CHAPTER 4

Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War ( 1740-1763), the Napoleonic wars ( 1796-1815), the Crimean War ( 1853-1856), the German and Italian wars for unification up to the end of the Franco-Prussian War ( 1871) and finally the First World War (1914-1918). Unfortunately, this scheme breaks down if we apply it to the Second World War or, for that matter, to the 16th and 17th centuries. In other words, the periodic nature of wars which, for a time, was an article of faith with some his- torians, is just another historic fallacy.
Toynbee tried to repair the damage when he traced Western history back to 1494. Proceeding rather arbitrarily, he set up five great war and peace cycles, the first and last of which were somewhat irregular. Every one of Toynbee's cycles consists of two periods of war and two periods of peace which, in some of the cycles, are preceeded by premonitory wars. This is how Toynbee tabulated his results, ^
Successive Occurrences of the War and Peace Cycle in Modern and post- Modern Western History
Overture First Regu- Second Regu- Third Regu- Fourth Phase (1494-1568) lar Cycle lar Cycle lar Cycle Cycle
(1568-1672) (1672-1792) (1792-1914) (1914- )
( 1 ) Premonitory
Wars (the Pre-
lude)
—
—
1667-8
—
1911-12
(II) The General
War
1494-1525
1568-1609
1672-1713
1792-1815
1914-18
(III) The Breath-
ing Space
1525-1536
1609-18
1713-33
1815-48
1918-39
(IV) Supplemen-
tary Wars (the
Epilogue)
1536-59
1618-^8
1733-63
1848-71
1939--i5
(V) The General
1559-68
1648-72
1763-92
1871-1914
Peace
If our present fourth cycle were to develop like the earlier cycles, we should be able to look forward to a very long era of general peace, but Toynbee himself was reluctant to make so optimistic a prognosis, for, as he saw it, the Second World War had been far too violent to be regarded as a mere supplement to ^ Arnold J. Toynbee: A Study of History (London-N.Y. -Toronto 1954), Vol. 9, p. 255.
THE WHEEL OF HISTORY 161
the First World War, and its outcome too indecisive for it to be looked upon as an epilogue. Moreover the respective intervals between the individual phases of the fourth cycle are out of phase with the corresponding intervals of the other cycles, even if we agree with Toynbee that the war phases have a tendency to grow shorter and the peace phases to grow longer. When all is said and done, Toynbee's scheme is a worse guide to the future than even the older theory of a fifty-year cycle was.
Perhaps we had best give up any idea of working with long war and peace periods altogether, and try instead to ascertain the length of specific wars and the peaceful intervals between them. If we do so, we shall find that, during the last 250 years, there have been roughly two years of peace for every year of war.
The IS years of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701 to 1714) were followed by 26 years of peace; the 23 years of the Silesian wars ( 1740-1763 ) which were punctuated by fairly long peaceful intervals, were followed by 33 years of peace; the 19 years of the Napoleonic Wars ( 1796-1815) were followed by 38 years of peace which continued until the Crimean War ( 1 853 ) ; the subsequent 1 8-year war period which lasted until the end of the Franco-Prussian War (l87l) was followed by 40 years of relative peace until the war between Italy and Turkey ( 191 1 ). From then on Eastern Europe was in an almost constant state of war right up to 1920, This nine year war period gave way to 18 years of peace. The Second World War lasted for six years, or rather for almost eight years if we include Hitler's annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. If the last war, too, were to be followed by a period of peace twice its own duration, a new war ought to be expected by 1960.
The fact that war and peace are in the approximate ratio of 1 : 2 is no mystical accident, but can be explained in physio- logical and psychological terms. Nations like individuals must recuperate after long periods of great strain, and the human organism needs roughly twice as much time to recover as it takes to lose its strength. This explanation is far more con- vincing than the old contention that one generation will never fight two wars, since many men have been known to volunteer for as many as three wars, provided only that the intervals were long enough for them to regain their strength and equanimity.
162 CHAPTER 4
Large states and small
The rhythmical alternation of war and peace is closely related to another periodic phenomenon. For a number of decades success- ful wars are followed by a drive towards amalgamation with the consequent disappearance or annexation of smaller and weaker countries. The national resentment of these weaker countries then grows stronger and stronger, until finally the large states are forced to decentralise. The phase of decentralisation con- tinues until the nationalism of the young states becomes so aggressive that peace and economic stability are threatened even more than they were by centralised states. Then the pendulum swings back again.
The phases of this development do not necessarily coincide with periods of war and peace, and many countries have gained independence without war or even revolution — ^for instance, Norway when she seceded from Sweden. On the other hand, even wars of conquest have often ended in the dissolution of estab- lished empires and the formation of countless new states. The popular belief that scientific progress leads to greater centralisa- tion is not borne out by past events. What really happened during the last 200 years can be summarised as follows:
American Independence (1783), was followed in 1787 by a marked period of centralisation which continued until the first decade of the Napoleonic wars. Scores of minor states disap- peared, and the few new states created by Napoleon were mere vassals without real independence. In 18 10, the trend began to be reversed, first in South America, where a whole series of new states were set up right up to 1822, and then in Europe (Greece, Belgium 1830). With the German Customs Union (1833) a new centralisation period was begun. This period culminated in the unification both of Italy and of Germany and lasted until 1871. From then on, self-determination, particularly in central and east- em Europe gave rise to the founding of the Balkan states in 1878, Norway's declaration of independence in 1905, Albania's in 1912 and Ireland's in 1921, together with the formation of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the restoration of Poland, the foundation of the Baltic states, of Syria, and of Iraq (1918 to 1920). A new centralistic wave began with Italy's annexation of Abyssinia in 1936, Germany's of Austria and Czechoslovakia
THE WHEEL OF HISTORY 163
( 1938-1939) and Russia's of the Baltic states during the Second World War. Since 1947 (Independence of India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Morocco, Tunisia, the formation of Israel, the division of Indo-China) there has been another great wave of independence.
Thus the last 1 70 years have known three Centralisation and Decentralisation cycles, viz.:
Period
Cbaracteristic
Duration
1787-1809
Centralisation
23 years
1810-1832
Decentralisation
23 „
1833-1877
Centralisation
45 „
1878-1921
Decentralisation
44 „
1922-1946
Centralisation
25 „
1947-
Decentralisation
—
The present period of decentralisation is characterised by anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Foreign ideologies are increasingly being challenged (e.g. in Hungary in 1956), and we may be certain that this period has a very long time to run yet.