I. e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. § 5.

(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?
(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
See §§ 7, 8.
(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts'ao Ts'ao (A. D. 155 — 220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of corn ! However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts'ao Ts'ao's own comment on the present passage is characteristically curt: |§* fft ^ ^ ^ ffjj jjfc |^ f{when you lay down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed, the offender must be put to death."
(5) Which army is the stronger?
Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch'en puts it, ptj Jfft £[» |^ ,
which might be freely rendered "esprit de corps and 'big battalions.'"
(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained ?
Tu Yu quotes 3E -^ as saying: "Without constant practice, the of- ficers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."
(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
IJJ , literally "clear;" that is, on which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished ?
14. By means of these seven considerations I can fore- cast victory or defeat.
I?- I^ 0 ftf ffS i&J fllfe
15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: — let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat: — let such a one be dismissed !
The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's treatise was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron ||f] ^ Ho Lii, king of the Wti State. It is not necessary, however, to understand ^j before @ ^ (as some commentators do), or to take *|^ as "generals under my command."
1 6. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail your- self also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
Capt. Calthrop blunders amazingly over this sentence: "Wherefore, with regard to the foregoing, considering that with us lies the advantage, and the generals agreeing, we create a situation which promises victory." Mere logic should have kept him from penning such frothy balderdash.
17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one's plans.
Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to' abstract principles; "for," as Chang Yii puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a favourable position in actual warfare." On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack the first to-morrow — I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are ?" *
* "Words on Wellington," by Sir W. Fraser.
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1 8. All warfare is based on deception.
The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many mili- tary qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe."
/i 9. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign dis- order, and crush him.
JJ5(, as often in Sun Tzu, is used in the sense of *j|c. It is rather remarkable that all the commentators, with the exception of Chang Yii, refer ja^ to the enemy: "when he is in disorder, crush him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu is still illustrating the uses of deception in war.
21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
The meaning of jjj is made clear from chap. VI, where it is opposed to ||[ "weak or vulnerable spots." jjtji » according to Tu Yu and other commentators, has reference to the keenness of the men as well as to numerical superiority. Capt. Calthrop evolves an extraordinarily far-fetched translation: "If there are defects, give an appearance of perfection, and awe the enemy. Pretend to be strong, and so cause the enemy to avoid you" !
22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to ir- ritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
I follow Chang Yu in my interpretation of :&% . j|l is expanded by Mei Yao-ch'en into ^ J^ j|r jg . Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu,
23.
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20.
says that the good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.
23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.
This is probably the meaning, though Mei Yao-ch'en has the note:
K% •$& ^ i^C $f $$. ^ ^ "while we are taking our ease, wait for
the enemy to tire himself out." The Yu Lan has jtj| ffjj ^ ^
"Lure him on and tire him out." This would seem also to have been
Ts'ao Kung's text, judging by his comment J,/j[ 7Ji|J »j& ^ .
If his forces are united, separate them.
Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the commen- tators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between them."
24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.
This seems to be the way in which Ts'ao Kung understood the passage, and is perhaps the best sense to be got out of the text as it stands. Most of the commentators give the following explanation : "It is impossible to lay down rules for warfare before you come into touch with the enemy." This would be very plausible if it did not ignore [J^ , which unmistakably refers to the maxims which Sun Tzu has been laying down. It is possible, of course, that jj£ may be a later interpolation, in which case the sentence would practically mean: "Suc- cess in warfare cannot be taught." As an alternative, however, I would venture to suggest that a second ^ may have fallen out after "jjj*, so that we get : "These maxims for succeeding in war are the first that ought to be imparted."
26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.
8
Chang Yii tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign. Capt. Calthrop misunderstands it as "the shrine of the ancestors," and gives a loose and inaccurate rendering of the whole passage.
The general who loses a battle makes but few cal- culations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.