II. Modes, according to Swedenborg.

" With respect to the existence of things, sound phi- losophy teaches us, that things which are much com- pounded take their origin from things less compounded ; the less compounded from things still less so ; these from their individual substances or parts, which are least of all limited ; and these again from things simple, in which
280 8WEDENB0KG, [Cji. XII.
no limits can be supposed, except one ; from which cir- cumstance also they are called simples. But whence is this simple, in which only one limit is to be conceived? And whence that limit ? It cannot exist by itself; for there must be something by which it may exist, if it have a limit, if it be simple, or if it be capable of giving origin to two or more limits. Extending the inquiry therefore, by the same philosophy we rationally proceed to the conclusion, that such a simple derives its exist- ence from the Infinite ; but that the Infinite exists of itself. Again, if we contemplate the successive progres- sion of causes, it will be found highly reasonable to con- clude, that nothing finite can exist without a cause; that things which are much compounded, or which con- sist of many individual parts, neither could be compound- ed, nor can subsist, without a cause, by which they were compounded, and by which they may consist : for a cause always precedes and afterwards accompanies that which exists from it. The individual parts of such a composite must in like manner be compounded of and subsist from their individual parts still smaller; and these again, by the order of their succession, from things simple. But still things simple can neither exist nor subsist from themselves. Wherefore there must be an Infinite Something; there must be something infinitely intelligent, which may be considered both as a cause in itself, and at the same time as an operator of effects out of itself; or as an inherent force, and at the same time as a positive agent ; or as a power capable of producing, and at the same time as actually producing the existence of other things. It follows, therefore, that things com- posite derive their origin from things simple ; things
Ch. XII.] A HEKMETIC PHILOSOPHEK. 281
simple from the Infinite ; and the Infinite from itself^ as being the sole cause of itself and of all things. It was before observed, that all finite things came into ex- istence successively ; for nothing can be at once such as it is capable of becoming, except the Infinite. Every thing finite acknowledges, or is indebted to, a certain mode, by which it is what it is, and nothing else ; a mode, by which it is of such a figure, and no other ; a mode, by which it occupies such a space, and no other. In a ivord, all things are modified ; and therefore they ac- knowledge a mode prior to their modification, and ac- cording to which it takes its place : they acknowledge also a time, in which they were so modified. Hence nothing is at once what it is capable of becoming, except the Infinite. All finite things must necessarily under- go different states successively ; but not so the Infinite. And thus we perceive that all things out of the Infi- nite have their modifications, hut that in the Infinite there is no such thing as a mode : He being the origi- nal cause of all modifications." Principia, vol. 1, p. 47.
Modes, according to Spinoza.
" By a Mode, I understand the affections of a Sub- stance, or that, which is in another thing through or by means of which other thing it is conceived. Ethics, part 1, def. 6.
Observe, that Swedenborg has said of Simples, out of which Compounds are made, that they cannot exist by themselves ; i. e. as Spinoza expresses it, they must be conceived as existing in something else, which some- thing else is in itself, &c.
Again (Spinoza says), " I understand by Body, a mode
2S2 8WEDKNB0RG, [Cn. XII.
by which the essence of God, in so far as he is consid- ered as Extension (res extensa, an extended thing), is expressed in a certain and determined manner or mode." Ibid, part 2, def. 1.
Again. " Particular things are nothing but affec- tions of the attributes of God, or modes in which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and deter- minate manner." Ihid. part 1, corol. to prop. 25.
Again. " The Essence of things produced by God does not involve existence." Ibid, part 1, prop. 24.
Again. " There must be a certain cause of the exist- ence of each thing which exists. * * * It must be concluded absolutely (universally) that, every thing ac- cording to whose nature many individuals may exist, must necessarily have an external cause of such exist- ence." Schol. prop. 8, part 1.
Hence, in the Etliics of Spinoza, man and all things in nature are considered as not having in themselves necessary existence ; but they are re- garded as modes, things existing in another thing, i. e. affections of the attributes of God, existing only in God.
Let us now notice what each of these extra- ordinary thinkers has to say of our knowled(/e, and it will be seen that each of them point out three different sources or kinds of knowledge, and that the two authors harmonize in a most remarkable manner.
Ch. X.] A HERMETIC PHILOSOPHER. 283