I. e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There

is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this latter clause. Tu Mu, Ch'en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch'en assume the meaning to be: "In order to make your defence quite safe, you must defend even those places that are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the clause balances less well with the preceding — always a consideration in the highly anti- thetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang Yii, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven [see IV. § 7], making it impos- sible for the enemy to guard against him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy cannot defend . . . He who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."
8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend ; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does not know what to attack.
An aphorism which puts the whole art of war into a nutshell.
45
91 $ II
10.
9. O divine art of sublety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;
Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with reference to the enemy. Chang Yii, whom I follow, draws no sharp distinction between ^ and BJft , but Tu Mu and others think that ^ indicates the
i/o* n"r IW*
secrecy to be observed on the defensive, and j[j|jj the rapidity to be dis- played in attack. The Yu Lan text differs considerably from ours, reading :
' IK * ft ¥ tic. m m ** » ^ I* ¥ it ¥
and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
The Tung Tien has jj£ j|| ^J )|& >f|> fjj ^ . Capt. Calthrop's version of this paragraph is so remarkable that I cannot refrain from quoting it in full : "Now the secrets of the art of offence are not to be easily apprehended, as a certain shape or noise can be understood, of the senses; but when these secrets are once learnt, the enemy is mastered."
10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
The second member of the sentence is weak, because ^ TJJ" ~fe is nearly tautologous with 'jfi ~pj* ^ . The Yu Lan reads ||| for JJ .
11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is to attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
Tu Mu says : "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return ; if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign himself." It is clear that Sun Tzu, unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.
46
is. & ^ A
12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.
In order to preserve the parallelism with § n, I should prefer to follow the Tu Shu text, which inserts g| before jjj- Jjjjj . This extremely con- cise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia Lin : §5j| ^ ^ ^ ||| yjffi "even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." The real crux of the passage lies in 3Jfe S j^f ^ -|j^ . ^ of course = jg .
Ts'ao Kung defines 3Jg by the word j^, which is perhaps a case of obscurum per obscurius. Li Ch'iian, however, says : g^J -jjjj* j? fjjj ^^ ^ "we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally clinches the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes — one of §§ ^ Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying ftjl? 2p» Yang-p'ing and about to be attacked by ffj Jj^ ^^ Ssu-ma I, suddenly struck his colours, stopped the beating of the drums, and flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unex- pected proceeding had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzti is advocating here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use of "bluff." Capt. Calthrop translates: "and prevent the enemy from attacking by keeping him in suspense," which shows that he has not fully grasped the meaning of 3JJ? .
13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided. ^ /^^^£/*vtty.
The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yii (after Mei Yao-ch'en) rightly explains it thus : "If the enemy's dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack from every quarter." ^ is here used as an active verb: "to make to appear." See IV, note on heading. Capt. Calthrop's "making feints" is quite wrong.
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14. We cap form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole,
The original text has ]fy ||£ ;p£f lit — • -{f^ , which in accordance with the T^ung Tien and Yu Lan has been altered as above. I adopt the more plausible reading of the Tu Shu: -jj^ j£j[ -J- ;pJ£ jit — • fy , in spite of having to refer -j-» to ourselves and not to the enemy. Thus Tu Yu and Mei Yao-ch'en both regard -J-1 as the undivided force, con- sisting of so many parts, and — • as each of the isolated fractions of the enemy. The alteration of ;gJ£ into ztt can hardly be right, though the true text might conceivably have been ^^ \fy -[- it JpJ£ ~ffi — • -jfj^ .
which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.
15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
For Jjg , the Tung Tien and Yu Lan have j|£ . Tu Yu, followed by
the other commentators, arbitrarily defines J^J as /j^ fjjj ^ )j|p "few and easy to conquer," but only succeeds thereby in making the sentence absolutely pointless. As for Capt. Calthrop's translation: "In superiority of numbers there is economy of strength," its meaning is probably known to himself alone. In justification of my own rendering of jj^J , I would refer to Lun Yu IV. 2 and VII. 25 (3).
1 6. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points;
Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's victories by saying that "while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering what he was going to do, he was thinking most of what he was going to do himself."
and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
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19. & *R ifc £ *fe *u ifc £ 0 f«
17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.
In Frederick the Great's Instructions to his Generals we read: "A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in smaller misfortunes to avoid greater."
1 8. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.
The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson's words, is "to compel the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction in turn."
19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.
There is nothing about "defeating" anybody in this sentence, as Capt. Calthrop translates. What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength. Among many such successful junctions which military history records, one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of Bliicher just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.
49
B
21.
