part in the American political process, challenging each political

party to search for a sure cure for what ails the economic system at any give time, be it unemployment, inflation, low profits, or high interest rates.
The present Administration's answer to this challenge was to respond with what has been termed "supply-side" economics, the idea being that by stimulating the productive plant or by increasing its efficiency, increased production will be forthcoming. This will reduce unemployment, stimulate investment, increase tax revenues, and reduce inflation. This is all to be accomplished through a pro¬ gram of cutting government spending and reducing government regu¬ lation (the much-heralded "get the government off our back" cry). Coupled with this is to be a substantial tax cut aimed at stimulating investment by selectively giving businesses and high income earners the largest cuts.
53
Critical Issues & Decisions
Will it work? Will "supply-side" economics as a program, if en¬ acted, stimulate investment, increase productivity, and reduce in¬ flation? This is a $64,000 question.
There is little sound economic theory to support the idea that such a program of inconsistent economically related actions will have the desired effect on the economy. However, most items do have wide public support, and their impact may be more psychologi¬ cal than economic.
The three most apparent weaknesses of the proposed "supply- side" economic program are as follows:
1. The program is not based on sound economic principles and is internally inconsistent.
2. The program is only working on the extreme margins of the total economic system. Alleged impacts, if they were to achieve their greatest goals, would affect the economy only minutely.
3. Probably the greatest weakness is that the program deals with the economy as it was conceived during the first half of the twenti¬ eth century, that is, as a nice, neat competitive free market system. Significant structural changes have occurred both domestically and internationally to suggest there no longer exists a free market econo¬ my. There certainly exists sufficient evidence that the major econo¬ mies of the world are so closely linked by large multinational firms and trading organizations that tinkering with marginal elements of the U.S. economic system as the "supply-side'program is suppposed to do, will be, from an operational standpoint, largely ineffective. The markets in international currencies, oil, aircraft, steel, automo¬ biles, grains, tires, farm equipment, computers, and a growing list of other commodities essentially link the U.S. with a worldwide eco¬ nomic environment. The Administration's commitment to "free trade" makes this even more true and makes the proposed program even less likely to succeed, especially when the free trade philosophy is marred by threats of Japanese car import limitations and other non-laissez-faire actions attributable to politics rather than eco¬ nomics.
At best, the proposed "supply-side" economic program can be likened to a blind man's swing at his opponent. Chances are slim it will connect with a telling blow, but given the present state of the economic arts, what alternatives are there?
54
Critical Issues & Decisions
Implications for the Department of Defense
Supply-side economics is defined here as a package of adminis¬ tration proposals intended to facilitate economic recovery. Supply- side economics includes the following dicta:
1. Cut (in constant value dollars) total federal expenditures while permitting some real expansion in defense expenditures.
2. Cut taxes, with the cut directed at reducing the marginal tax rates of the upper middle class and the wealthy, and at increasing corporate depreciation allowances so as to encourage investment in new and more efficient plants.
3. Permit only a modest, steady expansion of the currency, even at the cost of high interest rates.
4. Reduce federal government regulations.
The premise of supply-side economics is that productivity has suf¬ fered because of a lack of opportunity for capital formation and a lack of incentive for investment. Cutting government consumption will provide the incentive. The entrepreneurial spirit will be revived. Removal of counter-productive regulations will both encourage this spirit and raise productivity. Tight money will prevent inflation. When the investment produces a greater supply of goods and services, everyone will be better off.
Dr. Paarlberg implicitly acknowledges the following caveats in the supply-side program:
1. The tax cut has a weak theoretical basis; it stimulates more incremental demand than incremental capacity, at least in the short run.
2. The tax cut may not be perceived as fair to the majority and therefore may not be politically acceptable.
Nevertheless, Dr. Paarlberg recommends that the supply-side eco¬ nomic program be implemented, even though it can't do the whole job. He further refutes pessimism on the limits of growth by observ¬ ing that technological advance has always come through in the past.
The following reservations are my own. Dr. Paarlberg does not necessarily agree with them, but he characterizes them as "hard questions."
1. The cut in federal expenditures will involve throwing out the baby of investment along with the bathwater of consumption.
55
Critical Issues & Decisions
2. The funds released are not targeted for investment; they may leak into speculation or consumption.
3. Supply-side economics neglects other plausible explanations of the productivity decline, including:these:
• Short-sighted, salaried corporate managers who lack the entrepreneurial spirit (or who are not permitted to exercise it by short-sighted stockholders) and who therefore concentrated on short-term results and permitted their plans to become obsolete in the 1950s and 1960s.
• Decline of the work ethic, involving both implicit contracts between labor and management, which protect inefficient labor from market pressure, and abuse of recreational drugs ranging from cannabis to television.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is generally exempt from the expenditure cuts because of the urgency of an improved military posture. Nevertheless, because supply-side economics demands a cut in federal consumption, and because most DOD expenditures are consumption, DOD managers are obliged to attain this improved military posture at minimum expense and with maximum beneficial effects on the economy as a whole. This will involve both the appli¬ cation of supply-side economics to the mainstream of defense acqui¬ sition and managing the side effects of increased DOD expenditures to amplify the good effects of supply-side economics and perhaps even compensate for its deficiences.
Applying Supply-Side Economics to Defense Acquisition
Of the four tenets of supply-side economics, only the last, reduction of federal government regulations, applies to defense acquisition, but it applies well. A weakness of the federal government is that each time a potential abuse is perceived, a rule designed to correct it is applied to the whole enterprise. The combination of all those rules and reporting requirements leads to paralysis. Victims of over - regulation include not only defense contractors but the DOD itself.
For example, under the Carter Administration, the OMB rec¬ ognized that information was a valuable commodity and tried to put limits on the amount of information regulating agencies could
56
Critical issues & Decisions
demand from businesses. But we just as urgently need limits on the information that regulating offices (inside and outside the DOD) can demand from DOD components and from Defense con¬ tractors. Such limits would get the job done at lower cost and still permit worldwide reductions in DOD manpower.
Other techniques may be available to increase DOD efficiency. The Navy's Industrial Funding system, which targets appropriations for agents who can select among in-house performing activities, provides motives for efficiency and could be used elsewhere.
Large defense expenditures will inevitably have side effects. The challenge is to make sure that they are beneficial. We currently use procurement policy to support social goods unrelated to or even opposing efficient acquisition, for example, minority small-business set asides and the Davis-Bacon Act. If we accept the spirit of supply- side economics, we should eliminate those features designed to dis¬ tribute income downward and stimulate consumption, and substitute provisions designed to stimulate investment.
Indeed, if we count on technology to raise the limits of growth and note that many of the revolutionary technologies were born of or fostered by military necessity (transport, computers, integrated circuits), there may be a significant opportunity to institute policies to ensure that DOD will be making long-range investments to ensure the development of new technology, including investments that are too long-term for corporate managers.
The Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) component of a Service budget is generally 10-15 percent of the total, but this percentage is misleading as the bulk of these funds pays for the engineering of specific end items. Investment in the tech¬ nology base (research, exploratory development, and technology demonstration) is usually on the order of 2 percent of the total. Significant increases in the latter component should be made and would hardly be noticed in the total.
Another form of investment is Independent Research and Development (IR&D), in which defense contractors are permitted to include in their overhead a modest percentage to create a fund for the development of new products and technology. In contrast to direct technology base investment, IR&D investment decisions are made by the contractor and counterbalance errors in the Ser-
57
Critical Issues & Decisions
vice's investment strategy. Increased defense product engineering will automatically increase IR&D. Some meddling to ensure that some of the increase goes to long-term investment is probably warranted.
Another long-term investment is the education industry, which expanded, perhaps excessively, in response to Sputnik Fever but is now stagnant. Federal budget cuts directed at the industry are viewed by some as self-serving and unresponsive. Yet education is one of the most valuable and productive long-term national invest¬ ments.
A possible resolution would be to permit defense contractors to charge for the advanced education of their staff. Thus, DOD would be making a long-term investment in human capital, but the institutions would be chosen not by an educational bureaucracy but by hard-nosed defense contractors.
The past decade has seen a failure of economists to deliver on their promise that they could "fine tune" the economy. Although their models are not in good order, there seems general agreement that policies are needed to encourage investment and that counterpro¬ ductive government regulations should be reduced.
The DOD is largely exempt from federal expenditure cuts required to release funds for investment. Nevertheless, the DOD should recognize its responsibility to accomplish its mission at minimum cost and to encourage investment that will eventually raise produc¬ tivity. It can help accomplish the first goal by reducing regulations and the second by reducing its policies supporting social goals and, instead, encouraging (and funding) additional investment in the national technology base.
NASA's Future Under "Supply-Side Economics
Before discussing NASA's prospects in the 1980s under President Reagan's economic policies, we must assess the possible impact of the Administration's supply-side economic formula for recovery. The formula consists of four components:
1. A reduction in federal spending
2. A reduction in income tax
3. A compatible (tight) monetary policy
4. A reduction in federal regulations.
58
Critical Issues & Decisions
The second and third components will have little or no effect on NASA's future. Consequently, this discussion will concentrate on the first and fourth components.
President Reagan outlined his program in a Presidential message to Congress on February 18, 1981. In that message, "A Program for Economic Recovery," President Reagan indicated that in times of economic stress such as that facing the nation, the federal budget could still continue to carry many programs of national interest, but these programs would not necessarily be accorded the same urgency as before.
Fie further stated that, overall, NASA's programs would be slightly reduced by trimming back, eliminating, or delaying lower-priority programs, while the essential R&D and Space Shuttle programs would be continued at essentially the previously budgeted levels.
That statement translated into a budget reduction of $604 million, resulting in a revised FY82 budget of $6,122 billion. The budget reduction was accompanied by a mandate to reduce the civilian workforce by 804 (approximately 4 percent), from 22,613 to 21,809.
Generally speaking, the revised budget does the following:
1. preserves the Space Shuttle research, development, and flight test schdule;
2. continues production of a four orbiter fleet on the same schedule as before;
3. maintains an option for a fifth Shuttle orbiter;
4. supports continued development of the Space Telescope;
5. schedules the Galileo mission to Jupiter for a 1985 Shuttle launch using a modified Centaur upper stage;
6. continues support for flight missions such as Voyager that have been launched and are returning valuable scientific data;
7. provides for continued development of Landsat D for launch in 1982;
8. supports preparation for the early years of Shuttle operations at a reduced rate of buildup;
9. eliminates or defers all FY 1981 and 1982 new program initia¬ tives in Space Science, Aeronautics and Aplications;
10. deletes the U.S. Solar Polar spacecraft but supports NASA's commitment to the European Space Agency by providing for a
59
Critical Issues & Decisions
1986 launch opportunity for a cooperative mission using the ESA spacecraft;
1 1 . makes significant across-the-board cuts in aeronautical and space technology development but retains an effective aerospace research base;
12. deletes planned Construction of Facilities projects including the Transonic Dynamics Tunnel, the Small Engine Component Test Facility, the Mach 19 Nitrogen Tunnel, and a project to reduce energy consumption.
Is this budget a crippling blow to NASA's vitality and future?
I think not. NASA has been faced with difficult tasks before and has always found ways to overcome seemingly unsolvable obstacles. To accomplish successfully the remaining programs within the present funding and manpower constraints, NASA must develop new and im¬ proved management techniques that will increase productivity. In supply-side economics, the proposed tax reductions are intended to motivate industry to modernize their plants, thereby increasing their productivity. Since NASA is not subject to a tax incentive and since NASA's R&D missions do not, as a rule, require quantity production, contractors are not motivated to modernize their plants for NASA as they would for DOD business.
NASA's opportunity for increased productivity lies mainly in developing new management systems. This concept applies equally to NASA's contractors, who customarily provide only limited numbers (1-5) of specified items under their contracts as opposed to quantity production under DOD contracts. Since NASA and DOD both use to a great extent the same segment of industry to produce their technology, NASA will experience a natural "fall-out" from industry's modernization for DOD's long-production run require¬ ment, thus allowing NASA to reap some of the benefits from the tax relief component of supply-side economics.
