BOOK I CH. xt § 30. 117

the Ist (ms) sentence and the variety of positive assertions as to the Deity in the 8rd (Ms) sentence, is much more glaring than the opposition between the Ist sentence and the one negative assertion of the 2nd sentence. Besides the idea of inconsistency runs through the 38rd sen- tence, whereas it is entirely absent in the 2nd. I think also that the repetition of et is intended to point the contrast, ‘after having spoken as he did in the Timaeus and Laws, we find him in both asserting not only that we can name God, but that there are any number of substances which we may call by that name’. Taking it then as certain that the opposition lies between the 1st and the 3rd sentences, I have little doubt that the 2nd and 8rd have got misplaced. Compare the transposition in § 5 of the sentences beginning gua quidem and multum autem, that in § 88 and § 97, and many similar instances in Munro's Lucretius, see his Intro- duction p. 20 foll. ed. 1, also Miiller in V. Jahrb. for 1864, p. 144. In the present case and also in § 5 the transposition may be explained by sup- posing the misplaced clauses (Sunt vero and Qua quidem) to have been added on revision by C. himself, but wrongly inserted by the scribe. See below on idem in Timaeo.
longum est: see § 19 n.
inconstantia: Grote (Plato 11 161) applies this censure more generally. The discrepancy between different dialogues is partly to be accounted for by the change in Plato’s own sentiments during the course of a long life, partly by the different aim and style of the particular dialogues, scientific, popular, allegorical.
in Timaeo: p. 28 C. rov peév ody mointny Kal marépa rovdSe Tov mavrés evpeiv Te Epyov Kat edpdvta eis mavtas advvatov déyew, translated by C. Tim. 2 atque illum quidem quasi parentem hujus universitatis invenire difficile, et cum inveneris indicare in vulgus nefas. The passage was much quoted by the early Christian writers, e.g. Minucius c. 19 Platoni deus est mundi parens, artifexr animae, caelestium terrenorumque fabricator, quem et invenire difficile prae nimia et incredibili potestate, et cum inveneris in publicum dicere impossibile praefatur. Eadem fere et ista quae nostra sunt. On the other hand Celsus made use of it against the Christian preaching of the Gospel to the poor, to which Origen (vir 42) replies that the Christians not only affirmed with Plato that it was difficult to discover the Creator, but that it was even impossible for man to do this, except for those to whom the Son revealed Him. Clement of Alexandria, commenting on the words of Plato, says that, in using of the Ineffable such names as ty 4} tdayaOdv 7 voov 7} avTo TO by f Tarépa 7} Gedy 7 Snutovpyov 7 Kiptov, we do not profess to name Him truly, but employ various terms as a help to the feebleness of our own understanding, Strom. v 12 83.
in legum—censeat. As we have had occasion to suspect misrepresenta- tion in cases where it was difficult to arrive at complete certainty in regard to the doctrines referred to, it is a satisfaction to be able here to con- front the accused with the accuser, and prove the groundlessness of the
118 BOOK I CH. XII § 30.
charge. The passage alluded to is vit 821, where 6 A@nvaios, speaking the author’s sentiments, says ‘there is something very surprising in our notions about astronomy, tov peyerrov Bedov Kai odXov Tov Koopov hapev ovTE Cnrew Seiv ovre woAuTpaypovety Tas aitias €pevvavtTas’ ov yap ovd dovov etva, but true piety requires just the opposite. We ought to carry our inquiry into the nature of the celestial deities (the Sun, Moon, &c.), at least so far as to enable us to avoid such blasphemy as men are guilty of, when they call them wandering stars, and confound the rates of their movements’. It is plain that the word dapev introduces, not a sentiment of Plato’s, but that of the Athenian public, who had banished Anaxagoras and put Socrates to death on a similar charge. Plato’s own view comes out still more clearly in bk x11 966, where he argues that astronomy rightly studied is the foun- dation of true piety.
non censeat: negative used as in ov dni, cf. Of. 1 39 Regulus captivos reddendos non censuit.
idem et in Timaeo. Assuming that guod vero—comprehendinus has been misplaced in the Mss, we may suppose that the present clause was originally connected with the preceding, (janv de Platonis—censeat) either by a cum Which has dropped out between gui and iz Tim. so as to make zdem dicat the apodosis, or simply by the continuance of the Subj. constr. in dicat. The former would be after the pattern of § 121 cum enim optimam naturam dicat esse, negat idem ce. the latter of Of. 1 84 tnventi multi sunt qui non modo pecuniam sed vitam etiam profundere pro patria parati essent, idem (‘but yet’) gloriae jacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent. After the dislocation had taken place, the sentences would naturally be altered so far as to enable them to stand alone.
et mundum—accepimus: see § 18 n. These are all subordinate divinities owing their existence to the good pleasure of the one Father and Creator. So we read (7%. 34) of the plan pursued by the everliving God in forming the God who was to be (i.e. the world), and in p. 92 this created God is called the visible image of the invisible God. The name ovpavs is sometimes used of the xoopos, at other times confined to the starry heavens as opposed to the earth. Beside the passages already quoted, showing the divinity of the stars, see Zim. 40, where the Demiurgus is said to have made the earth, our nurse, the guardian of day and night, the first and oldest of the gods dcot évrés otvpavod yeyovact. In the same passage Plato affirms his belief in the deities of the traditional religion (eos guos majorum institutis accepimus) the children of Heaven and Earth, and tells us that they, like the celestial deities, acted as subordinate agents in the creation of man and the other animals, receiving from the Demiurgus a separate divine particle to be the nucleus of each human soul (41 c. foll.) But when C. says that Plato deified animos, he probably alludes to Leg. x. 892 foll. where it is proved that soul, as the self-moving substance, must be prior to body, and then (899 B) the conclusion is drawn that, since soul or souls haye been shown to be the cause of all movement, and since they are