20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred li apart, and even the nearest are separated by several li\
The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, but the mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendez-vous in separate columns, each of which has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed at haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yii's note may be worth quoting here : "If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will be forfeited through our preparations for defence, and the positions we hold will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual support will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there is any great distance between the foremost and hindmost divisions of the army."
2 1 . Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yiieh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory.
Capt. Calthrop omits J^j[ 3S, teF ^ , and his translation of the remainder is flabby and inaccurate. As Sun Tzu was in the service of the Jj£ Wu State, it has been proposed to read J& instead of ^* — a wholly un- necessary tampering with the text. Yiieh coincided roughly with the present province of Chehkiang. Li Ch'iian very strangely takes ^ not as the proper name, but in the sense of jj^ "to surpass." No other commentator follows him. JJ|f j|£ belongs to the class of expressions like ^ jj£
"distance," - /J> "magnitude," etc., to which the Chinese have to resort
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22. n. HI
23. ft £ ffij
in order to express abstract ideas of degree. The T'u Shu, however,
omits J|j£ .
I say then that victory can be achieved.
Alas for these brave words ! The long feud between the two states ended in 473 B. C. with the total defeat of Wu by ^J {^ Kou Chien and its incorporation in Yiieh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzu's death. With his present assertion compare IV. § 4 : ^ fjf ffl jffl ^ "pf jj^ (which is the obviously mistaken reading of the Yu Lan here). Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus goes on to explain: "In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said, 'One may know how to conquer without being able to do it,' whereas here we have the statement that 'victory can be achieved.' The explanation is, that in the former chapter, where the offensive and defensire are under discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot make certain of beating him. But the present passage refers particularly to the soldiers of Yiieh who, according to Sun Tzu's calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of the impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can be achieved."
22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting.
Capt. Calthrop quite unwarrantably translates : "If the enemy be many in number, prevent him," etc.
Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.
This is the first of four similarly constructed sentences, all of which present decided difficulties. Chang Yii explains 2$ fl| ^ ^ If as J$ fi ffj- ;£ ^ -^C • This is perhaps the best way of taking the words, though Chia Lin, referring g-j- to ourselves and not the enemy,
offers the alternative of^^^^^ff^^^-tfc "Know beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy's failure."
y 23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity.
Instead of ft , the T'ung Tien, Yii Lan, and also Li Ch'uan's text have ^ , which the latter explains as "the observation of omens," and Chia Lin simply as "watching and waiting." ft is defined by Tu Mu
24.
as Wi t ' and Chang Yu teUs us ^at by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances the action of Chu-ko Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman's head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his Fabian tactics.
Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
Two commentators, Li Ch'uan and Chang Yii, take ^^ ^ in the sense of ^ ~£ "put on specious appearances." The former says: "You may either deceive the enemy by a show of weakness — striking your colours and silencing your drums; or by a show of strength — making a hollow display of camp-fires and regimental banners." And the latter quotes V. 19, where ^ ^ certainly seems to bear this sense. On the other hand, I would point to § 13 of this chapter, where J|J must with equal certainty be active. It is hard to choose between the two inter- pretations, but the context here agrees better, I think, with the one that I have adopted. Another difficulty arises over Tfa ££: ^ Wj> which
most of the commentators, thinking no doubt of the ^ J|Jj in XI. § i, refer to the actual ground on which the enemy is encamped. The notes of Chia Lin and Mei Yao-ch'en, however, seem to favour my view. The same phrase has a somewhat different meaning in I. § 2.
24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own,
Tu Yu is right, I think, in attributing this force to ^j| : Ts'ao Kung defines it simply as ip" . Capt. Calthrop surpasses himself with the stag- gering translation "Flap the wings" ! Can the Latin cornu (in its figurative sense) have been at the back of his mind?
so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. Cf. IV. § 6.
25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them ;
The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. ifljE J^ is perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see supra, § 9) as "showing no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.
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so. 5
81 H £ l^W * » £ If
28.
conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.
ft Hj is expanded by Tu Mu into g| ^ |gj fg- '$ ^ |£ Jfc. [For P|] ,see XIII, note on heading.] He explains J# ^jf in like fashion :
^^^it£±^^iti£
have clever and capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us."
26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics - - that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
All the commentators except Li Ch'iian make ^ refer to the enemy. So Ts'ao Kung: @ $£ ^ ffij lfc Jjf . ^ is defined as jf . The T*u Shu has iS, with the same meaning. ^§ee IV. §13. The Yu Lan reads ^ , evidently a gloss. v3nxi§L
27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. ^/>C^^fy