Since NASA is not a regulatory agency, the fourth component of the supply-side economics (i.e., reduction of federal regulations) will result in minimal impact on NASA and its contractors.
In summary, while some new and worthwhile programs are being delayed, deleted, or reduced in priority, NASA's important ongoing programs will continue to receive budget and management support. Thus, even though it is not quite what NASA would have opted for, Mr. Reagan's budget will not have a fatal impact on NASA's future.
60
Critical Issues & Decisions
Agricultural Issues for the 80's in the Economic Picture
Agriculture must be a significant part of any plan to improve the U.S. economy. There are 23 million people employed in agriculture- related jobs (one- fifth of the national labor force). Agriculture accounts for 20 percent of the nation's Gross National Product.
Three areas offer promising opportunities for action that should help stem inflation: (1) commodity payments to producers, (2) productivity, and (3) agricultural exports.
The U.S. has a long history of price supports for many agricultural commodities. Price supports have been defended as necessary to ensure stable production levels and farm income. However, govern¬ ment programs can insulate producers from market forces. This can lead to a slowness in adjusting production levels, less incentive to become more efficient, and prices that are not competitive on the world market. The dairy support program provides a recent example of a support program that is stimulating too much production and becoming too expensive. Support programs should be continued but with frequent adjustments that keep prices more in line with market conditions.
The record of productivity in the agricultural sector has been good. However, more recently there appears to be a leveling off with little or no increase in agricultural productivity. Yield-per- acre appears to have leveled off for some crops and output-per- worker may not be increasing. Mechanization has played an im¬ portant role in productivity gains for agriculture, but the impact of a strong program of research and development across all phases of agricultural production and marketing has been a strong underly¬ ing factor. An increase in prices and in intensity of agricultural re¬ search related to productivity is seen as one input for increased productivity for the future.
Agriculture will net a trade surplus of about $30 billion this year, a hugh contribution to the national balance of payments. Continued success in exports is linked to our action in the commodity payments and productivity. How competitive the U.S. becomes in the world marketplace and our capacity to produce adequate supplies for the export market will determine how large our share of this market will
61
Critical Issues & Decisions
be. The attention the U.S. gives to ensuring adequate supplies at competitive world market prices and negotiations for trade agree¬ ment will be critical to the success of the U.S. in taking advantage of agricultural exports to strengthen the U.S. economy.
62
Critical Issues & Decisions
ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR.
Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and President, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. Dr. Pfaltzgraff has taught foreign policy and political science here and abroad and was President, United States Strategic Institute.
From left to right: Mildred Thymian, Administrator, USDA/AMS; Chester R. Benjamin, Associate coordinator for International Organization Affairs, USDA/ OICD; Ronald Levin, Director, International Agreements and Monitoring Divi¬ sion, U.S. Department of Commerce; Robert Copeland, Director, Office of Health and Disability, U.S. Department of Labor; and Dr. Alan Berman, Direc¬ tor of Research, Naval Research Lab.
Critical Issues & Decisions
IF NOT DETENTE, THEN WHAT?
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
In the United States in recent years there has been a dramatic transformation in outlook toward the Soviet Union. This is based upon several factors which will affect profoundly the American conception of the Soviet Union in the years ahead and the policy options available to the United States in coping with what has been aptly described as "the present danger" posed for the United States by the Soviet Union. To understand the evolution of this changed outlook toward the Soviet Union, it is essential to assess, first and foremost, the apparent differences that emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union in their conceptions of detente in the early to mid-1970s. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine the prin¬ cipal features of Soviet foreign policy during the last decade. Last but not least, crucial to an understanding of the foreign policy prob¬ lems confronting the United States in its relationship with the Soviet Union in the years just ahead is an assessment of the change in the strategic military balance between the superpowers in the last decade.
The apparent differences in the ways the United States and the Soviet Union have reviewed detente result from the idea that, in retrospect, detente was oversold to the American public and was based upon illusion, even within much of our official policy com¬ munity in the early to mid-1970s. As we look back upon the last decade, it is evident that the failure of detente, as defined by Ameri¬ can policymakers, can be dated from the October War of 1973, which also, incidentally, cast into doubt one of the other central premises upon which American foreign policy in those years had been built, namely, the ability of allies and friends to become surro¬ gates for American power in one or more regions of the world in which the United States was forced by circumstances to reduce its commitments.
President , Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.; Associate Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
65
Critical Issues & Decisions
The failure of detente diplomacy is deeply rooted in the American outlook toward the Soviet Union. Three successive Administrations have tried variants of detente diplomacy with the Soviet Union— Nixon's, Ford's, and Carter's— although their conceptions of Soviet- American relations differed substantially from each other. The re¬ sults of each have been at least less than satisfactory and at most potentially disastrous to the security interests of the United States. The Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach sought a conception of linkage between Soviet behavior in one category of foreign policy and in another. An attempt was made in the principles of coexistence to which each side agreed in May 1972 to establish a code of conduct for superpowers based on the exercise of unilateral restraint and the avoidance of efforts by either side to gain advantage in regional issues at the expense of the other. The Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach sought an East-West balance with the Soviet Union by the SALT accords, which codified parity, by normalizing American relations with China and at the same time encouraging the growth of U.S. surrogate powers in various regions of the world. Moreover, Soviet behavior in one category, especially trade, would be linked to Soviet behavior in other categories. The Soviet Union would come, it was hoped, to have a vested interest in detente because of its potential and existing benefits.
The Carter Administration's approach to U.S. -Soviet relations was fraught with paradox, reflecting the apparent split within his own Administration on U.S. -Soviet relations. Carter came to office as a critic of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approaches to relations with Moscow. He sought to subordinate U.S. -Soviet relations to other, allegedly more important global issues— those of the Third World. He attempted to align American policy, in the United Nations for example, with Third World aspirations. This idea reached its zenith in President Carter's 1977 Notre Dame Speech: "Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of com¬ munism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear. I am glad that's being changed." At the same time, Mr. Carter sought to make human rights a central element in U.S.- Soviet relations, together with the achievement of arms limitation agreements— the SALT. He held to a belief that unilateral restraint on the part of the United States would produce reciprocal action
66
Critical Issues & Decisions
on the part of the Soviet Union. Perhaps even more than the Nixon- Ford-Kissinger policy, Carter's efforts were failures and were per¬ ceived as failures by a growing number of his countrymen and eventually by most of those who voted in the election of 1980. Toward the end of his Administration, and particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, there were im¬ portant manifestations of a changing outlook on his part— in particu¬ lar, the withdrawal of the SALT 1 1 T reaty from Senate consideration —although Carter had promised in the Presidential campaign to re¬ submit the T reaty to the Senate if he was reelected. Here it is doubt¬ ful that the SALT II Treaty would have achieved Senate ratification even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It probably would have been ratified only if it were linked with vast increases in Ameri¬ can defense capabilities to cope with the growing challenge posed by the Soviet Union as a result of its military buildup in the 1970s.
These successive failures in American efforts to bring about an improved relationship with the Soviet Union set the stage for the debate that erupted in the United States in the late 1970s, both about the nature of the American role in the context of U.S. nation¬ al interests and the implications of the growth of Soviet strategic military power for the security of the United States and its allies. Of major importance in this debate was the repeated evidence of a fundamental difference between the American and Soviet approach¬ es to regional stability or instability. It may be argued that Kissinger had understood the nature of the Soviet Union as what he termed an imperial power, a state in the imperial phase of its history and be¬ having much as such states could be expected to behave in their international relationships. Although, or because, the American willingness to devote adequate resources to national security and to foreign policy had apparently declined in the post-Vietnam period, it was essential for the United States to call upon whatever restraints existed to contain Soviet power. This was the context in which the United States made repeated efforts to call into being, as if it were possible to do so, a global system of several power centers. The United States was engaged in a holding action until a new con¬ sensus could emerge in support of a more activist, internationalist and effective foreign policy.
67
Critical Issues & Decisions
If this was the case, the effect of U.S. policies of the early 1970s was to produce unwarranted expectations of immediate success— a generation of peace or a new structure for global peace, as the terms were widely used— although by the end of the 1970s the United States had begun to enter yet a new phase in its foreign policy. It was the widening gap between American expectations and Soviet policy— in Angola, Yemen, Somolia, Ethiopia, Southeast Asia, and finally Afghanistan— that produced the coup de grace for the Soviet - American relationship in the 1970s and the assumptions on which it was based. The evidence mounted that Moscow held to a conception of detente, acknowledged by the Soviet leadership itself, in which periodic improvements in relations with the United States in no way diminished the need for a continued struggle against Western imperi¬ alism. Whereas we had perceived detente often as an end in itself, a condition of peace and global stability, the realization grew in the United States that for the Soviet Union detente was a process, or means, toward an end— that struggle, not stability, was inherent in international political relationships.
By the end of the 1970s we had come full circle, from a concep¬ tion of containment in a generation after World World II that rested on a broadly based bipartisan consensus until the Vietnam War, but which was shattered until the mid to late 1970s, and which has begun to be restored as a new nationalism (some would say neo¬ conservatism) massively demonstrated in the election of 1980.
Of perhaps equal importance to the changed U.S. -Soviet relations was the dawning realization in the strategic military affairs com¬ munity of the United States that fundamental differences existed between the superpowers in their conceptions of strategic stability and of military doctrine. Translations of Soviet literature and the study of Soviet military concepts yielded abundant evidence that the Soviet Union placed emphasis on concepts of surprise and pre¬ emption, as well as the integration into a doctrinal framework of strategic offense and strategic defense. Deterrence in a strategic- military sense had different force level requirements in the Soviet Union than in the United States. If nuclear was unthinkable in the United States, the Soviet Union was working on means to survive it. The recognition of such asymmetries in Soviet and American doctrine led to a belief that American conceptions of strategic
68
Critical Issues & Decisions
doctrine, grounded in mutual destruction, were inadequate in a strategic relationship in which one's adversary held to a funda¬ mentally different conception of deterrence and of the potential role accorded to strategic military power in support of political objectives.
With a growing appreciation of difference between the doctrines espoused by the Soviet leaders and those of the United States, it was only logical to relate such statements to strategic nuclear force levels and to the trends manifest in the Soviet strategic force pro¬ gram. If Soviet doctrine stressed preemption and surprise, together with the survivability of the Soviet Union in the event of nuclear war— emminently sound military concepts and objectives— there was mounting evidence of Soviet strategic programs in keeping with such concepts. The Soviet air defense and civil defense programs, about which there was controversy in the United States related more to their extent and effectiveness than to their existence, were cited in support of Soviet doctrine. In contrast, the United States, per¬ haps in keeping with the concept of mutual assured destruction, had in effect abandoned air defense after about 1970. Similarly, Mos¬ cow's deployment of several fourth-generation ICBM launchers, the hardening of launch sites and facilities for elites, the deployment of ICBMs with throw-weight and accuracy potentially capable of destroying all or a major portion of the U.S. Minuteman force, gave evidence of a relationship between Soviet strategic doctrine and the force levels that were being developed and deployed in its support.
Such was the context within which the SALT II Treaty debate took place in the United States. The American approach to SALT had been premised upon the mutual assured destruction doctrine (MAD) of the United States. Those who rejected MAD usually had serious reservations about a SALT II Treaty, which appeared only to codify a strategic military balance that was tilting ominously away from the United States. The split in the American strategic military affairs community between proponents of MAD and those who emphasized a much stronger defense posture based on counter¬ force was in part a division between proponents and opponents of the SALT II Treaty. A third approach may be noted— it was argued that the Treaty did not reduce substantially the strategic forces of either side and therefore could not be said to constitute genuine
69
Critical issues & Decisions
arms control. It was such dissension that ultimately helped defeat the SALT II Treaty. But the debate on the SALT II Treaty was really a debate about U.S. -Soviet relations, past, present and prospec¬ tive. Critics of the Treaty argued that in the decade of SALT the Soviet Union had achieved, with the United States, not only parity but an increasing measure of superiority in most categories of strate¬ gic forces. In the decade of SALT, the Minuteman vulnerability problem had grown. The Interim Agreement on Offensive Systems signed in 1972 had conceded the Soviet Union a quantitative edge in ICBM launchers, while the SALT process since 1972 had done little, if anything, to restrain a qualitative Soviet improvement. In short, SALT had been perceived increasingly to be a kind of strategic cul-de-sac for the United States. Clearly, with or without SALT, we would face the need for major new strategic programs in the 1980s if we were to counter the Soviet buildup. Opponents rested their case on the fact that the Treaty codified a superpower strategic military relationship grossly disadvantageous to the United States. Proponents were often able only to argue that, without the Treaty, the United States would be even worse off because the balance would tilt even further away from the United States. The recourse, both came to agree in principle, lay in American modernization programs designed to rectify perceived deficiencies in the U.S. mili¬ tary force posture.
