).
29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory.
I may take this opportunity of pointing out the rather nice distinction in meaning between jpj? and Jpjr. The latter is simply "to attack" without any further implication, whereas tjpc is a stronger word which in nine cases out of ten means "to attack with expectation of victory," "to fall upon," as we should say, or even "to crush." On the other hand, jpc is not quite synonymous with >0£, which is mostly used of operations on a larger scale, as of one State making war on another, often with the added idea of invasion. ^j£ , finally, has special reference to the subjugation of rebels. See Mencius, VII. 2. ii. 2.
30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.
The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no mistakes." Another reading substitutes [g for $$£ and jp| for ^| . The latter variant only is adopted by the T'ung Tien and Yu Lan. Note that jjj| here means "at the end of his mental resources."
3 1 . Hence the saying : If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt;
Capt. Calthrop makes the saying end here, which cannot be justified, if you know Heaven and know Earth,
^ and jfy are transposed for the sake of the jingle between ^
and ^ . The original text, however, has ^W ^C ^»W ijfe > and tne cor- rection has been made from the T'ung Tien.
you may make your victory complete.
As opposed to |j^ £ ^"> above. The original text has B^L 7JT
^f\ |p| , the corruption being perhaps due to the occurrence of jf\ *JK* in the preceding sentence. Here, however ~jf\ j|S| would not be synonymous
with jf\ ^ , but equivalent to ^f\ ^ ]Q *jjj* "inexhaustible," "beyond computation." Cf. V. § n. The T'ung Tien has again supplied the true reading. Li Ch'uan sums up as follows: ^ ^ ^ ^jp jfy ^}J ^
^ 1^ 9$ K'J W ifc W ^ "Given a knowledge of three things - the affairs of man, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth — , victory will invariably crown your battles."
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