VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS.

The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzu does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us (V. §§ 6 — n) that such deflections from the ordinary course are prac- tically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large number. "All it means is that in warfare ^ jjjfe it $jj& we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost degree ... I do not know what Ts'ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out to be [the latter's note is^^Jg^fij^j1^^ -Jjj^ ], but it has been suggested that they are connected with the Nine Situations" — of chap. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yii: see note on ^ ijjj, § 2. The only other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost — a supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends some weight.
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.
Repeated from VII. § i, where it is certainly more in place. It may have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to the chapter.
2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. For explanation of J^J ]fy , see XI. § 8.
In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies.
See XI, §§ 6, 12. Capt. Calthrop omits
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Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.
£& Jjjj is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43, q. v.). We may compare it with jg $fa (XI. § 7). Chang Yii calls it a ^ $g £ ijjj, situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch'iian says it is "country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which to advance." In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem.
See XI. §§ 9, 14. Capt. Calthrop has "mountainous and wooded country," which is a quite inadequate translation of [j] .
In a desperate position, you must fight.
See XI. §§ 10, 14. Chang Ytt has an important note here, which must be given in full. "From Jg, ijjj fiffi ^ ," he says, "down to this point, the Nine Variations are presented to us. The reason why only five are given is that the subject is treated en precis ( Jjjf; Jt -fc $fa fy ). So in chap. XI, where he discusses the variations of tactics corresponding to the Nine Grounds, Sun Tzu mentions only six variations; there again we have an abridgment. [I cannot understand what Chang Yii means by this statement. He can only be referring to §§ 11—14 or §§ 46 — 50 of chap. XI; but in both places all the nine grounds are discussed. Per- haps he is confusing these with the Six ^Jj J^ of chap. X.] All kinds of ground have corresponding military positions, and also a variation of tactics suitable to each ( j^ jfy ^ we find enumerated first [§§ 2 — 10] are the situations; afterwards [§§ 1 1 — 14] the corresponding tactics. Now, how can we tell that the "^ J||j& "Nine Variations" are simply the ^ jfy ^ %jj& "variations of tactics corres- ponding to the Nine Grounds"? It is said further on [§ 5] that 'the general who does not understand the nine variations of tactics may be well acquainted with the features of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.' Again, in chap. XI [§ 41] we read : 'The different measures adapted to the nine varieties of ground ( ^L Mfe £ 'HI ) an(^ ^e exPediency of aggressive or defensive tactics must be carefully examined.' From a consideration of these passages the meaning is made clear. When later on the nine grounds are enumerated, Sun Tzu recurs to these nine variations. He wishes here to speak of the Five Advantages [see infra, § 6], so he begins by setting forth the Nine Variations. These are inseparably connected in practice, and therefore they are dealt with together." The weak point of this argument is the suggestion that 3£ IJJ "five things" can stand as a - , that is, an
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abstract or abridgment, of nine, when those that are omitted are not less important than those that appear, and when one of the latter is not in- cluded amongst the nine at all.
3. There are roads which must not be followed,
"Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch'iian, "where an ambush is to be feared."
armies which must not be attacked,
More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be attacked." Ch'en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a trivial advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men's strength."
towns
Capt. Calthrop says "castles" — an unfortunate attempt to introduce local colour.
which must not be besieged,
Cf. III. § 4. Ts'ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own experience. When invading the territory of ^ yft Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of jSE Jjjj? Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble " ^j jj£ Hsiin Ying, when urged to attack >fg Kjl? Pi-yang, replied: "The city is small and well-fortified; even if I succeed in taking it, 't will be no great feat of arms ; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and manoeuvres. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province." *
positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for au- thority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim:
* "Marshal Turenne," p. 50.
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5. # ^ m t$ % -I £ m % m & MU ye ^ mn ZM^
6- '/£ ^ ^ 531 #,•£& £ * SI 2fl 3E. fU ^ .H ft A
. "Weapons
are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military com- mander is the negation of civil order !" The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity. Cf. III. § 17. (5), X. § 23. The Tung Tien has $f ^£ 1|[ before ^& ^ , etc. This is a gloss on the, words by Chu-ko Liang, which being repeated by Tu Yu became incorporated with the text. Chang Yii thinks that these five precepts are the 3JL ?PJ referred to in §6. Another theory is that the mysterious ~j\^ %jj& are here enumerated, starting with
and endin§ at *tb W j^r ^ ^ ' while the final clause
embraces and as it were sums up all the nine. Thus Ho Shih says : "Even if it be your sovereign's command to encamp in diffi- cult country, linger in isolated positions, etc., you must not do so." The theory is perhaps a little too ingenious to be accepted with confidence.
4. The general Ivho thoroughly understands the advan- tages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
Before 7J;|J in the original text there is a ^|j which is obviously not required.
5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.
Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in every possible way. Chang Yii says : "Every kind of ground is characterised by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How is it possible to turn these natural features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"
6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.