In retrospect, it may be argued that just as the United States expected too much from a detente relationship with the Soviet Union, it placed excessive hopes in SALT and in arms control gen¬ erally. By the early 1980s, the dominant view had come to be that arms control policy would be no substitute for an adequate strategic doctrine or for effective defense modernization programs in the United States. Thus the election of 1980 symbolized, in foreign policy, the rejection of a large number of assumptions of the 1970s about U.S. -Soviet relations, including the previously fashionable view that military power, relative to other instruments of state¬ craft in foreign policy, was of little importance to the United States.
What then are the prospects for U.S. -Soviet relations in the 1980s? Much American analysis in recent years has focused on the phenom¬ enon of "window of vulnerability" for the United States, which translates into a "window of opportunity" for the Soviet Union.
70
Critical Issues & Decisions
The extent to which the Soviet Union presses whatever advantages may be said to accrue to it in the years just ahead will determine the nature and extent of stability or instability in the Soviet-Ameri- can relationship. Will the Soviet Union seek to exploit U.S. vulner¬ abilities during a period in which the United States is rebuilding its military capabilities? Will the Soviet Union engage the United States in crisis diplomacy in which Moscow's advantages will be substantial at progressively higher rungs in a hypothesized escalatory ladder- in a Cuban-missile-crisis-in-reverse scenario. In that crisis the United States held both local and regional conventional superiority and strategic-nuclear superiority. While the Soviet Union enjoyed mili¬ tary advantages in certain other crises, as in the successive tests of Western will in Berlin, the United States was superior at the strate¬ gic-nuclear level. As a result of trends in the last decade, we face the prospect of inferiority at both levels until and unless basic changes are made in our overall defense posture.
Although many in the United States initially viewed without alarm the growth of Soviet military capabilities, even seeing them as contributing to stability, since Moscow presumably would be more inclined to negotiate arms ceilings once it had attained parity with the United States, the question now arises whether the Soviet Union can be expected to acquiesce in American efforts to narrow or eliminate a military gap favoring the Soviet Union. The ability to answer that question would enhance our understanding of the prospects for the U.S. -Soviet relationship in the years just ahead. Unless the Soviet Union had come to embrace American concep¬ tions of deterrence, strategic stability, arms control, and the pre¬ sumed disutility of military power in the late twentieth century, there would be little reason to expect Moscow to behave toward the United States as the United States did toward the Soviet Union while Moscow was narrowing the gap.
Perhaps evidence of resolve and of strengthened national will on the part of the United States, seen in sharp contrast to the vacilla¬ tion in American policy of recent years, will provide the deus ex machine sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from exploiting what¬ ever advantage may be perceived to accrue from the vast capabilities accumulated during the last decade. It is conceivable that the United States will thus transform weakness into strength even in the absence
71
Critical Issues & Decisions
of sufficient military capabilities. But it is equally plausible that the Soviet Union will assess the correlation of forces as being maximally to its favor just before or precisely at the time that the United States begins to narrow the gap in military capabilities. In this event, the point of maximum danger in international crisis to the United States would seem to lie in the years just ahead. The approximate time of such a period of maximum danger depends upon whether the military advantage favoring the Soviet Union widens before it narrows, and when or whether it is transformed from the edge enjoyed by the Soviet Union to a "margin of safety" for the United States.
To be sure, the Soviet Union faces numerous vulnerabilities both during and after its period of maximum opportunity. It is conceiva¬ ble that its formidable problems in Poland will deepen and spread and that repression by Moscow will meet with resistence. The pros¬ pect exists that the vulnerabilities of today will be magnified for the Soviet Union in the next decade or generation. These include declining productivity and an aging population as a result of demo¬ graphic trends, nationalities problems, repeated failures in agriculture and in the nonmilitary-industrial sector, and problems of reliability often noted in the forces of the Warsaw Pact and underscored by events in Poland. If such problems can be expected to create growing vulnerabilities for the Soviet Union in the next decade, does this not reinforce the notion that the maximum opportunities available to Moscow will fall within the next several years?
What then are the policy options available to the United States in fashioning a global strategy in the years ahead? It is possible that the communication of national resolve by the United States to its principal adversary will elicit deference even in the absence of requisite strength, and that such signals will deter the Soviet Union from miscalculation in its relationship with the United States. But it can be argued that without the substance of power the United States risks a humiliating situation in which Moscow calls its bluff. Would it not be preferable for the United States to acquiesce in Soviet probes until American power is reconstituted? If the United States faces the specter of a Cuban-missile-crisis-in-reverse, would it not be less damaging to American interests and prestige to avoid by whatever means possible a confrontation with the Soviet Union in
72
Critical Issues & Decisions
the next several years? To answer such questions in the affirmative is to embrace a policy of appeasement based on weakness and to acknowledge the implications of the failure of American detente policy toward the Soviet Union for at least the past decade.
To adopt such an approach is to assume, furthermore, that the United States necessarily has the luxury of choosing between de¬ fending its interests with whatever means may be available or accom¬ modating, if only temporarily and tactically, the superior power and designs of the Soviet Union. Although such choices are theoretically available, they confront in the real world vital interests for which such compromise based upon expediency may be impossible be¬ cause of the vital interests at stake. The most obvious example can be found in a hypothetically destabilized Saudi Arabia in which the Soviet Union becomes, or threatens to become, the dominant influence, with attendant consequences for Western Europe, Japan and the United States.
In keeping with the notion of a world of diffused economic power, the United States can try to achieve a more equitable sharing of the burdens of international security with its allies, notably with Western Europe and Japan. Although there remain substantial dif¬ ferences between the United States and its allies stemming from their interests and relations with the Soviet Union (e.g., West German trade with the Soviet Union and the tangible benefits flowing from intra-German normalization), the United States will seek from its allies a fair share of defense both within their immediate regions and perhaps, although to a lesser extent, outside. Central to its strategy in the late twentieth century is the preservation of alliances. Although the power and the threat of the Soviet Union have grown, the United States faces, especially in Western Europe, allies whose policies are conditioned by domestic constituencies and constraints. These constraints lead governments to policies different from what the United States, in this new phase of American policy, is likely to consider adequate. In the years ahead, moreover, the Soviet Union can be expected to maintain its efforts to reinforce such tendencies as a means of encouraging what has been termed the Finlandization, or perhaps the Hollandization, of Western Europe. Soviet policy will be designed to strengthen those forces opposed to needed NATO modernization, including the deployment of long-range theater nuclear systems.
73
Critical Issues & Decisions
Such forces have achieved momentum in important constituencies in Western Europe. In some respects, however, their perspectives have not been at odds with the policy of the United States until recently. For more than a decade, successive American administra¬ tions urged upon our allies policies of detente and support for strate¬ gic arms control. SALT was initially an American, not a European, idea, although its most fervent supporters in the official policy community are now to be found not in the United States but in Western Europe. Just as present European perspectives are the products of forces shaped over at least a several-year period, policies of consistency and strength manifested by the United States will help to strengthen those among our allies who hold a common appre¬ ciation of the dangers confronting us. Such a change, however, will not come overnight. Thus if there is a lack of policy synchroniza¬ tion between the United States and its allies, its causes lie not only in our allies' quest for greater independence, but also in American policies of the past decade now discarded in the official American policy community but still deeply rooted in the prevailing orthodoxy of certain elites abroad.
Of equal importance to the United States is the preservation, and to the extent necessary, the strengthening of relations with allies and friendly states in East Asia. In that region we have seen the evolution of a security framework over the last decade which con¬ tains as principal actors the Soviet Union, Japan, and China, in addition to the United States. This security system has been de¬ scribed as quadrilateral in its key actor membership, although it af¬ fects, and is affected by, relationships among lesser states, notably the two Koreas. It is asymmetrical as a result of the vast differences among its members in the major categories of military and economic strength. Only the United States possesses relatively balanced capa¬ bilities encompassing both the military and economic sinews of power. Over the last decade, whatever interests existed among at least some of the major actors to follow a policy of equalibrium with respect to the other members of the system— notably with China and the Soviet Union— have been replaced by a policy, es¬ pecially in the case of the United States, of de facto alignment with China against the Soviet Union, and in the case of Japan a quest for rapidly expanding trade with China. (Of course, the future of
74
Critical Issues & Decisions
Japan's economic relationships with China now seems less certain because of the apparent setbacks in the four modernizations in China and the apparent continuation of a power struggle within the PRC.)
The security framework that has evolved in East Asia over the last decade has been set, of course, within the broader global strategic framework outlined earlier. That is to say, the manifest growth of Soviet military power, the outward thrust of Soviet policy into the littorals of the Indian Ocean, and the marked deterioration in relations between Moscow and Washington have deeply influenced alignment patterns in East Asia and can be expected to continue to do so in the years just ahead. Hence, elements of a classical balance of power model serve as useful reference points for analyzing region¬ al security at a macrocosmic level.
In this respect the United States and China have evolved a series of parallel interests, together with a common appreciation of the threats posed by the Soviet Union. As the momentum of Soviet efforts in military modernization and its willingness to make direct or indirect use of such power politically, the American relationship with China changed from a framework based on equilibrium, or equidistance, to one providing for alignment, but not formal alliance, with China against the Soviet Union. By 1981 the ultimate extent of an American alignment with the PRC against the Soviet Union remained undecided; however, the scope of that relationship will be determined in the future, as historically it has been for other nations, by perceived dangers emanating from the Soviet Union. In the United States the assertion of a new nationalism, or a neo¬ conservatism, in foreign policy based on the recognition that the principal threat stems from the Soviet Union coincided with the same strategic assessment in Beijing. This PRC assessment included China's assertion that the Soviet Union was, and is, pursuing a two¬ pronged strategy in which pressure is applied to the West against NATO and to the East against China and Japan. China contributes to the contemporary regional and global security system by holding on her western frontier approximately one-quarter of Soviet military strength. To the East and to the West, the Soviet Union has been effectively contained by China and by NATO. Therefore, the Soviet Union has pushed southward into regions adjacent to the strategical-
75
Critical issues & Decisions
ly vital Persian Gulf and into the oceans, in an effort to outflank Western Europe and to encircle China. This so-called two-pronged Soviet strategy, to which Chinese spokesmen have frequently re¬ ferred in recent years, is worth outlining here because it represents in a growing consensus among American analysts an accurate assess¬ ment of Soviet strategy. Thus we may speak of parallel Sino-Ameri- can interests in Soviet containment based on a common strategic appreciation which, nevertheless, does not necessarily translate into identical policies.
Although China's and Japan's security perspectives in and beyond East Asia differ substantially, there has been a considerable change in the Japanese outlook on regional and international security issues in recent years. This results from four principal factors: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the strengthening by the Soviet Union of its military forces in the northern territories seized from Japan at the end of the Second World War, the sustained maritime buildup by the Soviet Union in the seas adjacent to Japan at a time when the United States had drawn down its forces because of security interests in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf, and the threats posed to energy in the Persian Gulf region upon which Japan is so vitally dependent. As a result, Japan and the United States seem to be reaching a con¬ sensus on international security to an extent hardly imaginable even a few years ago. Japan's cosmetic consensus, however, is not yet sufficiently strong to support what the United States, and even some in Japan, would like to see Japan bear as a fair share of the security burden in the Western Pacific. Once again, as in the case of the European-American relationship, there is a lack of synchronization between Japanese and American policies, reflecting the interests of different constituencies.
