part 1, prop. 17, schol. : the proposition being,

that " God acts by the mere laws of his own na- ture, and is not necessitated."
As a further illustration of this point, I add the fol- lowing from Swedenborg. " Those who do not under- stand the Divine Omnipotence, may imagine either that there is no order, or that Grod can do contrary to order, as well as according to it, when yet, without order, there could be no creation. * * * Yea, Grod himself can- not do contrary to his own divine order, since this would be to do contrary to himself." p. 347.
The corresponding passage to this in the Ethics, is in the 2d schol. to prop. 33, part 1, where Spinoza says, " It clearly follows from the preceding propositions, that things have been produced in the greatest perfection by God ; seeing, indeed, that they have followed necessari- ly from His most perfect nature. Nor does this opinion argue any imperfection in God ; for it is his very perfec- tion which has compelled us to affirm it. Nay, it follows from the contrary opinion, that God is not wholly perfect ; 13*
^298 8WEDENB0RG, [Cii. XII.
for if things could have been produced in any other mode, we must attribute to God another nature, different from that which we have been compelled to attribute to llim, from the consideration of the most perfect Being [Ens.y
And further, in tlie same sclioli. Spinoza re- marks, that the supposition that God could create things otherwise than according to order, would imply that God could change his own decrees, while all agree that God's decrees are unchange- able.