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M J-ftflfr
Ts that follow;" but this cannot be right. We must rather look back to the five "variations" contained in § 3. Chia Lin (who reads jfc ^|j& here to balance the 5t %\\ ) te^s us tnat these imply five obvious and generally advantageous lines of action, namely : "if a certain road is short, it must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted ; and if consistent with military operations, the ruler's commands must be obeyed." But there are circumstances which some- times forbid a general to use these advantages. For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on. Here the *|& comes in to modify the ^|J , and hence we see the uselessness of knowing the one without the other — of having an eye for weaknesses in the enemy's armour without being clever enough to recast one's plans on the spur of the mo- ment. Capt. Calthrop offers this slovenly translation : "In the manage- ment of armies, if the art of the Nine Changes be understood [stf\, a knowledge of the Five Advantages is of no avail."
7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.
"Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says Ts'ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your mind."
8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
>j=| , according to Tu Mu, is equivalent to ^ , and %jfc Tfj" ^ -j^
is paraphrased by Chang Yii as "jjj* J£j[ ^jp £ ^£ lf£ • Tu Mu Soes on to say: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our cal- culations."
9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we
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are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.
A translator cannot emulate the conciseness of J^ "to blend [thoughts of advantage] with disadvantage," but the meaning is as given. Tu Mu says : "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I must consider not only the enemy's ability to injure me, but also my own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself. . . For instance, if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will incite my ad- versary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy's toils." See the story of Ts'ao Ts'ao, VII. § 35, note. In his first edition, Capt. Calthrop translated §§ 7 — 9 as follows: "The wise man perceives clearly wherein lies advantage and disadvantage. While recognising an opportunity, he does not overlook the risks, and saves future anxiety." This has now been altered into: "The wise man considers well both advantage and disadvantage. He sees a way out of adversity, and on the day of victory to danger is not blind" Owing to a needless inversion of the Chinese, the words which I have italicised are evidently intended to represent § 8 !
10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;
Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of which would only occur to the Oriental mind: — "Entice away the enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counsellors. Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful contri- vance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) considers the ^ to be military chastisement: "Get the enemy," he says, "into a position where he must suffer injury, and he will submit of his own accord." Capt. Calthrop twists Sun Tzu's words into an absurdly barbarous precept: "In reducing an enemy to submis- sion, inflict all possible damage upon him."
make trouble for them,
UH is defined by Ts'ao Kung as it}. , and his definition is generally
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adopted by the commentators. Tu Mu, however, seems to take it in the sense of "possessions," or, as we might say, "assets," which he considers
to be ^ JK H W A 3® ^ ff "a larSe army' a rich exchequer, harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfilment of commands." These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.
and keep them constantly engaged;
^, literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ "prevent them from having any rest."
hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
Meng Shih's note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use of *|& : "^ T^J %jj& pjj JJ g|? "cause them to forget pien (the reasons for acting otherwise than on their first impulse), and hasten in our direction."
1 1 . The art of war teaches us to rely not on the like- lihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readi- ness to receive him;
The Tung Tien and Yu Lan read ^ || 0 ^ ^ ifc » but the
conciser form is more likely to be right.
not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.
The Tung Tien and Yu Lan insert 3£ -^ after the first ]^£ , and omit # Jft ,
1 2 . There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (i) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
_p| fjfjj ffiE j|T% "Bravery without forethought," as Ts'ao Kung analyses it, which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yii, "must not be encountered with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzti, chap. IV

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"In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, too, makes the incisive remark _t ^ >5 ^ "Simply going to one's death does not bring about victory."
(2) cowardice, which leads to capture-
' Jj£> 0^ is explained by Ts'ao Kung of the man "whom timidity pre- vents from advancing to seize an advantage," and Wang Hsi adds, "who is quick to flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase ^ jjfc £|r ^ "he who is bent on returning alive," that is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzti knew, nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T'ai Kung said: -fc %\] ^ fl^f ^ §g S $& "He who lets an advantage slip will subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Jjjj\ ^t Liu Yii pursued the rebel ^g "& Huan Hsiian up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle with him at |Jj|J. |]||| ty\\ the island of Ch'eng- hung. The loyal troops numbered only a few thousands, while their op- ponents were in great force. But Huan Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should he be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment's notice. The natural result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardour to be first in the fray, Huan Hsuan's forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping. [See ^|p jfe
chap. 99, fol. 13.] Chang Yii tells a somewhat similar story of ^ ffl 7Jjf> Chao Ying-ch'i, a general of the Chin State who during a battle with the army of Ch'u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get across.
(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults ;
I fail to see the meaning of Capt. Calthrop's "which brings insult." Tu Mu tells us that $|c j| Yao Hsiang, when opposed in 357 A.D. by ^ Jg Huang Mei, ^ =fe Teng Ch'iang and others, shut himself up behind his walls and refused to fight. Teng Ch'iang said: "Our adver- sary is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry and come out.
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Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured on as far as ^ j§* San-yuan by the enemy's pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.
(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame ;
This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect in a general. What Sun Tzti condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch'en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: ^j|J ^^ ~jf\ |p| "The seeker after glory should be careless of public opinion."
(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to Worry and trouble.
Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasise is the danger of sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief came through 'the very man who started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his men." By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of Sun Tzti's mouth.
13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.
14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.