What will be needed in the Japanese-American relationship in the years ahead will be a conception of comprehensive security in which Japan can play a somewhat greater maritime defense role in the Western Pacific and a larger economic role outside the region. As with alliance relations elsewhere, U.S. cooperation with Japan will call for a sophisticated combination of American leadership and consultation, together with a continuing American-Japanese assessment of the global and regional security environment, leading to an appropriate division of labor based upon more adequate force levels from both Japan and the United States.
76
Critical Issues & Decisions
But the principal conflict arena, it is widely assumed, lies not in Western Europe or in East Asia, but in the Southern Hemisphere, in politically unstable Third World countries, some of which are im¬ portant producers of minerals upon which the United States and its allies depend. Although much attention has been focused on the Persian Gulf, the potential for instability and for conflict elsewhere is abundant. The causes of such conflict can be found in local social, economic, and political circumstances, in the upheavals that have followed the end of Western empires in such regions, and in the arm¬ ing of revolutionary groups by outside powers, especially the Soviet Union and Moscow's use of surrogate forces from Cuba. A decade ago the United States sought unsuccessfully to reach agreement with the Soviet Union that neither superpower would exploit such in¬ stability for unilateral advantage. In the 1980s the United States faces the immediate need to halt Soviet-Cuban arms transfers to such groups and to take other steps designed to prevent forces com¬ patible with American interests from being overwhelmed by Soviet- Cuban supported groups. In large part, this is the meaning of Amer¬ ican policy in El Salvador set in a broader strategic context.
Thus the alternative to a discredited conception of detente is the pursuit by the United States of policies designed, first and foremost, to maintain and build coalitions of strength in support of vital in¬ terests while undertaking necessary defense modernization programs. This means, for the United States, steps to strengthen each of the legs of the triad of strategic forces and to increase their survivability in light of present or emerging asymmetries favoring the Soviet Union. Defense modernization necessarily encompasses general pur¬ pose forces as well as strategic nuclear capabilities. It includes the modernization of maritime forces as well as the development of a rapid deployment capability and the refurbishing of reserve forces. It means consideration both of the nature of future conflict and the creation of adequate doctrines and strategies, together with cor¬ rection of deficiencies in the American defense mobilization base both in its industrial infrastructure and in manpower-personnel di¬ mensions.
Last but not least, the policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union must be set within a framework which has military as well as political-economic dimensions. Burden-sharing with allies
77
Critical Issues & Decisions
should encompass the concept of a fair share for each ally in de¬ fense, but it should also contain the notion that alliance partners contribute to the sharing of nonmilitary burdens as well— what in Japan has been termed comprehensive security. The alternative to detente, moreover, must seek to exploit existing and emerging Soviet vulnerabilities— to turn the Soviet Union inward to cope with its own formidable problems and thus to relieve outward pressures by Moscow upon the United States and its allies. To set forth such basic guidelines for American policy toward the Soviet Union is to acknowledge the existence of risks, especially in a period of maximum Soviet military power. However, to fail to take such steps would pose even greater risks for the United States and other peoples whose security will depend ultimately upon the strength and clarity of purpose of the United States in the years ahead.
78
Critical Issues & Decisions
Commentary on Foreign Policy
After World War II, the U.S. adopted a policy of containment of Soviet expansion, a policy that in time had both successes and failures. But the war in Vietnam weakened domestic resolve for military opposition to communist aggression. This change of heart led to a policy of detente, which most Americans considered a way of reaching an accommodation with the Soviets. It was clearly based on the assumption that the Soviets would halt their expansion¬ ism if we enlarged our trade with them, limited our arms develop¬ ment and procurement, accepted Soviet hegemony where it existed, and otherwise backed away from confronting the USSR. It now seems clear that the Soviets never had the same perception of detente that we had; they have not acted as though detente posed any barrier to their expansionism or arms build-up.
If one believes, as we do, that the Soviets remain committed to global domination, then one must assess the threat the Soviets pose to the U.S. and the rest of the world. This threat is composed of three major elements.
First of all, the Soviets have a clear superiority over the U.S. in both strategic and conventional military capability. This superiority not only exists quantitatively, but may also exist qualitatively, particularly in some weapons categories. Their strategic threat is intensified by policies that assume that the Soviet Union would make the first strike, enjoy a grossly superior edge after it, and have more weapons left even if we had the will to retaliate with what is left us after the first strike. The Soviets obviously have much greater conventional forces and can now project them virtually any¬ where they want. Their projection capability exceeds our own, at least in such vitally important areas as the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. And it will take many years for the U.S. (or any other nation) to develop and deploy new weapons in sufficient numbers to close the gap.
79
Critical Issues & Decisions
Second, our allies in Western Europe are moving towards their own accommodation with the Soviets. In part this stems from a growing dependence on East-West trade (the West seems to be more dependent than the East, at least politically), a mistrust of the U.S.'s capability and willingness to help Europe, the fear that Europe would suffer as much as or more than anyone else in a nuclear war, their vulnerability in resources such as energy, and their feeling that perhaps Finlandization is not so bad. In short, our allies, with their own economic and social problems, are becoming less and less will¬ ing to spend more on arms or to curtail East-West trade in a way that would put pressure on the Comecon nations. Japan is in much the same position, though Soviet occupation of former Japanese islands (e.g., North Sakhalin) reduces the likelihood of a Russo-Japanese accommodation.
Finally, the Third World is the area easiest for the Soviets to pene¬ trate. While there are exceptions, the standard of living in most of these countries is extremely low and is getting even worse in relation to that of most Northern nations. Some form of socialistic economy appears to be more attractive to them than capitalism, an attraction that results in a conceptual friendliness with Moscow. In many cases, our allies do not seem to feel that there is any real threat from the Soviets. Moreover, with Soviet successes in every part of the globe, indigenous communist movements can and do receive direct aid from their neighbors in states such as Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Cuba.
The result of this threat is that the Soviets now have what has been termed a "window of opportunity" to expand their influence. Conversely, the U.S. is said to have a "window of vulnerability" that grows wider as Soviet military superiority increases. Moreover, trying to defend the status quo everywhere, which obviously can be very unpopular in some countries, is inherently much more diffi¬ cult than the Soviet foreign policy of destabilizing any situation out¬ side of its world that it can. The Soviet window of opportunity will be at its widest just at the moment when the U.S. decides to re-arm but has not yet been able to increase significantly its deployed forces.
Given the nature of the threat, the question becomes, What can and should the U.S. try to do about it? The objective is clearly to reach some form of accommodation with the Soviets. Should this accommodation be achieved through some form of (self-) Finlandiza-
80
Critical Issues & Decisions
tion, through some form of detente, or through a rebuilding of U.S. strength that would allow greater leverage in any negotiations or con¬ frontations with the Soviets? If the latter route is taken, there re¬ mains the question, What should the U.S. do while its window of vulnerability is most widely open? For example, what should the U.S. do in the event of a Soviet-sponsored Baluchi war of inde¬ pendence which threatens the Straits of Hormuz?
The U.S. appears to have only two real choices: It can accede (at different paces) to further extensions of Soviet power and the resulting reductions in the independence of the U.S. and other states, or it can attempt to regain sufficient military power to con¬ front the Soviets in those areas most sensitive to our national interest (which could be any area not currently in the hands of the Soviets or their proxies). While conceding that the Finlandization of the U.S. might not be that bad— even that it may be inevitable— we strongly recommend that the President take the other course and adopt a policy of confronting the Soviets' expansionist moves with sufficient power, including military power, to deter them. Specific actions that we feel should be pursued include the fol¬ lowing:
1. Since the only area in which the Soviets have real superiority over the U.S. is military, the starting place for relieving the pressure is to build up the West's strategic and conventional weapons. But how, given the current Soviet superiority, should this build-up take place?
2. While the allies, particularly Japan, may be willing to devote more to their military forces (and this should be encouraged), the U.S. should not count on assistance in any ally's confrontation in which its homeland is not directly threatened.
3. A greater conventional military force would ensure the quick deployment of large numbers of trained forces, including logistical support and tactical air power. At some point, the U.S. needs to admit that the all-volunteer army is a failure in providing the number and quality of its personnel. In short, the resumption of the draft and the maintenance of reserves at a higher level of capability are needed. Other needed steps include the strengthening of air and naval support units and the ability to protect them, the develop¬ ment of a new generation of hand-held missile-type weapons that
81
Critical Issues & Decisions
do not expose the users to great danger, and the development of extremely simple weapon systems that can be used quickly and effectively by unsophisticated forces such as local guerrilla groups in Afghanistan.
How should we reduce the time it takes to develop a new weapon system? Of particular interest is the development of a sufficient, in¬ being industrial capacity to produce the most important weapon systems and the strategic resource reserves from which to make the weapons.
How do we get out of the post-war military thinking that stifles the procurement of weapon systems? Evidence suggests that the two things that have scared the Soviets the most in recent years are the cruise missile and the ability of the U.S. to go into space and recover whatever it wants. There are undoubtedly analogous weapons sys¬ tems for conventional warfare that could be developed to overcome the numerical superiority of the Soviets in such areas as tanks and and tanks may look good by the standards of past wars but may be inefficient and ineffective in offsetting the Soviet threat. In this area we need more open debate on survival capability and more cooperation with our allies in developing technology.
We must decide what percent of GNP is appropriate for rebuilding the military. Perhaps the job could be done relatively cheaply if the right weapons systems were chosen to go with greater and better manpower. On the other hand, adding $50 billion a year may be worthless if it is spent outproducing the Soviets in. tanks or paying draftees more.
We must be willing to supply other nations or factions within nations with military and economic help in countering threats by the Soviets or their proxies. This will, of course, stretch our pro¬ duction budget and may up the percent of GNP devoted directly to confronting the Soviet threat. But it should also reduce the per- copy costs, gain some return of trade dollars (e.g., from OPEC countries), and allow the testing of military equipment by others.
An important question is whether the U.S. will ever be credible in international defense until it once again shows a willingness to have its troops bloodied in some kind of conflict. Obviously, it would not be to our advantage to commit ourselves to another con¬ flict like Vietnam, in which the logistics and other odds were stacked
82
Critical issues & Decisions
against us. Yet the legacy of the Vietnam war is such that even if U.S. public opinon has shifted to the point at which the public would support at least limited military intervention, neither the Soviets nor our (potential) allies may perceive the shift.
We must use trade more effectively as a weapon. Trade with the Soviets and their satellites by the U.S. and allied nations may help Western economies, but, at the same time, it allows the Soviets to devote their resources more fully to increasing their military might. Moreover, to the extent that this trade transfers technology to the Soviets or increases Europe's dependence on the Soviets for energy, it strengthens the Soviets vis-a-vis the West. This is not the classical economics classroom prespription for free trade, of course, but rather a recognition that the Soviets' gains from trade can translate into military and political power that is greatly to our disadvantage.
How can we most effectively sue our agricultural products to our advantage? The USSR has done a terrible job in handling its agricul¬ tural problems, and Eastern Europe has the same kind of prob¬ lems. But holding back on agricultural trade with the Soviets often creates disproportionate hardships on our agricultural sector. Fur¬ thermore, when the U.S. constrains the shipment of agricu 1 tu ra I products, the Soviets can rucoup some of the loss from other sources, albeit often at higher prices. In short, we need to find a mechanism, which might require greater federal intervention than free market economists are willing to tolerate under normal conditions, to assure as much damage to the Soviet economy as possible when it em¬ barks upon an expanionist venture.
Our allies have shown a remarkable willingness to offset any re¬ ductions we may make in trade with the Soviets by increases in their own. Moreover, they assume that the GATT agreements give them every right of access to our markets despite these actions and despite their unwillingness to spend an appropriate amount of their GNP on military defense. Again, despite the protestations of free market economists, some strings should be attached to free trade with our allies to encourage them to reinforce rather than negate whatever trade policies we decide are appropriate for the Soviets.
4. The Soviets have political and social weaknesses as well as economic ones. If we are to divert them from external expansionist
83
Critical Issues & Decisions
tendencies, then one way is to force them to pay more attention to some of these internal social and political problems. The most ob¬ vious example is Poland. From a strictly Machiavellian point of view, the best outcome for the U.S. would be a Soviet invasion of Poland. This would have some impact on the so-called nonaligned nations, would divert Soviet military forces from other targets, and would probably have major impact in Europe; the West would become more wary and more willing to sacrifice while the East would suffer eco¬ nomic dislocations. (Poland is a key to the distribution of the pro¬ duction functioning of Comecon.)
We must also continue to exploit the schism between Moscow and Beijing. The Chinese are reportedly tying up about 25 percent of the Soviets' military forces already. While there are dangers in tying ourseives too closely to China, it is certainly in the U.S.'s interest to do whatever it can to ensure that China remains an antagonist of Moscow. If possible, it may also be useful to consider using China as a conduit for the supplying of arms to groups resisting Soviet expansion, especially in Afghanistan and possible in Pakistan should the latter (with Iran) ever be threatened by a Soviet-spon¬ sored Baluchi freedom movement.
The U.S. must also decide how best to minimize the possibilities of communist-sponsored insurrections in a variety of Third World states. Past methods have included direct and indirect economic and military aid, the sponsoring of U.S. proxy nations, and reliance on the U.N. While none of these methods has proven particularly effective in all situations, each has a place, and the U.S. should con¬ sider how it can best use its allies in the Third World. Nations such as Brazil, Nigeria, Iraq, India, and Mexico are of extreme importance to the U.S. With the exception of India, they have all made consider¬ able economic progress. They generally have both the land and pop¬ ulation sufficient to be major regional power influences if they so choose. We must manipulate aid and trade with these nations in such a way as to encourage them to be our proxies in resisting Soviet expansion in their areas. This means that they should be encouraged to oppose local Soviet proxies. For example, we should do what we can to make Mexico and Cuba become antagonists or competitors rather than partners in denouncing the U.S. in the U.N. or elsewhere.
84
Critical Issues & Decisions
Finally, with regard to Third World states, there are two things we should avoid doing. First, the U.S. should not make nuclear weapons in any way a condition for aid or trade. While further proliferation of such weapons is undesirable, we can at best hope to slow down the process. And in trying to manipulate their develop¬ ment of nuclear weapons, we are more likely than not to reduce our ability to influence those states in taking other actions far more relevant to the containment of Soviet expansion. Second, we should espouse human rights but not to the point that ail hope for them gets lost as the Soviets take over the country. In short, while it may make us look hypocritical at home and abroad, our support of noncommunist governments, even if they abuse human rights we endorse, may be preferable to leaving states open to Soviet take¬ overs.
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Critical Issues & Decisions
ROBERTA. GOLDWIN
Resident Scholar and Director of Con¬ stitutional Studies, American Enterprise Institute, Dr. Goldwin has acted as Special Consultant to the President and Advisor to the Secretary of Defense as well as Dean of St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland. He has written many articles on ethics, education, and the role of government.
From left to right: Richard Heifner, Staff Economist, USDA/AMS; Dr. Francis T. Holt, Environmental Specialist, USDA/Soil Conservation Service; and Allen Hidlebaugh, Soil Scientist, USDA/Soil Conservation service. Not in picture: Richard DeHaan, Chief, System Policy and Planning Group, Department of Justice; and Shirley A. Evans, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Finance and Accounting, Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Critical Issues & Decisions
OF MEN AND ANGELS:
A SEARCH FOR MORALITY IN THE CONSTITUTION*
Robert A. Goldwin
Do not be misled by the theological tone of the title of this essay. Despite the reference to angels, and despite the unlikelihood that any serious political inquiry can progress very far without encounter¬ ing theological questions, it is my intention to present my argument in terms wholly secular, or at least as secular as political discourse can be.
The title speaks of men and angels, and doesn't mention women. As you shall see, the title refers to a sentence in The Federalist, the great commentary on the proposed Constitution written in 1787, principally by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, under the pen name Publius: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary." I cannot, of course, take liberties with a famous sentence from a Great Book, but one should think that women are being ex¬ cluded. Publius would surely have conceded the full equality of women, as I do, in this respect, and in very many others, and would have agreed that women, every bit as much as men, are not angels.
Another caution: I read the sentence "If men were angels, no government would be necessary" as two linked assertions: one, that men are not angels, and, two, that government is necessary. I know, and I point out to the reader, that the sentence does not say that in so many words.
A final caution: I mean very seriously, as the subtitle indicates, that this essay is meant to be a search. What I am searching for is morality in the American constitution. Immediately three questions present themselves:
1 . Why do we have to look for it?
2. What is meant by the constitution?
3. What morality is possible and appropriate for America?
* Robert A Goldwin's "Of Men and Angels: A Search for Morality in the Consti¬ tution" appeared in The Moral Foundations of the American Republic, edited by Robert H. Horwitz in 1977. We wish to thank the Universtiy Press of Virginia for permission to reprint it here.
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Critical Issues & Decisions
Why must we look for and worry about morality in the constitu¬ tion? For two good reasons. First, because so many immoral actions have besmirched our behavior in the recent past. We have had assas¬ sinations, Watergate, tawdry congressional sex scandals, corporation bribery on a worldwide scale, labor union murders, grain inspection frauds, mishandling of receipts of food stamps, cheating by medical laboratories, scandals in the management of guaranteed student loans, and so on and on in a seemingly endless list that convinces many that no part of the American community is uncorrupted, that immorality is ingrained in us as a national trait, that we are hope¬ lessly immoral. That is one reason for searching for morality in the constitution.
A second reason is that we are a morally judging people who make moral judgments all the time. Sometimes we judge ourselves much too high and sometimes much too low. For example, wartime rhetoric made it seem that we had no selfish national interests in the world wars and their aftermaths, that unlike every other nation, in¬ cluding our allies, we fought for altruistic and idealistic reasons only.
But when we are not judging ourselves too generously, we are often very severe, some would say too severe, on ourselves. During the two years of the Watergate revelations, Europeans were confused by what they called our naive reaction to government behavior that they considered just what one must expect of government officials anywhere. One intelligent and thoughtful Englishwoman told me that the American public's reaction to Watergate revelations con¬ firmed what she had long believed about Americans, that we suffer from "moral greed." Europeans generally thought we were denigrat¬ ing ourselves excessively. Even now, when the facts are known, dis¬ mal as they are, many still think so.
The fact of civil doing and the discovery of it, and our unfailing national shock, and the widespread, vehement, public condemnation that follows, are evidence of two equally significant points: not only that we are capable of immorality, that is, that we are not angels, but also that we set very demanding moral standards of political be¬ havior, approaching the angelic, and truly expect and demand politicians and other leaders to live up to them.
I belabor this duality because it is very important for the survival of political liberty and decency in the world that we Americans have
90
Critical Issues & Decisions
a true appraisal of ourselves. In national matters, as in personal mat¬ ters, to know yourself is as important to survival as it is happiness. And to know yourself, as we all learn from study and from experi¬ ence, is one of the most difficult tasks men and women face in life. If we do not know ourselves and hence judge ourselves by inappro¬ priate standards, all kinds of false judgments result, too lenient or too harsh, but just right only rarely— and then only by accident.
The national danger is that by condemning ourselves or excusing ourselves unjustly, that is, by false standards, we will weaken the very forces in the world that are almost alone capable of upholding the principles of decency we love and seek to live by.
Americans are moral judgers, and severe judgers at that. More, we judge no one as severely as ourselves. This may not always have been the mass phenomenon that is it today, but elements of it have always been present in us.
That does not mean that we always, or even regularly, do the right or good thing. It means that when we do not, or when we do the wrong or evil thing, for whatever reasons of necessity, or conveni¬ ence, or advantage, or whim, or passion, or ignorance, there are al¬ most always, and almost always promptly, voices raised in self-criti¬ cism and self-condemnation. And those morally condemning voices have listeners.
Moral principle has weight and force in American political dis¬ course. Even if we assume— as we must assume if we remember that men and women are not angels— that people act in politics primarily in pursuit of interests that are advantageous to them, and usually not advantageous, or even disadvantageous to others, nevertheless, in America individuals and groups are greatly strengthened if they can connect their cause to moral principles. And if that connection is a true one, and if decent, disinterested people can see that con¬ nection readily, the case is strengthened even more, even to the ex¬ tent that supporters will be enlisted whose interests might otherwise not make them allies, or might otherwise even make them opponents.
One massive example comes readily to mind, and that is the great civil rights movement of the fifties and, especially, the sixties. The principles of justice and equality had been available for generations to all American interest groups seeking to pursue their own advan¬ tage through political action. The fact that individual leaders like
91
Critical issues & Decisions
Martin Luther King and interest groups like the NAACP and CORE and the Urban League could add to their otherwise insufficient political strength by connecting themselves, not only in words but in concerted actions, to the most powerful moral principles of the American polity added to their strength fivefold, and more.
This combining of noble principle and self-interest, a foundation of American politics, is not hypocrisy, in my judgement. To show that black citizens gained material advantages by the legislation and court orders they obtained through moral arguments does not, I think, demean or debase the principles; it ennobles the interests. That is one way to understand Tocqueville's phrase "self-interest rightly understood"— that it is possible for selfishness to be ennobled, if not sanctified.
So seriously do Americans take morality, so politically powerful are the principles of justice and equality, that no policy, domestic or foreign, political or economic or military, can be successful, can get support, can be sustained, can survive setbacks, that does not have a clear and acceptable moral content, visible and meaningful to the Congress, the press, and above all to the American people. No matter how adroitly scheming, calculating, and self-serving individu¬ als or groups may be, unless their suggested policies can be clothed in fitting moral garb, they will not have and hold for a sustained period the indispensable element for practical success— public support.
We can see America's moral standing more clearly in the context of a rough catalogue of varieties of moral postures of nations. For ex¬ ample, there are countries where a moral resignation prevails, where immoral practices are known and condoned; accepted, not resisted. There have been civil societies, of course, where morality was almost completely destroyed, so that when severe abuses of human decency occurred, the populace was not aroused in opposition, and could not be aroused. There have even been societies in which almost the entire populace was eager to join in acts of cruelty and depravity.
But even in Nazi Germany, perhaps the worst example in history of an entire civilized nation being corrupted and enlisted in the cause of evil, the leaders seemed not to be sure of the thoroughness of popular commitment to evildoing, and so they endeavored to keep secret the mass murders in the gas ovens. And apparently they were right that many Germans, even after a decade of indoctrination,
92
Critical Issues & Decisions
would have found it impossible not to condemn such immorality, if it had been known to them.
Thus even when we contemplate the depths of human viciousness there is reason to believe that there is in human nature a strong in¬ clination to what is morally right— something of the angel in us— and a strong aversion to what is morally wrong. There is also reason to believe that it is very difficult, but perhaps not impossible, to elim¬ inate in almost all of us those tendencies toward what is morally right.
There are also many societies where practices that are of a lesser order of immorality, like bribery, or tax evasion, or nepotism, or other forms of cheating, not only occur, as they do in this country, but are accepted as part of "the way things are done." Revelations of such immoral practices don't shock the people of those countries. They simply comment, "Of course. Everybody does it."
There is probably less bribery and corruption in this country than in most others, but very far from an absence of them. In this coun¬ try, however, if they are exposed, they are definitely not approved or condoned. When immoral practices are discovered and publicized, the highest-ranking officials, in and out of government, will resign or will be forced out of office. However many times examples of cor¬ ruption in political or business or labor or even charitable activities are exposed, we seem never to lack the moral fervor to attack and condemn, and usually to prosecute.
I will add only one more variety of national moral posture to the brief, and surely incomplete, catalogue of societies: very moral civil socieities. Some such may actually have existed for a time, and some may have existed only in fiction or utopian writings; in either case, I mean civil societies where there is no corruption, no bribery, no favoritism or self-seeking, no putting self-interest ahead of the pub¬ lic interest— societies that might be said to be thoroughly moral in act as well as in principle.
As I understand the Framers of our Constitution, on the evidence in The Federalist and in the debates of the Constitutional Conven¬ tion, they looked at America and Americans and decided that it would be fruitless and impractical, and perhaps even morally wrong, for the new nation to strive to become spotlessly moral.
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Liberty was their first principle and also their first goal. (Prosper¬ ity was their second goal.) A people that universally would put the public good ahead of private good every time would have to be regimented, ordered, disciplined, indoctrinated, preached to, and exhorted. Obvious institutional consequences would follow: state religion, uniform education, universal military discipline, diminu¬ tion of family household influence, and curbs on commerce.1
The Framers knew that such a society would have to put duties first and relegate rights and everything else that is private— both low and high— to a strictly subordinate place. Self-enrichment in such a society would be scorned and replaced by concern for the moral and economic strength of the civil society as a whole. I doubt that the Framers ever gave serious thought to making a nation of men and women who would be devoid of private ambition2— as we are told is generally the case in present-day China, for example— but if they had given thought to it, they would have rejected it, in the name of liberty and plenty.
Their own moral concern and their awareness of the character of the American people made two things clear to the Framers: first, that political liberty and economic energy unavoidably engendered some immorality, some cheating and selfish advancement of private good at the expense of the public; second, that the American people are unrelenting moral judgers. The two basic American moral facts are that immorality is unavoidable and unacceptable.
The Framers did not seek devices or measures to prevent all immo¬ rality, but rather to control its abuses, as consistent with the Ameri¬ can character, consistent with the principles of liberty and equality of rights, consistent with the diversity of American ethnic origins and the multiplicity of religious sects, and consistent with the en¬ trepreneurial energy they sought to encourage.
The reader will surely have noted that several times I have spoken of American character as the Founders perceived it, as if the nation had already been formed before its founding. To a large extent I think that was the case. Consider a little simple arithmetic. If we take 1619, the date of the establishment of the Virginia House of Burgesses, the first American legislative body, as a starting point, it was 170 years later that the Constitution was ratified. That means that it was not until 1959, just a few years ago, in the lifetime of just
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Critical Issues & Decisions
about everyone old enough to be concerned about morality in poli¬ tics, that Americans had as long a political experience on this con¬ tinent since the Constitution as before it. If you have a feeling for how long ago 1789 was, you can feel how long a time the American people had to develop a character of their own before the written Constitution.
That character derived from many factors, including religion (most of the sects were dissenters) ; experience in self-government (the legis¬ latures of many colonies had considerable power, including power of the purse); political doctrines emphasizing liberty and equality (from John Locke pre-eminently); and unusual, even unprecedented economic conditions.
Consider the economic conditions for a moment. Adam Smith de¬ scribes tellingly, in The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, the consequences of placing cultured Europeans, especially cultured in agriculture, on a vast and fertile continent, almost uninhabited, and pretty much free for the taking. His chapter on "Causes of the Pros¬ perity of New Colonies," begins thus: "The colony of a civilized nation which takes possession either of a waste country, or one so thinly inhabited, that the natives easily give place to the new settlers, advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness than any other hu¬ man society." In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century America, labor was in short supply relative to demand. Wages were high, and condi¬ tions were favorable to the worker. It was hard to hold on to hired hands because it was so easy for them to save enough in a short time to move off to start their own enterprise, usually farming their own piece of land, and plenty of open space to move on to.
The situation was favorable for the flowering of respect for the free individual's rights, because those who were not slaves had to be treated well to keep them on the job, since they had so many oppor¬ tunities everywhere. Where every hand is valuable, if you can't en¬ slave him or her, you have to pay a high price for that person's labor. And what you pay dearly for, you value highly. But even if an em¬ ployer did treat employees or indentured servants well, he was likely to lose them in a fairly short time, a few years usually, because it was so easy for newcomers with ambition to strike out on their own. In such circumstances, where the demand for labor exceeds the sup¬ ply, slavery is also very attractive. If you can assure yourself of a
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Critical Issues & Decisions
large enough number of laborers and any way of keeping them, where naturally rich unowned land is abundant, your profit is as¬ sured. Slavery and the principles of liberty and equality that ulti¬ mately led to its destruction grew out of the same soil.
The combination of propitious economic, political, and religious factors contributed to the development of tastes, inclinations, habits, and institutions among Americans that were strong and deeply in¬ grained when the Constitution was written in 1 787. The relevance of the pre-existing American character, in my understanding of it, can be explained by the simple device of sometimes writing the word constitution with a capital C, to denote that I mean the frame of government, in our case set forth in a written document, and some¬ times writing it with a small c, to denote that I mean something different, which I will now try to explain.
If we speak of the American constitution— with a small c— we could mean the way Americans are constituted: their character, their habits, their manners, their morals, their tastes, their countryside, their strengths, their weaknesses, their speech, their songs, their poems, their books, their sports, their machines, their arts, their heroes, their dress, their ceremonies, their homes and families, and their ways of conducting business. All of this, and more, would tell us how Americans are constituted. And since much of what is in¬ cluded in such a list would be the result of conscious effort and decision, it would also be possible to speak of how Americans have constituted themselves. Thus, considering how long Americans were on this continent before 1787, it is perfectly intelligible to speak of what the American constitution was before the Constitution of the United States was written, as well as to speak of the formative in¬ fluence the Constitution of the United States had, subsequently, on the American constitution.
The document called the Constitution names itself in the Pre¬ amble as "this Constitution for the United States of American," but it could just as well have been called "the Articles," or "the Charter," or "the Covenant," or "the Compact," or "the Policy," or a number of other suitable words. When the Congress sent it to the original thirteen states for ratification, they gave it no caption. In most states, when it was printed for the use of the delegates of ratifying
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conventions and for public information, it was entitled "A Frame of Government."
The word constitution for this purpose grew in usage in the cen¬ tury from 1689 to 1 789, from the Glorious Revolution to the adop¬ tion of the Constitution. Before that, the usage pointed more to the way things were ordered. According to the Oxford English Dictio¬ nary, constitution meant "the way in which anything is constituted or made up; the arrangement or combination of its parts or elements, as determining its nature and charcter, e.g., constitution of nature, of the world, of the universe, etc." The political usage indicated "the mode in which a state is constituted or organized, especially as to the location of the sovereign power, as a monarchical, oligarchical, or democratic constitution."
But Constitution grew out of this usage as a fitting word for a document that seeks to apply an appropriate frame of government to a people who are constituted in a discernible way. A well-designed Constitution records and proclaims how we are constituted and how we intend to be constituted for the future. Whether the Constitution is written or not, every political community has a constitution, be¬ cause to be a political community it must have an accepted ordering of things and a location of the sovereign power.
Let the exception prove the rule. When we ask whether a nation ruled by a dictatorial individual or group has a Constitution, we are stretching the concept to its breaking point. For example, some na¬ tions are described as constitutional monarchies, signifying that some other monarchies are not constitutional. What we mean is that abso¬ lute monarchies have no discernible order in the ruling, that the monarch can act without restraint, without law, according to whim, not only with unlimited powers, but arbitrarily. That is why John Locke said that "absolute monarchy. . .can be no form of civil gov¬ ernment at all."3 And I say that any nation has a constitution, but at times there may be no Constitution and its unconstitutional rulers may not be a government.
When nations that have been ruled by tyrants overthrown them and form a new and constitutional government, it is clear that they had a constitution all along; that is, they were constituted a certain way and are now able to frame a government that is thought to suit the way they are constituted. And that "frame of government" may
97
Critical issues & Decisions
properly be called the Constitution. It is in this sense that we say that nations get the government they deserve.
My thesis is that the Framers considered the constitution of the American people— what they were and what they were capable of being and doing— and drew up the Constitution of the United States. They did not want to leave Americans just where they were, but, rather, starting where they were, they wanted to make them better. As was once written, long ago, by a non-American: "Lawgivers make the citizens good by training them in habits of right action— that is the aim of all lawmaking, and if it fails to do this it is a failure; this is what distinguishes a good Constitution from a bad one."4
The Framers did not seek to remake Americans, but rather to take them as they are and lead them to habits of right action. Their task was to direct the powerful American tendency to self-interest and self-advancement so that abuses would be controlled. More, they aimed not only to control these tendencies but actually to turn them to the benefit of the people.
Other societies have tried to curb or eliminate selfish ambition and selfish interest out of a reasonable fear that when those inclinations are combined with political power, tyranny often results and the people often lose their freedom. The constitutional scheme in other societies has relied on measures such as rigorous education in the virtues of selflessness, or constant surveillance, strict discipline, and severe punishment.
The American constitutional scheme is explained briefly in The Federalist Put separate parts of political power in the hands of dif¬ ferent officials in different parts of the government— legislative, ex¬ ecutive, and judicial— and encourage, if they need encouragement, ambition and self-interest. "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition," Publius says. "The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place."5 By this means the abuses of power by one official, or several, will be opposed by others who have strong and natural incentives that need no inculcation or exhortation. In fact, if officials in one part of the government should be insufficiently moved by ambition and self-interest, a necessary balancing restraint would be lacking and the danger would increase of concentration of power in the hands of others. It seems that there is a need for very many ambitious and self-interested officials to keep
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Critical issues & Decisions
our government in balance. As fundamental as separation of powers is as a principle of the Constitution, that officeholders must be ambitious and self-interested is even more fundamental.
Are these the habits of right action the Constitution aims to train us in? In part, the answer is yes. In part, however, the answer must be also that the Constitution seeks to train us in habits of restraint and moderation, because that is the only way ambitious office¬ holders can contend with other ambitious officeholders without falling victims to the law, or to power struggles.
It is a system for nonangels who nevertheless are convinced that men and women are good enough to govern themselves. What is clear is that it is a frame of government for a people so constituted that clashing with each other almost without cease is the expected daily routing.
In a discourse on the work of Isaac Newton, Thomas Simpson of St. John's College in Sante Fe made this comparison:
Our Republic was designed in the image of Isaac Newton's vision of the System of the World , set forth in the Third Book of his Principia. Hobbes had taught man to regard the state as an artifice to rescue himself from war and his own nature , but it was Newton who showed how exactly-counterworking forces could be composed to form a harmonious and lasting system— and this composition of forces in the system of planets about the sun was the ultimate paradigm for the authors of our Constitution as they attempted to solve the three-body problem of the legislative, the executive, and the judicial powers.
Newton, then, showed how the cosmos might be grasped by the mind as a purposeful system, an intelligent design; the authors of our Constitution showed the world in turn how man could make this insight, out of mathematical physics, serve him in the design of a balanced and rational policy .6
I would not dare to quarrel with Dr. Simpson about Newton, but would only accept his guidance respectfully and gratefully and do my best to understand. But the notion of the Constitution of the United States as "harmonious" is very wide of the mark. Much closer, I think, is the description of Tocqueville in capturing the
99
Critical Issues & Decisions
character of the American constitution and political system: "No sooner do you set foot on American soil than you find yourself in a sort of tumult; a confused clamor rises on every side, and a thousand voices are heard at once, each expressing some social requirements."7 Tumult, confused clamor, a thousand voices— not harmony— that is how America was and is constituted.8 And the Framers wisely chose, I think, not to strive to change it, but rather to institutionalize it.
If that is the American constitution, the morality most character¬ istic of America, then and now, is what might be called a measured, or a restrained, or a moderated, or even a mean morality. It does not ignore or condone immorality. In fact, it holds morality very high in public esteem. As I have argued, no public policy can gain and hold the support of the American people if its moral content is not laudable and apparent to the people generally. A policy may be begun, it may be continued for a time, but if it lacks moral ac¬ ceptability it cannot be sustained. But the morality that is needed must commence with the understanding that men and women are not angels.
Awareness that we are not angels has complex significance. It does not mean that we are evil or unrelievedly selfish. It does mean that we acknowledge that our basic motivation is self-interest and that there is a need to control the unavoidable abuses that follow from that selfishness. From somewhere, perhaps out of our selfish¬ ness— that is, out of the sense of justice that derives from the sense of injustice (which is easily come by from the natural dislike of acts of unfairness to ourselves)— but in any case in some way there comes a strong sense of morality, of fairness, or aversion to unfair¬ ness. And this strong sense of morality leads frequently to an excess of morality.
I do not agree that measure or restraint or moderation is mis¬ placed in matters of morality. Men and women sometimes indulge themselves in excesses of morality, and such self-indulgence and such excess have the same distorting effects as do all other forms of extremism.
The morality most appropriate to the American way, to the American constitution as it was even before the Founding, and as it still is, is a morality that is moderate, that does not crusade, that
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Critical Issues & Decisions
accepts the fact that among human beings who are free there will be abuses, and that does not seek to eradicate all evil from the face of the earth, knowing that such moral attempts are excessive and often lead to monstrous immorality. Though we sometimes use the rhetoric, we are not true to ourselves and to our national character when we crusade, domestically or in foreign policy.
Consider the story of Carmen. When her soldier-lover hears the bugle call summoning him back to camp, she warns him that if he goes she will not meet him again. He explains that the regulations require him to report at an appointed hour, and Carmen replies with the famous line, "Gypsy love knows no law." So it is with un¬ bounded moralism. Alluring and seductive, it, too, knows no law. The morality of our constitution is very much a bounded and law- abiding morality.
When I speak of the American character and its morality, I do not mean that we are consistent in our tendencies and reactions. Thank goodness that we are not, and that life is not so simple and dull. The truth is, and all of us know it, that as a nation we have a multi¬ plicity of reactions, a multiplicity of individuals and groups tending to go in a multiplicity of directions; and, sometimes, a multiplicity of tendencies contend within each of us.
One of these common tendencies is for us to shrug our shoulders when we hear one more revelation of wrongdoing. It does get tire¬ some, after all. We develop an aversion less to the wrongdoer and more to the moralizers and wish they would do us all a favor and just shut up.
At other times we become mightily aroused; we judge quickly and harshly; we preach to others and volunteer our services as policemen to the world, ready, like Superman, to fly anywhere in the world to fight evil, at whatever cost of pain and treasure.
Sometimes, however— and at these times we are at our best, in my estimation, and most true to our real constitution— we judge and act with measured restraint, with moderation. We do not ignore the presence of evil, nor do we try to exterminate it and, perhaps, many valuable things with it. The Constitution is designed to help foster this restraint.
Practical or political morality always involves two related but separable and distinct steps. The first step, and an essential one for a
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Critical Issues & Decisions
moral person, is to face the fact of wrongdoing and judge it. When we fail to take that step, we slip into our worst amoral lethargy; fortunately for us as a nation that strives for decency, failure to make a moral judgment happens rarely, and when it happens it is possible for us to be roused from it, for we are not deaf to moral suasion. So the first step is to make the moral judgment, to recognize evil as evil, and not look the other way, or refuse to judge (on rela¬ tivistic grounds), or shrug our shoulders and say we "don't care."
But making a moral judgment does not settle the question of policy. The second step remains; to ask ourselves, what shall we do about it? There are moral as well as practical considerations in¬ volved in the second step. The first-step moral judgment may tell us that something ought to be done, but it leaves to deliberation what that something might be.
The best example of this I know in American history is the consis¬ tent position of Abraham Lincoln on the question of slavery. The first step was easy for him, and he made it clearly and persistently in all of his public utterances, notably in his debates with Stephen Douglas. On the question of the extension of slavery into new states and territories not yet slave territory, Douglas said "I don't care" whether it is voted up or voted down. Let the local people on the spot decide for themselves— local rule, self-determination.
Lincoln said in response what must be said first: that slavery was wrong and that we cannot say "I don't care" whether this immoral institution is extended and strengthened. After all, he ar¬ gued, we are the children of the Declaration of Independence, and there are principles that will not let us alone, that we cannot turn our backs on and still remain Americans. That was the first step.
As for the second step, Lincoln said he was not an abolitionist, just as he would not be a slaveholder. Abolitionists looked on the Constitution as an abomination, a compact with the Devil, and they regularly burned a copy of the Constitution at their meetings. That is an example of the unbounded moralism I spoke of before, which in its crusading striking out at evil is likely to destroy with it many good things— like the Constitution, in this case— that give us, ulti¬ mately, our best hope for persisting decency in political life. Lincoln, unlike the abolitionists, sought a way to end slavery without destroy¬ ing the Union and the Constitution, the instrumentalities of our liberties.
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Critical Issues & Decisions
Thus, even after the Civil War had commenced, Lincoln was still trying to develop and get acceptance for a plan of gradual and com¬ pensated emancipation of the slaves. His plan could have taken as long as thirty-five years to complete emancipation of the last of the slaves, and no force would have been used. During that time there would be no spread of slavery, and the more it was diminished by purchase of the freedom of slaves from slaveholders, the weaker would become the pro-slavery forces.
Many would condemn a policy that would prolong enslavement for some for decades and pay slaveholders for slaves they had no moral right to own. But Lincoln thought that Americans, North and South, shared the blame for slavery and that the chief task was less to punish wrongdoers than to right the wrong. He thought some slavery could be tolerated so long as its increase was halted, its diminution assured, and its termination achieved without massive bloodshed, without confiscating what some people claimed under the law was property, without disrupting the Union, and without weak¬ ening or possibly destroying the Constitution.
Lincoln's plan for gradual compensated emancipation was not so much rejected as ignored. Instead, the Civil War went on; the matter was settled by unbounded moralists on both sides of the controversy; and we had, as a result, horrendous warfare, a divided nation, and deep-seated bitterness which, a full century later, has not fully abated.
In the light of all I have now said about how I think the Founders, or Publius, thought about this question and what the consequences are of thefact that men and women are not angelic, consider the brief passage that is the basis for what I have said, and judge my interpre¬ tation for yourself; "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary."
If I am right about what kind of political morality is truly Ameri¬ can, what kind of morality truly fits the way we have constituted ourselves as a nation, there remains still a problem of grave propor¬ tions; the question of attractiveness.
103
Critical Issues & Decisions
In a democratic republic such as ours, where public opinion and popular taste rule, ultimately, on everything, measures and policies must be attractive to hundreds of millions of people to gain the sup¬ port that is essential to sustain them.
There is something drab and unsatisfying in moral moderation. There is a natural yearning for something higher and purer. All that aiming lower has to recommend it is that it works, but that leaves many of the best of men and women restless and dissatisfied. The search for excitment and inspiration in moderation is fruitless. For example, the only conclusion one can come to after reading the famous essay by William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," is that there is no moral equivalent of war.
Between extremes iies a mean; it is worth pointing out that the word mean is, at the very least, ambiguous. One can try to dress it in finery and speak of the golden mean, but there just is no glitter in mean morality. Moderation or measure or restraint or seeking the mean in anything is not the kind of cause for which people devise banners and slogans. It is hard to compose a marching song or an inspirational poem in praise of sobriety or moderation. You cannot have neon borders flashing on and off, and brass bands parading, and cheering sections screaming at the top of their voices if the message is: "Be moderate." You can't even write such a command with an exclamation point without turning it into a joke.
Some words are suited for whispers or a soft voice: "Kiss me," or "I love you." Others can be shouted or screamed: "Hit him!" or "Kill the umpire!" or "Stop thief!" But moderation can be neither whispered nor shouted. To whiper "moderation" is insipid, and to shout it is rediculous. Moderation is truly a mean word.
And yet unless this notion of moderation, of bounded morality, is widely accepted, it will be hard for us to think of ourselves as a
truly moral nation, for that is the morality that fits us. And that
conviction, that we are truly a moral nation of moral men and moral women, is essential to our survival and happiness, because of the way we are constituted. We need to believe it; and for us to believe it, it must be true. We have for a long time been the world's best
hope that political decency might prevail widely. There are still,
out there in the rest of the world, billions of persons longing to be free. A revitalized America, confident of its own strength and its own
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Critical issues & Decisions
rectitude, is their best hope that things might ever change for the bet¬ ter. A sense of our own rectitude is our Samson's long hair; without it we have no strength. I think that is what enables us to say that "right makes might," which is not to say that right is might.
What is the chief obstacle to our reviving our confidence in our national rectitude? In large part it is our powerful sense of morality and our aversion to hypocrisy. Our strong moral sense judges and condemns our weaker moral practice. Being strongly moral, we declare ourselves immoral. The judge, out of a superabundance of morality, declares the culprit immoral, but the judge and the culprit are one and the same. Is there any solution, any way for the judge to see himself as a constant moral judge as well as an inconstant immoral culprit and— on the whole— a righteous people?
I think so, and I think Publius has shown us the way. It rests on the difference between righteousness and self-righteousness. What is that difference? If we can answer that question, we can chart a course back to the national self-confidence we need, for our own sake, for the sake of political decency, and for the sake of the hopes of oppressed men and women everywhere.
Let me attempt the distinction. Because men and women are not angels, the standard of human righteousness cannot be that one act as an angel would. The standard must be something akin to our humanity, to our nonangelic state of being. For us nonangels, a righteous person is one who strives to live and act by the light of righteous principles, which include, surely, respect for the equal rights of others to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happi¬ ness. Trying to follow the guidance of America's standard political principles is the first element of human-scale political righteousness, whether one always succeeds or not.
We would have to add, of course, that trying is not enough in it¬ self; there must be a fairly high degree of success. But above all there must be a recognition that because we are not angels, and because we have freedom, there will be failures, there will be fallings off, there will be abuses, and that there must be "devices" for controlling and dealing with these failures. The devices— including ambition counter¬ acting ambition— must be bounded, and legal, and habitual, and even institutional. If we describe a people such as that— guided by right principles, usually living in accord with them, sometimes failing to
105
Critical Issues & Decisions
measure up, rarely in doubt about what the standards ought to be, seeking to punish abuses and prevent them but too committed to lib¬ erty to seek to root out all the possible causes of future human fail¬ ings— we are describing a nonangelic, but decidedly righteous, people.
Now what about self-righteousness? Self-righteousness is rightly scorned. Self-righteousness is an excess of righteousness, a distortion and disfigurement of righteousness; it is righteousness without mod¬ eration. It is more easily recognized in the flesh than defined in words. Self-righteousness is not only boring but hateful; it has been the source of many of the most vicious and inhuman acts in the annals of history, and on a grand scale.
The self-righteous person mistakes the rectitude of his principles for his own rectitude. He confounds his beliefs and his behavior, in his mind he converts his professed righteous principles into a person, and thinks he is that person. Righteousness and "self" become as one. This confusion enables him, in the name of the highest princi¬ ples of morality, to consider himself the appointed enforcer of morality, the embodiment of righteousness, as if he were the Aveng¬ ing Angel, or any angel rather than a human being.
Publius is our guide in this singling out and condemning the self- righteous moralist. In the simplest terms, the self-righteous person forgets the difference between human beings and angels. Self-righ¬ teousness in personal matters is distressing enough, but in government it is especially ludicrous, for "if men were angels, no government would be necessary."
Now I have finished. What I seek is some way to appeal— not through showmanship but through reasoning, which in most times and places has been attractive to young and other sound minds— some way to appeal to the best in us and persuade us that we have and always have had what is needed to be a righteous people. Noth¬ ing that has happened since we started to constitute ourselves as one people more than three hundred years ago, and nothing that has happened since we declared our founding principles and wrote down our Constitution almost two hundred years ago, has diminished the possibilities of righteousness and morality on a national scale, so long as we do not confuse righteousness and self-righteousness.
The key to our political salvation, if such combining of the secular andthe divine may be allowed, is the lesson inherent in the most basic principle of the American constitution: Men and women are not angels.
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Critical Issues & Decisions
FOOTNOTES
1 Plutarch tells us how Lycurgus transformed Sparta by limiting landholdings (which brought about economic equality); by making lead the official currenty (which put an end to retail and foreign trade); and by decreeing that meals could no longer be eaten at home, but only in eating clubs (which ended the influence of mother and kitchen). These three changes reconstituted Sparta, almost at a stroke.
2For those who wish to ponder this subject more thoroughly, I suggest reading the discussions of salary for public officials in The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, cd. Max Farrand, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale Uni¬ versity Press, 1911-37). See Index: salaries of congressmen, salary of ex¬ ecutive, salary of judges. See also The Federalist, No. 72.
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Book 2, section 90.
4Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, 1103b. There is, of course, no indi¬ cation in the Greek text that the word Constitution is capitalized.
5 The Federalist, No. 51 .
6
"Newton and the Liberal Arts," The College, January 1976, St. John's College, Annapolis, Md.
7Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 223.
8
As for Dr. Simpson's contention that the Constitution is drawn out of mathe¬ matical insight, this comment of Aristotle's should suffice: "A carpenter and a geometrician both seek after a right angle, but in different ways" (. Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, 1098a).
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Critical Issues & Decisions
DIVERSITY AND MULTIPLICITY OF INTERESTS VERSUS UNIFYING ACTION Commentary
PIGS (Private Interests Groups) are one of the strengths of our form of government. The framers of our Constitution felt that a multiplicity of interests was needed to protect our rights. In a recent paper, Dr. Goldwin stated: "It [multiplicity] opposes the formation of an overwhelming concentration of power."1
The encouragement of diversity of interests has served the nation well for nearly two centuries. A National Agenda for the Eighties2 points out the concerns of some citizens that the growth of diversity has exceeded the proper balance. They fear we will not build need¬ ed coalitions. They see the prolifferation of "single issue" organiza¬ tions with their attendant publicity campaigns, as a threat to our form of government that must be addressed by strengthening our political parties. In this way they feel we can build the necessary coalitions and concensus needed to govern.3
It is important to note that even though some members of the Commission feel the prolifferation of "single issue" PIGS is not in a proper balance with unifying actions, the cure they propose does not attempt to weaken the multiplicity of interests approach.4 Rather they seek to build a stronger mechanism to assure coalition building to act as a balance against what they see as excessive frag¬ mentation.
Diversity and multiplicity of interests do keep the nation in at least a mild state of turmoil. But this is the path the framers of the Constitution chose to protect everyone's rights. They depended on the separation of power wtih the built-in checks and balances to achieve the unifying action needed to govern the nation. The sys¬ tem, although chaotic at times, has worked well.
Some people have ridiculed PIGS as being extremists, we need to remind ourselves that PIGS are beautiful.
1 Goldwin, Robert A., The Constitution and Human Rights, Prepared for the
Editorial Services Division, U.S. International Communications Agency,
March 18, 1981.
108
Critical Issues & Decisions
2 A National Agenda for the Eighties, Report of the President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties, Washington, D.C., 1980, pp. 10-14.
3lbid.
^ Ibid.
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT- OF, BY AND FOR THE PEOPLE
Commentary
What implications does Constitutional government— of, by and for the people— have for the federal government in the 1980s? The re¬ sponse by the entire seminar group indicated some variance. Some individuals felt that the issue was not a critical one. Others felt that Dr. Robert A. Goldwin had not given any answers and no clues as to where changes should be made.
The majority, however, reacted positively, as did Group IV. These individuals felt the topic was most timely and that it merited the kind of attention that would lead to changes in government policy. Certainly the analysis is not as straightforward as some of the others discussed in the seminar. It involves a much more intensive examina¬ tion of our heritage and a where-do-we-go-from-here approach.
Our group reaction was based on the in-depth study of the as¬ signed readings. We were particularly impressed by Dr. Goldwin's article "Of Men and Angels: A Search for Morality in the Constitu¬ tion" (published by the University Press of Virginia in the book entitled The Moral Foundations of the American Republic .) The group found Goldwin's non legal ist ic presentation and responses to questions refreshing.
As we tried to answer the question "what relevance does this topic have for the federal government in the 1980s?" we found ourselves dealing with five different subjects: rights and duties, diversity and multiplicity of interests versus unifying actions, com¬ parative performance of constitutional democracies and authoritari¬ an systems, morality in the Constitution, and constitutional govern¬ ment and foreign policy.
109
Critical Issues & Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY
Commentary
What are the implications of a Constitution of, by, and for the people in the foreign policy decision making of our federal govern¬ ment in the 1980s? In view of the discussions by our seminar group and the presentations by Dr. Pfaltzgraff and Dr. Goldwin, this question is one of the most crucial facing our government. Certainly the economic situation we face is important. It is one of foremost concern to our citizenry. And therein lies a reason why designing a foreign policy in accord with the Constitution is ranked with eco¬ nomic problems. The two are inseparable, yet the man-on-the-street rarely thinks of foreign policy.
This situation leads to a question that must be answered in the 1980s. How does the federal government arouse the public about international tensions without being an alarmist? One member of our seminar group has advocated the release of all satellite photography in order to give the public a clear view of the build-up of Soviet arms. This suggestion merges with Thomas A. Bailey's response to the critical symposium entitled "Can Foreign Policy Be Democratic?" Bailey reasons that the mass of people can make broad decisions if all relevant information can be placed before them, if the issues can be fully discussed, if the problems are not too technical for the lay mind, and if there is time for democratic judgments to jell. Such a theory is in direct contrast to those ideals of Sibley expressed earlier in this paper. Consequently, one implication for our federal government in the 1980s is the extensive release of foreign policy information. The big question here is, of course, how extensive.
Another implication involves space exploration. We have been assured repeatedly that our latest space effort was conducted solely for peaceful purposes. Yet we read of accusations by the Soviet Union and other Communist Bloc Nations that the space shuttle was intended to explore possibilities for space armaments. Again, with the debate between Bailey and Sibley in mind, what is the truth about our space program? Sibley would require the federal govern¬ ment to comply with his five points requiring full disclosure by government officials. On the other hand, Bailey's response would be that if certain things were done, only then could a democratic
110
Critical Issues & Decisions
approach under the Constitution be implemented. And it is high¬ ly unlikely that the if 's of Bailey are anywhere near realistic. Con¬ sequently, the implications of the pure-Constitution approach to foreign policy are idealistic, and we must look again to the morality in our Constitution.
ON RIGHTS AND DUTIES Commentary
One problem facing our society in this decade is that of how to deal with an ever-increasing demand for the [perceived] rights of its citizens. This concept of rights, has expanded greatly since the founding of our nation through a variety of governmental policies and actions. Originating with the explicit rights enumerated in our Constitution, we have gone on to identify a new range of rights through legislative and congressional actions. The effect of these actions has been to raise our citizens' expectations of what services and facilities their government will provide or safeguard. The mo¬ mentum of growth in this area has been especially great since the 1930s. The expansion of economic and social programs begun in this era and continuing through the recent past has created a host of governmental entitlement programs. One indicator of the psychology of rights is the tremendous growth we have seen in civil litigation, much of which arises from rights established through federal legis¬ lation and rulemaking.
As we begin this decade, several facts are obvious. We have recent¬ ly been unable to sustain the rate of economic growth to which the citizenry has become accustomed. We are beset by foreign and domestic problems. There is an increasing dissatisfaction with govern¬ mental programs in the social services area. Many believe that the levels of regulation and taxation are becoming oppressive. A climate for change exists.
The challenge of the coming years in the area of rights will be to avoid imposing undue individual hardship or creating a climate of disaffection among large segments of our society, while at the same time revising the manner in which governmental entitlement pro¬ grams are perceived. These actions will require the compromise inherent in our democratic political system and institutions.
Ill
Critical Issues & Decisions
A key ingredient in this process must be the inculcation of a sense of duty in our citizenry. The emphasis upon individual interest must be balanced by a recognition of the responsibilities of individuals to the society at large. This message must be clearly articulated by leaders at all levels and backed up by governmental policies and programs. A concept of public service should be enunciated. Where appropriate, entitlement to social programs should require some form of public service. At a different level, a formal program of national compulsory public service should be proposed, debated, and enacted. Finally, our presentation of foreign policy issues should consistently reiterate the continuing conflict between the USSR and the democratic nations of the world.
MORALITY IN THE CONSTITUTION Commentary
Constitutional government of, by and for the people implies that our leaders be effectively under the control of the community, speak only truthfully, provide full disclosure of information for decision making by the people, provide for full discussion by the community at large, and strive to control factors that would effect irrational decisions. At least this is one philosophy put forth in the readings associated with Dr. Goldwin's presentation. If we examine those points and look at Dr. Goldwin's thesis that, since men and women are not angels, we cannot expect a true approach in a con¬ stitutional democracy, the implications for the federal government in the 1980s are clear.
Dr. Goldwin points out that the framers of the Constitution "did not seek devices or measures to prevent all immorality, but rather to control its abuses, as consistent with the American character, con¬ sistent with the principles of liberty and equality of rights, consis¬ tent with the diversity of American ethnic origins and the multi¬ plicity of religious sects, and consistent with the entrepreneurial energy they sought to encourage." This concept, together with the philosophy set forth in the paragraph above implies that the federal government must realize that some immoral acts will occur but that they must be kept at a minimum.
112
Critical Issues & Decisions
Actions must be taken to ensure that our leaders can answer to the five points but with a small probablity of assassination. Quick, ra¬ tional handling of such events as Abscam must set the stage so that all parties know the consequences of such actions. We must give more thought to some of the basic operating procedures to indicate to those contemplating immoral acts that these acts are not accept¬ able.
At the same time, actions by the federal government must attempt to strike a mean that does not either overly condemn or too easily excuse such actions unjustly. And Dr. Goldwin aptly points out that the word mean is, at very least, ambiguous. Nevertheless, therein lies the challenge and consequently the implication.
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES AND AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEMS Commentary
Several major constitutional issues which bear upon government in the 1980s relate to both domestic economics and the international struggle with Soviet Communism. Can our system, and similar sys¬ tems in other countries, continue to allow the individual rights and liberties we have enjoyed in the past while providing satisfactory economic performance and holding the line against Communism? In this era of international tension, is constitutional democracy, as a form of government, on the rise or decline?
By the end of the 1980s this country will have been governed for two centuries under a Constitution which has served us remarkably well and which has provided a model of constitutional government for many other nations. This record, unmatched by any other modern government, attests to the vigor and vitality of our system. Indeed, at different times in the past, such as the period after World War II, when many former colonies became independent nations, the prospects seemed bright for representative democracy to in¬ spire ever-growing imitation throughout the world. But recent events have been less encouraging. Many promising democracies, such as those in Chile and South Korea, have been overturned and replaced with autocratic regimes of the left or right. This poses a dilemma in
113
Critical Issues & Decisions
our foreign policy. Is our system one to which we should urge other peoples of markedly different cultures to aspire? Should we encourage government to follow our pattern or simply befriend nations who help us combat Soviet Communism, regardless of their own forms of government?
In the developed countries of Western Europe and in Japan, representative governments have survived and generally prospered for over three decades since World War II. A generation has matured and learned to operate and trust these institutions. But there are few countries where democratic institutions are as firmly rooted as in the U.S. and England. Threats of left and right wing takeovers seem always ready to surface, especially whenever economic con¬ ditions worsen.
Robert Goldwin seems to be cautiously optimistic about the pros¬ pects for democratic private enterprise systems compared to auto¬ cratic socialistic regimes. But he says that the democracies are "beleaguered." Until recently, their actual performance tended to be unfavorably compared with the theoretical performance of socialistic systems. He notes that enough experience has accumu¬ lated with socialistic systems that their performance can now be evaluated by both sides. The democracies fare much better in this comparison. The failures of the communist system simply cannot be excused due to forty years of bad weather!
In the decade ahead, it will be more essential than ever to under¬ stand the strengths and weaknesses of constitutional government. On the foreign policy side such understanding will be needed for winning and maintaining the support of allies and for knowing where we stand when dealing with antagonists. On the domestic side it will be needed to help judge what can be accomplished through government so that our energies can be allocated among economic, political, and social goals with minimum waste.
Critical Issues & Decisions
WILLIAM H. BRANSON
Professor of Economics and International Affairs, Princeton University. Dr. Branson is also Director of Research in Interna¬ tional Economics and Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. He has editorial positions in several economics publications and serves as a consultant for many national and in¬ ternational economics-related institutions.
From left to right: Dr. J. B. Hilmon, Associate Deputy Chief, USDA/Forest Service; James E. Haskell, Director, Cooperation Marketing, USDA/ACS; Donald Lemmon, Director, Management Policy and Systems, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management, U.S. Department of Labor; Neill Schaller, Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs, USDA/Office of the Secretary; and Gene Mandrell, Assistant for Supply Policy (Logistics Management Special¬ ist) U.S. Air Force.
Critical issues & Decisions
THE U.S. IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: COMPETITIVE AGAIN
William H. Branson